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Introduction générale
Le problème posé dans cette étude
La présente étude explore la manière dont se développent les applications Web, en soulevant
la question de la nature de leur développement, son modus operandi, ainsi que la question
de la façon dont les entreprises peuvent l’exploiter.
L’importance du Web en général a été explorée par des études dans plusieurs disciplines
scientiﬁques. La Gestion, comme les Sciences Sociales, ont étudié l’usage des services Web
ainsi que les implications de cet usage, dans une pléthore de contextes (dans les entreprises et
les organisations, mais aussi comme dispositifs marchants et dispositifs de communication).
Cependant, il n’y a pas d’étude dans ces disciplines fournissant un cadre d’analyse et de
déploiement des biens de ce type, au-delà de la discussion des aspects technique dans le
domaine de l’ingénierie.
Les questions mentionnées ci-dessus seront étudiées en utilisant une stratégie de « phe-
nomenon - based research » (von Krogh et al., 2012), qui vise à la distinction et l’exploration
de la nature d’un phénomène, avant la proposition d’un « research design», une conception
de recherche particulière, susceptible de donner la possibilité au chercheur de mieux creuser
les spéciﬁcités du phénomène en question. Ce travail se déroulera dans trois parties, en dé-
composant les questions de recherche et en menant une enquête de leurs diﬀérents aspects.
La nature du modus operandi du développement des applications Web sera alors recher-
chée dans une perspective managériale, en explorant les questions de « qui » le fait,
« comment » cela se fait et « pourquoi » cela se fait, par analogie avec la distinction
introduite par Raasch et von Hippel (2012) entre les approches d’innovation d’usager et
d’industriel. L’exploration en parallèle des questions qui, comment et pourquoi n’est pas
nouvelle pour autant dans la gestion. Comme Hatchuel et Weil (1992) l’ont montré, les
entreprises elles-mêmes, lorsqu’elles font face à une épreuve de rationalisation, sont appelées
à concevoir et à mettre en place un nouveau schéma organisationnel, une philosophie man-
agériale et un substrat technique. L’ensemble de ces réponses constitue alors une nouvelle
rationalisation. Néanmoins, en ce qui concerne notre propre recherche, nous ne nous at-
tendons pas à identiﬁer un terrain rationalisé. Cependant, cette recherche identiﬁera les
acteurs, les raisons et les moyens spéciﬁques du développement des applications Web, tels
qu’ils se dessinent en lien avec les modèles d’innovation usager et industriel (von Hippel et
von Krogh, 2003; 2006, Raasch et von Hippel 2012). Par conséquent, la première partie de
la présente étude exposera les grandes lignes du modus operandi rencontré sur le terrain,
apparaissant comme original.
Une fois le problème de « qu’est le développement d’applications Web » exploré, en
conduisant à une proposition d’un modus operandi spéciﬁque, composé par des acteurs
surprenants, ainsi que des raisons et moyens d’action, l’enjeu de l’étape suivante de cette
recherche sera l’identiﬁcation des conditions d’apparition d’un tel phénomène. À ce propos,
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nous utiliserons les leçons de la première partie comme une règle de lecture de l’histoire du
développement d’autres conﬁgurations industrielles, dans la seconde partie. Les industries
que nous étudierons ainsi seront celles de l’ordinateur entreprise, de l’ordinateur personnel
et de la radio, aﬁn de répondre à la question de savoir si le modus operandi initialement
identiﬁé est, quant à lui, une spéciﬁcité du Web ou, en revanche, s’il est rencontré également
dans des secteurs industriels proches.
Enﬁn, la troisième partie reviendra dans le champ du développement des applications
Web aﬁn d’explorer les conditions d’exploitation du modus identiﬁé précédemment. À ce
propos, nous discuterons la littérature sur la gestion des dispositifs relationnels informels,
les communautés ou les réseaux, qui ont un rôle important dans l’innovation ouverte et
l’innovation par les usagers (von Krogh et al., 2003; Simard et West, 2006; von Hippel, 2007;
West et Lakhani, 2008; Benkeltoum, 2009). Malgré des recherches riches en ce domaine tout
au long de cette dernière décennie, la question de l’exploitation de ce genre de dispositifs par
les entreprise reste encore ouverte. Cependant, notre exploration se déploiera sur la base de
trois aspects de la question, en rapport avec les acteurs du développement des applications
Web. Le premier aspect exploré, portera sur les conditions de possibilité d’émergence de
tels dispositifs, en premier lieu. Puis, le deuxième aspect portera sur l’exploitation de tels
dispositifs par une entreprise à des ﬁns d’exploration du potentiel de son service. Enﬁn, le
troisième aspect abordera la question de l’exploitation de tels dispositifs par une entreprise
à des ﬁns d’exploitation du potentiel de son service. Ces enquêtes seront soutenues par un
cadre d’analyse qui situera les notions de conversation et d’action collective parmi celles
d’une communauté et d’un réseau.
Méthodologie
L’étude actuelle fera usage d’une stratégie de « phenomenon-based research » (von Krogh
et al., 2012) aﬁn d’explorer le développement des applications Web. Von Krogh et al., en
exposant les grandes lignes de cette approche selon les diﬀérents objectifs de recherche,
décrivent les étapes suivantes :
1. Étape de distinction, durant laquelle la recherche vise à décrire les spéciﬁcités sous-
jacentes du phénomène en référence à un corpus des savoirs existant, à décrire le
contexte en termes généraux et culturels, et à identiﬁer des concepts pertinents pour
une étude plus approfondie du phénomène. À ce propos, les auteurs suggèrent l’usage
des méthodes ethnographiques ou des narrations.
2. Étape d’exploration, durant laquelle la recherche vise à intensiﬁer la collecte des don-
nées, à la fois en utilisant les concepts de référence et en allant au-delà de ces concepts,
générant des concepts plus robustes pouvant servir de ﬁltre pour une collecte de don-
nées encore plus approfondie. À ce propos, les auteurs suggèrent l’usage des méthodes
statistiques, l’étude d’archives ou les sondages.
3. Étape de conception, durant laquelle la recherche vise à essayer des designs de recherche
alternatifs. À ce propos, l’utilisation des concepts de recherche opportunistes est sug-
gérée, aﬁn d’approfondir ou mettre en question les concepts initiaux, aﬁn de permettre
la prise en compte de la dynamique du phénomène.
De plus, les chercheurs continuent leur exposition par la proposition des étapes suivantes,
celles de la théorisation et de la synthèse, correspondant à la génération inductive d’une
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nouvelle théorie dans le premier cas, et l’établissement d’une vue d’ensemble du phénomène
dans le deuxième. Au cours de notre étude, nous n’utiliserons que les trois premières étapes
de la stratégie de recherche mentionnées ci-dessus. La méthodologie utilisée sera conforme
à des exigences et des contraintes des questions de recherche posées, à la fois en ce qui
concerne les dispositifs particuliers étudiés et la méthode d’exploration utilisée à chaque fois.
La Partie I fera usage d’une variété de méthodes permettant l’accès et l’étude des ter-
rains diﬀérents, ayant comme objectif la distinction et l’exploration des acteurs, des raisons
et des moyens d’action du développement d’applications Web. Tout d’abord, par le bi-
ais d’entretiens d’experts d’entreprises du secteur, nous allons procéder à une restitution
du discours des fournisseurs de services, ce qui conduira à des premières indications sur
l’existence d’un modus operandi au delà de celui de l’entreprise, ce dernier déﬁnissant le
champ d’expertise des personnes interviewées. Par la suite, et en suivant ces indications,
nous utiliserons une méthode de « participation observante » aﬁn de rejoindre et observer
l’action de ceux qui semblent être des nouveaux acteurs, même si leur identité reste encore
mal déﬁnie. Notre but sera d’enquêter sur la raison et les moyens d’action de ces acteurs.
Ensuite, nous examinerons des « cookbooks », les « livres de cuisine » que ces acteurs étu-
dient aﬁn d’être en position d’utiliser les moyens en question pour développeur leurs propres
applications. Ici, notre objectif sera d’identiﬁer et d’explorer la nature de ces acteurs, par
le biais de leurs raisons d’action liées aux hypothèses (implicites ou explicites) que font les
auteurs de ces livres pour leur public. Enﬁn, nous utiliserons l’histoire d’une application,
dont la raison de développement est connue, aﬁn de mener une exploration plus approfondie
du modus operandi dans son ensemble. Cette méthodologie sera analysée de manière plus
approfondie dans la Section 2.2.
La Partie II comparera les résultats de l’exploration de la première partie à d’autres cadres
industriels, aﬁn d’explorer si les spéciﬁcités identiﬁées en comparaison avec la distinction des
modèles d’innovation par l’usager et par le fabriquant, sont propres au développement des
applications Web ou pas. Sur la base des spéciﬁcations de notre problème de recherche, nous
étudierons l’histoire de l’ordinateur entreprise, celle de l’ordinateur personnel et celle de la
radio. À ce propos, nous utiliserons les travaux d’historiens dans ces secteurs, et nous allons
nous permettre de consulter d’autres sources originales dans des cas où certains aspects sont
peu explorés par ces auteurs. Cette méthodologie sera discutée de manière plus approfondie
dans la Section 9.3.
Enﬁn, la Partie III utilisera des méthodes d’accès au terrain propres à des dispositifs
informels et éphémères. Tout d’abord, nous utiliserons la méthode de « participation obser-
vante » aﬁn de rejoindre les « Barcamps », des dispositifs conversationnels, ainsi qu’une
« analyse de monuments d’interaction », faisant usage de traces d’interaction liée aux dis-
positifs et qui sont disponibles en ligne, aﬁn de compléter notre observation. Cette observa-
tion portera sur 16 Barcamps qui ont pris lieu à Paris lors d’une période de trois ans. Ensuite,
nous utiliserons les mêmes méthodes pour étudier le « Hackathon », un dispositif d’action
éphémère et exploratoire, en étudiant le cas de celui qui a pris lieu aux locaux de Google, en
Californie. Le dernier dispositif étudié sera celui des forums de soutien des développeurs, que
nous étudierons en utilisant une analyse de monuments d’interaction, ayant comme objectif
d’explorer la manière dont les fournisseurs de service soutiennent l’exploitation du potentiel
de leur service par ces acteurs. Cette méthodologie sera plus approfondie dans la Section
14.3.
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Contribution
Cette étude aboutit à la conclusion d’une conﬁguration d’un modus operandi spéciﬁque et
distinct à la fois des modèles d’innovation usager et industriel (von Hippel et von Krogh,
2003; 2006, Raasch et von Hippel 2012), qui sera identiﬁé et exploré dans la première
partie. Curieusement, comme il sera discuté dans la seconde partie, ce modus operandi
étrange n’est pas propre au développement d’applications Web : des acteurs similaires,
ainsi que des moyens et des raisons d’action similaires, sont historiquement apparus dans
chacun des les trois cas industriels étudiés, même si l’utilité de ce modus est liée à des
phases assez spéciﬁques du développement industriel. Enﬁn, trois dispositifs d’interaction
informelle seront identiﬁés, pouvant être utiles à des entreprises exploitant l’action des tiers
développeurs.
Partie I : Un modus operandi étrange
La première partie identiﬁe un étrange modus operandi, qui se positionne entre le modèle
d’innovation par l’usager et celui par l’industriel Raasch and von Hippel (2012), à la fois en
ce qui regarde ses acteurs et ses moyens et raisons d’action. Plus précisément, trois ﬁgures
d’acteur seront identiﬁées, selon leur raisons d’action :
1. L’Usager-Développeur (UD), utilisant ses compétences de développement aﬁn d’innover
pour son propre usage, est semblable à un « lead user » ; ce dernier est décrit dans la
littérature sur l’innovation des usagers (von Hippel et Katz, 2002; von Hippel, 2005;
Franke et al., 2006), sauf qu’il dispose à la fois de la « sticky information » relative
au contexte d’usage, attribuée par von Hippel (1990) à des usagers, et de la « sticky
information » relative aux technologies, attribuée par von Hippel à des industriels.
2. L’ Usager-Développeur-Entrepreneur (UDE), qui, bien qu’il soit caractérisé par une
démarche d’innovation similaire à celle de l’UD, ne révèle pas de façon libre sa création,
comme le modèle « privé-collective » (von Hippel et von Krogh, 2003; 2006) le
suggérait, mais décide de poursuivre sa commercialisation.
3. Le Développeur-Entrepreneur (DE), qui, contrairement aux deux ﬁgures précédentes,
n’innove pas pour son propre usage, mais le fait pour les autres, tant en intégrant une
démarche commerciale dès le départ de son processus de conception.
Toutes les trois ﬁgures utilisent pour autant les mêmes moyens, qui pourraient être décrits
comme une « palette à innover », et qui proviennent à la fois du modèle d’innovation de
l’usager et de celui de l’industriel. D’un côté, ils utilisent un logiciel libre, qui fut l’objet
de nombreuses recherches en Gestion durant la dernière décennie. De l’autre, ils utilisent
des « Interfaces de Programmation d’Applications » (Application Programming Interfaces,
APIs), qui sont des dispositifs fournis par les entreprises aﬁn que les développeurs puissent
créer des application en utilisant leur technologie.
Partie II : les conditions d’apparition du modus operandi et ses
effets sur le développement industriel
Dans la deuxième partie, en étudiant l’originalité du modus operandi identiﬁé dans le cas
du développement des applications Web et en se posant la question de son apparition dans
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d’autres cadres industriels, nous sommes conduits à une exploration plus approfondie de ce
modus dans son ensemble, en rapport avec les diﬀérentes phases industrielles.
Le modèle résultant de l’identiﬁcation de ces phases industriels, où les UDEs jouent un
rôle important, est comparé a posteriori aux modèles connus de développement industriel les
plus proches. Le résultat de cette comparaison suggère que la transition des premières « lead
user innovations » (von Hippel, 1978b) à leur production et diﬀusion industrielles par des
entreprises n’est pas linéaire : il y a une transformation progressive à la fois des acteurs, des
raisons et des moyens d’action lors de l’exploration du potentiel sous-jacent d’un nouvel objet.
De même, la perturbation d’une industrie par une innovation (« disruption ») décrite par
Christensen (1997), durant laquelle les agents d’une nouvelle technologie arrivent à identiﬁer
un marché correspondant, n’est pas la seule manière dont un nouveau potentiel est déployé :
il peut y avoir également des situations où à la fois un potentiel commercial et un potentiel
technologique sont « visibles » aux acteurs, alors même qu’une exploration plus approfondie
est exigée, engendrant souvent des risques considérables et nécessitant des révisions majeures
des conceptions précédentes.
Les rôles des ﬁgures d’acteur, déjà conﬁgurées dans la première partie de notre étude,
sont les suivants, selon les diﬀérentes phases du développement industriel identiﬁées :
• Matérialisation Précoce. Des usagers-développeurs (UDs), souvent ayant des rap-
ports intimes avec des Universités, utilisent une nouvelle théorie aﬁn de créer les pre-
miers objets illustrant le potentiel d’usage de la théorie. Ces matérialisations peuvent
être soit des « meilleures solutions » à des anciens concepts, servant des besoins
connus, soit des « nouveaux rêves », c’est-à-dire des matérialisations illustrant la
possibilité d’existence d’autres sortes d’objets, des objets inédits. Au sein de ces cer-
cles initiaux de UDs, quelques uns vont poursuivre leurs eﬀorts dans des tentatives de
commercialisation des objets en questions, et devenir alors des usagers-développeurs-
entrepreneurs (UDEs), tandis que d’autres deviendront des « adopteurs précoces »
(« early adopters » selon Rogers (1962)), une première clientèle.
• Émergence du Marché. Les UDEs arrivent à trouver leurs premiers clients parmi les
cercles des premiers UDs et développeurs des premiers produits. Souvent, ce fait peut
déclencher l’intérêt des entreprises actives dans des secteurs industriels proches, qui
rejoindront l’épreuve. Cependant, à cette aube d’une nouvelle industrie, le nouveau
potentiel est largement inconnu dans son ensemble de tous les acteurs impliqués. La
compétition alors démarre, et les UDEs doivent inclure des préoccupations marchan-
des dans leur raisonnement de développement, au delà de leurs propres préférences
personnelles, aﬁn d’avoir une chance de survie.
• Compétition dans le Brouillard. Les développeurs-entrepreneurs (DEs), souvent
originaires des premiers cercles d’UDs, continuent l’exploration à la fois du potentiel
de marché et du potentiel technologique du nouvel objet, en compétition avec les en-
treprises qui sont entrées dans l’exploration. Une pléthore d’objets devient disponible à
des adopteurs précoces, même si le savoir disponible, provenant des phases précédentes
ainsi que des rationalisations dans des secteurs industriels proches, s’avère insuﬃsant
pour que les UDs puissent proposer des règles de conception (« design rules », Baldwin
et Clark, 2000) englobantes, pouvant conduire à une segmentation de marché.
• Rationalisation Industrielle. La phase précédente prend ﬁn, lorsqu’une entreprise,
utilisant le savoir produit jusqu’ici par les acteurs qui ont émergé, aussi bien que son
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propre savoir, crée une synthèse, en rationalisant la conception, la production et la
commercialisation d’une ligne de produits uniﬁée. Dans cette phase, les DEs ne sont
pas en mesure de tenir la compétition avec les entreprises, à moins qu’ils déclenchent
un nouveau cercle, en se retournant vers les UDs et en ouvrant une nouvelle trajectoire,
sur la base d’un concept qui n’est pas inclut dans la rationalisation en question.
Partie III : méthodes pour l’émergence et l’usage par les entreprises
des dispositifs UDE
La dernière partie de notre étude contribue à l’exploration plus approfondie du modus
operandi identiﬁé par l’analyse de trois dispositifs diﬀérents. À l’aide d’un cadre d’analyse
incluant l’action collective (Hatchuel, 2005a) et la conversation parmi les réseaux sociaux
et les communautés, cette étude suggère des méthodes d’encadrement et d’exploitation de
l’activité des UDEs.
Les Barcamps constituent un cas exemplaire des dispositifs éphémères de conversation,
utilisés pour l’exploration de la possibilité d’émergence des nouvelles communautés et de
réseaux UDEs. Leur conception permet la mise en réseau ainsi que l’exploration des tech-
nologies, des marchés et des usages émergeant, notamment par la conversation. Distincts
des « anciens membres » des communautés et du « noyau » des réseaux, les « réguliers
» de ses dispositifs conversationnels, même s’ils ne partagent pas nécessairement un terrain
commun et ne sont pas connectés a priori, sont néanmoins en mesure de bénéﬁcier de ces
dispositifs dans leur ensemble, en prenant en compte ces conversations dans leur propre
action et en se rapprochant des réseaux et des communautés émergeant.
Le dispositif de Hackathon permet une exploration ciblée du potentiel d’un service ou une
technologie spéciﬁque, par le biais de la constitution de groupes éphémères qui parcourent
tous les niveaux de qualité du savoir tacite (Erden et al., 2008) en trois jours, en développant
des applications ou des prototypes explorant le potentiel ciblé. Bien que la conception d’un
Hackathon ait des attributs en commun avec celui d’un Barcamp, les apports du cas étudié
suggèrent une dimension « personnelle » en ce qui regarde à la fois le processus d’innovation
et son résultat, dans ce genre de dispositif.
Enﬁn, les forums de support de développeurs, malgré leur ressemblance avec des disposi-
tifs de résolution des problèmes, servent à des fonctions au plus avancés que la résolution
des problèmes en tant que telle. En faisant usage d’un cadre d’analyse des experts et des
systèmes (Hatchuel et Weil, 1992), nous sommes conduits à la proposition d’un autre type
d’expert entreprise, actif dans ce terrain. Le « curateur » n’a pas nécessairement besoin
de disposer d’un « savoir faire », d’un « savoir comprendre » ou d’un « savoir planiﬁer »
(Hatchuel et Weil, 1992). En revanche, ses actions visent à « prendre soin » des UDEs, une
activité qui exige des compétences telles que savoir identiﬁer une nouveauté, structurer une
conversation et développer une sorte d’intimité avec les interlocuteurs. La notion d’« em-
pathie entre entreprise et UDEs » pourrait s’avérer utile à une exploration plus approfondie
de cette fonction, au delà de la résolution des problèmes.
Synopsis de la thèse
Le Tableau 1.1 (page 17) résume la structure de la présente étude. La Partie I aborde le
problème du modus operandi du développement des applications Web, en explorant la perti-
nence de la distinction entre les modèles d’innovation par l’usager et par fabriquant (Raasch
et von Hippel, 2012) pour cette conﬁguration. Nous étudierons ce problème à l’usage d’une
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stratégie de recherche de phénomène, visant à distinguer ce modus, en répondant aux ques-
tions de qui développe, comment développer et pourquoi développer ce type d’applications.
Cette exploration nous conduira à la conﬁguration de trois ﬁgures d’acteur, les UDs, les
UDEs et les DEs. Leur action est entreprise à l’aide des dispositifs à la fois de logiciel libre
et des APIs, du fait qu’ils exploitent leurs produits issus des communautés aussi bien que des
entreprises, ces derniers prescrivant un usage spéciﬁque, en laissant la possibilité en parallèle
de leur exploitation comme moyens de conception (ce sont alors des « produits ouverts »
(Chrysos et al., 2010)).
Vu que ni le modèle « d’investissement privé » ni le « collectif-privatif » (von Hippel
et von Krogh, 2003; 2006) ne suﬃsent pas à décrire le modus operandi identiﬁé dans son
ensemble, la question qui se pose est de savoir si ce modus constitue une particularité du
terrain du Web ou non. Nous abordons ce problème en étudiant trois cadres industriels
proches mais diﬀérents, en particulier ceux des industries de l’ordinateur d’entreprise, de
l’ordinateur personnel et de la radio. En identiﬁant des ressemblances, nous poursuivons
notre exploration en nous intéressant aux conditions de possibilité de ce mode d’action, ainsi
qu’à ses eﬀets sur le monde des aﬀaires. Nous concluons en proposant que les acteurs
identiﬁés précédemment contribuent à l’exploration d’une multitude de nouveaux concepts
durant leur diﬀusion à des adopteurs précoces, durant les phases de développement qui
précèdent une rationalisation industrielle.
Enﬁn, la Partie III revient sur le terrain du Web et, en s’intéressant davantage aux
acteurs, aborde le problème de savoir comment les entreprises peuvent exploiter l’activité
des UDEs. Aﬁn d’étudier cette question, nous explorons trois dispositifs diﬀérents. En
posant les questions des conditions de possibilité d’émergence social des UDEs, ainsi que
celles de l’exploitation de leur activité par les entreprises à des ﬁns liées à l’exploration
et l’exploitation du potentiel des services de ces dernières, nous proposons trois méthodes
diﬀérentes (Barcamps, Hackathons, et Forum de Support de Développeurs), qui rendent ces
démarches possibles.
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1.1 The problem addressed in this study
The current study explores the way in which Web-based applications are developed, posing
the question of “what is a Web-based application development and how can enterprises
harness its benefits?”.
The importance of the Web in general has been explored by many diﬀerent disciplines.
Management Science, as well as the Social Sciences, have investigated the use of Web
services and their implications on a plethora of use contexts (in enterprises and organisations,
as a market setting, as a communication means). However, no study is available that provides
a framework of analysis and deployment of such goods, beyond the technical discussions
within the engineering community.
The above mentioned questions will be studied using a phenomenon-based strategy (von
Krogh et al., 2012), aiming at distinguishing and exploring the nature of phenomenon, before
providing a research design for both its harnessing and its further study. This work will be
undertaken in three parts, breaking down the questions and investigating their diﬀerent
aspects in parallel.
The nature of Web-based application development will thus be investigated from a man-
agerial perspective, by initially exploring the questions of “who” does it, “how” is it done
and “why” it is done, as compared to the synthetic distinction of Raasch and von Hippel
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(2012) between user and manufacturer innovation paradigms. The parallel exploration of
who, why and how questions is not new to management. In fact, as Hatchuel and Weil
(1992, 1995) have shown, enterprises themselves, when facing a rationalisation challenge,
are led to the design and the implementation of a new organisational schema, a managerial
philosophy and a technical substrate. These responses as a whole constitute thus a new
rationalisation. Still, I do not expect to identify a rationalised ﬁeld, since - as it will become
clear in the chapters to follow - my research started when third party applications were still
new to the ﬁeld and ends before an industrial rationalisation has been proposed. However,
my research will identify the speciﬁc actors, reasons and means of Web-based application
development, as distinguished from the user and the manufacturer models (von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, 2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012). Thence, the ﬁrst part of the current
study will make an outline of a modus operandi met in the ﬁeld that appears to be original.
Once the problem of “what is Web-based application development” is explored and brings
us to the proposal of a speciﬁc modus operandi composed by peculiar actors, reasons and
means, the next phase of my research will be to identify the conditions of appearance of
such a modus. For this, I will use this problem in Part II as a reading rule of the history
of other industrial settings, namely the enterprise computer, the personal computer and the
radio industries, to answer the question of whether or not this modus operandi is speciﬁc to
Web development or, in the contrary, is common to other, close industries.
Finally, Part III will return to the ﬁeld of Web-based application development to explore
the conditions that are in place to allow for the harnessing of the modus previously explored.
For that, I will discuss the literature on informal settings, communities or networks, which
have been claimed to be important for Open and User innovation (von Krogh et al., 2003a;
Simard and West, 2006; von Hippel, 2007; West and O’Mahony, 2008). Despite intensive
research on these approaches during the last decade, the question of how enterprises can
harness such settings for open and user innovation still remains open. Thus, my exploration
will be based on three diﬀerent aspects of the question, in relation to the actors of Web-
based applications development. The ﬁrst aspect regards the conditions of possibility for the
emergence of such settings in the ﬁrst place. The second aspect regards the harnessing of
such settings for enterprise service potential exploration. Finally, the third aspect regards their
harnessing for enterprise service potential exploitation. This investigation will be supported
by an analytical framework that places the concepts of conversation and collective action
in-between the communities and networks settings.
1.2 Methodology
This research will use a phenomenon-based strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012) to explore
Web-based application development. Von Krogh et al. outline the following steps, according
to their research goals:
1. Distinction, during which research goals include encountering bracket peculiarities
against an existing body of knowledge, the description of the context in broad cul-
tural terms and the identiﬁcation of relevant concepts for study, through the use of
ethnography or narratives.
2. Exploration, during which research goals include the intensiﬁcation of data gathering
inside and outside the focal concepts, the generation of more solid concepts that can
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serve as ﬁlter for further data gathering, through the use of statistics, archival data or
surveys.
3. Design, during which research goals include experimentation with alternative research
designs and the employment of opportunistic research designs that expand or collapse
concepts to take into account the dynamics of the phenomenon (von Krogh et al.,
2012, p. 290).
Furthermore, von Krogh et al. (2012) outline the steps of theorising and synthesising, for
the inductive generation of a new theory and the establishment of a phenomenon overview,
respectively. During my study I will use the three ﬁrst steps of this strategy. The methodology
that will be used will comply with the requirements of the research questions, both in what
regards the speciﬁc setting of the ﬁeld that will be explored and the exploration method.
Part I will use a variety of methods to access and study diﬀerent ﬁelds aiming at the
distinction and the exploration of the actors and the means of and reasons for of Web-based
application development. Initially, through interviews with service provider managers I will
reproduce the discourse of service providers leading to some early indications on the existence
of another modus operandi, beyond the enterprise one, in which my interlocutors are experts.
Then, following those indications, I will use an “observant participation” method to join and
observe the action of those appearing to be new actors, though still remaining poorly deﬁned.
My goal will be to investigate the reason for and the means of this actor’s activity. Afterwards,
I will examine the available “cookbooks” (books on Web-based application development) to
identify and explore the actors using them and the corresponding reasons for their action, as
assumed by the books’ authors. Finally, I will use the story of an application of which the
development reason is known to further explore the identiﬁed modus operandi as a whole.
This methodology will be further analysed in Section 2.2.
Part II will compare the outcomes of Part I with other industrial settings, to explore
whether or not the peculiarities identiﬁed are particular to Web-based application develop-
ment or not. On the basis of the requirements of my problem, I will study the history of
the enterprise computer, the personal computer and the radio industry. For this, I will use
the works of historians in the corresponding ﬁelds, in the few cases where a topic in poorly
explored by those authors, I will also use primary ﬁeld texts. This methodology will be further
analysed in Section 9.3.
Finally, Part III will use methods to access the ﬁeld that are proper to informal and
ephemeral settings. Firstly, I will use the method of ‘“objervant participation” to join Bar-
camps’ conversational setting, and a “interaction monument analysis” method, using traces
of interaction relating to the setting which are available on the Web to complete my obser-
vation. 16 Barcamps that took place in Paris over a period of three years will be studied and
analysed. Subsequently, I will use the same methods to study the Hackathon exploratory
setting, which took place in August 2010 in the headquarters of Google, California. Finally,
I will use “interaction monument analysis” to explore the ways in which service providers
support developers who use their technologies to innovate. This methodology will be further
analysed in Section 14.3.
1.3 Contribution
The outcome of this study is the conﬁguration of a speciﬁc modus operandi, distinct from
the user and the manufacturer innovation paradigms (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003,
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2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), which will be identiﬁed and explored in the ﬁrst part.
Surprisingly, as studied in the second part, this peculiar modus operandi is not proper to
Web-based application development: similar actors, motives and means have appeared in
all three industries studied, contributing to industrial development during special phases.
Finally, three settings of informal interaction are identiﬁed that can be useful to enterprises
harnessing the action of third party developers.
1.3.1 Part I: A peculiar modus operandi
More speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst part, I identify a peculiar modus operandi, which is placed in-
between the user and the manufacturer paradigms (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), in what
regards its actors, reasons and means of action.
More speciﬁcally, three actor ﬁgures will be identiﬁed, according to their motives for
action:
1. The User - Developer (UD), who uses his development skills to innovate for own use,
much like an “lead user” as described in user innovation literature (von Hippel and
Katz, 2002; von Hippel, 2005; Franke et al., 2006), though utilising both “use-related
sticky information”, attributed by von Hippel (1990) to users, and “technological sticky
information”, attributed to manufacturers.
2. The User - Developer - Entrepreneur (UDE), who, while having a similar starting point
to the UD, does not “freely reveal” his creation, as the “private-collective” model
suggests (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006), but decides to go on, and try to
commercialise it.
3. The Developer - Entrepreneur (DE), who, unlike the previous two ﬁgures, does not
innovate for his own use, but does so for others, having a commercial goal at the
outset of the design process.
Still, all three ﬁgures use the same means, which could be described as an “innovation
palette”, originating both from the user and the manufacturer paradigm. On the one hand,
they use free and open source software (FOSS), which has been the object of extensive
management research during the last decade, on the other hand they use Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs), which have been given less attention by management scholars.
Those APIs are settings provided by enterprises in order for developers to create applications
using their technology.
1.3.2 Part II: the conditions of appearance of this modus operandi
and its effects on industrial development
In the second part, while studying the question on whether or not the modus operandi met
in the Web-based application development ﬁeld is encountered in other industrial settings, I
am led to further exploring it as a whole, in relation to the diﬀerent industrial phases.
Retrospectively related to some of the most relevant models for industrial development,
the outcome of my study will suggest that a transition from early “lead user innovation” (von
Hippel, 1978b) to an industrial production is not linear: there is a progressive transformation
of the actors, the means and the reasons of action during the exploration of the potential of
a new object. In parallel, disruption (Christensen, 1997), during which a novel technology
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manages to identify a corresponding market, is not the only way in which a new potential
is deployed: there can be situations where both a commercial and a technological potential
are “visible” to the actors, though more exploration, often risky and implying revisions of
previous concepts, is required for its to become true.
The roles of the actor ﬁgures identiﬁed in the ﬁrst part according to the phases of
industrial development will be the following:
• Early Materialisation. User-Developers, often having intimate ties with universities,
use a new theory to create the ﬁrst objects to illustrate the use potential of the the-
ory. These materialisations can either be “better solutions” for old concepts, or “new
dreams”, materialisations that illustrate that other kinds of objects are possible. From
these early UD circles, some will go on and attempt to commercialise this materialisa-
tion, thus becoming User-Developer-Entrepreneurs (UDEs), while others will become
their early adopters.
• Market Emergence. UDEs manage to ﬁnd some early clients and produce an early
product. Usually, this fact can trigger the interest of neighbouring business sectors
actors, joining the challenge. Still, at this early level, the full potential of the new
object remains largely unknown for all actors implied. Competition begins and UDEs
have to reason commercially, beyond their own preferences, to have a chance to survive.
• Foggy Competition. Developers-Entrepreneurs (DEs), often originating from early
UD circles, further explore the marketing and technological potential, in parallel with
the enterprises that have joined. A plethora of objects becomes available to early
adopters, though the knowledge available, both from earlier phases and from other in-
dustrial rationalisations, is not suﬃcient to propose encompassing design rules (Baldwin
and Clark, 2000) being able to lead in a market segmentation.
• Industrial Rationalisation. The previous phase ends, when an enterprise, using
the knowledge produced so far as well as its own, creates a synthesis rationalising
design, production and marketing of a uniﬁed product line. DEs cannot compete with
enterprises, unless they trigger the beginning of a new cycle by returning to UDs and
drawing a trajectory on a new concept, not encompassed by this rationalisation.
1.3.3 Part III: methods for the emergence and enterprise use of
UDE settings
The last part contributes to the further exploration of this modus operandi by investigating
three diﬀerent settings. By constructing a framework of analysis that positions collective
action (Hatchuel, 2005b) and conversation in-between social networks and communities, it
suggests methods for the framing and the harnessing of UDE collectivities.
Barcamps constitute an exemplary case of ephemeral conversational settings that are
used for the exploration of the emergence possibility of new UDE communities and networks.
Their design also enables networking through a mainly conversational exploration of emerging
technologies, markets and uses. In a diﬀerent mode from communities’ older members and
networks core nodes, the “regulars” of these settings, while not necessarily sharing a common
ground or being connected, are in position to beneﬁt from the overall setting by taking into
account those conversations and coming closer to the emerging networks and communities.
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A Hackathon setting allows the focussed exploration of a speciﬁc service or technology
potential, through the ad hoc constitution of groups that cover all levels of tacit group
knowledge quality (Erden et al., 2008) in three days, by developing applications or prototypes
on the basis of the desired potential. While their design shares attributes with other methods
for creativity and knowledge-sharing, the outcomes of the Hackathon studied suggest that
ephemeral settings may be particularly characterised by a “personal” dimension of both
innovation process and its outcome.
Finally, developer support forums, despite their appearance as problem-solving settings,
serve functions beyond problem solving itself. Using a system expert analytical framework
(Hatchuel and Weil, 1992), I am led to the conclusion of a diﬀerent kind of enterprise
expertise, active in these settings. The “curator” is not necessarily required to have a
“doing”, “understanding” or “planning know-how” (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992). Instead, her
actions aim at “taking care” of the UDEs, an activity that requires skills such as novelty
identifying, conversation structuring and intimacy developing. The notion of “enterprise-
UDE empathy” may be useful for the further exploration of this function, beyond the one of
problem-solving.
1.3.4 Study overview
Table 1.1 outlines the structure of the current study. Part I addresses the problem of whether
or not Web-based application development can be described according to the distinction of
Raasch and von Hippel (2012) between user and enterprise innovation paradigms. I study
this problem using a phenomenon-based research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012) aiming
in the distinction and the exploration of the Web-based application development modus
operandi, exploring the questions of who, how and why develops such applications. This
exploration will lead me to the identiﬁcation of three actor ﬁgures, UDs, UDEs and DEs,
of whose the action is based on use, use and proﬁt or just proﬁt reasons. Their action is
undertaken by the use of both FOSS and APIs, as they exploit products, developed either by
communities or enterprises, that prescribe a speciﬁc use, while allowing their utilisation as
design instrument, too (such objects have also been described as “open products” (Chrysos
et al., 2010)).
Since both the “private investment” and the “private-collective” models (von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, 2006) are not suﬃcient to describe this modus operandi, the problem
posed is whether or not it constitutes a peculiarity of the Web. Thus, I address this problem
by examining diﬀerent industrial settings (namely the enterprise computer, the personal
computer and the radio ones). Finding similarities, I further explore when such modi appear
and what their eﬀects are for business, concluding with the proposal that they contribute
to the exploration of a multitude of new concepts while they diﬀuse them to UDs or early
adopters, during the industrial development phases that precede rationalisation.
Finally, Part III returns to the question of the Web and, focussing on the actors, addresses
the problem of how enterprises can harness UDE activity. To investigate it, I study three
diﬀerent settings, being limited at the level of the actors. Posing the questions of the
conditions of possibility for the social emergence of UDEs, as well as those of UDE activity
harnessing by enterprises for potential exploration and exploitation ends, I propose three
diﬀerent methods (Barcamps, Hackathons and Developers Support Forums) rendering these
conditions possible.
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Part I
The surprising characteristics of
Web-based application development
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Les caractéristiques étonnantes du
développement des applications Web.
Introduction à la Partie I
Cette partie aborde la question de « qu’est-ce le développement des applications Web ». Elle
explore le problème de la nature de ce type de développement en comparaison aux paradigmes
d’innovation par les usagers et par les industriels Raasch and von Hippel (2012) en étudiant
ses spéciﬁcités. Cette exploration sera entreprise en utilisant une approche de « phenomenon-
based research » von Krogh et al. (2012) qui fera usage des méthodes permettant de saisir les
spéciﬁcités du terrain. Cette enquête suggère l’existence d’un modus operandi étrange, à la
fois en ce qui regarde les acteurs, les moyens et les raisons de développement d’applications
Web.
Le problème posé : Qu’est-ce le développement d’applications
Web?
La littérature en Gestion, ainsi que celle en Sciences Sociales, a étudié le champ des services
Web en adoptant une perspective d’usage et en explorant un éventail de contextes d’usage
(usagers individuels, usagers en groupe, marchés et transactions, externalités de réseau).
Cependant, cette littérature a ignoré le processus même de développement de ces biens, en
le considérant de façon implicite comme une question qui ne regarde que la communauté
d’ingénieurs.
Cette partie de notre recherche explore la nature du développement des applications
Web comme un phénomène (von Krogh et al., 2012) et en comparaison aux processus de
développement étudiés par la littérature de Gestion, ayant comme référence la distinction
entre les modèles d’innovation par l’usager et par l’industriel (Raasch et von Hippel, 2012),
illustrés dans la Figure 2.1 (page 28), prêtée par les auteurs. Dans cette première phase de
notre recherche, nous sommes intéressés par la conﬁguration de cette activité en rapport
avec ces deux modèles, en ayant comme objectif d’inclure ce modus operandi dans un de
ces modèles, ou, dans le cas inverse, de produire une description des spéciﬁcités du modus
étudié.
Notre recherche sera alors limitée à la distinction et l’exploration (von Krogh et al., 2012)
du modus operandi de développement des applications Web. À ce propos, nous divisons la
question de la nature du développement d’applications Web aux questions suivantes:
1. Qui développe des applications Web? Cette question vise à identiﬁer les acteurs
spéciﬁques de ce processus, ainsi que des divergences éventuelles de ces acteurs en
comparaison au modèle proposé par Raasch et von Hippel (2012).
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2. Comment développent-ils des applications Web? Cette question vise à identiﬁer les
moyens spéciﬁques à ce processus, toujours en comparaison avec des modèles connus.
3. Pourquoi développent-ils ces applications? Cette question vise à identiﬁer les raisons
de cette activité, comme comparés à des motivations connues des deux modèles (von
Hippel et von Krogh, 2003; 2006; Raasch et von Hippel, 2012).
L’exploration parallèle de ces trois questions n’est pas nouvelle en gestion. Comme Hatchuel
et Weil (1992; 1995) le montrent dans leur travail séminal, « L’expert et le système », les
entreprises, lorsqu’elles se trouvent face à des nouvelles épreuves de rationalisation, doivent
concevoir et mettre en place un nouveau schéma organisationnel, une philosophie gestionnaire
et un substrat technique. Donc, les entreprises elles-mêmes sont appelées à répondre aux
questions « qui », « comment » et « pourquoi », par la conception de ces trois éléments,
établissant des nouveaux acteurs, raisons et moyens d’action, sur la base desquels prend lieu
le changement organisationnel. En utilisant cette lecture des travaux de Hatchuel et Weil,
nous transformons la question de la nature du développement des applications Web et son
rapport avec les modèles connus, à un problème de conﬁguration des trois éléments de son
modus operandi.
La méthodologie utilisée : quatre axes d’exploration
La méthodologie qui sera utilisée dans la partie actuelle, est schématiquement illustrée dans
la Figure 2.3 (page 29) et visera à distinguer et à explorer les acteurs, les raisons et les
moyens étranges rencontrés sur le terrain. Cette exploration sera entreprise sous quatre axes
:
1. D’un modus operandi connu à un inconnu. Par le biais d’entretiens d’experts de
services Web bien connus (comme Google ou Yahoo), nous restituerons le discours
des fournisseurs de services en ce qui concerne les originalités contemporaines dans
leur développement. L’objectif sera d’identiﬁer quelques premières indications d’un
mode opératoire diﬀérent, au delà de celui dont nos interlocuteurs sont les experts,
et qui leur semble être original. À ce niveau d’exploration, nous ignorons la manière
dont les entreprises gèrent ce processus, mais nous savons que, dans la mesure où ce
processus est géré, nos experts y sont impliqués.
2. Identification des raisons et des moyens d’action, en considérant l’acteur connu. En
considérant l’acteur connu (les « développeurs »), nous utiliserons nos observations
tirées de notre propre participation à leur action, aﬁn de distinguer leurs moyens et
leurs raisons d’action. À ce propos, nous utiliserons une méthode de « participation
observante », en prenant partie au développement d’un site Web.
3. Identification des acteurs et de leurs raisons, en considérant leurs moyens connus. En
considérant leurs moyens connus (les « Interfaces de Programmation d’Applications
(APIs) »), nous étudierons les « livres de cuisine » du développement des applications
Web pour identiﬁer les acteurs et leurs raisons d’action, telles que comprises par les
auteurs de ces livres.
4. Exploration des acteurs et leurs moyens, en considérant leurs raisons connues. En
considérant leurs raisons connues (la commercialisation d’une application initialement
développée pour leur propre usage), nous approfondirons notre exploration du modus
operandi dans son ensemble.
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Résultats de la partie
La Figure 2.4 (page 31) illustre les résultats de cette partie. Tout d’abord, les moyens utilisés
pour le développement des applications sont des logiciels libres, connus en gestion par un
grand nombre d’études (Lakhani et von Hippel, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003; Benkeltoum,
2009, et autres), ainsi que des nouveaux moyens, les APIs, fournis aux développeurs par des
entreprises aﬁn que les premiers puissent créer des applications en utilisant les technologies
des seconds (Chrysos et al., 2010). Ensuite, en ce qui concerne les acteurs et leurs raisons
d’action, nous distinguons trois ﬁgures d’acteur diﬀérents :
• Les usagers-Développeurs (UDs), exploitant leurs compétences de développement aﬁn
de créer des applications pour leur propre usage, de façon similaire à l’exemple d’innovation
par des « lead users » (von Hippel, 2005), sauf que les UDs ont des compétences à la
fois liés à l’usage et à la technologie, qui les distinguent des autres usagers.
• Les usagers-Développeurs-Entrepreneurs (UDEs), exploitant leurs compétences de développe-
ment comme les UDs, sauf qu’ils poursuivent un eﬀort de commercialisation de leurs
applications, contrairement à la « révélation libre » des innovations rencontrées dans
le modèle d’innovation par les usagers (von Hippel et von Krogh, 2003; 2006).
• Les Développeurs-Entrepreneurs (DEs), exploitant leurs compétences de développe-
ment aﬁn de créer une application commerciale, potentiellement attirant une audience
de marché ayant des préférences diﬀérentes de celles des DEs en question.
Donc, ces ﬁgures d’acteur sont positionnées entre les deux modèles décrits par Raasch et
von Hippel, comme illustré dans la Figure 2.5 (page 31).
Présentation synthétique de la Partie I
Le Tableau 2.1 (page 33) présente une synopsis des chapitres à suivre. Tout d’abord, nous
construirons un cadre d’analyse pour l’étude des innovations dans les services Web, en nous
basant sur la littérature y relative. Ensuite, nous décrirons l’approche méthodologique qui
sera utilisée sur les diﬀérents terrains de recherche à étudier. Les trois chapitres qui suivront,
exploreront le phénomène en faisant usage des biais d’accès diﬀérents : premièrement, nous
identiﬁerons les étrangetés du champ de recherche, comme exprimées par le discours des
fournisseurs de services. Dans la suite, nous approfondirons notre enquête en examinant
les normes d’action de la ﬁgure du développeur, comme exercées lors du développement
d’un nouveau service Web. Ces premiers résultats seront utilisés pour une enquête plus
systématique sur les raisons d’action qui se basera à des « livres de cuisine » du développement
des applications. Enﬁn, nous étudierons un cas spéciﬁque de l’action d’un UDE, qui a
développé une application pour les usagers-vendeurs du service eBay.
Les paragraphes suivants résumeront ces chapitres.
Concepts théoriques
Le Chapitre 3 est consacré à la revue de la littérature, où l’accent est mis sur les concepts
à utiliser par la suite. En réexaminant l’expérience du phénomène des « Dot.com », et
la manière dont il a été abordé par les chercheurs de l’époque (Section 3.1), nous faisons
remarquer le besoin d’une étude minutieuse des étrangetés du champ sous exploration (von
Krogh et al., 2012) lorsqu’on examine l’éventualité d’un phénomène, pour contrebalancer les
eﬀets de la « management fashion » (Abrahamson et Fairchild, 1999).
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Ensuite, la Section 3.2 examinera les approches diﬀérentes utilisées par diverses disci-
plines aﬁn de décrire l’usage des services Web : trois conceptualisations proposées par des
économistes, portant sur la valeur d’usage des services en ligne, ont eu une inﬂuence majeure
sur les études en gestion. Donc, les notions de réduction des « coûts de transaction » et
des « coûts d’information », ainsi que des approximations sur la valeur d’un réseau pour ses
usagers sont largement mobilisées dans la gestion de ce type de services. Néanmoins, quant
à la pratique de ces service, d’autres valeurs sont révélées : de chercheurs en gestion ont mis
l’accent sur le fait que, au delà de faciliter l’échange d’information, la mise en place dans les
entreprises des dispositifs dits « social software », conduit au développement des rapports
peu conventionnels, qui incitent à des nouvelles pratiques de gestion. D’un point de vue
diﬀérent, les sociologues, analysant l’usage de ce type de services, proposent que leur valeur
distinctive soit associée au développement de l’identité personnelle des usagers. Cependant,
toutes ces approches, explorent l’usage des dispositifs Web et ses implications, sans étudier
les processus spéciﬁques de leur conception.
Par la suite, la Section 3.3 discutera la distinction entre les paradigmes d’innovation par
l’usager et par le industriel (Raasch et von Hippel, 2012), qui servira de référence tout au
long de cette partie pour le positionnement comparatif de l’activité sous exploration. Comme
l’objet de notre investigation porte sur les services Web, le paragraphe 3.3.4 discutera les
approches générales de gestion de services, du point de vue de l’innovation. À ce propos, un
« paradoxe » apparaît lorsqu’on étudie le discours académique sur les services Web, lié d’une
part à la tendance forte de transition des produits aux services (Cusumano, 2008), d’autre
part à la nature « automatique » de ces services.
Approche méthodologique
Le Chapitre 4 discute les approches méthodologies mobilisées dans la Science de Gestion, en
faisant remarquer les diﬃcultés qu’impose un champ de recherche particulièrement ﬂuide,
susceptible de révéler un nouveau phénomène. À cause de ces limitations, nous construirons
une posture méthodologique qui consiste à explorer en parallèle l’objet sous développement
et le discours de ses développeurs, une posture qui présente des caractéristiques favorables
à l’identiﬁcation de phénomènes d’innovation potentiellement originaux, et plus particulière-
ment le cas du développement des applications Web.
Indications sur un nouveau modus operandi : le discours des fournisseurs de
services
Le Chapitre 5 fera une restitution du discours des fournisseurs de services en ce qui concerne
l’originalité du développement des applications Web, visant à identiﬁer des indications con-
duisant potentiellement à la suggestion d’un nouveau mode opératoire, au delà de celui déjà
connu aux entreprises.
Quelques premières indications seront donc identiﬁées, portant sur un acteur étrange, le «
développeur » , qui semble explorer par son action le potentiel d’un service donné, en servant
à ses propres ﬁns. La création d’une « start-up » constitue une des possibilités de cet acteur,
sans qu’elle soit pour autant un objectif toujours clair. De nouvelles technologies fournies
par les entreprises, et plus précisément des interfaces conçues pour donner la possibilité à
des tiers de créer leurs applications, visent un vaste public de développeurs.
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Identification d’un modus operandi, se situant entre les modèles d’innovation
par usager et par industriel
Le Chapitre 6 continue l’exploration de ce qui semble être un nouveau modus operandi,
en étudiant les acteurs, les moyens et les raisons d’action qui peuvent le décrire. Cette
conﬁguration sera poursuivie sur la base d’une recherche de phénomène, qui se déroulera
dans deux étapes : la première étape se base sur mes observations de ma propre participation
au développement d’un site Web, la seconde se base sur l’étude systématique des « livres de
cuisine » fournissant le savoir nécessaire pour cette activité.
Ces deux étapes viseront à l’identiﬁcation des normes d’action (Argyris et Schon, 1978)
des acteurs en question, en comparaison avec les modèles d’innovation d’investissement
privé et le collectif-privatif (von Hippel et von Krogh, 2003; 2006). Les conﬁgurations
en résultant (UDs, UDEs et DEs) émergeront comme une hybridation des normes d’action
rencontrées dans les deux modèle, même si « l’investissement personnel » des développeurs
semble jouer un rôle structurant dans cette activité.
Les ﬁgures d’acteur émergeant dans mon étude peuvent être décrites par la raison de
leur action, dans les UDs, UDEs et DEs.
Exploration du modus operandi identifié
Enﬁn, le Chapitre 7 poursuivra l’exploration sur la manière dont les éléments diﬀérents de
ce mode d’action sont mobilisés en pratique, par le biais du « récit raconté d’une histoire »
d’innovation par un UDE.
En faisant usage d’une approche de narration, ce chapitre étudie un cas où une application
développée pour un usage propre devient un bien commercial. N’étant pas un « success story
», ce cas illustre les dilemmes auxquels un UDE fait face.
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This part addresses the question “what is Web-based application development”. It ex-
plores this issue in comparison to the user and the manufacturer innovation paradigms
(Raasch and von Hippel, 2012) through the study of its speciﬁcities. This exploration is
undertaken by a phenomenon-based research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012) and through
the use of methods allowing one to seize the speciﬁc challenges of the ﬁeld. It suggests
the existence of a peculiar modus operandi, in regard to the actors, their means and their
reasons for developing Web-based applications.
2.1 The problem addressed: what is Web-based
application development?
Literature in Management, as well as in Social Sciences, has studied the ﬁeld of Web service
through a use perspective, exploring a wide range of use contexts (individual users, user
groups, markets and transactions, network externalities) though ignoring the very process of
development of these goods, implicitly considering it as an exclusively engineering issue.
This part explores the nature of Web-based application development through a phenomenon-
based approach (von Krogh et al., 2012), in comparison to development processes studied by
management literature, having as a reference the synthetic distinction proposed by Raasch
and von Hippel (2012) between user and manufacturer innovation paradigms, quoted in Fig-
ure 2.1. In this early phase of my research, I am interested in conﬁguring whether or not
this activity enters any one of the two models proposed, or if, in the contrary, it constitutes
a diﬀerent model, distinct from both.
My research will be limited to distinguishing and exploring (von Krogh et al., 2012) the
modus operandi of Web-based application development. For that, I break down the question
“what is Web-based application development” into three questions:
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Figure 2.1: The synthetic distinction of innovation paradigms by Raasch and von Hippel
(2012).
1. Who develops Web-based applications? - This question aims at the identiﬁcation of
the speciﬁc actors of this process, and their potential speciﬁcities in regards to the
models proposed by Raasch and von Hippel (2012).
2. How do they develop Web-based applications? - This question aims at the identi-
ﬁcation of the speciﬁc means for this process, always in comparison to the known
models.
3. Why do they do it? - This question addresses the reasons for this activity, as compared
to the known motives of user and manufacturer innovation paradigms (von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, 2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012).
Addressing these three questions in parallel is not unprecedented in management. As
Hatchuel and Weil (1992, 1995) show in their seminal work “Experts in Organizations: A
Knowledge-Based Perspective on Organizational Change”, enterprises, when faced by a new
rationalisation challenge, have to conceive and implement a new organisational schema, a
managerial philosophy and a technical substrate. Thus, in such situations, enterprises them-
selves are called to answer the questions “who”, “why” and “how”, by the design of these
three elements, establishing new actors, reasons and means on the basis of which organisa-
tional change occurs. Using this reading of the work of Hatchuel and Weil, I formulate the
question of what Web-based application development is and its distinction of known models
into the problem of conﬁguring its elements as a modus operandi, shown in the Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Elements of a modus operandi.
2.2 The methodology used: four angles of exploration
The methodology that will be used in the current part will aim at the distinction and explo-
ration of the peculiar (von Krogh et al., 2012) actors, reasons and means of those developing
Web-based applications. This exploration will be undertaken using four angles, as shown in
Figure 2.3:
Figure 2.3: Part methodology.
1. From a known modus operandi to an unknown. Through interviews with managers
of well-known Web services (such as Google or Yahoo), I will present their discourse
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on what they think is original. The aim will be to identify some early indications
of a diﬀerent modus operandi, beyond the one in which they are already experts,
where Web-based application development occurs and which seems to be, in their
own knowledge, original. At this level, I do not know how enterprises manage this
process, though I do know that - to the extent that it’s the case - it is managed by
the managers.
2. Reasons and means identification, considering the actor known. Considering the actors
as known (“developers”), I will use my observations garnered from participating with
their action in order to distinguish their reasons for and means of action. For this, I
have used an “observant participation” method, taking part in the development of a
Web site.
3. Reasons and actors identification, considering means known. Considering their peculiar
means as known (“Application Programming Interfaces”), I will study the “cookbooks”
of Web-based application development to identify the actors and their reasons for
action, as assumed by the authors of these books themselves.
4. Actor and means exploration, considering reasons known. Considering the reasons of
action known (the commercialisation of an application developed for own use), I will
further explore the resulting modus operandi as a whole.
2.3 Part outcome
Figure 2.4 illustrates the results of the current part. Firstly, the means used for application
development are both open source, those means having been studied by a great number of
management scholars (Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003b; Benkeltoum, 2008,
and others), as well as a new means, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), furnished
by enterprises to developers for them to create applications extending their service (Chrysos
et al., 2010). Then, regarding the actors and their action reasons, I distinguish three diﬀerent
actors, all using the same means:
• The User-Developer (UD), using his developing skills to create an application for his
own use, much like “lead users” do in the user innovation paradigm (von Hippel, 2005),
though they diﬀer from other users in the fact that they have speciﬁc skills.
• the User-Developer-Entrepreneur (UDE), using his developing skills to create an appli-
cation for his own use, though later attempting to commercialise his creation, unlike
the “free revealing” innovation model (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006).
• the Developer-Entrepreneur (DE), using his developing skills to create a commercial
application, that could be useful to a market audience having diﬀerent preferences
from his own, personal ones.
Hence, these three actor ﬁgures are positioned in-between the user and the manufacturer
as shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Part outcome: Actors, means and reasons conﬁguration.
Figure 2.5: Actor ﬁgures identiﬁed as compared to the model of Raasch and von Hippel
(2012).
2.4 Part overview
Table 2.1 presents a synoptic overview of the chapters to follow. Initially, I will construct
an analytical framework for the study of Web services innovations drawing on the related
literature. Then, I will describe the methodological approach to be used in the diﬀerent ﬁelds
studied. Then, the three following chapters will explore the phenomenon using diﬀerent
entries. Firstly, I will be interested in identifying the peculiarities of this ﬁeld, as expressed
in service providers’ discourse. Then, I will further study the action norms of a novel ﬁgure,
the developer, as exercised during the development of a Web service and as understood
by those providing the necessary knowledge for this action, namely the authors “Developer
Cookbooks”. Finally, I will study a speciﬁc case of a User-Developer-Entrepreneur (UDE)
creation, an eBay sellers application.
Theoretical Concepts
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the literature review, where emphasis is given to the concepts that
will be used later on. Revisiting the experience of the “Dot.com” phenomenon, and the way
it has been addressed by the scholars of that time (Section 3.1) I remark that there is a
need for a careful peculiarities investigation (von Krogh et al., 2012) when faced with new
phenomena, as a counterbalance to the inﬂuence of“management fashion” (Abrahamson
and Rosenkopf, 1997).
Section 3.2 reviews the diﬀerent approaches that have been used by diﬀerent disciplines
to describe the use of the Web services. Economists have proposed three very inﬂuential con-
ceptualisations of the value of use for online services, extensively mobilised by the literature
on Web business. Hence, the notions of “transaction” and “information costs” reduction,
as well as the approximations of the value of a network for its users are widely used both by
practitioners and scholars. Still, when it comes to practice, other values come to light. Man-
agement scholars have highlighted that, beyond facilitating information exchange, “social
software” services, when used as a tool within the enterprise context, lead to “unconven-
tional” relationships that call for new management practices. From a diﬀerent standpoint,
sociologist analysing the use of such services propose that their distinctive value of use is
associated with personal identity. Nevertheless, all those approaches investigate the use of
Web services and related interaction setting, as well as its implications, without looking into
the speciﬁc process of their development.
Then, Section 3.3 will review the distinction between the user and producer innovations
paradigms (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), which will serve as a reference throughout this
chapter, for the comparative positioning of the activity under investigation. As the object
under investigation is the development of Web services, paragraph 3.3.4 will discuss the
general theories describing services management. When studying the academic discourse
on online services, a “paradox” appears during the passage “from products to services”
(Cusumano, 2008) that I am studying: while service delivery highly depends on the “moment
of truth” when clients meet the front-oﬃce employees, in this particular ﬁeld there is no
employee to meet.
Methodological Approach
Chapter 4 reviews the major methodological approaches used by management scholars and
notes the diﬃculties implied for their use in a research ﬁeld potentially revealing a new phe-
nomenon. Because of these limitations, I will construct a methodological posture consisting
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Chapter/ Section Outcome
3 Theoretical concepts
3.1 The trend trap. The case of the Dot.com
phenomenon
Need for a careful peculiarities investigation.
Proposition: to focus on new technologies and new
actors
3.2 Web services literature: focussing on use,
missing development
There is a rich exploration of uses and a poor
exploration of web services development process
3.3 Manufacturer and user paradigms. Who
develops the applications?
Review of the distinction of user and manufacturer
paradigms, using the perspective of Web apps
development
4 Methodological approach
4.3 An object - discourse investigation approach A methodological posture for the emerging ﬁelds
study
5 Indications on a novel modus operandi :
the discourse of service providers
5.1 Service provider managers interviews Service providers discourse restitution
5.2 Outcomes Peculiarities indications. New technologies:
interfaces for application development; New actors:
“free lance” developers
6 Modus operandi identification:
in-between user and manufacturer
paradigms
6.2 Theoretical concepts A critical review of the “private-collective” model
for innovation
6.3 Methodology: distinction and exploration A two-steps methodology for phenomenon
exploration
6.3.2 First step: early norms distinction Immersion in the developers’ action and discourse,
through participation in the development of a Web
service
6.3.3 Second step: exploration Analysis of developer ﬁgures through the
underpinning norms of their action through the
study of developers’ “Cookbooks”
6.4 Findings (ﬁrst step): development for proﬁt Unlike user innovation paradigms, user-developers
activity is driven by proﬁt expectation
6.5 Discussion (First step): keeping a foot on
both camps
UDEs action comprehends norms from both user
and manufacturer paradigms
6.6 Findings (second step): diﬀerent developers
conﬁgurations
UD, UDE, DE distinction
6.7 Discussion (second step) The three conﬁgurations of UDE ﬁgure act in the
interplay between user and manufacturer paradigms
7 Modus operandi exploration
7.2 Theoretical concepts A comparative framework setting
7.3 Methodology: narration as a phenomenon
illustrator
The use of a story as an argument illustrator
7.4 Outcome: design and diﬀusion of a
“spare-time” product
UDE action in practice
7.5 Discussion: Design and knowledge issues in
third-party application development
UDE personal skills inﬂuence services competition
Table 2.1: Part 1. An overview: chapters of the current part and their synoptic outcomes.
in the parallel examination the object under development and its developer’s discourse, as
a privileged way to explore potentially original innovation phenomena, and more speciﬁcally
the Web services one.
Indications on a novel modus operandi : the discourse of service providers
Chapter 5 will eﬀect a restitution of the service providers discourse on the originalities of
contemporary Web service innovation, aiming at an early identiﬁcation of originalities that
could suggest there is a novel modus operandi, beyond what service providers usually do.
Some early indications will thus be identiﬁed on a peculiar actor, the developer, who
appears to explore the potential of a given service for its own proﬁt, potentially creating
a start-up, in the case of an exploration leading to a concrete concept. New technologies
supplied by services, and in particular interfaces conceived to enable third party application
development and, thus, the exploration of the potential of a given service by third party
developers, aim to be adopted by a dispersed public of developers to create new services.
Modus operandi identification: in-between user and manufacturer paradigms
Chapter 6 further explores what is suggested to be a novel modus operandi, examining the
actors, reasons and means that can describe it. This conﬁguration will be undertaken using a
phenomenon based research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012), which will deploy in two steps:
the ﬁrst one consists in my observant participation in an ephemeral developers’ team building
a Web site, the second consists in the systematic study of the “Cookbooks” providing the
knowledge required for this activity.
Both steps aim at identifying the action norms (Argyris and Schon, 1978) of this ﬁg-
ure and comparing it with the “private investment” and the “private-collective” innovation
models (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006). The resulting conﬁgurations (UD, UDE,
DE) emerge as an hybrid of action norms met in the two models, though the “personal
investment” (necessary skills and knowledge acquisition) of the developers appears to have
a structuring role for this activity.
The emerging actor ﬁgures can be described through the reasons behind their action
as summarised by three actor ﬁgures: User - Developers (UD), using their skills to create
something that can be useful to them, much as in the user innovation paradigm (von Hippel,
1975), User - Developer - Entrepreneurs (UDE), commercialising this creation and Developers
- Entrepreneurs, creating something that does not correspond to their own needs but instead
corresponds to their projections of what a potential clientele would buy.
Modus operandi exploration
Finally, Chapter 7 will further explore how diﬀerent elements of this mode of action are
mobilized in practice, through the “telling” of a story of UDE innovation.
Using a narrative approach, this chapter explores the way in which an application devel-
oped for personal use becomes a commercial good. Given the particular case is not a “success
story”, it illustrates the dilemmas a user-developer faces when trying to commercialise his
creation.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical concepts for an industrial
development analysis of third party
innovation in Web services
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Introduction. The problem of an encompassing
literature in Web services.
In management science there are very few approaches proposing generic models or theories to
describe the management of Web-based application development, as most studies focus on
speciﬁc aspects of features or cases encountered on-line, such as user forums or Wikipedia.
In my view, this fact is due to the diﬃculty of distinguishing between “inherited” business
practices and methods and “original” ones, either based on an ontological description of
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these services, on a genealogical study or on general theories. This kind of analysis becomes
even more complicated as the ﬁeld of online business is characterized by a signiﬁcant ﬂuidity.
Concerning business in online services, we can distinguish two currents of literature.
In the beginning, before 2001, there were attempts to propose some general models for
online services. However, after the dot-com bubble, management research encompassing
approaches were less frequent. Rather than researching for general analytical frameworks,
more recent management studies have focussed on particular cases and features.
The only analytical framework for on-line business is perhaps the one based on the notion
of multi-sided markets, which will be explicitly discussed.
In this dissertation rather than seeking the “keys of success” in the online business ecosys-
tems, or highlighting speciﬁcities of particular Web platforms, I will attempt to identify the
shared and speciﬁc business attributes in contemporary Web services, their modus operandi,
and propose a model for their management.
3.1 The trend trap. The case of the Dot.com
phenomenon.
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) studied the fashions in management research and prac-
tice, proposing that they evolve according to life-cycles. At ﬁrst, “emotionally charged,
enthusiastic, and unreasoned discourse characterizes the upswings of management fashion
waves”, while during the downswings management discourse is characterized as “more rea-
soned, unemotional, and qualiﬁed”. According to Abrahamson (2009), fashion is a general
phenomenon observed in diﬀerent scientiﬁc disciplines.
Paradoxically, in the case of the Web 2.0 wave upswing, management scholars not only
lacked enthusiasm, but they were rather reserved1. These reservations can be explained by
the fact that this upswing appeared only a few years after the dot.com bubble burst, the
latter characterized by a recent OECD study as an event that “helped lay the ground to for
the [actual] ﬁnancial crisis” (Keelee and Love, 2010).
However, as the Figure 3.1 suggests, there has been a considerable interest on the part of
the general public inWeb 2.0. This ﬁgure shows the evolution of the relative popularity of the
term “Web 2.0” in Google Search requests since autumn 2005 when the term ﬁrst appeared
in public. We see that this public interest follows an upswing until the end of 2007 and then
a progressive decline until the time of writing. This popularity curve raises the question of
the term content, that is whether it describes a bubble, not having any original content after
all, or, on the contrary, whether its content has progressively become a commonplace within
the speciﬁc community concerned. In advance, since the form of the curve showing interest
diminution is gradual and not sudden, one could suggest in anticipation that we may be in
the second case. Unfortunately, similar data do not exist for the case of dot.com (as the
Web - and Google in particular - was far less developed at the time), in order for us to be
able to make a comparison.
Hence, a review of the management literature during this early wave of Web business is
suggested as the best way to commence with the literature review. During the late 1990’s, the
“dot.com” wave had shown signs that it could lead to growth in the global economy. What
1While the documentation of the absence in generally, and the absence of enthusiasm in particularly, is a
diﬃcult task for researchers, the following title of a seminar organized in École de Paris de Management in
March 2008 is illustrative of the ambivalence in the academic world:“Should we take the Web 2.0 seriously?”
36
D
a
te
Jan 4 2004
Jan 11 2004
Jan 18 2004
Jan 25 2004
Feb 1 2004
Feb 8 2004
Feb 15 2004
Feb 22 2004
Feb 29 2004
Mar 7 2004
Mar 14 2004
Mar 21 2004
Mar 28 2004
Apr 4 2004
Apr 11 2004
Apr 18 2004
Apr 25 2004
May 2 2004
May 9 2004
May 16 2004
May 23 2004
May 30 2004
Jun 6 2004
Jun 13 2004
Jun 20 2004
Jun 27 2004
Jul 4 2004
Jul 11 2004
Jul 18 2004
Jul 25 2004
Aug 1 2004
Aug 8 2004
Aug 15 2004
Aug 22 2004
Aug 29 2004
Sep 5 2004
Sep 12 2004
Sep 19 2004
Sep 26 2004
Oct 3 2004
Oct 10 2004
Oct 17 2004
Oct 24 2004
Oct 31 2004
Nov 7 2004
Nov 14 2004
Nov 21 2004
Nov 28 2004
Dec 5 2004
Dec 12 2004
Dec 19 2004
Dec 26 2004
Jan 2 2005
Jan 9 2005
Jan 16 2005
Jan 23 2005
Jan 30 2005
Feb 6 2005
Feb 13 2005
Feb 20 2005
Feb 27 2005
Mar 6 2005
Mar 13 2005
Mar 20 2005
Mar 27 2005
Apr 3 2005
Apr 10 2005
Apr 17 2005
Apr 24 2005
May 1 2005
May 8 2005
May 15 2005
May 22 2005
May 29 2005
Jun 5 2005
Jun 12 2005
Jun 19 2005
Jun 26 2005
Jul 3 2005
Jul 10 2005
Jul 17 2005
Jul 24 2005
Jul 31 2005
Aug 7 2005
Aug 14 2005
Aug 21 2005
Aug 28 2005
Sep 4 2005
Sep 11 2005
Sep 18 2005
Sep 25 2005
Oct 2 2005
Oct 9 2005
Oct 16 2005
Oct 23 2005
Oct 30 2005
Nov 6 2005
Nov 13 2005
Nov 20 2005
Nov 27 2005
Dec 4 2005
Dec 11 2005
Dec 18 2005
Dec 25 2005
Jan 1 2006
Jan 8 2006
Jan 15 2006
Jan 22 2006
Jan 29 2006
Feb 5 2006
Feb 12 2006
Feb 19 2006
Feb 26 2006
Mar 5 2006
Mar 12 2006
Mar 19 2006
Mar 26 2006
Apr 2 2006
Apr 9 2006
Apr 16 2006
Apr 23 2006
Apr 30 2006
May 7 2006
May 14 2006
May 21 2006
May 28 2006
Jun 4 2006
Jun 11 2006
Jun 18 2006
Jun 25 2006
Jul 2 2006
Jul 9 2006
Jul 16 2006
Jul 23 2006
Jul 30 2006
Aug 6 2006
Aug 13 2006
Aug 20 2006
Aug 27 2006
Sep 3 2006
Sep 10 2006
Sep 17 2006
Sep 24 2006
Oct 1 2006
Oct 8 2006
Oct 15 2006
Oct 22 2006
Oct 29 2006
Nov 5 2006
Nov 12 2006
Nov 19 2006
Nov 26 2006
Dec 3 2006
Dec 10 2006
Dec 17 2006
Dec 24 2006
Dec 31 2006
Jan 7 2007
Jan 14 2007
Jan 21 2007
Jan 28 2007
Feb 4 2007
Feb 11 2007
Feb 18 2007
Feb 25 2007
Mar 4 2007
Mar 11 2007
Mar 18 2007
Mar 25 2007
Apr 1 2007
Apr 8 2007
Apr 15 2007
Apr 22 2007
Apr 29 2007
May 6 2007
May 13 2007
May 20 2007
May 27 2007
Jun 3 2007
Jun 10 2007
Jun 17 2007
Jun 24 2007
Jul 1 2007
Jul 8 2007
Jul 15 2007
Jul 22 2007
Jul 29 2007
Aug 5 2007
Aug 12 2007
Aug 19 2007
Aug 26 2007
Sep 2 2007
Sep 9 2007
Sep 16 2007
Sep 23 2007
Sep 30 2007
Oct 7 2007
Oct 14 2007
Oct 21 2007
Oct 28 2007
Nov 4 2007
Nov 11 2007
Nov 18 2007
Nov 25 2007
Dec 2 2007
Dec 9 2007
Dec 16 2007
Dec 23 2007
Dec 30 2007
Jan 6 2008
Jan 13 2008
Jan 20 2008
Jan 27 2008
Feb 3 2008
Feb 10 2008
Feb 17 2008
Feb 24 2008
Mar 2 2008
Mar 9 2008
Mar 16 2008
Mar 23 2008
Mar 30 2008
Apr 6 2008
Apr 13 2008
Apr 20 2008
Apr 27 2008
May 4 2008
May 11 2008
May 18 2008
May 25 2008
Jun 1 2008
Jun 8 2008
Jun 15 2008
Jun 22 2008
Jun 29 2008
Jul 6 2008
Jul 13 2008
Jul 20 2008
Jul 27 2008
Aug 3 2008
Aug 10 2008
Aug 17 2008
Aug 24 2008
Aug 31 2008
Sep 7 2008
Sep 14 2008
Sep 21 2008
Sep 28 2008
Oct 5 2008
Oct 12 2008
Oct 19 2008
Oct 26 2008
Nov 2 2008
Nov 9 2008
Nov 16 2008
Nov 23 2008
Nov 30 2008
Dec 7 2008
Dec 14 2008
Dec 21 2008
Dec 28 2008
Jan 4 2009
Jan 11 2009
Jan 18 2009
Jan 25 2009
Feb 1 2009
Feb 8 2009
Feb 15 2009
Feb 22 2009
Mar 1 2009
Mar 8 2009
Mar 15 2009
Mar 22 2009
Mar 29 2009
Apr 5 2009
Apr 12 2009
Apr 19 2009
Apr 26 2009
May 3 2009
May 10 2009
May 17 2009
May 24 2009
May 31 2009
Jun 7 2009
Jun 14 2009
Jun 21 2009
Jun 28 2009
Jul 5 2009
Jul 12 2009
Jul 19 2009
Jul 26 2009
Aug 2 2009
Aug 9 2009
Aug 16 2009
Aug 23 2009
Aug 30 2009
Sep 6 2009
Sep 13 2009
Sep 20 2009
Sep 27 2009
Oct 4 2009
Oct 11 2009
Oct 18 2009
Oct 25 2009
Nov 1 2009
Nov 8 2009
Nov 15 2009
Nov 22 2009
Nov 29 2009
Dec 6 2009
Dec 13 2009
Dec 20 2009
Dec 27 2009
Jan 3 2010
Jan 10 2010
Jan 17 2010
Jan 24 2010
Jan 31 2010
Feb 7 2010
Feb 14 2010
Feb 21 2010
Feb 28 2010
Mar 7 2010
Mar 14 2010
Mar 21 2010
Mar 28 2010
Apr 4 2010
Apr 11 2010
Apr 18 2010
Apr 25 2010
May 2 2010
May 9 2010
May 16 2010
May 23 2010
May 30 2010
Jun 6 2010
Jun 13 2010
Jun 20 2010
Jun 27 2010
Jul 4 2010
Jul 11 2010
Jul 18 2010
Jul 25 2010
Aug 1 2010
Aug 8 2010
Aug 15 2010
Aug 22 2010
Aug 29 2010
Sep 5 2010
Sep 12 2010
Sep 19 2010
Sep 26 2010
Oct 3 2010
Oct 10 2010
Oct 17 2010
Oct 24 2010
Oct 31 2010
Nov 7 2010
Nov 14 2010
Nov 21 2010
Nov 28 2010
Dec 5 2010
Dec 12 2010
Dec 19 2010
Dec 26 2010
Jan 2 2011
Jan 9 2011
Jan 16 2011
Jan 23 2011
Jan 30 2011
Feb 6 2011
Feb 13 2011
Feb 20 2011
Feb 27 2011
Mar 6 2011
Mar 13 2011
Mar 20 2011
Mar 27 2011
Apr 3 2011
Apr 10 2011
Apr 17 2011
Apr 24 2011
May 1 2011
May 8 2011
May 15 2011
May 22 2011
May 29 2011
Jun 5 2011
Jun 12 2011
Jun 19 2011
Jun 26 2011
Jul 3 2011
Jul 10 2011
Jul 17 2011
Jul 24 2011
Jul 31 2011
Aug 7 2011
Aug 14 2011
Aug 21 2011
Aug 28 2011
Sep 4 2011
Sep 11 2011
Sep 18 2011
Sep 25 2011
Oct 2 2011
Oct 9 2011
Oct 16 2011
Oct 23 2011
Oct 30 2011
Nov 6 2011
Nov 13 2011
Nov 20 2011
Nov 27 2011
Dec 4 2011
Dec 11 2011
Dec 18 2011
Dec 25 2011
Jan 1 2012
Jan 8 2012
Jan 15 2012
Jan 22 2012
Jan 29 2012
Feb 5 2012
Feb 12 2012
Feb 19 2012
Feb 26 2012
Mar 4 2012
Mar 11 2012
Mar 18 2012
Mar 25 2012
Apr 1 2012
Apr 8 2012
Apr 15 2012
Relative popularity of the term "Web 2.0" in Google Search
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
A
u
to
m
n
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Fi
gu
re
3.
1:
P
op
ul
ar
ity
of
th
e
te
rm
W
eb
2.
0
in
G
oo
gl
e
Se
ar
ch
re
qu
es
ts
.
W
e
ob
se
rv
e
a
do
w
ns
in
g
of
th
e
te
rm
po
pu
la
ri
ty
du
ri
ng
th
e
ye
ar
s.
So
ur
ce
:
G
oo
gl
e
T
re
nd
s.
37
was named the “Dot.com bubble”, in 2001, illustrated in a painful way that these economical
predictions were too optimistic. Christmas 2000 had no Santa Claus for online business, as
the projections of a dramatical rise in online sales were proven wrong, disappointing stock
market investors (Aspray and Ceruzzi, 2008) and leading to the closing of a great number
of business. Far from seeking out those responsible, a look into the literature of the time
on how management research community addressed the issue can provide insights for the
current study, regarding the theoretical and methodological posture to develop.
Using a term while not defining its referent.
The ﬁrst paper of the pre-dot-com period that I will review is entitled “Five steps to a
dot-com strategy: How to find your footing on the Web” (Venkatraman, 2000) and was
published in the MIT Sloan Management Review just before the burst of what has remained
in the collective memory as the “dot-com bubble”.
The article calls managers to answer to the following questions, in order to develop their
“dot-com strategy”:
1. What’s your strategic vision for dot-com operations?
2. How do you govern dot-com operations?
3. What’s your operating infrastructure for dot-com operations?
4. Is your management aligned for the dot-com agenda?
The author concludes by stating the importance of having a “dot-com vision” :
They [established companies] need to blend their traditional and dot-com oper-
ations while confronting the challenge of brain drain as their top talent jumps
ship for other dot-com operations. The game is far from over, and we will see
powerful transformations as companies embrace the Net and craft innovative
strategies that successfully blend physical and digital infrastructures. It’s up to
managers to take the necessary actions to align their visions to the dot-com
world.
This paper illustrates the tone of discussion beyond even beyond the academic community
of management during that era. No deﬁnition or description is presented as an answer to the
question “what is a dot-com?”, since this question is not posed. Yet, while a “dot-com” is
considered as an evidence of visionaries, the bubble of dot-coms, which was expressed with a
dramatic fall of the stocks of the “high-tech” enterprises in 2001, illustrated in a painful way
that there was no evidence on the nature of a “dot-com” for business, beyond the simple
fact that they all had a Web portal of which the URL ended in “.com”.
A similar eﬀect was reproduced during the ﬁrst period of the “Web 2.0” era (one could
ﬁnd the term “Web 2.0” as a generic adjective for business), evoking thus the suspicion on
the part of the academic community, I’ve already mentioned. Yet, this time more explicit
descriptions were initiated, often focusing on the new technical methods and features used
in Web development. In this dissertation I will enter those methods of development in order
to identify the novel ways of business that they suppose or impose.
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Success stories without the keys to success: The missing link of knowledge
sharing
A second example of the literature refers to the studies based on exemplar cases, in which
“success stories” are studied. The researcher’s attempt in this case is to induce the “keys
of success” of projects usually undertaken by large enterprises. Yet, in the absence of a
reference to a set of solid theoretical framework(s) or a positioning of the issue on a historical
basis, beyond the temporal euphoria, new business phenomena could only be interpreted as
“better applications” of already known approaches, when studied. In such circumstances,
the potential that is hidden behind the success cannot be revealed by the researcher.
The article “Pathways to E-Business Leadership: Getting from Bricks to Clicks”, by
Willcocks and Plant (2001), also published inMIT Sloan Management Review, was developed
on the bases of the following research question:
How do leading business-to-consumer corporations harness the Internet to ac-
quire new customers and increase their market share?
One of the case-studies used, was a grocery retailer, Tesco, expanding its activity in the
on-line environment. The case is interpreted as a typical example of “brand as a strategy”,
which passed from “brand reinforcement to brand repositioning”. The case was presented
as follows:
In the United Kingdom, supermarket chain Tesco moved from brand reinforce-
ment to brand repositioning over two years. First, in 1998 it reinforced its brand
by creating Tesco.com, a wholly owned Internet subsidiary that allows customers
to order groceries online for delivery and uses existing retail outlets for supply.
In 1999, although the online business had lost £11.2 million on £125 million
in sales, it also had attracted 300,000 users and was anticipating a profit in
two years. By the end of 2000, Tesco had invested £56 million in its online
retail business, dedicated 7,000 staff members to it, and had almost all 600 local
stores online. At the same time, Tesco used the power of its existing brand and
relationships with shoppers to reposition Tesco.com as a seller of services and
goods other than food and to launch Tesco Personal Finance, an online joint
banking venture with the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Senior executives said they expected non-food goods ultimately to comprise half
of e-sales and both Internet businesses to move into the market quadrant and
reach profitability in 2001.
In the presentation of the case by the authors we observe a typical myth of the dot-com
era, that is the idea that creating a site is a suﬃcient action to enforce a brand. Another
hypothesis, considered as evidence during that time, indicated in the paper by the metric of
users, was the aﬃrmation that a fast rate of user base growth guaranteed a future enterprise
prosperity. In a book edited by the historian Paul Ceruzzi, this approach was named “Get Big
Fast” (Kirsch and Goldfarb, 2008), and its aim was to exploit the “ﬁrst mover advantage”.
To this purpose, many enterprises used to spend important resources on advertisement. Yet,
many of those enterprises saw their stock options dramatically losing value or shutting down
their business, despite their large user base. In other words, the dot-com world, at least
as we can judge ex post, was not a “canonical” world, in which managers could align their
visions.
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As the discussion on the installed user base is still one of the main arguments concerning
Web services managements, I will refer to it more explicitly in the next section, concerning
the “network externalities” approach.
Nevertheless, tesco.com was one of the sites that indeed managed to survive during the
bubble. Yet, a study realized in 20022, comparing tesco.com with other on-line grocery
stores, such as Webvan, which reached a stock market value of $7.9 billion at the end of its
IPO, had a diﬀerent interpretation of Tesco’s success. As presented in an article in the MIT
Sloan Management Review (Ellis, 2003):
The failure of Webvan and the success of Tesco, among other online grocers in
Britain, illustrate the need for sellers to carefully educate customers about new
services and coach them in how to get the most benefit from the service. (. . . )
In addition, many failed online retailers concentrated too much of their marketing
efforts on attracting a broad range of customers and too little on retaining target
customers.
The article of Willcocks and Plant (2001) uses a structure that is common to all papers of
that time: based on some example cases, they propose a list of advice for enterprises entering
the on-line business. However, in the absence of reference to a speciﬁc theoretical framework,
a genealogical analysis or a description of speciﬁc methods, techniques or tools used by the
enterprises in these cases, the reader has the diﬃculty to judge whether these advices are
“general truths” - such as the diﬀerent modes of branding for companies addressing large
public - or whether they correspond to the speciﬁcities of on-line business. In the case of
Tesco for instance, one could not state that “brand repositioning” would be a false strategy.
Nevertheless, “brand repositioning strategy” wasn’t a pertinent description of the originality
of Tesco’s practice, which consisted in accommodating and educating users in the use of its
service.
3.2 Different disciplinary approaches on Web services
use
This section reviews the major conceptualisations of Web services in three disciplines: eco-
nomics, management and sociology. Table 3.1 outlines the level of analysis and the use
descriptions explored and adopted by diﬀerent studies. Economics analyses the phenomenon
at an abstract level, interested in value measuring. To this end, their notions are mobilized:
a) information cost reduction, b) transaction cost reduction and c) network externalities.
In management, contemporary Web services (described as Web 2.0 or social software)
are studied through three perspectives, corresponding to diﬀerent levels of use: a) within the
enterprise context, b) between an enterprise and its clients and c) beyond the enterprise, at
the level of autonomous communities.
Finally, sociologists enact a more detailed study of user practice, proposing that the pecu-
liarity of those services resides in their use for personal identity aﬃrmation and construction.
However, all the above approaches adopt an approach of methodological separation
between the developer or designer and the user actors (Callon, 1992), and pay attention
to the user side, this is generally the case aside from most studies in the current of STS
2Internet Disintermediation of Food Delivery: Spanning the Last Mile, 2002.
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(Science, Technology, Society) (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2008). In the current study, I will not
“choose” andy of these use ﬁelds to further explore, since I am interested in the development
rather than the use of such settings. However, the literature review operated in the following
paragraphs will be useful, as an illustration of the variety of use contexts and ﬁelds to which
Web services and applications are addressed, thus indicating a great potential for innovation
from a development perspective.
3.2.1 Economics use conceptualisation: information & transaction
costs, network value
There are three major theoretical approaches in economics that have been inﬂuential in online
business management studies. Two categories can be distinguished in these approaches
regarding the perception of users’ beneﬁt: on the one hand, information and transaction
costs theories, developed in diﬀerent periods though sharing some common elements, which
focus on costs and on the other hand network externalities theory, which focus on added
value. The level of analysis of these studies has initially been at that of the market or the
consumers. Later, the same framework has been used to analyse communication costs within
a value chain.
In the ﬁeld of online services, use is addressed either indirectly, diminishing costs for
consumers through the facilitating future transactions, or directly, adding value to a given
service through rendering it more useful for its clients.
This section brieﬂy reviews these concepts and their use in the study of online services,
noting the limited potential of theoretical concepts use for the design and development
process of a new Web service or application.
Information and transaction cost theories: application in online services and
limits.
Most management scholars investigate the case of online services using the framework of
information economy. A very inﬂuential study on the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge economy’
was the doctoral work of Porat (1977) at Stanford University, The Information Economy:
Definition and Measurement. Porat identiﬁed as a major source of value the ‘information
cost’ preceding a transaction, and proposed a way to measure it3. For him, this cost repre-
sented a great part of the overall economy and information technologies that had emerged
provided the chance for business to proﬁt from its reduction. The foundations of the ap-
proach of the information economy are to be found in the analytical methodology of ‘Input
- Output Economics’ (Neisser, 1941; Leontief, 1941; Walras, 1896; Quesnay, 1759), a quan-
titative economic technique that represents the ﬂows of value within diﬀerent elements of
an economy.
A similar approach is found in transaction costs reduction (Wallis and North, 1986).
Both Wallis and North on the one hand, and Porat on the other, share a common ground in
3A diﬀerent approach was developed in France, during the same period. A report of the Inspection
Générale des Finances, that became very known among public at large as the Nora-Minc report, concerned
the “Informatisation of the society” (Nora and Minc, 1978). Adopting a wider view, beyond that of the
market level, it underlined the need for a national plan for the “révolution informatique”. It introduced the
term “télématique”, binding together the notions of telecommunications and “informatique”. For Nora and
Minc new technologies were to transform society in an horizontal way, penetrating all domains of activity,
within a context of radical social changes, regarding existing institution, as well as consumer preferences
that were urging for innovation.
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an understanding of markets as places where future clients search for a good to purchase,
those clients reasoning according to a bounded rationality decision-making model (March,
1978). The costs encountered in order for this search process to reach its conclusion are
considered very signiﬁcant for both clients and vendors, thus a source of value is proposed
to provide ways to limit them. For instance, a real-estate agency putting a tenant in contact
with a house owner is a typical example of the added value described by both approaches4.
Transaction cost economics focus exclusively on market transactions facilitation. As such,
they do not analyse production, design or organizational issues.
These concepts have been used for the study of innovation phenomena in the case of user
innovation as well as in the ﬁeld of platform management. The notion of “sticky information”
(von Hippel, 1994) has been based on this theory, suggesting that use-related information
is costly to transfer from the user to the manufacturer side. From a diﬀerent perspective,
modularity is proposed to be an eﬃcient way to reduce transaction and information costs
both within an organisation and a value chain, as group autonomy enabled by common design
rules reduces the need for communication (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Baldwin, 2008). Hence,
the concepts of sticky information and modularity have acted as interdisciplinary boarders
between economics and management, enabling the exploration of their further implications
in collective action ﬁelds.
Most management studies on Web services adopt the approach of the transaction costs
reduction as a means to analyse the value created (Bourreau and Gensollen, 2004; Caillaud
and Jullien, 2003; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Baldwin and Woodard, 2010, and others).
Following this way of thinking, one can interpret the success of Search Engines on the
Web, such as Altavista and, later on, Yahoo and Google, as ‘facilitators’ of the decision
making process for future buyers or sellers using the Web to reduce the ‘information’ or
‘transaction’ costs preceding a commercial operation.
For instance, Baldwin and Woodard (2010), consider buyers and sellers considered (plat-
form) complementors and eBay illustrates the importance of “bringing them inside the walls”,
reducing their transaction costs:
The buyers and sellers on eBay want to transact with one another, and are willing
to pay a fee to the platform if it reduces their transaction costs. The same holds
for the merchant and customer in a credit card transaction, and the searchers,
searchees and advertisers on Google (Baldwin and Woodard, 2010, p. 39).
The same value had become evident even before the Web, during the broad expansion of
the Minitel online service in France, and speciﬁcally the immediate success of the Annuaire
Électronique, an online user directory, and, later on, the Kiosque, an online directory for
services available within the Télétel network.
Particularly, Bourreau and Gensollen (2004), studying forums of cultural goods retailers
observe that user communities exchange knowledge that is necessary to buy a cultural or
“experience” good. Of course, consumer forums are a fraction of the total amount of online
forums, though more interesting for market studies.
Limits of the information economy concept: semantic Web and social networking platforms
By continuing this reasoning, scholars have predicted that “Web 3.0” - as opposed to the
“Web 2.0”- would be deployed on the basis of the semantic Web concept (Lassila and
4For an in-depth comparison of the two approaches, see Engelbrecht (1997).
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Hendler, 2007; Hendler and Golbeck, 2008; Hendler, 2008). The idea of the semantic Web
is based on the classiﬁcation of information according to hierarchical information categories.
A very simpliﬁed version of this view, concerning business innovation, is the following: since
information search has been a principal innovation trajectory for the online business, the
semantic Web, where information could be more structured and, thus, more easy to access,
would be the next great innovation trajectory for the domain.
Although semantic information categories were popular to the scientiﬁc community, and
most frequently appear in disciplines such as data base management, early indications have
suggested that they don’t constitute the only way for a public of users to search and access
information. As engineers had noted back in 2005, 4% of Web searches concerned queries on
individual’s names (Guha and Garg, 2005), while the equivalent part was estimated at a rate
of 5-10% in 2007 (Kalashnikov et al., 2008). While search engines display information on
the basis of user requests (typically by the use of keywords), social media ‘push’ information
from user to user, mixing it with expressions of personal feelings, viewpoints or experiences.
While there have been evolutions on this approach in Web services infrastructures, more
signiﬁcantly in the organisation of large databases, end-user services being exclusively based
on the semantic categorisation of information by the users, also called “folksonomy” (Auray,
2007), such as Delicious5, had a limited success compared to social networking platforms,
though they emerged during the same period.
Hence, the emergence of social networking services indicates a change in the value of
information technologies, related to the information or transaction cost reduction, described
by Porat and Wallis and North. Within the discipline of economics, the network approach
better describes the social aspects, though always on an abstract level.
In parallel, transaction cost approaches do not enter the development and design process
challenges. An exception is the work of Baldwin (2008), where she argues that modular
design can reduce transaction costs6. Baldwin refers to a transaction network, such as a
5Delicious is one of the services that signiﬁed the Web 2.0 era, being one of the ﬁrst Web-based cloud
computing services. The service consists in saving one’s bookmarks or favourite Web pages online, in ones
Delicious account. Moreover, users categorise these links by attributing one or more key words (tags). It was
developed as a spare time project by Joshua Schachter, working at the time in Wall Street, and presented
in one of the early conferences of the milieu of Silicon Valley developers/entrepreneurs, the Foo Camp, in
2003.
Following a course of growth, the service was acquired from Yahoo! in 2005 for about $ 30 millions.
It was the period wherein most of the features of the Web 2.0 (such as blogs, forums, tagging systems,
photo-sharing sites) have been developed, often by developers/entrepreneurs that later sold afterwards their
platforms to actors such as Google, Amazon or Yahoo!.
However, the service did not manage to grow as quickly as the ones of its generation. In 2008, it had
nearly 6 millions users, while Friendster, one of the early social networking sites founded a year earlier than
Delicious, measured 70 million users in 2008. Eventually, Yahoo! sold Delicious in 2011.
See Lacy (2009); YouTube Founders Acquire Delicious, Slashdot, April 27,
2011. URL: http://news.slashdot.org/story/11/04/27/2112239/YouTube-Founders-Acquire-
Delicious?utm_source=headlines&utm_medium=email . Retrieved on August 20, 2012;Charles
Arthur, Yahoo to sell Delicious for $1m, The Gardian.18 March 2011. URL:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/18/yahoo-sell-delicious-stumbleupon . Retrieved
on August 20, 2012.; Friendster dying? More like growing, Bitbot, June 29, 2008. URL:
http://bitbot.wordpress.com/2008/06/29/friendster/ . Retrieved on August 20, 2012.
6Baldwin (2008) mentions:
Modularizations, whatever their stated purpose, create new module boundaries with (rela-
tively) low transaction costs. Modularizations thus make transactions feasible where they
were previously impossible or very costly (Baldwin, 2008, p. 42).
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market, of which the architecture may imply reduced transaction costs. Still, this study does
not refer to the development process per se, but to its modular outcome.
The value of the network
Another popular approach for the interpretation of the “Web 2.0 phenomenon” is the one
of network externalities (Shuen, 2008; Hendler, 2008; Deshayes and Bourguinat, 2008; Lee
et al., 2010). According to this approach, the value of a good (e.g. a Web service) increases
the more people use it. A common example in this literature is the case of the FAX, which
becomes more valuable the more people use it. This approach was funded by Katz and
Shapiro (1986) in order to propose “a formal model on network competition”, founded on
the argument that “consumers will base their purchase decisions on expected network sizes”
(p. 426). Since then, various “laws” have been proposed to capture the exact value of a
network as calculated by its externalities7.
While there is no consensus in the academic community on the right equation, there
is however a certain reality of calculating Web services value by the number of end users.
Web services are most frequently evaluated by ﬁnancial circles on the basis of the number
of users, as well as the estimated value-per-user.
Limits of the network externalities approach
Beyond stressing the importance of an end user base, the attempt to provide a precise
numerical value of a service induced exclusively by the number N of network externalities,
underestimates a number of variables, such as the quality of relations between end users, the
number of third party applications available in the service, the number of developers making
those applications, or the extension potential of the platform (as expressed for instance by
the variety of available or future applications) and so on.
Moreover, we should note that this approach already existed before the dot-com bubble
and inﬂuenced the entrepreneurs of that time. Kirsch and Goldfarb (2008) report the fact
that during that time, enterprises used to make use of extensive advertisement, in order to
“get big fast”. Nevertheless, the number of end users did not help many of them even pay
back the cost of advertisement, leading to bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the FAX communication networks have a relatively ﬁxed identity, concerning
the terminals, the uses as well as the networks themselves. Nevertheless, as has been
remarked (Le Masson et al., 2006) computers have a relatively weak identity. A consequence
7Metcalfe’s Law (Metcalfe, 1995), proposed by the homonym inventor of the Ethernet network and
further utilised by Shapiro and Varian (1999b), proposes that the value of a network is proportional to the
following number:
P = n2 − n, (3.1)
where n is the number of end users, or network externalities. In fact, the value of a network is considered
analogous to the number of possible pair connections among end users (n
2
−n
2
).
Reed (1999) proposed his own law, where the value of a network should be analogous to the following
number:
2n − n− 1 (3.2)
or, as he put it in his paper in the Harvard Business Review, the value of a “group-forming network”
increases exponentially, in proportion to 2n (Reed, 2001). The reasoning here is that one has to take into
account not only the pair connections between the end - users (one-to-one), but also the group connections
(many-to-many). One can ﬁnd diﬀerent variations of similar laws (eg. the KK-Law by Kilkki and Kalervo
(2004), or Zipf’s Law used by Briscoe et al. (2006)).
45
of that is that networks, terminals and exchange modes can be a ﬁeld of innovation in the
case of the Web.
The utility of a numerical value to be attributed to a service or a network refers to the
need for a market value of the service as a whole. Moreover, this market value is useful when
an enterprise enters the stock market. In fact, entering the stock market (IPOs8) was the
basic economic model for Web start-ups before 2001. Since the bubble though, and in the
framework of the “Web 2.0” entrepreneurial wave, IPOs were replaced by acquisitions from
large enterprises. However, when facing the issue of acquisitions, the monetary value of a
service is to be taken into account partially, as more criteria are to be considered, such as
technological and cultural integration issues, not included in the laws described above.
The multi-sided market approach
Further observations on networks, using in parallel the logic of transaction economics, led to
the expression of the “chicken and egg” problem (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003). In networks
that act as markets, such as eBay for instance, the value depends on the number of sellers
and buyers. However, for a network to emerge a “critical mass” of either category is necessary
to attract the other. Price moderation from the service provider has been proposed as a
regulating strategy within this framework. Hence, Rochet and Tirole (2003) proposed that
free access to “Internet portals” resolves this issue, by attracting potential buyer in the ﬁrst
place.
However, on the developer level, beyond the requirement that a service has to have as
many users as possible, the network externalities approach does not provide further insights
on how to conceive and develop an online service.
Another slightly diﬀerent approach used by the literature is the one of multi-sided markets
(also referred to as double-sided markets or networks). The review of this literature can be
facilitated by the case of eBay. It is perhaps the most studied or referred to case in the
domain of Web business, which makes it a horizontal case across diﬀerent management
approaches, thus consisting of a meeting ground for management scholars.
eBay has been one of the few companies founded before the dot-com bubble that has
managed to become a leading enterprise in the Web services sector. Consequently, it has
been mentioned as an exemplary case of Web service in a number of studies in Management
(Lai and Turban, 2008; Karakas, 2009; Levy, 2009; Baldwin and Woodard, 2010; Suarez and
Cusumano, 2010; Chantepie, 2010, and others). All these studies refer to the initial business
model of eBay, described by the following sequence of processes:
1. An end user auctions a good on the Web site of the service,
2. he or she deﬁnes a starting price and an auction period,
3. then an auction within the community of end users takes place,
4. the good is sold to the bidder once the pre-deﬁned period of auction ends,
5. eBay gets reimbursed for the transaction,
6. the seller sends the good to the buyer,
8IPO: Initial Public Oﬀering.
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7. the buyer may evaluate the seller on the latter’s eBay proﬁle, providing to the service
the knowledge for the liability of the seller, to be used from other end users in future
transactions.
In Caillaud and Jullien (2003), one of the basic articles explaining the approach of “two
sided markets”, used eBay as an example of a two-sided market with the following description:
Auction websites charge fees that are proportional to the transaction price or
even piecewise linear, but sellers also have to pay registration fees that depend
on their reserve prices.
The authors propose a model on the “equilibrium market structures” that emerge as well
as diﬀerent pricing strategies. The intervention assets that double sided markets have in their
disposal are the informational intermediation as well as the price discrimination (namely the
transaction fees). Using a similar framework, Bourreau and Gensollen (2004) highlight the
economic importance of the search tools in Web platforms, regulating the access to new
products and thus, competition within this market.
Like most approaches by economists, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Bourreau and
Gensollen (2004) use a “matchmaking” reasoning, that is an hypothesis that demand and
supply pre-exist the market, and that the market just puts them together. The possibility
that the Web service imposes or enables design rules on the development of the oﬀer is not
addressed.
As expressed in their more conceptual article, Rochet and Tirole (2004) describe a multi-
sided market as platform with the following characteristics:
A platform enables or facilitates the interaction between the two sides provided
that they indeed want to interact. The interaction can be pretty much anything,
but must be identified clearly. In the case of video games, an interaction occurs
when a buyer (gamer) buys a game developed by a seller, and plays it using the
console built by the platform (p.5).
In addition, the authors state that they share the view of the network externalities ap-
proach in the hypothesis that “there are non-internalized externalities among end-users”, as
“an end-user does not internalize the welfare impact of his use of the platform on other
end-users”, or in other words end-users act as individuals and not as groups (a proposition
that has been criticized by Reed’s Law, as we’ve seen in the Section 3.2.1).
The same analytical framework is utilized by Suarez and Cusumano (2010), (referred to
as two-sided networks), also using the case of eBay :
Each side of the network represents a different type of user, such as bidders and
sellers in the eBay system, and platform companies incur costs in serving each
group but can potentially collect revenues from each group as well (p. 83).
Here, the authors refer to the theory of Eisenmann on multi-sided networks. Eisenmann
et al. (2006) also describe a similar function of a platform as a multi-sided market, as
do Caillaud and Jullien (2003). Moreover, they refer to the potential of a platform to
“embody an architecture” to facilitate user interactions as well as a set of rules “that govern
transactions”.
In fact, the transaction cost theory is one of the fundamental analytical tools used in the
case of online services and for that reason it will be separately reviewed in the next section.
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The limits of the market approaches
Market approaches described in this section have a limited view on network externalities.
End users, either sellers or buyers, are taken into account only as unrelated individuals acting
according to a logic of bounded rationality and having cost as their sole criterion of action.
Active contribution to the service by or its content by end users or - even more - their
innovation is not taken into account. Similarly, the speciﬁc architecture of the network (its
topology) or the activity of third party developers/entrepreneurs on the extension of the
overall platform are overlooked.
Chapter 7 will study the case of an eBay application development, where it will become
clear that Web services become starting points for development, beyond their nature as
networks of product use and diﬀusion.
3.2.2 The management use approach: unconventional action
norms
The concept of the use of Web services platforms as an infrastructure for internal enterprise
organisation came about as a “colonisation” of enterprise action norms by those met outside,
rather than an extension of the community of practice logic.
Particularly, Mcafee (2006) argued that “wikis, blogs, group-messaging software and the
like can make a corporate intranet into a constantly changing structure built by distributed,
autonomous peers - a collaborative platform that reflects the way work really gets done”.
While CoP approach emphasises the long term relationships built through the work tasks as
a major factor for internal communities deployment (Wenger, 1998), the “Enterprise 2.0”
approach focuses on the potential of online practices diﬀusion within the enterprise.
Consequently, the issue has been tackled as a matter of “technologies adoption” and not
of technology design and development. Denyer et al. (2011) argued that adoption of such
technologies has major implications within the enterprise environment, calling for a change
in “organisational culture” and “leadership style”. More speciﬁcally, they summarised the
challenge as the requirement that “employees need to believe that it is safe to speak up”
(Denyer et al., 2011, p. 392). What is thus observed is how these technologies turn the
question of “technological adoption” to one of “personal expression”, even when they are
introduced to environments characterised by a standard division of roles and labour, such as
the enterprise.
Nevertheless, the concept of personal expression is diﬀerent to the one of labour, and by
extension to the one of collaboration, at least as it has been deﬁned by classic scholars like
Adam Smith or Frederick W. Taylor. Moreover, it is also diﬀerent to the concept of CoP,
as what constitutes an identity in this case is the common (practice, knowledge, interest)
and not the personal. Besides, the results of Denyer et al. (2011), far from being local
observations, match research results on general tendencies of the labour transformation,
as expressed by the work contract. Lefebvre (2009), conducting a genealogy of the work
contract concept from the late 18th century to our days, found that there it undergoes a
slow but stable transformation, suggesting that we have crossed a phase of transition leading
to the establishment of a “personal professional” contract type.
Autonomous communities: “mechanism” users, not designers
Management research studying online communities has historically been interested in the
open source phenomenon, where a distributed coordination of software development pro-
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cesses occurs (Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001; Shah, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003a; Bagozzi
and Dholakia, 2006, and others), where users learn and advance their skills through source
code sharing.
Still, the advancement of online interaction technologies lead to the use of such “mech-
anisms” of interaction by a broader public, beyond the developers. An exemplar case is
Wikipedia, where the close dependence of articles and editors relationships has been high-
lighted (Kane, 2009), as well as the very fact that users construct and share a common
information corpus (Gensollen, 2003; Benkler, 2006). Another case studied, also distant
from the technical communities, has been the one of video gamers. Haeﬂiger et al. (2009)
observed how user-evaluation mechanisms, such as marking a comment or a user with one or
more “stars”, enable a self regulation of the community, through resulting, “bottom-up” user
and content evaluation. Further research in such communities focussed on the diﬀerent roles
between the users, principally leaders and followers (Giuri et al., 2008; Ho and Huang, 2009;
Sutanto et al., 2011), or brokers and spanners (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007). Overall,
these studies explore norms of action that are rather novel, as they are unfamiliar to the
formal organisation norms used within the enterprise context.
Such examples lead to the declaration of the “Contribution Revolution”, (Cook, 2008),
according to which companies can harness the products of communities. The relationship
between such communities and enterprises is often problematic and occurs in an indirect
way, through the individual engagement of employees (Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; Dahlander
and Magnusson, 2005; Jarvenpaa and Lang, 2011).
However, the design process of these interaction mechanisms is almost always neglected,
while those studies who mention it clearly imply that they play a major role in structur-
ing the interactions in question. More explicit description though would have enabled an
exploration of the development conditions of such technologies or services from a user-
developer-entrepreneur perspective.
Knowledge and information sharing among consumers.
Bourreau and Gensollen (2004) have studied user communities of online retailer services, such
as Amazon or Fnac. In their paper they undertake a comparison between two theoretical
cases, on a basis of a mathematical model of market simulation: a retailer who sells only very
well-known books, and another one who sells many unknown titles. The originality of the
study is that it takes into account the tools oﬀered by the service in searching or evaluating
a good, as this parameter is typically ignored in studies that consider Web services as “n-
sided networks”. They conclude that retailers have strong incentives to diﬀerentiate their
catalogues of cultural goods to reduce the intensity of competition.
Gensollen (2003), referring to similar cases of online communities, characterizes in a
more conceptual article the relations among consumers, as well as between consumers and
enterprises hosting their communities. He proposes that the speciﬁcity of these communities
is the absence of links among the consumers, as these communities are completely mediated
by the platform. In addition, he stresses the fact that enterprises can have a direct relation
with their clients, exploiting the use-related feedback as an input to their internal processes
of innovation. He also suggest the need for a “limited intimacy” for participants, in order
for their contributions in the online discussion to be more eﬃcient for the whole community.
Gensollen (2007) stresses the role of an informational corpus jointly build by the com-
munity of customers (such as in the case of clients forums), important for the purchase and
consumption of ’experience goods’, such as books, ﬁlms or music.
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From a diﬀerent perspective, though in the same context, Richard (2010) highlights the
challenge for the business of customer relations, as it has to engage in the public discourse
on its products and to implement “Internet sites” to “adjust end user information” on a
unique knowledge base.
Given the expansion of online communities, the question of harnessing the beneﬁts of
their activity was soon posed by enterprises. Wenger’s approach on communities of prac-
tice (CoP)(Wenger, 1998; Wenger et al., 2002) had been initially used as an interpretive
framework (Hara, 2009). However, the three dimensions of CoP, community, practice and
domain, deﬁning the shared identity, knowledge and practices, cannot be “cultivated” by the
enterprise in cases where the communities act beyond its boundaries: studies have suggested
that there are diﬀerent incentives between user communities and producer ﬁrms.
Hence, Burger-Helmchen and Cohendet (2011) called for further research attention to
the enterprise-community relationship, as related to diﬀerent types of users, since end-user
communities refer to a diﬀerent knowledge domain (Wenger, 1998) than user-developer
communities.
A diﬀerent approach has been within the framework of open innovation, where external
communities are structured around idea competitions (Piller and Walcher, 2006; Ebner et al.,
2009; Huber et al., 2009). trajectories of study emerged in the research community: on the
one hand, Piller and Walcher (2006); Huber et al. (2009) emphasise the importance of
platform design to harness this type of communities. On the other hand, Blohm I et al.
(2011) explore the potential of collaboration between the participant teams as an alternative
setting, as well as combinatory approaches (Ebner et al., 2009).
However, more recent research has proposed that “intrinsic” motivations, such as con-
tributors’ enjoyment, tend to lead to more substantial contributions than “extrinsic” ones,
as monetary rewards usually assigned to contests winners (Frey et al., 2011). In the same
line, Hienerth et al. (2011), studying user community animation cases from well-known en-
terprises, observed that none of the companies use monetary rewards. Instead, they rely on
“user’s willingness to co-create in return for a) being valued as an equal partner, b) having
the opportunity to work on new new products and services or on the improvement of existing
ones that better fit their needs, c) being recognized by peers, and d) being allowed to take
up ideas generated during the ideation process” (Hienerth et al., 2011, p. 356).
Overall, while “crowdsourcing” logic more or less implicitly suggests that harnessing com-
munity value begins with addressing a task-division to a dispersed “crowd” (Howe, 2006b,a),
what is observed in practice is a rather inverse process, where users participation is more a
personal engagement, triggered by their interests, their desire to learn, to be recognised and
to create.
Hence, what research has observed is that external contributions come about as a result of
a personal identity process expression and construction, though this process does not ﬁt with
typical enterprise culture or professional identity action norms. Still, how can these incentives
become design requirements for developers desiring to create Web-based applications? In
order to identify some concepts that allow us to explore these questions, we need to further
tap into these dimensions of personal activity - a work that will be undertaken in the second
part of the current chapter.
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Harnessing external communities
Crowdsourcing: a Web platform as a communication medium for innovation.
The literature on crowdsourcing sees the Web as an opportunity for enterprises to exploit the
potential of end user communities. The term was coined by Jeﬀ Howe, editor in the Wired
Magazine. In his article entitled “5 rules of the new labour pool” Howe (2006a) describes
the following principles of crowdsourcing:
1. The crowd is dispersed.
2. The crowd has a short attention span.
3. The crowd is full of specialists.
4. The crowd produces mostly crap.
5. The crowd finds the best stuff.
According to Howe’s reasoning, the “crowd” can operate tasks, which can be of important
specialization, as long as they are divided in elementary parts necessitating ”less than 30
minutes to complete”. Open calls for submission of ideas or solutions produce by default low
quality contributions. Nevertheless, a ﬁltering of these contributions can be operated by the
user community itself.
Studies on crowdsourcing, mainly examine user contests, where a problem is posed by
an enterprise and a good solution is sought. These studies examine the behaviour of the
participants in crowdsourcing initiatives (Haythornthwaite, 2009) and their relation with
expertise (Roman, 2009; Poetz and Schreier, 2010), the designing of new products, such as
t-shirts by the crowd (Brabham, 2008; Piller, 2010), the design attributes of competition
platforms (Huber et al., 2009) as well as task formulation issues (Kittur et al., 2008a).
Thus, literature on crowdsourcing faces Web platforms as a communication medium for
innovation, either studied from the perspective of knowledge or ideas sharing, or from the
perspective of competitive problem - solving. We should note though, that crowdsourcing
does not inﬂuence the platform used. While a “good platform for crowdsourcing” can be
a question of research in this literature, the object of the contest is usually beyond the
device of the platform (e.g. a t-shirt). Participants do not modify the design parameters or
functionalities of the crowdsourcing platform.
The consumer - producer
The capability of users to publish information on the Web has lead to a diﬀerent model, very
popular in the “Web 2.0” era: the model where users consume the information produced by
themselves. We propose the distinction between two diﬀerent categories of cases: the cases
referring to a common corpus of information and the ones referring to a private corpus.
Usually, the ﬁrst category of information is shared in public, while the second one in an
intimate circle of “friends”.
The most common case of a common corpus of information is Wikipedia, which con-
stitutes one of the study ﬁelds of interdisciplinary discussion among management science,
sociology and computer science, though public enterprise forums are also studied in the same
context. Research questions include contribution modalities (Levrel, 2006; Cook, 2008),
including “best ways” of participation coordination (Kittur et al., 2008b), motivations of
the “Wikipedians” (Nov, 2007), issues related to on-line discussion (Kittur et al., 2007;
Garﬁnkel, 2008; Auray et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2009), consumer communities governance
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issues (Forte et al., 2009; Fredberg, 2009; Haeﬂiger et al., 2009; Nambisan and Watt, 2010),
contributors relations (Kane, 2009).
In the second category, recent research examines the ﬁeld of online ‘social networks’, such
as Facebook or Twitter. Management studies focus on the use of these services from a mar-
keting perspective, rather than their design and development. Research includes questions
on the use of these services by large enterprises (Rybalko and Seltzer, 2010), on the relation
between online and local networks (Felzensztein et al., 2010), participation of consumers in
company marketing (Muniz Jr and Schau, 2011). A basic concept in these lineage of studies
is the concept of the viral marketing, reviewed in the section 3.2.2.
Viral Marketing
Miller et al. (2009) summarize well another inﬂuential approach of management studies
regarding on-line communities:
Consumers’ preferences form within communities as individuals exchange opin-
ions about products and services and observe one another’s purchases.
This aspect is studied by the ﬁeld of online services and is termed viral marketing. This
approach highlights the value of the word-of-mouth promotion, or buzz (Dye, 2000). Viral
marketing uses electronic communications to trigger branded electronic messages throughout
a widespread network of buyers (Dobele et al., 2005). The virtue of the Internet in this case
is described as follows:
It makes talking easier for customers, and its low-cost, minimal response time,
and potential market impact make it attractive for businesses willing to put
in the effort to create and implement thoughtful viral marketing designs and
campaigns.
Viral marketing research questions include the content of the main messages of marketing
campaigns (Dobele et al., 2007; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2011; Swanepoel et al., 2009), the
importance of pre-existing customers relational networks in the spread of the buzz (De
Bruyn and Lilien, 2008), the importance of capturing the customer feedback of consumers’
behaviour (Phelps et al., 2004; Kalyanam et al., 2007).
What is important is the circulation of the information containing an enterprise’s mes-
sage. This approach is putting the enterprise into the position of a Web service end user,
trying to inﬁltrate user networks. Yet, in our study we will be interested in the enterprises
and entrepreneurs that design and develop Web services, rather than their end users. Never-
theless, to the extent that Web 2.0 economical models largely depend on advertisement, the
question of how to construct services in which end users will “perpetually exist” and receive
the advertisement remains important.
3.2.3 Sociological and STS approaches: the distinction between
user and developer
Sociology as well as STS (Science, Technology and Society) studies are largely based on the
separation of use and development processes, in an analogous way to which innovation models
are distinguished by Raasch and von Hippel (2012) in the producer and the user paradigms.
Mallard (2007) reviews the principal studies in sociology noting a distance between use and
innovation perspectives, an “impossible integration of sociology of uses and sociology of
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Figure 3.2: Research perspective: the review of studies on Web services use aims in the
identiﬁcation of Web service requirements, considered common both for UDEs and service
providers.
innovation” (Mallard, 2007, p. 2), following the general rules of distinction between those
developing and those using a speciﬁc innovation (Callon, 1992). Figure 3.2 graphically
synthesises the diﬀerent approaches, as mapped in comparison to the categories proposed
by Raasch and von Hippel.
Hence, as Mallard synthesizes, innovation is mainly studied by a use and user perspective,
highlighting diﬀerent phases of product life. There are studies focussing on the appropria-
tion through transformation or “domestication” of technology (Jouët, 2000; Haddon, 2004),
on the user-designer interaction through “use programming” and adoption or through ser-
vice provider and client interaction (feedback) (Akrich, 1993; Boullier, 1990) and through
the integration of user innovations by manufacturers, or “bottom-up” innovation (Cardon,
2005). To that, Mallard (2007) adds the “top-down” innovation perspective, where provider
innovations are transformed by users during adoption.
Particularly in what regards the ﬁeld of contemporary Web services, Réseaux (Networks)
review constitutes a corpus of systematic research on uses (Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel,
2006a; Cardon, 2008; Beuscart et al., 2009). Synthesising the research on the ﬁeld, Cardon
(2008) argues that “Web 2.0” services can be categorised through the “identity formats”
adopted by users in relationship to the “visibility strategies” proposed by each service. Hence,
Cardon proposes a cartography of Web 2.0 services, dividing them into “civil identity”, “active
identity”, “virtual identity” and “narrative identity” ones. Hence, Beuscart et al. (2009) ﬁnd
that in Flickr, a popular photo-sharing platform, users share their photos with a controlled
audience, where conversation on the photos marks their quality. A fact that service providers
respect, as the forms of “editorialisation”, that is the proposition of content to other users,
respect this distinction of audiences.
As Georges (2009) observes, the peculiarity of online identity building lies in the fact that
it is a process operated through the “traces” users leave, what commonly is referred to as
content. Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel (2006a) in one of the early studies of this “school”,
explored the “production of the self” through a user interaction within the blogosphere. They
analyse how, through using the features of a blogging platform (such as posting, linking,
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commenting etc.), users build their own identity while interacting with “their public”.
The authors identiﬁed four modes of enunciation in blogs: intimacy sharing among
anonymous users; familiar conversation among relatives; community-based coordination; and
public opinion exchanges. Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel remark that, although these modes
of blogging practice are characterised by diﬀerent attributes, they all take place by using the
same device, the blogging platform.
While the discussion of the relationship of this mode of use with the business world often
leads to a discussion on the use of private information by enterprises in activities such as
marketing or recruitment (Rallet and Rochelandet, 2011; Miltgen, 2011; Benraïss-Noailles
and Viot, 2012), the studies in the use of “Web 2.0” services reveal an interesting fact for the
development perspective: while these studies initially adopt a user-to-user level of analysis,
they highlight the importance of the service “object” and its design to the deﬁnition, or the
“programming” (Akrich, 1993), of user activity potential.
Hence, the conclusions of these studies could be used from a developer’s perspective
as a set of “general requirements” to respect when designing a new service, consisting
in the conception of “places” where individual identity can be reaﬃrmed and deployed.
Thus, concepts and knowledge used in the development process should include personal
development. As we are going to discuss in the next chapters, this remark can be consistent
with user innovation literature, to the extent to which the innovation in question embodies
personal knowledge and ideas - as opposed to innovation embodying knowledge and ideas
reﬂecting personal identities diﬀerent to the developer’s.
3.2.4 The use of the Web for communication amongst developers
A diﬀerent case of online communities, is the case of developers communities. The issue
of developer communities has been extensively studied on the ﬁeld of open source software
development.
As Benkeltoum (2008) noted, these are communities of user-developers. An inﬂuential
book for management has been The cathedral and the bazaar by Raymond (1999), popular
in the open source developers community public. Raymond described in his book how he
built an e-mail client, Fetchmail (a program downloading one’s e-mail from the server to his
computer) with the help of a community. To the model of centralized software development
process (the “cathedral”) of an enterprise or an organisation, Raymond opposes the model
of distributed development (the “bazaar”) of a networked community of developers. As
O’Mahony (2003) remarks, open source and free software projects are initiated and managed
by a distributed group of people who do not share the same employer.
Raymond describes some good practices and propositions for community based develop-
ment, later further explored by management scholars.
A ﬁrst issue addressed was the one of problem solving:
Raymond’s Proposition. Every good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s
personal itch.
The same proposition was also formulated as follows:
Raymond’s Proposition. To solve an interesting problem, start by finding a problem that
is interesting to you.
This proposition would be later formulated as the private-collective model (von Hippel
and von Krogh, 2003, 2006). According to it, innovations comes from a personal problem
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solving process, to be later shared with the community of users. In addition, innovators
beneﬁt from “positive network eﬀects” while diﬀusing their innovations. An aspect of this
is that most innovations address problems faced by a user community (Benkeltoum, 2008).
A second ﬁeld of propositions concerns community management and participation, where
the question of enterprise participation is more explicitly studied.
Raymond’s Proposition. Treating your users as co-developers is your least-hassle route to
rapid code improvement and effective debugging.
Raymond’s Proposition. Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost
every problem will be characterized quickly and the fix obvious to someone. Or, less formally,
“Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”
Studies on participation noted that more experienced developers participate more in these
communities (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006). A number of studies (Bergquist and Ljungberg,
2001; Lakhani et al., 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; Zeitlyn, 2003) explore the individual
motivations for participation in opensource community, such as reputation, knowledge acqui-
sition or personal utility. O’Mahony (2007) examines the governance of such communities,
proposing a model taking into account the parameters of pluralism, independence, decen-
tralized decision making, autonomy in participation and representation of the community in
central decision making.
The role of enterprises in this framework can either be by contributing code to the
community (Lerner and Tirole, 2004) or by communities of enterprises (Henkel, 2003). At
the same time, Benkeltoum (2008), noting the elements of solidarity in these communities
(beyond individual motivations), also notes that open source software projects are often
developed in shifting organisational environments.
Compared to the case of Web services development, there are some important diﬀerences.
While in the case of open source software the source code of the programs is accessible to
all with the liberty (in the case of free software) to copy, modify, distribute and use the
program at one’s will, in the case of Web services the source code is not available to either
end users or to developers. Use (consumption, production or development) of the platforms
takes place on the basis of the interfaces, that is in relation with speciﬁc (and speciﬁed)
inputs and outputs. Moreover, the availability of the service is under the control of one
organisation, the service provider enterprise, which can control use and access issues, either
by the terms of use, or by the devices themselves.
Chapter 17 will explore the use of the Web by developers for problem-solving processes,
once the modus operandi of Web-based application development is determined.
3.3 A framework for an industrial analysis. The
distinction between manufacturer and user
paradigms
In management literature, as well as in practice, two visions of innovation process organisation
are often opposed. On the one hand, there is the traditional enterprise-based innovation
paradigm, which follows new product or service management methods (NPD) to provide
a new good to the market and has been extensively studied in industrial contexts. On
the other hand, user innovation often takes place beyond the enterprise context and within
55
user communities, thus raising the question of the relation between this type of innovation,
enterprises and markets. The case of Web-based platforms demands a critical review of both
currents, as innovation phenomena in this context are located in the intersection between
the two approaches.
Late research in user innovation focuses on interaction between user innovators and
enterprises. In their recent article Raasch and von Hippel (2012) summarize previous work in
user innovation and focus on the rivalry between two innovation paradigms: the “free”, peer
diﬀusion one, as studied by the literature on free-revealing of knowledge and innovations (von
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006), and the producer-based ‘paradigm’. This opposition
has also been underlined by the complementary work of Baldwin and von Hippel (2011),
according to whom the criterion for the distinction between the two is whether or not user
innovators (either enterprises or individuals) freely reveal their innovations with a community
of peers or, in the contrary, follow a closed, proprietary model for their exploitation. Thus,
the economical motivations in the two cases are not the same: “users expect to benefit from
using a design, a product or a service”, while ‘‘producers expect to benefit from selling” it
(Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011, p. 3).
The general model of Raasch and von Hippel (2012), summarized in the Figure 3.3,
can be used as a starting point for our literature review. There, the authors juxtapose two
diﬀerent paradigms, the user innovation paradigm (von Hippel, 2005, and others) on the top
and the “linear” producer innovation one as described by Godin (2006), the latter induced
by an historical study on managerial doctrines.
The arrow connecting the two paradigms represents for the authors the interactions
between the paradigms. In their article they explore this interaction in terms of competition
and complementarity between these two modes.
Figure 3.3: The user and producer innovation and diﬀusion paradigms (Raasch and von
Hippel, 2012).
However, what happens in the case where a single developer creates and exploits an
application on top of an existing platform? Is such a case valuable for platform providers?
We will proceed to an analytical review of the two paradigms mentioned by Raasch and von
Hippel taking into account the advances in Management literature studying the diﬀerent
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phases outlined in Figure 3.3.
In the Figure 3.4 we indicate the positioning of our research ﬁeld and problem within the
literature on innovation management.
I
Application
Developers?
Figure 3.4: The position of our research ﬁeld and problem within innovation management
literature.
3.3.1 The user innovation paradigm
Raasch and von Hippel begin their reasoning by the review of studies on user innovation,
which they see in three phases, according to the process observed in the ﬁeld. Firstly, users
innovate on the basis of their own needs (von Hippel, 1986). User innovation is understood
as a problem-solving process, where “sticky information” (von Hippel, 1994), possessed by
“lead users”, yet ignored by the manufacturers (von Hippel, 1986), is mobilized for the design
of new objects.
Afterwards, user innovators usually “freely reveal” (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003,
2006) their knowledge and concepts to a community of fellow users, the latter being able
to modify the initial innovations, as in the case of the free/open source software (Lakhani
and von Hippel, 2003; Benkeltoum, 2011, and others). That is the phase of “collaborative
evaluation, replication and improvement” indicated in the Figure 3.3.
Finally, innovations are diﬀused through “peer-to-peer diffusion” channels, such as hor-
izontal user networks (von Hippel, 2007) or communities (Franke and Shah, 2003), where,
according to Raasch and von Hippel, “no producers need to be involved” (Raasch and von
Hippel, 2012, p. 2).
The experience of open source software development has been of an important inﬂuence
on user innovation studies. Such projects act more as a common infrastructure rather than
products. Through distributed collaboration (Lee and Cole, 2003) developers, participating
either as motivated volunteers or as a part of their oﬃcial occupation tasks (Bergquist and
Ljungberg, 2001; Hars and Ou, 2001; Ghosh et al., 2002; Lakhani et al., 2002; von Krogh
et al., 2003a; Zeitlyn, 2003), develop programs that can be commonly accessed and modiﬁed.
An open question in this literature is the one of the relationship between enterprises and
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communities as, in order to lead an open source project, a constant change of the framing
organisation is needed (Benkeltoum, 2008, 2011).
Two innovation trajectories for users.
The recent discourse on the interactions between the two paradigms does not take into
account the diﬀerent trajectories that user innovation may follow. The notion of “sticky”
knowledge (von Hippel, 1994), while alerting enterprises on their ignorance of some valuable
knowledge related to the goods they produce, it has implicitly discouraged the eﬀort to
further categorize user knowledge and concepts.
However, looking into the case studies of some of the most important studies on user
innovation, we can retrace two diﬀerent methods the users may follow: the one of problem-
solving and that of use-diversion.
The ﬁrst method, the one of problem-solving, results from the activity of users leading to
innovation through the problem solving method. Here, innovators using “sticky knowledge”
(von Hippel, 1994) regarding the product in use, identify problems that others cannot, and
invent new solutions. This is the case for instance for “knee-activated brake levers”, providing
greater braking power and helping avoiding fatigue in a very mountainous terrain, in the case
of mountain bike innovation studied by Lüthje et al. (2005). This type of innovation modiﬁes
the object’s design parameters (the brake), though not the identity of the object or its use
(in this case, it remains a mountain bike used for mountainous terrain).
The second method, the one of use diversion, results from the activity of users leading
to innovation by highjacking the design rules of the object in use. Here, innovators have
the knowledge of the use, though utilize knowledge of a distant ﬁeld to divert the “kind
of use”, thus the identity of the object. A very enlightening study on this method is the
case examined by Haeﬂiger et al. (2010) where a gaming platform became a ﬁlm producing
platform, through user innovation.
Haeﬂiger et al. (2010) study a case where user entrepreneurship takes place in a diﬀerent
market. In their case study, video game users utilize the virtual context of a video game
platform (graphical environment, characters etc.) to create and commercialize ﬁlms, entering
into the motion picture market. The resulting ﬁlming “school”, using video game platforms
to shoot ﬁlms is called “Machinima”. The conclusions regard user’s creativity when in an
entrepreneurial venture:
The point here is not that user entrepreneurs’ creativity is unlimited but that
their accumulated experience in the production of Machinima, and the gaming
culture that the team shares with its audience, are sources of new ideas that can
give rise to new opportunities and ultimately to commercialization (Haefliger
et al., 2010, p. 1210) .
In other words, the authors observe a double phenomenon: on the one hand, the conﬁg-
uration of the gaming platform (constituted by its features as well as its public) conditioned
by entrepreneur’s creativity, in a way similar to the one we described in Part I: it constituted
an initial knowledge base and conceptual architecture, though expansive partitions (Hatchuel
and Weil, 2009), in particularly by partitioning the design space by the use of a new knowl-
edge base - the one of ﬁlm making. It is important to note here that innovation did not
entail the modiﬁcation of platform’s design parameters (DPs), but an introduction of new
functional requirements (FRs). This diversion of the use opened up a radically new design
space. On the level of knowledge, entrepreneurs needed to master the platform’s design
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parameters. Moreover, they needed to have some knowledge, not trivial in the community
of gamers, regarding ﬁlm making.
As Haeﬂiger et al. note, the origins of this transformation of use are to be found in gamers’
innovation during the 1990s, according to which users often recorded their adventures and
then published them. Moreover, they note that the diﬀerence between user innovators and
user entrepreneurs lies in the latter’s skills in applying complementary assets. They note that
a “non-feature”, a property not having a central role in the gaming experience (in particular
the fact that avatars could point down their gun and look straight ahead) could be exploited
in artistically (to create the illusion of two avatars engaging in a dialogue). Hence, features
of a platform may obtain a higher value than the one predicted by a diversion of the use
trajectory.
However, the design parameters were critical to enabling such an operation: this platform
made available a feature which users could use to record their experience. The innovators
studied used this feature beyond their own gaming experience, to record the avatars in the
virtual environment as if they were to record actors, far beyond the game’s objectives.
In Figure 3.5 I schematically represent the two innovation trajectories we encountered in
the literature regarding user innovations. As in the C-K theory (Hatchuel and Weil, 2009),
the schema is divided in two spaces: the concept space and the knowledge one. However,
the concept space begins with a known artefact, that is the object of use.
Figure 3.5: Two trajectories of user innovation: problem-solving and use diversion.
This simple categorisation is however important, as it implies diﬀerent modes of enterprise-
UDE interaction. When users use the problem-solving way, enterprises are expected to sup-
port the user activity. A speciﬁc task entering this regime (Hatchuel, 1999; Segrestin et al.,
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2002; Garel and Rosier, 2008; Elmquist and Segrestin, 2009; Benkeltoum, 2011) is contribut-
ing to the resolution of bugs reported by users, something that in the context of open source
software development is undertaken by the community itself (Auray, 2004).
On the other hand, regarding the use-reversion trajectory, things may become more com-
plicated for enterprises. Unexpected trajectories should be identiﬁed and platform potential
exploration should allow the evaluation of the trajectory before engaging resources to support
a new direction.
Of course, enterprises should be able to evaluate user innovation as a whole and be
in position to autonomously propose new trajectories, aligning the community at the same
time.
3.3.2 The manufacturer paradigm
While user innovation is often triggered by user needs, the methods followed in the business
world are a lot more structured. Raasch and von Hippel describe the “linear paradigm” as
follows:
Producers start by studying user needs, and then perform R&D as needed to
develop and produce novel products and services. Next they diffuse what they
have created via sales in the marketplace. As producers would lose profits and
sales if other producers adopt their innovations without payment, innovating
producers generally try to prevent this via such means as secrecy and intellectual
property rights (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012, p. 3).
The four phases presented by the authors (Figure 3.3) represent the main categories of the
linear paradigm (Godin, 2006). However, these phases undergo important transformations
as well: market research is no longer limited to studying user needs, R&D is called in to
integrate the function of innovation, product development management is urged to take into
account design as well as market considerations.
Typically, during the “Market Research” phase, where “producers start by studying user
needs” (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), marketing studies, following qualitative or quantita-
tive methodologies, are undertaken by enterprises and institutions, aiming at an estimation of
the demand, on the basis of consumer behaviour and consumption reasoning (Langeard and
Meyer, 1975). Still, Drucker (1998) calls for attention on “unexpected occurrences”, “de-
mographic changes” and “changes in attitudes” regarding consumers: such transformations
create new market spaces and trigger innovation processes beyond the already established
metrics. The case of Ford Mustang is cited by Drucker as a result of the realisation that
lifestyle was at the time the new segmentation of the car industry market, replacing the one
of income. Moreover, marketing can introduce new values that did not exist before, what
is also referred to as value innovation Kim and Mauborgne (1997). More generally, it has
been remarked since the 70’s that there is a fast rate of consumer behaviour transformations
(Carof, 1973; Nora and Minc, 1978), with enterprises responding to those changes with short
product life cycles, as the revenue depending on three year old products can represent 80%
of the total revenue (Le Masson et al., 2006, p. 68). Thus, I can summarize the ﬁrst phase
as the one of the initial concept/idea elaboration, either being the response to a speciﬁed
user need/desire, or being the fruit of a new value introduction, which in any case should
correspond to a competitive environment of intensive innovation (Le Masson et al., 2006).
In parallel, R&D is placed by Raasch and von Hippel in the second phase of the linear
model. However, R& D has also been a study ﬁeld for research questioning the linearity of
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innovation process. The discussion in R&D management has taken important dimensions,
especially since the 1980s, opening up two challenges (Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996):
• R&D ﬁnancing and articulation between science and technology on the one hand and
• capturing the ‘fruits of research’ through innovation on the other .
As we enter into the realm of competition through innovation, a broader view of inno-
vation becomes necessary beyond the ﬁeld of speciﬁc products, confronting it as “a process
having its own specificities, resources, targets and management”, guiding and articulating
Research and Development (Hatchuel et al., 2001). Hence the imperative of innovation in
New Product Development (NPD) questions in practice the linearity of the process: man-
agement of concepts and knowledge, time, processes as well as the value included in the
realm of innovation the acceptance of the unknown.
On the level of ﬁnancing, diﬀerent modes have been applied. While public funds can
cover parts of costs, especially for large industrial groups (Gandon and Jacquin, 2001), indus-
trial partnerships are also frequent, resulting in complex “webs” (Rosenbloom and Spencer,
1996) of alliances or joint ventures (Baptista et al., 1991; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Peng
and Shenkar, 2002). Hence, co-evolution (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000), co-development
(Chesbrough and Schwartz, 2007) and co-innovation (Maniak and Midler, 2008) incentives
emerge to cover the gap in the ﬁnancial but also the cognitive level within partnerships.
However, even when the phase of development (indicated in the bottom arrow in Fig-
ure 3.3) is reached, research and design is often not over, as the notion of “closure” (Bijker
et al., 1987) of the design at some point in the process before launching a product to a
market is challenged in practice. While useful in process modelling, linear models frequently
fail when faced with the element of the unknown implied in innovation. Thus, a certain level
of openness in the process has been proposed by diﬀerent management scholars.
A very inﬂuential representation of this process is the funnel metaphore (Cooper, 1987),
shown in Figure 3.6, according to which the initial project ideas are progressively ﬁltered
through a go/kill decision process:
A “new product funnel” builds in tough go/kill decision points throughout the
process; the poor projects are weeded out; scarce resources are redirected toward
the truly deserving projects - the high value ones; and more focus is the result
(Cooper, 2001, p. 116).
However, linearity in this process is questioned as well. During NPD processes, ﬁrms
are called upon to acquire the virtues of speed and anticipation (Brown and Eisenhardt,
1995; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Jouini et al., 2004), to “freeze” the design concept in
the middle - and not the beginning - of the NPD process (Iansiti, 1993, 1998) and develop
“anticipation”, “reaction” and “ﬂexibility” capabilities (Verganti, 1999; MacCormack et al.,
2001; Buganza and Verganti, 2006). Moreover, it has been proven (Hooge, 2010) that during
NPD processes, value is not universally deﬁned among stake holders, as it presents important
variations through the course of the project. In the particular case of NPD collaboration,
this variation makes mutual engagement diﬃcult, as a contract “may hide more than it
reveals” (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997), hence joint ventures may end in “divorce” (Peng
and Shenkar, 2002). Thus a diﬀerent kind of engagement, a “contract for exploration”
(Segrestin, 2006) remains to be invented.
Besides, as enterprises act and react within a business environment implying among
diﬀerent actors, knowledge and ideas are exchanged along diﬀerent organisations. Bayart
et al. note:
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Figure 3.6: New product development funnel (Cooper, 2001). Poor projects are “killed”,
deserving projects “go”.
By introducing the possibility of “trading”, buying or selling projects (wholly
or partly) at different stages in their development, the relevant business model
is modified to take into account the management of the R&D portfolio. This
takes us from the conventional R&D “funnel” to one which we might describe
as a “porous funnel”, leaving room for trading with other firms as shown in the
diagram below (Bayart et al., 2000, p. 10) [Diagram reproduced in Figure 3.7].
Figure 3.7: New product development “porous” funnel (Bayart et al., 2000). New projects
can be bought during the NPD process.
For Open Innovation literature (Chesbrough, 2003a,b; Chesbrough et al., 2006, and oth-
ers), these purposive “inflows and outflows of knowledge and ideas” can be managed through
extensive licensing of inventions that are “sitting on the shelf” (Chesbrough, 2003a, p. 38).
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3.3.3 Enterprise - users innovation interaction: linking the two
paradigms.
Returning to the work of Raasch and von Hippel summarized by the Figure 3.3 (page 56)and
the interaction between the two models reviewed above, the authors identify two diﬀerent
conditions, two diﬀerent states of this interaction, ‘user-contested market’ and ‘user com-
plemented market’. The ﬁrst condition is when commercial products face competition from
self-supplied users. This “contestation” excerts “price discipline” onto producers as, in some
conditions, user innovations can exert greater competitive pressure than rivals. The second
condition is when products are complemented by user innovation. This is the case when
a product may be sold on the market, while techniques for operating that product may be
diﬀused peer-to-peer.
The scholars also provide examples for both conditions. A typical illustration of con-
testation is the competition between “open source” and “closed source” software suppliers
(Benkeltoum, 2008, 2011; Sen et al., 2008), while typical illustrations of complementary
relationships are described by the literature on customization and user innovation toolkits
(von Hippel, 1994; von Hippel and Katz, 2002; Piller, 2010; Oliveira and von Hippel, 2011).
The relation between these user communities and enterprises, however is a research question
for diﬀerent studies, most of them based on the notion of “lead users” (von Hippel, 1986;
Leimeister et al., 2009; Mahr and Lievens, 2012), where enterprises are called upon to reach
the lead users and their innovations (Herstatt and von Hippel, 1992). Yet, this process
can fail in the case of complex products (Olson and Bakke, 2001) as ﬁrms are often not in
position to integrate innovations realized by communities (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005;
Le Masson et al., 2010).
Still, the speciﬁc condition where users have advanced development skills and use them to
innovate on a given service through the creation of third party applications is not addressed
by the two paradigms reviewed above. As regards my research, this is the very condition
that I explore.
The specific condition of user-entrepreneurs.
A speciﬁc condition cited by Raasch and von Hippel, though not particularly explored, is
when the roles change, and users become producers, the case of “user-entrepreneurship”.
The authors refer to other studies exploring this particular issue. Yet, since this regime
(Hatchuel, 1999; Segrestin et al., 2002; Garel and Rosier, 2008; Elmquist and Segrestin,
2009; Benkeltoum, 2011) is closer to our research topic, regarding the way innovation is
deployed on the basis of Web 2.0 platforms, we will analytically review literature exploring
this ﬁeld.
Baldwin et al. (2006) study cases where users become entrepreneurs. Their research
is based on a design reasoning, according to which “user innovation begins when one or
more users of some good recognize a new set of design possibilities - a so-called “design
space” - and begin to explore it” (Baldwin et al., 2006). Thus, user innovations cover this
particular design space. Then, once an innovation starts to be diﬀused in a community of
users, the authors observe that ﬁrst “user-purchasers” appear, preferring to buy rather to
create innovations themselves. Hence, the ﬁrst manufacturers to enter the market are “likely
to be user-innovators” using the same technologies they used to build their own prototypes
(Baldwin et al., 2006). In their paper they develop an economical modelling of this process
based on the work of Baldwin and Clark (2000) on design costs. Moreover, unlike the current
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of entrepreneurship research highlighting the importance of psychological and behavioural
characteristics of individual entrepreneurs (Gollwitzer and Brandstätter, 1997; Zhao et al.,
2005), Baldwin et al. highlight the collective aspects of entrepreneurship, proposing that
user community encompassed entrepreneurship is more eﬃcient in terms of cost and design
exploration than solitary entrepreneurship.
Shah (2003) studied the case of innovation in sports equipment, speciﬁcally in wind-
surﬁng, questioning market actors about their early entrepreneurial steps. She found that
“of all expert practitioners who innovated, 71% sought to profit from their innovations by
forming small, lifestyle firms that would produce their innovations for sale to others.” (Shah,
2003, p. 48). Moreover, she observed that existing sporting ﬁrms were not present in
innovations during the emergence of the windsurf market.
Lüthje et al. (2005) also studying innovation in sports, though this time in the mountain
bikes market, propose that expert users are more likely to innovate as they have already been
involved with use and thus possess a high level of relative knowledge and experience. This
way, they escape initial investment costs that outsiders would have to spend, in order to
reach a level of formulating new problems and thus resolving them.
Shah and Tripsas (2007), in an eﬀort to propose a theoretical framework for user-
entrepreneurship, agreeing with Lüthje et al., propose the following formulation on their
speciﬁcity:
User entrepreneurs are distinct from other types of entrepreneurs in that they
have personal experience with a product or service and derive benefit through
use in addition to financial benefit from commercialization.
They also distinguish two categories, the end-users (that use a good in their day-to-day
life), and professional-users (that use a good as a part of their professional duties). Their
investigation concerned juvenile products manufacturers, where they found that many of
the ﬁrms in the market came from the parents of the users. They argue that users are
“accidental” entrepreneurs, as the development of the idea, experimentation, adaptation
and preliminary adoption often occur before the formal evaluation of the idea as the basis
of commercial venture. Their model consists in the following steps of user-entrepreneurship
(Shah and Tripsas, 2007, p. 129):
1. The beginning comes from the existence of user’s unmet needs.
2. User creates a novel solution to satisfy their own needs.
3. The innovation is illustrated within a community or in public, attracting though the
interest of others and obtaining a ﬁrst feedback.
4. Innovators identify the business potential and
5. forms a ﬁrm.
6. The ﬁrm enters the market and uses market feedback to improve the product.
Using the literature - phenomena mapping of Raasch and von Hippel (2012) (Figure 3.3
on page 56), I locate the steps proposed by Shah and Tripsas (2007) in the two paradigms,
as shown in the Figure 3.8. The user-entrepreneur is considered by Shah and Tripsas as a
transition from the user paradigm to the producer one, “skipping” the two early producer
phases (“Market Research” and “R&D”). In the end, what diﬀerentiates user-entrepreneurs
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from typical producers is not their intermediary position, but their former user experience
which is exploited to manage feedback, once their product is on the market. In parallel, the
market replaces the “peer-to-peer diffusion” phase that would occur if they had remained in
the user community.
Figure 3.8: User-entrepreneurship steps according to Shah and Tripsas (2007) localised in
the mapping proposed by Raasch and von Hippel (2012).
In all of the above case studies, user-entrepreneurs utilize their innovation to enter the
initial market (in most cases considered, the sporting equipment one). Moreover, in all the
above-mentioned studies on user-entrepreneurship, once users become manufacturers they
are considered independent from the initial product manufacturer, who is rarely mentioned.
As I am going to show in my study, in the case of Web services platforms, that third-
party innovations remain functionally attached to the initial platform, thus rendering the user
innovators’ autonomy impossible.
This impossibility of autonomy has to do with the nature of services in themselves. In
services, as outlined by many scholars (Fixari et al., 1997; Bancel-Charensol and Jougleux,
1997; Jougleux, 2006), information plays a central role in the everyday delivery of the good. In
addition, information changes over time, making it crucial for providers to have a permanent
relation with their sources. Hence, the platform remains dominant over third parties, as long
as it controls the ﬂow of information.
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The question of Web-based application development
In comparison to the above mentioned studies, Web based application development presents
an important original phenomena as they aggregate in their platform third party innovations
while the framing organisation (the enterprise) remains the same. That is possible because
those service platforms are characterized by an important design originality: while keeping
the code of their platform closed, ﬁrms (such as Facebook or Google) provide to exterior
developers the means (called APIs - Applications Programming Interfaces) to expand their
product. At the same time, the exterior developers beneﬁt from the resources provided by
the platform.
3.3.4 Service management: the automated services “enigma”
Unlike products, in services there is a direct interaction between user and enterprise during
its delivery. This process, can be described as a potentially innovative design process, since
it aims at making “something that is partly unknown and partly specified with things that
already known and/or discovered during the process” (Hatchuel and Le Masson, 2007).
Moreover, there appears to be a paradox when faced with the case of Web services. On
the one hand, management scholars highlight a strong tendency “from products to services”,
speciﬁcally in the ﬁeld of information technologies (Cusumano, 2008; Gawer, 2010a; Suarez
and Cusumano, 2010). On the other hand, as Cusumano notes, enterprises “productize”
their service, so they can be delivered more eﬃciently. Google, eBay and Amazon are some
of the most frequent examples of this tendency. In those services, there is no employee to
help clients ﬁnd information or buy something. Instead, actions such as suggesting similar
information or items are integrated in the technology (the user interface) as “features”.
Gallouj and Weinstein (1997) noted that in the case of automated service, “interfaces or
front office technologies” supply “certain [service] characteristics directly to the customer”,
instead of them being delivered by an employee.
However, while the beneﬁt in terms of eﬃciency is clear for enterprises, the issue of
service eﬀectiveness remains open. Of course, one could state that this issue will always
be open, since the criterion of eﬀectiveness is the rather diﬃcult to deﬁne one of, client
satisfaction. What appears as a paradox is the expression of the fact that, as Chase (1978)
has observed early on about employees delivering services, “interaction with the customer
makes the direct worker in fact part of the product and therefore his attitude can affect the
customer’s view of the service provided”. Jougleux (2006) argued that, even if marketing
methods can provide a clear image of clients’ expectation, not much is known about the
means to eﬀectively provide this service. Codello-Guijarro et al. (2011) found that employees
in the front oﬃce often deliver more than a single service, while a collaboration both at the
front and the back oﬃce are necessary for improve service eﬀectiveness. citetNormann1991
used the term “the moment of truth” to describe the situation where an agent and client
are face to face and service is about to be delivered. Gallouj and Weinstein (1997), based
on the work of Lancaster (1966), remarked that service delivery is also dependent on a
client’s competencies, while, particularly in what regards information services, Delaunay and
Gadrey (1987) (p. 185-189) also highlighted the importance of “interactivity” between
service consumer and provider during the delivery of a service, the rules that characterize
this interaction and the consideration of the social situation of the two.
Drawing from the case of banks’ databases, Delaunay and Gadrey indicate a series of
problems in the process of service delivery:
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• joint deﬁnition with users of data input procedures and need and practice relevant
references,
• qualiﬁcation of the individuals operating this, often not codiﬁed, procedure for the
users,
• consultation modes that take into account adaptation services;
• global knowledge of the procedures and of the model of function,
• system ﬂexibility to deal with the arrival of unexpected data or new requirements.
For the authors, service delivery implies a relation between humans (as opposed to re-
lations mediated by objects). They also add that service relation cannot be ﬂattened in a
relation of technical information management. Nevertheless, Gallouj and Weinstein (1997)
highlighted some cases demonstrating the feasibility of user interaction automation, the
example of the ATM has already being one of them. :
Interfaces or front-office technologies, mobilised by the service provider, by the
client or, more generally, by both at the same time, supply certain service charac-
teristics directly to the customer, and in that respect have something in common
with the internal technical specifications of goods. Home banking is undoubt-
edly the archetypal example of this scenario, in which all the customer has to
do is ’press a few buttons’ to obtain the service he or she requires (Gallouj and
Weinstein, 1997, p. 543).
Yet, in their study they consider it an exception and do not advance their analysis fur-
ther. Moreover, while ‘home banking’ is presented by the authors as an exemplary case of
automation, in the terms of Simon (1965), where a client can obtain the service required in
a few clicks, home banking is found to be home of innovations, as well. Von Hippel (1998)
examined the case of a speciﬁc type of interface, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
of computer-telephony integration, which “refers to a field of specialized computing applica-
tions that draw upon both computing and telephony functions to accomplish a task”. These
APIs permit one:
to incorporate basic telephony functions such as “answer phone" or ”transfer call"
in their programs in the same way that they incorporate traditional computing
functions such as “add” or “create a file”.
Unlike ATMs, these interfaces were addressed to developers, for them to create their
own banking applications. Oliveira and von Hippel (2011) returned to the ﬁeld of e-banking,
studying applications created with Web-based APIs, this time, ﬁnding that developers had
invented many new services, in a similar manner.
In the ﬁeld of the Web, similar interfaces have been identiﬁed. Returning to the example
of eBay, Suarez and Cusumano (2010) refer to its need for complementary services (“delivery
services and secure payment methods”), in order for the platform “to function properly”.
Iansiti and Levien (2004) mention eBay as “a good example of a keystone company that
eﬀectively creates and shares value with its ecosystem”. They also note the existence of
additional tools addressing to the end-users:
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[eBay] has developed state-of-the-art tools that increase the productivity of net-
work members and encourage potential members to join the ecosystem.
Among these tools, exists one which “helps new sellers prepare professional-looking on-
line listings” as well as another which “tracks and manages thousands of bulk listings on
home computers”.However, the role of the external eBay developers and their relation with
the service provider is not discussed in the above mentioned studies, as their analytical
framework focuses on two actors: eBay and its end users (the latter group split in two:
buyers and sellers). Still, 25% to 30%9 of items listed in the service do so by using third-
party tools and applications10. eBay ’s “community of developers” counts more than 100.000
members who have created over 13,000 active applications, according to the enterprise11.
Overall, the service literature has shown that there is an inherent “element of the un-
known” in service delivery, usually covered by the employees skills during his/her interaction
with the client. Automated services - such as e-banking or eBay - have implemented user
interfaces rendering service delivery an issue of bounded rationality (March, 1978), and en-
abling a multiple choice user interaction (“clicks”). Still, in many services - such as e-banking
or eBay - there appear other types of interfaces, for other types of actors, the developers,
who are not about choosing (“clicking”), but about creating additional automatic services,
or applications. This early sign in the literature, may imply that in such services the place
of the employee has been taken by a developer, who addresses the potential cases of ser-
vice delivery which are not included in the initial options. This possibility will be explored
in the current part of the thesis, aiming at the identiﬁcation of the Web-based application
development’s modus operandi.
9According to statistics published to the oﬃcial Ebay Blog, addressed to the eBay developers community,
the percentage of the listings coming through third party applications were 25% in 2007 and 30% in 2009.
Unfortunately, such statistics are quite rare for Web platforms.
Source 1: Ebay Blog, Blog: Certiﬁed Provider, “Last week’s CP Fair in Salt Lake City”, Mar.21.2007. URL
retrieved on the 11th of August 2011.
http://developer.ebay.com/community/blog/?category=Certiﬁed+Provider
Source 2: Ebay Blog, News Blog: Product News, “We are 9! The 9th Anniversary of the eBay Developers
Program”, Dec.02.2009. URL retrieved on the on the 11th of August 2011.
http://developer.ebay.com/community/blog/default.aspx?category=Business+News See also
10We should note that data on the traﬃc or the use of a service due to third party applications are rarely
communicated by service providers. Most commonly, such statistics are announced either during conferences
or on blogs and forums addressing to the developers’ community.
11Ibid.
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In my work, I will use an exploratory, qualitative approach, studying multiple cases and
utilizing multiple sources to triangulate my contributions.
4.1 The scope of case studies methodologies
Many case studies in Management Science have been based on the contribution of Eisenhardt
(1989), who in turn built on Mintzberg:
No matter how small our sample or what our interest, we have always tried to
go into organisations with a well-defined focus - to collect specific kinds of data
systematically (Mintzberg (1979, p. 585) cited in Eisenhardt (1989, p. 536)).
Another approach widely used by management scholars1 is the one put forward by Yin
(2003), defending a richer proposition for case studies research. As Yin put it, case studies are
the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator
has little control of the events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with
some real-life context (Yin, 2003, p. 1). For him, case studies constitute a comprehensive
research strategy, by relying on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in
a triangulating fashion, while they beneﬁt from prior development of theoretical propositions
to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003, p. 14).
In the upper side of Table 4.1, we see how Yin positions case studies within the broad
spectrum of research methodologies. For him, the questions starting with “who, what where,
1During the discussion of my work with members of the academic community (conferences, journals),
reviewers would often suggest the use of the methodologies proposed by Yin (2003).
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how many, how much” are better addressed by other methodologies, namely surveys or
archival analysis. Case studies are most appropriate for answering questions about “how” or
“why”, like history studies. Still, the latter focuses on past events, while case studies focus
on contemporary ones.
Strategy
Form of Research
Question
Requires Control
of Behavioural
Events?
Focuses on
Contemporary
Events?
Yin (2003,
p. 5):
Relevant
Situations
for Diﬀerent
Research
Strategies
(quoting
COSMOS
Corp.)
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes
Survey
who, what, where,
how many, how
much?
No Yes
Archival Analysis
who, what, where,
how many, how
much?
No Yes/No
History how, why? No No
Case Study how, why? No Yes
Genealogy
how, what, where,
why?
No Yes
Table 4.1: The genealogical situated in comparison to the typology of Research Strategies
as outlined by Yin (2003).
Yin (2003) summarized his proposal on the relation between research questions and
methodologies as follows:
In general, “what” questions might either be exploratory (in which case any
of the strategies could be used) or about prevalence (in which surveys or the
analysis of archival records could be favoured). “How” and “why” questions are
likely to favor the use of case studies, experiments or histories (Yin, 2003, p. 7).
At this point, let us return to my own research questions:
Q. 1) What are the speciﬁcities of “Web 2.0”? This question addresses my research
goal to model its distinctive characteristics.
Q. 2) What is the genealogy for the Web 2.0? This question addresses my research
goal to identify its dynamics in time.
Q. 3) How do we manage those platforms? This question addresses my research
goal to identify management practice peculiarities.
From those questions, only the last one may be explored by using a case study method-
ology, as described by Yin (2003). According to his typology, the ﬁrst question is to be
explored using any methodology (as is an exploratory question), while the second one does
not enter in the categories proposed: we propose the study of the history while focussing on
contemporary events, a genealogy. In fact, Q. 2) is a necessary “bridge” between Q. 1) and
Q. 3).
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As my research questions complicate the review of methodologies, I should note that
researchers are often troubled when facing new phenomena in what regards the methodolog-
ical issue. In fact, Mintzberg himself questioned the utility of research questions at all when
studying strategy, practically receding from his 1979 claims, as used by Eisenhardt (1989):
Asking a right question in strategy is analogous to an explorer’s finding his or
her bearing before starting the journey. There is no standard methodology for
coming up with questions: intuition and experience play far too important a role
in the process (Mintzberg et al., 2003, p. xii-xiii).
However, giving up the research questions is not considered in the current thesis. Intuition
has played indeed an important role, especially in its early phase, a fact that is diﬃcult to
formalize. On the other hand, experience, while also diﬃcult to model, was programmed
and organised.
To summarize, I am going to use a case study approach in the third part of my document,
exploring the Q.3). There we will further analyse our methodological approach utilising recent
academic propositions on phenomenon-based research(von Krogh et al., 2012) to study three
“tools” for User-Developer-Entrepreneur collective action management.
In order to design a research methodology for Q. 1) and Q. 2) I aim to review the
literature on research methodologies on surveys and archival analysis, as proposed by Yin
(2003). After identifying their limits, I will review less popular methodological approaches,
taking into account researcher’s experience and the genealogy of the problem.
4.2 The scope of surveys and archival analysis
Surveys are often used in Social Studies for further understanding a question. In the particular
case where categories are to be the output and not the input, questionnaires or semi-directed
surveys and interviews are proposed by the literature. As Spector (2001) summarizes, such
studies aim at investigating the causes of or the responses to an eﬀect (Spector, 2001,
p. 15). Interviews are preferred over surveys in cases when in-depth study is required, where
questions may be more open, though demanding more time.
Archival analysis refers to the study of archives, of an institution or an organisation.
Archives are typically ﬁled according to some existing categories (administrative or other),
which can be useful to the researcher applying quantitative methodologies.
However, information technologies have brought about another type of archives, the
traces of online communication. Thus, Benkeltoum (2008) has used online surveys and chat
interview methods, to enable the evaluation of open source software projects by a dispersed
developer community, while Chanal (2004) has used emails and texts to study organisational
innovation through employees communication. Mailing lists and online forums have been
used as research material by a number of researchers studying online communities (von
Krogh et al., 2003b; Bourreau and Gensollen, 2004; Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel, 2006b;
Haeﬂiger et al., 2009; Fayard and DeSanctis, 2010, and others). In this latter methodology,
the researcher has the advantage of studing this ﬁeld without inﬂuencing his/her sample,
though seeing without being seen.
From surveys to semi-directed interviews and from archival studies to traces of commu-
nication researchers gain in scope, though a greater eﬀort of a posteriori formalisation is
required.
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Still, in the current study this appears to be a challenge: while previously mentioned
studies were able to limit the scope of their sample through organisational boundaries (be it
a speciﬁc community or an enterprise), how might we determine the sample of our study in
an emerging business environment?
To answer this question, we need an additional methodological levier, the study of the
field through an object-discourse approach.
4.3 An object-discourse approach: studying an
emergent field
I describe the methodology I will apply in the current research as an object-discourse method-
ology. The focus of my research will be on the novel technical substrates used by the develop-
ers of third party applications and the relative discourse of the actors on these technologies,
as well as the resulting applications.
My approach resulted from the fact that, during semi-directed interviews, interviewees
’clearly’ identiﬁed the peculiarities of the ﬁeld, although they used their own, technical
language to express it.
For instance, the centrality of interfaces for the development of third party applications
(Application Programming Interfaces, APIs) has been a recurrent issue in our interviews both
with UDEs and platform providers. An exemplar case of an enterprise extensively using APIs
for innovation has been Twitter. Here is how a Twitter engineer described the emergence of
their platform2:
Once the API was out there, for several months it was really just a Web site
added feature – API added feature, Web site added feature – API added feature.
(. . . ) But I think the nice thing that Twitter has helped out with is that almost
every site now has an API. And Twitter is a good example in this, it enables
innovation around the platform, people adding value that you just don’t have
time to add if you’re a five person start-up3.
As suggested by the last lines of the above quotation, the use of APIs seems to play an
important role in innovation, value adding and growth.
Nevertheless, the recursive method of “Web site added feature - API added feature”, also
expressed by Google Developer Relations Engineers as the fact that in Google’s case “there is
always going to be a steady stream of APIs, just as you have a steady stream of products”4,
outlines a trend which is not easily described by Management terminology. While a “stream
of products” is easily understood by the New Product Development literature, the meaning
of a “new stream of APIs” needs to be further explored.
In parallel, the actors of the ‘milieu’ highlight the importance of speciﬁc technologies,
often developed or advanced by others, though commonly used by developers to innovate
through the use of such “APIs”.
Here is how a Mozilla executive described the increased ability of developers innovate
today5:
2Interview taken on August 13, 2010. San Francisco, California, USA.
3Interview taken on 10/08/2010.
4Interview taken on August 10, 2010. Mountain View, California, USA.
5Interview taken on August 12, 2010. Mountain View, California, USA.
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For me the most important bit is that modern APIs are really easy to consume.
I think the more exciting thing that happens today with the APIs is that they
are either JSON or RESTful. And both ways you can really easily manipulate.
So, you don’t need to be a C++ developer, as you need to be for a platform
API like Linux. You can write your stuff in HTML and Javascript and you can
write mashups in Javascript and you don’t need to learn new techniques and
system-level knowledge. Which I think is the most interesting think about it.
This is super-powerful because it enables more and more people to build [their
applications].
From a management research standpoint, one can understand from the above quote that
there is something that excites the actors of the ﬁeld, regarding the capacity of developers
to innovate, and that is related to the use of some programming languages instead of others.
Still, what does this change in technical terminology mean for business? Can it be
related to the tendency to move from products to services (Cusumano, 2008)? Do
these technical terms “hide” some kind of answer to the current debate on services
platforms (Gawer, 2010a)?
The study of conversations has already been a common practice for Management scholars
within an organisational context, enforced by the extensive use of information technologies
in organisations, rendering conversations readable by researchers a posteriori (Krogh et al.,
1994; Adam and Murphy, 1995; Vaast, 2003; Chanal, 2004, and others).
However, while these studies have focussed on conversations within an organisational
discourse - the latter based on older or emerging task divisions - in my study the discourses
concern the deﬁnition of a new, complex object by those who use it to innovate. These
actors do not belong to the same organisation, though they share a common discourse of
the milieu.
Hence, in order to understand the meaning of the discourse, I will have to study the object
itself: as the discourse is not limited in organisational boundaries, I propose that
the best way to delimit it is through the object of discussion. From this perspective,
the technical language would normally be considered by management scholars as a problem,
in my study I consider it as the solution to a challenge.
The challenge is to identify and characterise the ﬁeld problem (Hatchuel and Molet,
1986), common to diﬀerent actors engaged in a great variety of institutional settings within
the same business environment. To this aim, I will use as an entry point the new technical
language used by the developers to describe their activity.
Hatchuel and Weil (1992), studying the implementation eﬀorts of expert systems in
diﬀerent industrial settings, conclude to a prediction about the emergence of the technical
language within the enterprise, as a result of further rationalisation of information technolo-
gies:
Given the complexity and heterogeneity of knowledge [amongst autonomous
divisions], communication is difficult without a base of shared knowledge and
without specific efforts to maintain this common base. (. . . ) [In the future]
We will probably talk less in terms of expertise, knowledge or imitation as long
as more abstract and more technical concepts appear that will simply say that
we know how to treat some specific information structures (Hatchuel and Weil,
1992, p. 150).
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What I observe in my study is a common technical language, shared among developers in
diﬀerent countries and enterprises (mainly in France and in the United States and in start-ups
as well as large Web services providers). By reversing the argument of Hatchuel and Weil
(1992), I use this technical language as the expression of a common knowledge among the
experts of the ‘milieu’. Then, I perform an “interpretation” of this knowledge in business
terms, based on an extensive review of on New Product and Services Management.
4.3.1 The use of the object-discourse methodology to reply to the
hypothesis of “Web services platforms”
The contemporary discourse of User-Developer-Entrepreneurs is analysed on the basis of a
concrete case study. Consequently, the open question of the relation between today’s online
services platforms and the traditional ones, identiﬁed by the literature, will be explored on
the basis of a case of a collective design of an online market ??. The discourse on Web
services architecture will then be analysed by the constitution of a “dialogue” between the
literature and the actors of the ﬁeld on the issue of Web platform architecture.
Similarly, the question of the transition from products to services, raised through a market
study by Cusumano (2008), will be in-depth studied by a concrete case, in Section ??. The
discourse in this case will regard the speciﬁc technologies that enable the Web to be a
platform for services, corresponding to the need for a constant information ﬂow exchange
(and not a static Web, as it had been the case before Web 2.0). Hence, we ﬁnd that the
“new words” for developers correspond to a new environment for online business, opening
the way for the expansion of Web-based services.
4.3.2 An historical perspective: the role of UDEs in industrial
development
In Part II of my study, I will use a genealogical approach, on the basis of the problematization
regarding the speciﬁc role of UDEs in industrial development.
To this regard, I borrow Foucault’s notion of genealogy to trace the history of the thought
leading to the knowledge and the concepts appearing today as Web 2.0 peculiarities, respond-
ing to the question “how can knowledge be constituted” (Foucault, 1984) 6.
In this task, I will analyse at the same time the objects and the discourses of those
developing or using them while they appear in history, concentrating in describing their
diﬀerences, transformations and mutations (Kendall and Wickham, 1999; Foucault, 1969).
Practically, I will be studying the discourse of the two notions, collective intimacy and
computers, as opposed by previous disciplines and as connected with emerging ones.
On the one hand, I will study the emergence of “collective intimacy settings”, focussing
on the coﬀee-shops institutions, identiﬁed by a series of scholars as the foundations of what I
6Foucault typically mentions:
Histoire de la pensée, ça veut dire non pas simplement histoire des idées ou des représentations,
mais aussi la tentative de répondre à cette question : comment est-ce qu’un savoir peut se
constituer ? Comment est-ce que la pensée, en tant qu’elle a rapport avec la vérité, peut avoir
aussi une histoire ? Voilà la question qui est posée (. . . ) [Problématisation] est l’ensemble
des pratiques discursives ou non discursives qui fait entrer quelque chose dans le jeu du vrai et
du faux et le constitue comme objet pour la pensée (que ce soit sous la forme de la réﬂexion
morale, de la connaissance scientiﬁque, de l’analyse politique, etc.) (Foucault, 1984).
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call collective intimacy. On the other hand, we are going to study the emergence of computer
industry, to which Web 2.0 platforms services and their developers are genealogically bound.
Reviewing the collective work “Foucault, Management and Organisation Theory” (McKin-
lay and Starkey, 1998), Hatchuel (1999) and discussing organisational ideals, such as “au-
tonomous teams” or “democratic dialogue”, proposes the following teachings of the works
on Foucault’s investigation method:
(a) understand the genealogy of the rationalization forms which produced the
disciplinary regimes of corporate history;
(b) think of the forms of rationalization which correspond to values that are now
important to us, while remaining attentive to the disciplinary forms they
prepare - in other words, by trying to ensure that the invitation transmitted
to Dr. Jekyll does not result in the arrival of Mr. Hyde —;
(c) avoid building up relations and knowledge which leave others with the ﬁgure
of Mr. Hyde as the only feasible way of constructing themselves as subjects
(Hatchuel, 1999, p. 518).
Hence, in our particular case, I will investigate the genealogy of rationalization forms that
produced the various disciplines in the regimes of computer industry, as well as the forms of
rationalizations corresponding to the value of collective intimacy.
Additionally, when tracing the genealogy of Web 2.0, we will try to respond to the question
of the role of User-Developer-Entrepreneurs. Hatchuel (1999) designs two conditions for the
study of the “forms of rationalization”:
First, the consolidation of a set of “actor figures” (Hatchuel and Weil, 1995):
making places, relations and identities visible through discourse and practices;
secondly, says Foucault, these “figures” must act as forms of “subjectification”,
they must become the truth through which actors perceive themselves as “sub-
jects”.
In this study, responding to the ﬁrst condition, we will be investigating the consolidation
of the set of the UDE actor ﬁgures, their making places (such as clubs or associations), the
relations and identities that become visible through their discourse and practices (scientists,
entrepreneurs, hackers, users). As I have deﬁned the collective intimacy as the place where
the “true self”, the truth about subjectivity is expressed, tested and experienced, the study
level of these actors will be the historical conﬁgurations of their collective intimacy. Thus,
we will less focus on their family life or their enterprise tasks, unless expressed within the
collectivity in question.
75
76
Chapter 5
Indications on a novel modus operandi
: the discourse of service providers
Contents
5.1 Methodology: managers interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.2 Outcomes: “open products” and “developers-entrepreneurs” 79
5.2.1 Technology: enabling third party application development . . 80
5.2.2 Enterprise - UDE relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
In this chapter, using semi-directed expert interviews I trace three indications of possible
contemporary Web services peculiarities, regarding the means for value exploration and the
actors engaged in the process of service creation, through the reconstitution of the platform
providers discourse. I conclude with the indication that the originality of Web 2.0 services lie
in the parallel exploration and exploitation of the service while in the market. This original
development mode seems possible only through a synergy between platform providers and
user-developer-entrepreneurs, enabled by the provision of speciﬁc interfaces for application
development.
5.1 Methodology: managers interviews
I trace the ﬁrst intuitions (Mintzberg et al., 2003) on the peculiarities of a possible phe-
nomenon to be distinguished (von Krogh et al., 2012), the Web 2.0, using a set of semi-
directed interviews of experts, product developers or community managers for large Web
platform providers. The “open-ended” question (Eisenhardt, 1989) I am exploring is “what
are the specificities of “Web 2.0” platforms ?”. The question being broad, interviews
are semi-directed, leaving space for interviewees to themselves indicate the ﬁeld of possible
answers. Borrowing from the article of Eisenhardt (1989), “Building Theory from a Case
Study”, I do not assume any hypothesis or theories at this level. I enter the ﬁeld by “over-
lapping data and analysis”, being limited here to a single “data source”, experts interviews,
and I identify the common views of the experts on the speciﬁcities of the phenomenon.
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Position Enterprise Date Place Duration
Technology
Advisor
SUN Microsystems 19/07/2007
Paris,
France
46 min.
Product
Manager
Yahoo! 25/07/2007
Paris,
France
44 min.
Product
Manager
Netvibes 17/08/2007
Paris,
France
57 min.
Product
Manager
Google 02/05/2010
Paris,
France
27 min.
Developer
Relations
Manager
Google
18/05/2010
-
19/07/2010
Online
2
months
Labs Direc-
tor
Orange 10/08/2010
San Fran-
cisco, USA
1h
44min.
API Devel-
oper
Twitter 10/08/2010
San Fran-
cisco, USA
40 min.
Labs Direc-
tor
Mozilla 12/08/2010
Mountain
View, USA
55 min.
Platform
Architect
eBay 13/08/2010
Mountain
View, USA
32 min.
Developer
Relations
Google 14/08/2010
Mountain
View, USA
55 min.
Ubuntu
Product
Manager
Canonical 3/10/2010
Paris,
France
56 min.
Table 5.1: The discourse of platform providers. Interviews taken.
Starting from a pragmatic, evidence-based entry, I compare the outcomes to a “broad
range of literature” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 544). I then formulate three indications, using the
evidence provided from the ﬁeld, to be further explored in the following sections.
In the Table 5.1, I list the interviews undertaken and analysed. My interlocutors are man-
agers engaged in product management processes. The sample of our interlocutors is taken
from the three models: the open source model (Mozilla, Canonical), enterprise paradigm
for companies that existed before the Web (Orange and SUN Microsystems) and the Web
2.0 case (Yahoo!, Google, eBay, Twitter, Netvibes). To enable a peculiarity distinction (von
Krogh et al., 2012) for contemporary Web services to emerge out of this material, my anal-
ysis is undertaken three to six years after the interviews, after having being exposed as a
researcher, in the meanwhile, to additional sources of information.
In the next Section I present the outcomes of those interviews, identifying some early
intuitions of the ﬁeld actors regarding what can be a business phenomenon to distinguish.
At this stage of my research, I adopt an exploratory posture, since the very existence of a
particular phenomenon contained in what was discussed under the term Web 2.0 is not yet
proven. The ﬁeld intuitions found in the interview material are recognised a posteriori and
used as early elements for the construction of my thesis’ argument, to be further explored in
the following chapters. Then, by discussing those intuitions, I identify three indications of the
peculiarities of a possible phenomenon regarding business, as compared to other community
or enterprise-based innovation models (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012; von Hippel and von
Krogh, 2006, 2003) the latter two models having already been reviewed in Section 3.3.
5.2 Outcomes: “open products” and
“developers-entrepreneurs”
The “Web 2.0 wave” was seen by platform providers themselves as an encompassing phe-
nomenon, including three dimensions: the value eventually served to end-users, the tech-
nologies enabling third parties to innovate with this service and the ﬁgure of the third parties
themselves. Typically enough, a SUN Microsystem expert summarized the phenomenon as
follows:
For us, we reckon that the Web 2.0 is at the same time a set of services, a set
of communities, and the overall set of tools enabling the interaction of these
communities, either at an internal level or between different communities.1
The above quotation is typical of the discourse I met, the latter characterized by the
omnipresence of the term “community” to describe both the services, the related technologies
and the interactions among the stakeholders. For most of my interlocutors, while elements
of both the technology and the social interaction modes had already been there, the rapid
expansion of these services to a wide public of users rendering it “easy to share on-line”,
has modiﬁed the quality of both the technical substrates and the relationships of end-users,
ultimately diﬀusing a “communitarian” relational value. This approach joins the academic
1Translated from French. Original quote:
Pour notre part on estime que le Web 2.0 c’est à la fois un ensemble de services, un ensemble
de communautés, et l’ensemble des outils permettant à ces communautés d’interagir, soit en
interne au sein de ces mêmes communautés, soit d’une communauté à l’autre.
Interview taken on July 19, 2007.
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discourse on Web services platforms, which investigates the use and the diﬀerent community
and personal expression settings explored (Haeﬂiger et al., 2009; Ebner et al., 2009; Gensollen,
2003; Cardon, 2008; Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel, 2006a).
Moreover, as I adopt a perspective of industrial development (outlined in Section ??),
my study will focus here on the level of “those who build the service”, rather than the one of
the end-users. Hence, I consider the end-user value from the perspective of those designing
the service - as a design requirement (Suh, 1990), not from the ones who consume it.
Explicitly, despite the activities divergence between the diﬀerent actors interviewed, I
identify two peculiarities of contemporary Web service platforms to which experts’ views
emerged:
1. The central place of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for the creation of
new services.
2. The role of User-Developer-Entrepreneurs as important actors in the creation of new
services by extending greater ones.
These dimensions will be further explicated in the following paragraphs.
5.2.1 Technology: enabling third party application development
A second set of intuitions on possible peculiarities of Web services is to be drawn from the
part of the providers’ discourse regarding the technologies enabling third party innovation.
Research in management has shown that there is a correlation between experts’ common
knowledge and technical language. In fact, Hatchuel and Weil, studying information systems
conception within diﬀerent enterprise contexts, presumed that the emergence of an abstract,
technical language would substitute the debate on experts knowledge (Hatchuel and Weil,
1992, p. 150). In my research, I followed a reverse reasoning: I used the technical language
utilised by the providers to enter their debate on third party innovation enabling.
Studying the ﬁrst “boom” of Internet business at the end of 1990s (which eventually
lead to the so called “dot.com bubble”), Cusumano and Yoﬃe, in their widely respected
study, highlighted the importance that the “battle of browsers” (between Microsoft and
Netscape) had not only for those business actively engaged in online services at the time,
but for “Competing in Internet Time” in general:
We are not exaggerating when we say that the Internet and the World Wide Web,
with the browser as its user interface are revolutionizing mass communications,
as well as mass networking technology (Cusumano and Yoffie, 1998, p. 2).
For companies competing in the new information economy, the Internet is forcing
managers and employees to experiment, invent, plan and change their ideas
constantly while they are trying to build complex new products and technologies
(Cusumano and Yoffie, 1998, p. 5).
If the latter argument of Cusumano and Yoﬃe about the Internet “forcing managers and
employees” to adapt to a faster rate of innovation is generally accepted today, the former
one, regarding the infrastructure should be given the same attention.
The “revolution in mass communication” was based, according to the authors, on the
potential which Web browsers opened up: through those devices and by the use of their
interfaces, a great public was enabled to access information, hosted at an enormous number
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of Web sites. The early era of Web business was then deployed through the development of
commercial Web sites (recognised by their “.com” suﬃx).
Regarding this very potential, the interview I had with with a Mozilla Labs director,
questioned the above mentioned perception on the value of Web browsers:
What came out the Web 2.0 for me is the nearly omnipresence of APIs. You’ve
got APIs everywhere. And that’s really interesting because it allows you to
do things very very differently. It’s interesting because, I think, one of the
manifestations of APIs are now apps. Because an App consumes an API and
presents the data in an non-web format. It’s a native App. But it consumes
Web data. So, APIs is a really interesting topic. And I see companies today,
before they build the service, they build the API.
This statement from a Mozilla executive suggests a radical change. To further grasp
the content of this statement, we have to enter the underpinning technical knowledge.
While in the period studied by Cusumano and Yoﬃe browsers were the unique means to
access Web-based information for the broad public, our interlocutor talked about applications
(“Apps”) as an alternative for end users. Consequently, what is indicated is that Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) are presented, thus, as a way for the service provider to
enable the creation of these Apps by third parties. While in the early period, that studied
by Cusumano and Yoﬃe, the crucial part of competition was between the major browsers
(Microsoft Explorer and Netscape, the latter becomingMozilla Firefox afterwards), today the
corresponding part is alluded to the competition of a Apps multitude galaxy. To the extent
that platform providers use APIs to distribute information, end users access it (“consume
it”) not only through the browser, but by a multitude of “Apps”, applications that can be
“native”, that is proper to speciﬁc devices connected to the Internet beyond the PC (such
as smartphones, tablets or other devices). Hence, while the early Web was characterized
by the “omni-presence” of browsers, today’s “omni-presence” of APIs is said to change the
business environment.
Along these lines, while in the ﬁrst phase (the dot-com era), of which the conditions were
described by the study of Cusumano and Yoﬃe (1998), innovation trajectories regarded “Web
pages” (web sites with the suﬃx .com), the era of the Web 2.0 signiﬁed the opening of an
innovation trajectory through the “Apps”.
Regarding this suggested shift towards Apps, during the interviews I found signs that they
constitute both a continuity and a rupture with the computer industry history, eventually
shifting innovation outside the boundaries of the enterprise. Characteristically, a Canonical
product manager commented:
Typically, we have been developing APIs that were accessible only on the level
of a single computer. Then, we were enabled to render those APIs usable on
a computer network, though a local one (. . . ) Afterwards, there was a guy
that came and said “that is stupid, we already have a communication language
between different elements, it’s named HTTP, which is already in use by security
interfaces, why not simply re-use the same way of interaction as HTTP, that is
by passing the orders in the request and simplify the most possible”.
And with that, we arrived at an API that really exited the walls of the enterprise
and passed to APIs usable on the Internet2.
2Translated from French. Original quote:
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What I keep from this quote is the insight that the APIs, and consequently Web based
Apps, were inherited from the history of computers by successive changes in both the tech-
nologies and the practices used and that this process resulted in the ability to “exit” the
boundaries of an IT enterprise in respect to the innovation process in the Internet economy.
In other words, what is suggested above is a coupling between the historical evolution
of Web substrates with the historical evolution of the enterprise leading to what was char-
acterized as an Open Innovation era (Chesbrough et al., 2006), in the particular domain of
computer industry.
Hence, I can formulate the following insight, to be developed, concerning the importance
of the evoked shift towards “Apps” and the technologies that enable it (the APIs):
Intuition 1. The shift from the Web browser to Apps as user interface for accessing
Web-based information, enabled by the provision of APIs, is a shift of a historical
value and has major implications for innovation.
Advancing my exploration of the providers’ discourse insights, and trying to understand
the nature of these “APIs”, I identiﬁed a case frequently cited in the “milieu” of developer
entrepreneurs, which highlights the value of this “substrate”: the Twitter API and the way
it helped the company grow. Here is how an eBay platform architect commented on the
case of Twitter API :
They certainly invested into APIs because they seem to, I don’t know . . . but
that’s what it seems they do. They have got a lot of great APIs that they come
out with and as a result you saw a lot of third party applications and, you know,
I used to read this, that 2/3 of all access at Twitter is done through APIs.
The above estimation indicates that Twitter API worked as an exemplary case for the
developers of the ﬁeld, causing a discussion on its features and its success. Like in open
source communities (Lakhani et al., 2002; Zeitlyn, 2003; Osterloh and Rota, 2007, and
others), reputation on technical achievements circulates within the milieu. However, unlike
open source, one cannot know the details of the technology and its use (e.g. the platform
source code). Hence, reputation seems to result out of “rumour spread than by exact
knowledge of the inner nature of a platform.
In Twitter itself, the invention of the ﬁrst API has taken the form of a “rational myth”,
an “action model allowing the mobilisation of the organisation on the basis of an objective in
which the actors believe (myth), though of which the formulation and objectives are realistic
and adaptable (rational)” (Hatchuel and Molet, 1986). Such a “myth” was built on the
experience of the ﬁrst API, expressing the memory of the rationalisation of a new mode of
Typiquement c’est que pendant longtemps on a développé des APIs qui étaient accessibles
uniquement au sein d’un ordinateur. Et puis en suite, on s’est permit de rentre ses APIs
utilisables à un réseau d’ordinateurs mais en local (. . . ) Puis un gars qui est arrivé en disant «
mais non, ça c’est quand même stupide, on a déjà un langage de communication entre diﬀérents
éléments, qui s’appelle HTTP, qui a déjà des interfaces de sécurisation, pourquoi ne pas tout
bêtement réutiliser la même façon d’interagir que HTTP, c’est-à-dire en passant les ordres dans
la requête et on rendre la chose la plus simple possible.
Et là on est arrivé réellement à une API qui est sortie des murs de l’entreprise, et passée à des
APIs utilisables sur Internet.
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innovation management not only for Twitter, but the entire emerging sector. Here is how a
Twitter API developer, hired when Twitter was beginning to grow, described this experience:
You know, in the beginning we put an API out. It was basically what the Web
site had. So we had a Web site, by virtue of choosing the Ruby Rails technology
we kind of got an API more or less for free, 3 and it was sort of a side project
first as I understand it, I wasn’t here, and took off, got attraction, people started
building alternate desktop clients4 and that kind of spread the API as a thing
(. . . ) So, once it was out there, for several months it was really just “Web site
added feature - API added feature, Web site added feature - API added feature”.
Twitter API is thus discussed as a platform feature allowing others to build upon their
service. The attraction of individuals capable to do that is referred to as another factor of
success.
In the same spirit, a Yahoo product developer summarized the value of APIs for the
enterprise as follows:
To deploy, popularise, extend the functionalities of Yahoo to third party services5.
For the Yahoo product manager, as well as the others interviewed, the API mode is a way
to render the service more popular, but also to enrich its functionalities, while the service
in the market. From the above, we have some further insights on the characteristics, to be
further explored:
• There seems to be a “mirror-relationship” between information provided by the Web
site and those provided by the API, as their relation is commented as a reﬂective one
(“Web site added feature - API added feature, Web site added feature - API added
feature”);
• APIs are about “attraction” of “people starting building” upon a speciﬁc platform;
• An important challenge for an API is “to spread”, to be adopted by others;
I am going to further explore those insights in the discourse of platform providers in the
following paragraphs, starting from the ﬁrst point.
A “mirror-relationship”
Beginning from the ﬁrst point, an overlapping field between the different information inter-
faces is suggested, also supported by other platform managers interviews. Matching features
of Web sites to APIs seemed to be a common concern of all platforms. Our eBay platform
architect has been very enlightening on this regard:
3One of the ﬁrst engineers employed by Twitter.
4A desktop client is an application for a desktop computer that receives and displays information from
the Internet. Browsers or the “Fetchmail” application (Raymond, 1999) can be considered desktop clients,
as well.
5Translated from French. Original quote:
Déployer, populariser, étendre les fonctionnalités Yahoo sur d’autres services tiers.
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If there’s a Web page on eBay, we will probably create an API that does some-
thing similar. So, you have My-eBay where you can see things you are bidding
on, things that you’re watching, things you’re selling. So, we’ll create an API
that gives you all the same data.
For eBay, where users bid for items in an auction, information provided by the APIs is on
this particular activity: online selling and buying goods by auctions. Hence, generally, what
is evoked above, is that the same information provided on the Web site (on “things you are
bidding on, things that you’re watching, things you’re selling”, is to be provided by the API
as well. This insight can be expressed as a “mirror-relationship” between the Web site and
the API: both provide information on the activities of the same service.
Still, what is the use of an API if it provides the same kind of data? The answer is
already suggested by the statement of the Mozilla executive: these substrates enable, in
some way, the creation of applications - they are not to be directly used by end-users. So,
there is something in the nature of these interfaces, as compared to the browser or the Web
page, that makes third party innovation possible.
Hence, what is evoked is that APIs provide streams of information, already in the Web
site, using the same categories of information as the site, for third parties to further develop
the functionalities of the Web site through their own applications.
Another parameter of the assumed “mirror-relationship” between a Web site and an API
is its reﬂective relationships: provider actions on the ﬁrst one induce similar actions on the
second one. Here is how a Google manager put it:
There is always gonna be steady stream of APIs, just as you have a steady stream
of products (. . . ) So for the past five years it looks like we’ve been releasing
API at fairly steady base. So I would guess it will continue that way.
Consequently, there emerges the suggestion that the API is a parallel mechanism to
product development, at least as the latter has been studied by the new product management
literature (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Midler, 1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995), or by the
two models proposed by Raasch and von Hippel (2012): this mechanism is attached to the
product, shares common attributes with the latter, while it enables a synergy between the
provider and third party developers on the further development of the product.
This close relationship between the ﬁnal service, as perceived by the end users, and the
application development interfaces, as used by entrepreneurs for the invention of applications,
will be further explored in Chapter 7. A guide - to be tested - for this exploration will be the
following intuition:
Intuition 2. In contemporary Web services, there is a “mirror-relationship” between
the service provided to the end users and the means provided to developers for the
development of applications.
Next, I will further look into on third party application building aspect of APIs.
“People starting building”
Judging from a more traditional enterprise perspective, the director of Orange Labs in San
Francisco characterized the APIs as quite revolutionary in the new paradigm that emerged
through the Web 2.0:
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Offering APIs for others to come and use your data to manufacture other prod-
ucts (for example, look at Google Maps, it has been one of the examples) is
a very original innovation development strategy, because you have people who
work with your data, whom you don’t pay, perhaps it’s them who pay you a
bit. And if you like the product, either you buy it, either you buy the firm - it
is what often happens - or these people will create more value on your product
with their developments. APIs have been quite revolutionary in this model6.
Furthermore, a metaphor by the Canonical product manager for those devices helps
further understand their particular nature of these devices:
The API is something like a plug. Not only the plug, but also the power, etc,
but it corresponds to the way that it will interact with the one who provides us
the power7.
The metaphor of a “plug” has been used by the literature (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002)
to describe cases such as the USB key, enabling the development of a “complementary”
industry of computer peripherals, based on Intel ’s microprocessors. This way, I trace once
again a parallelism between the typical computer industry and Web services. However, in
the former case, the common design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) were conﬁgured on the
basis of commonly recognised and standardized instrumental values (such as the calculating
power of a microprocessor). Still, can one argue that the values related to personal identity
development can meet the same “universal” recognition by the diﬀerent actors of the business
environment as do computer interfaces?
The comparison between the diﬀerent use of APIs from eBay and Twitter enlightens this
dimension. For eBay, APIs were used to enable innovation on a very speciﬁc ﬁeld, already
identiﬁed by the company’s business model. The latter being user transactions (with eBay
revenue coming from its mediation), APIs were focussed on the creation and development
of tools for expert sellers, that is sellers beyond the average user, operating a higher volume
of transactions. On this, the eBay platform architect was very clear:
We really focused most on APIs around sellers. There were things that we knew
we weren’t going to go after but we knew that there was a market there that
could enable other folks. Maybe if we wanted to go after this market, maybe we
wouldn’t release the API so often, I don’t know. It was a long time ago, hard to
say.
6Translated from French. Original quote:
Oﬀrir des APIs pour que d’autres viennent utiliser vos donner pour fabriquer d’autres produits
(par exemple, regardez les Google Maps, ça a été un des exemples ) c’est une stratégie de
développement d’innovations très originale, parce que vous avez des gens qui travaillent avec
vos données, que vous ne payez pas, peut-être que eux vous paient un peu. Et si le produit
vous plait, soit vous l’achetez, soit vous achetez la boite - c’est ce qui est arrivé souvent - soit
les gens vont valoriser vos produit encore mieux avec leurs développements. Les APIs ont été
assez révolutionnaires dans le modèle.
7Translated from French. Original quote:
L’API c’est en quelque sorte la prise. Pas seulement la prise, mais c’est aussi la puissance, etc,
mais ça correspond à comment est-ce que va interagir avec ce qui nous fournit de la puissance.
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While the market for eBay seller tools was already identiﬁed and APIs came about as
a result of a particular enterprise scope (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) understanding, this
was not exactly the case for Twitter.The development of the Twitter API was described as a
more adventurous process, being transformed through the interaction of the enterprise with
user-developers. “Firehose” was been the API that provided user-developers with a stream of
“tweets”, user posts in the service. This stream was the basic “material” for user-developers
to innovate, by inventing new services. Here is how the API developer described the process:
So the first notion was, well we’ll take the Firehose and we’ll offer sampled feeds,
so you’ll get 1% of the tweets. So if I’m a developer at home - I think at that
time the rate was maybe a hundred tweets a second - I get a couple of tweets a
second. And that’s pretty easy for me to handle. And then there are other ways
to start creating more interesting slices of the full Firehose. “I want tweets that
contain some key-words”, “I want tweets that happen in a certain location or
have certain hashtags”, or from a specific list of people. So there we’ve really
grown around what users are asking for.
What is described above is a synergy between Twitter and user-developers on the ex-
ploration of the value of a “stream of tweets”. The design of the Firehose had taken into
consideration the capacity of a single developer working on his computer to process infor-
mation (therefore they provided the 1% of the tweets). Still, this quantitative segmentation
was not enough. Further, qualitative restrictions of the stream based on key-words regarding
brand names, locations, topics of discussion (“hashtags”) and others were introduced for
the “material” to be more relevant to emerging segments of the “tweets” market.
Enterprises like Google have also embraced the experimental, exploratory potential of
this operation mode. Concretely, Google used the Labs concept to indicate the unstable
nature of an API. Here is how a Google developer relations manager described this practice:
So by having that system [Labs] we can put out our API without having to worry
about the three years compatibility. So that makes it easier for putting out APIs.
If every time we have put out an API we had to, like, swear to having the same
interface for three years and supporting it we probably wouldn’t have put out as
many, ’cause that’s rather difficult.
The more experimental the nature of the interface and the resources it provides for
developers to innovate, the closer the interaction has to be between platform and developers
to acquire a feedback and identify the speciﬁc use segments. At the same time, the less
engaging this process can be for the platform provider, such as Google, as the value of a
feature (and thus the necessarily resources invested in it) remains to be explored.
Building on the Intuition 2, I describe the peculiarities of the services under study by their
double identity: being used by end user as they are, while being enriched by third parties on
the basis of what they are.
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Intuition 3. We can describe contemporary Web services as “Open Products”
(Chrysos et al., 2010), embodying two characteristics:
1. They provide a standard set of uses for end-users.
2. They provide the means to further explore and develop the product to devel-
opers, based on the attributes of the initial set of uses.
“Spreading” the API
Moreover, the management of the relationship with user-developers is another condition for
this model to be possible. This dimension was expressed by the Canonical product manager
as follows:
If I launch an API that is only usable for myself, there is no interest. After [the
launch] there is the marketing problem for this API, hoping that there will be
users that will begin to use it.8.
In the next section I am thus going to outline the ﬁndings regarding the management of
the relationship with user-developers-entrepreneurs. For the moment, I can draw some addi-
tional working hypothesis, summarizing the part of the provider discourse on the importance
of APIs.
Intuition 4. For an API to be successful, it has to be actively used by UDEs. This
requirement implies the need for management of the particular relationship between
platform provider and UDEs.
5.2.2 Enterprise - UDE relationship
Beyond the technical conditions for a service to be extended by third parties, there is an-
other condition highlighted above, the intimacy between developers and platform providers,
something that is present in the Web environment though not similarly in the close, telecom-
munication sector. In fact, this model is diﬀerent from the case of enterprise partnership,
studied in diﬀerent business contexts (Midler et al., 1997; Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Bozeman
and Dietz, 2001; Segrestin, 2005, and others). The novelty comes from the capability pro-
vided to nearly everyone to use those substrates to innovate. Here is how a Netvibes product
engineer outlined this dimension:
Two companies that work together to propose a product, that’s not new. It
always existed. What is a lot more novel, is these open APIs, which are given
to everyone, which enable everyone to make mashups9. And the popularity of a
service is also measured by its APIs10.
8Translated from French. Original quote:
Si je lance une API qui n’est utilisable que par moi il n’y a aucun intérêt, ensuite c’est le problème
de marketing pour cette API, en espérant qui il ait d’utilisateurs qui se mettent à l’utiliser.
9A mashup is an application using more than one sources of Web data (APIs).
10Translated from French. Original quote:
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However, launching an API does not lead to an open product strategy at once. An Orange
Labs executive commented on the eﬀort made on behalf of telecommunication operators to
use the same model:
Telecom operators all try to provide APIs on the networks, for people to be able
to develop on the network. It works a little bit, not as we could have imagined,
because actually there is no intimacy between the world of telecommunications
and the developers, as there is an intimacy between the world of Web and the
developers11.
As we have already shown in the previous paragraph, APIs are conceived taking into
account the requirement of enabling a single developer to experiment (as in the case of the
Twitter Firehose API). This requirement is the rule in Yahoo as well, user-developers can
experiment without even asking the permission of the provider. This development process
precedes the creation of the start-ups by the developers. As also described by the Orange
Labs executive, the successful innovations have the chance to be acquired by the platform
provider (and thus are not freely revealed, as in the case of the private-collective model in
open source (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003)). Here is how the Yahoo product manager
described the purpose and the process of API innovation:
They [user-developers] create their mashup and use it in their corner . . . Generally,
they don’t ask our opinion. That’s the reason why APIs were invented and dis-
tributed, for people to appropriate them and create their own services beginning
from those APIs. So, there is not necessarily the need to come back to Yahoo
and ask for a specific validation to advance. It is automatic, which allows it to
go a lot faster rather than burdening the process, which would take longer.
On the contrary, it’s true that today we trust start-ups, providing them with APIs
so that they can start up and [then we] begin making strategic partnerships with
those start-ups that we estimate that will develop themselves very fast. There
is a real policy today that goes in this direction. Specially in France, but also in
general for Yahoo.12.
Deux sociétés qui travaillent ensemble pour proposer un produit, c’est pas nouveau. Ça a
toujours existé. Ce qui est beaucoup plus nouveau, c’est ces APIs ouvertes, qui sont données
à tout le monde, qui permettent à tout le monde de faire des mashups. Et la popularité d’un
service se mesure également à ces APIs.
11Translated from French. Original quote:
Les opérateurs de télécom essayent tous de fournir des APIs sur les réseaux, pour que des gens
puissent développer sur le réseau. Ça marche un peu, pas comme on pourrait imaginer, car en
fait il n’y a pas d’intimité entre le monde des télécom et les développeurs, comme il y a une
intimité entre le monde du Web et les développeurs.
12Translated from French. Original quote:
Ils créent leur mush-up et l’utilisent dans leur coin. . . En général, on ne nous demande pas notre
avis. C’est la raison pour laquelle les APIs on été inventées et distribuées, c’est pour que les gens
se l’approprient et créent leurs propres services à partir de ces APIs. Il n’y a donc pas forcément
un réel besoin de revenir sur Yahoo et de demander une certaine validation pour avancer là-
dessus. C’est automatique, ce qui permet d’aller beaucoup plus vite plutôt que d’alourdir les
process, ce qui est forcément très long.
En revanche, c’est vrai qu’on fait d’avantage conﬁance, aujourd’hui, aux start-ups en leur four-
88
Hence, platform providers "trust" developers helping them start up. At the same time,
what the "intimacy" between the two suggests in addition, that developers should also "trust"
as well the provider. For a Google Developer Relations engineer, the biggest risk is losing
trust from the user-developer community:
The big risk with APIs is probably losing trust, because when you’re using an
API you’re trusting. It’s kind of having like a reasonable uptime, cause you’re
taking part of your site and you’re making it depend on an API so if that API
starts breaking a lot, or it’s flaky or gets slow you’re gonna lose trust in there,
right? Or if you’re trying to use it you can’t get any responds you file a bug and
you never hear back you’re gonna lose some faith.
I think that’s the big risk, right? ’Cause if you have a bad experience with a
Google API you’re probably not gonna use another Google API, right? And then
you might tell other people, you might do a blog post that says Google App
Engine sucks. There are certainly posts like that. And then other people have
that attitude as well. It could actually be that it sucks and it’s something we
obviously need to fix, right?
Hence, what is described above is a trust through the liability of the substrate, on top of
which developers build their own services. A problem on the interface will have eﬀects on the
entire set of services that are "plugged" into it instantly, as what is in use is a constant ﬂow
of information. Moreover, user-developers are not isolated. The capacity of user-developers
to blog or complain to others may diﬀuse the information, engendering negative network
eﬀects for the provider’s reputation.
Still, when I asked a Google product manager how they manage the relationship with
those developers, he answered:
It’s our strongest point. Without developers, you don’t see the word Google. A
developer is really a person that’s saying “what business can I do? Can I develop
this? You know what? I will not start from scratch. This is the platform that I
need for a base. And I build my stuff on top of it.” And that’s where the API is
coming in.
So, you could say developers are actually an extension of Google. Because they
take our technology, they add their technology and they build something in the
middle.
We ﬁnd thus a particular actor, the user-developer-entrepreneur (UDE) who is given
enough value from the platform providers in what regards the expansion of their platform,
in terms of popularity, functionalities and deployment. Still, the platforms do not engage in
a typical partnership relationship with them. At the same time, UDEs do not reveal freely
their innovations: they either create their own services or get acquired by the providers if
they present a fast rate of growth.
A key element in this process is the establishment of intimacy between providers and
UDEs: providers have to trust UDEs, while UDEs have to trust, on their terms the providers.
nissant des APIs pour qu’ils puissent démarrer et commencer à faire des partenariats stratégiques
avec des start-ups dont on estime qu’elles vont se développer très rapidement. Il y a une vraie
politique aujourd’hui qui va dans ce sens. Spécialement en France, mais aussi en général pour
Yahoo.
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What is assumed from the discourse represented above, this "chicken and egg problem" has
two dimensions: on the one hand, the Web business environment seems to have begun with
an a priori trust among the two, something which has not been the case for instance for
telecoms. On the other hand, this relationship is maintained and managed by the platform
provider throughout the life of the platform.
Hence, we can conclude this paragraph with the formulation of the following working
hypotheses:
Intuition 5. User-Developer-Entrepreneurs constitute a particular actor for inno-
vation in Web platforms. The synergy between UDEs and platform providers is a
critical requirement for the expansion of the platforms
Intuition 6. While UDEs are not organised in innovation sharing communities,
such as in the User Innovation paradigm (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), they
are linked with each other, as well as with platform providers through “intimate”
ties.
Intuition 7. Web services open product strategy, beyond the provision of specific
substrates for UDE innovation, is due to two reasons:
1. The historical competitive advantage of this business domain in what regards
an intimate relation with developers.
2. The active management of the communities of UDEs.
5.3 Discussion
In the Table 5.2 I synthesize the Intuitions as resulting from the identiﬁcation of the business
domain peculiarities through the platform providers’ discourse.
During the interviews, service provider executives stressed the importance of three major
peculiarities, as well as the prerequisites rendering them possible and illustrating the leading
direction for enterprise strategy.
The peculiarities regarded two elements of online business: the technical substrate and
the actors of the sector.
Hence, Web services act as Open Products (Chrysos et al., 2010), providing a speciﬁc
value of use to end users, while giving UDEs the means to extend the platform, while the
latter is in the market (Int. 3). Between the attributes of the means provided to developers
(of the APIs) and the attributes of the ﬁnal service, as perceived by the end-user, there
appears to be a “mirror relationship” (Int. 2), as UDEs will develop their services using
the categories of information already there. For instance, in eBay they will use information
about auctions, while in Google Maps they will use information about mapping. This mirror
relationship comes as a result of an historical evolution consisting in the shift from Web
sites to APIs (Int. 1) enabling the expansion of Web services over diﬀerent devices and the
displacement of innovation trajectories form the Web sites to the Apps.
The ﬁgure of the UDE is central in this process: his activity goes where partnerships
cannot go. UDEs also appear as a condition for platforms to quickly be explored and
extended, enriching the ﬁnal oﬀer to end-users and rapidly tracing new tendencies in their
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Mirror rela-
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2
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tioned innovation
condition for inno-
vation
4
Peculiarities Open Prod-
ucts
3
Synergy with
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5& 6
Collectivity Man-
agement
7,2.
Prerequisites Shift from
Web sites to
APIs
1 Industry - Devel-
opers ties
7,1.
Table 5.2: Synthesis of the peculiarities identiﬁed.
public through the development of start-ups (Int. 4). Hence, a synergy between platform
providers and UDEs is suggested by their common interests (Int. 5), though this synergy can
only be based on an intimacy between the two actors, as partnerships cannot be deployed
at this level (Int. 6).
The fast development of Web services, with services reaching hundreds of millions of
users on a global level within few years, is among others, based on this synergy. The Web
services sector has had this competitive advantage because of its historical formation (Int. 7,
1). Still, the further deployment and popularisation of these services demands a management
method for this speciﬁc kind of relationship (Int. 7, 2.).
Overall, the innovative activity of UDEs enters in-between the two known paradigms for
innovation, the producer and the user innovation models.
In Figure 5.1 I indicate the major ﬁndings as compared to the two innovation paradigms
as outlined by (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012) (reviewed on page 56). Firstly, I identiﬁed
the speciﬁc value of use for Web services, the value of collective intimacy, which is an entry
point for innovation processes in both cases. Then, the particular actor identiﬁed in this
chapter constitutes a bridge between the two models: he comes from the user public while
he moves towards the enterprise. This speciﬁc move is what interested my interlocutors and
the reason for the provision of APIs is to facilitate it. Of course, the public of UDEs is
smaller than the one of end-users, still considerably larger than an enterprise’s engineering
department, when talking about Web services such as Google, Yahoo or Twitter. At the
same time, UDEs have an expertise which is higher than the average user, though still not
as advanced as enterprise R&D engineers.
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Figure 5.1: Peculiarities of the Web services innovation environment.
5.4 Conclusion
In this section I identiﬁed two indications on the questions of who develops applications based
on contemporary Web services and how this is done, as compared to existing studies on online
business, new product development and user/producer enterprise models. Enterprises appear
to share this challenge although they have an original model of innovation management,
based on the sharing of exploitation and exploration with a large public of individual user-
developer-entrepreneurs (UDEs), emphasizing the phase prior to the start-up formation.
UDEs innovation is placed in-between the user and the producer innovation model, calling
for novel management methods of peculiar innovation collectivities.
In the rest of the current Part of my study, I will further explore the actual peculiarities
identiﬁed in this chapter. Then, in the Part II, I will study the formation of the prerequisites
that allowed to the Web sector to produce such a particular innovation model.
In the last part of my study, I will distinguish, explore and propose three methods for
the management of such collectivities, taking into account all the particular characteristics
of this business environment, as well as their dynamics, as identiﬁed by the study of the
prerequisites formation.
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Chapter 5 traced some early indications of the possible peculiarities of contemporary
Web business, regarding a) the value of “online identity” provided by Web services, b) the
speciﬁc ﬁgure of User-Developer-Entrepreneurs (UDEs) and c) the particular technologies
supplied to the latter by service providers, enabling the extension of online services through
UDE innovation.
The current chapter explores the possibility of UDE activity constituting a third innovation
model, placed in-between user and manufacturer paradigms. Using a phenomenon-based
research approach (von Krogh et al., 2012), I distinguish some elementary characteristics
of such a model, by revisiting the well-known “private-collective” model for innovation (von
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006).
Examining such actors in action and triangulating my observations with the study of
specialised books for online service developers, I ﬁnd that typical norms of the existing inno-
vation models are not followed. Hence, I further explore this way of action and suggest that
UDEs oscillate in-between user and manufacturer roles through an entrepreneurial activity,
which may have an important impact on innovation strategies for the Web services sector.
6.1 Introduction
This study explores the ways in which third party innovation on Web services can be studied,
as compared to the general paradigms of user and manufacturer innovation. The distinction
between user and manufacturer innovation von Hippel (1975), as described by the “private
collective” model (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006), has provided a new perspective
on B-C (Business to Consumer) relationship understanding, enriched or event contested by
the C-C relationship. This chapter explores yet another ﬁgure that should be taken into
account, beyond B and C, the developer, particularly active in the Web services domain.
The current chapter will suggest that the role of developers can be analysed by taking
into account his three diﬀerent conﬁgurations: user-developer (UD), creating tools or appli-
cations for his own use, user - developer - entrepreneur (UDE), attempting to commercialise
such creations, and developer - entrepreneur (DE), using similar methods for direct com-
mercialization of creation but not for personal use. Two diﬀerent methods will be used to
distinguish the action norms of this ﬁgure, both being undertaken at the level of an individual
developer (and not at the one of an enterprise or a user community).
This exploration will be deployed in two steps, as outlined by Figure 6.1. The ﬁrst step
explores in a qualitative mode by means of an “observant participation” the way individuals
active in the domain operate. The outcome is that their activity seems not to ﬁt in either of
the paradigms, as individuals don’t reveal their creations, although aren’t manufacturers, in
the business sense, either. Moreover, they use a “palette” of tool-kits, coming from diﬀerent
origins, both free software tools, as in the open source paradigm and Web service based
ones, the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
The second step proceeds in a more systematic exploration of the action norms of these
individuals, as described by the technical “Cookbooks” they read, to be able to develop
their own applications. Verifying the propositions of the ﬁrst step through a more detailed
analysis, it suggests that their action mode can best be described as a “personal investment”
one, situated in-between the “private investment” and the “private-collective” models (von
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006).
The chapter concludes with the proposition of three alternative concepts for research,
the User-Developer (UD), the User - Developer - Entrepreneur (UDE) and the Developer-
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Figure 6.1: Chapter overview.
Entrepreneur (DE), each having a diﬀerent attitude towards the innovation process.
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6.2 Theoretical concepts
The question I am studying in this chapter is the following:
Question. Should the activity of people using existing Web services to develop their own
applications be described according to the user innovation or the manufacturer innovation
paradigm?
My objective will thus be to identify and explore (von Krogh et al., 2012) the peculiarities,
if any, of their particular actions and allow for their eventual classiﬁcation. Hence, the
principal concepts of the “private-collective” model will be reviewed in order to construct a
comparative exploration and analysis framework.
6.2.1 The “private-collective” model
In their inﬂuential work, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006), using the open source
development as an example case, introduced a novel model for innovation. The “private-
collective” model has been a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the articulation
between individual and collective incentives, for what had already been identiﬁed as “user
innovation” (von Hippel, 1990; Herstatt and von Hippel, 1992; Olson and Bakke, 2001; von
Hippel and Katz, 2002, and others). In brief, there are two fundamental questions according
to which von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006) classify the diﬀerent innovation paradigms:
• How is knowledge produced and shared?
• How is value appropriated?
More speciﬁcally, the “private-collective” model was introduced as a junction of two
other models, the “private investment” and the “collective action” ones, offering the “best
of both worlds” under many conditions (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, p. 209). Ta-
ble 6.1 summarizes the arguments proposed by the two authors, regarding the dimensions of
knowledge and added value production, which are reviewed in the following paragraphs.
Knowledge Value Appropriation
Model Production Sharing Private Public
Private
investment
R&D Patent Monopoly Loss
Collective
(public)
action
R&D, public
research
Knowledge
Control
Reliquishing
Reputation,
monetary
subsidies
“Common
pools” resources
Private-
collective
“Sticky”
knowledge
“Free revealing” Reputation,
Learning,
problem
resolution
“common
pools”, common
solutions
Table 6.1: Private-collective model as opposed to the Private Investment and the Collective
Model. Compiled from von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006).
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The “private investment” model
On the one hand, as a private investment model, von Hippel and von Krogh refer to what
elsewhere is termed the manufacturer paradigm (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012, and others).
The authors adopt the deﬁnition of Demsetz (1967), according to which this model is based
on the following fundamental assumption:
that innovation will be supported by private investment and that private returns
can be appropriated from such investments (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003,
p. 212).
Under this reasoning, “to encourage private investment in innovation, society grants
innovators some limited rights to the innovations they generate via intellectual property law
mechanisms” (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, p. 212). Hence, the monopoly granted to
innovators marks a “loss” for the society, as the knowledge created within these norms, can be
exclusively used by the innovators only (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, p. 213). In parallel,
mechanisms such as patents come to counterbalance this public loss, since, by deﬁnition, they
commute monopoly granted to public knowledge disclosure for the period of the exclusive
rights granting, after which this knowledge becomes public. Typically, knowledge created
and then exploited through innovation, is explored within an enterprise R&D department,
though it has been additionally proposed that innovation should be treated as a distinguished
enterprise process (Hatchuel et al., 2001), organising a dialectic relationship between research
and development.
The “collective (public) action” model
On the other hand, by the term “collective action model” von Hippel and von Krogh refer
to a model which “applies to the provision of public goods, where a public good is defined
by its nonexcludability and nonrivalry” (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, p. 213). For this
model to be actionable, collective action contributors are required to “relinquish control of
knowledge they have developed for a project and make it a public good by unconditionally
supplying it to a ‘common pool’ ” (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, p. 213). Monetary or
reputation subsidies are usually attributed to contributors by the public to foster this type
of innovation and ensure participation.
The “private-collective” model
Subsequently, the “private-collective” model comes about as a junction of the two other
models mentioned above. User innovators “freely reveal” their creations (von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, 2006) and beneﬁt in a non-proﬁt way: the eﬀorts for the resolution of a
problem they face, which is considered as the starting point of innovation, are shared within
a community of users through the public disclosure of the innovation itself.
One of the fundamental propositions of the user innovation is that the “locus” of innova-
tion, that is where innovation actually occurs, is often in the user, not on the manufacturer
side. So, in his seminal work on innovation in scientiﬁc instruments, von Hippel highlighted
that “it is almost always the user, not the instrument manufacturer, who recognizes the need,
solves the problem via an invention, builds a prototype and proves the prototype’s value in
use” (von Hippel, 1975, p. 20). Moreover, the user innovator does not keeps innovations
for himself, nor does he commercialize it, but “encourages and enables the diffusion of his
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invention by publishing information on its utility and instructions sufficient for its replication
by other users - and by instrument manufacturers” (von Hippel, 1975, p. 20).
According to von Hippel and other researchers of the user innovation “School”, innovation
is localized on the user side because use-related “sticky information” also lies on the user
side. By that term, von Hippel refers to information or knowledge that is costly to transfer
(von Hippel, 2005, pp. 67-68). In general, such knowledge may be obtained either by the
manufacturer or by the user. More speciﬁcally, as outlined in Table 6.2, users usually obtain
information about their needs, to which user innovation comes as a response, since it is
cheaper and more beneﬁcial for these actors. The “buy or innovate dilemma” expression
has been used to illustrate the motives of user innovation. On the contrary, manufacturers
are more likely to innovate during new product development when this information is about
technology, where their expertise is useful (Ogawa, 1998; von Hippel, 2005).
Innovation Actor Sticky information Innovation locus
Manufacturer Technological New product development
User User need - related Use
Developer Under exploration
Table 6.2: Likeness for Users and Manufacturers to innovate using “sticky” information.
Compiled from (von Hippel, 1994; Ogawa, 1998; Lüthje et al., 2005; von Hippel, 2005).
This chapter explores the values for the corresponding ﬁelds for the developer case.
As von Hippel (2005) puts it, one of the main values of “sticky” information for inno-
vation, resides in the modelling of users own needs (von Hippel, 2005, p. 8). This “sticky”
information is then the resource on which “each innovator will draw on” (von Hippel, 2005,
p. 71). As a result, user innovations tend to be closer to the speciﬁc needs and context of
use, than the ones of manufacturers:
In the specific case of product development, this means that users as a class will
tend to develop innovations that draw heavily on their own information about
need and context of use. Similarly, manufacturers as a class will tend to develop
innovations that draw heavily on the types of solution information in which they
specialize (von Hippel, 2005, p. 70).
In general, user innovation implies a series of advantages for innovators, such as the
low cost for innovation processes, development and maintenance through the activity of
user communities (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006; von Krogh et al., 2003a), the wide,
community-based diﬀusion, as well as the learning process itself (von Hippel and von Krogh,
2003, 2006).
The use of these categories to describe the development of online applications is not
evident: while technology is an easy to guess requirement for the development of an appli-
cation, the indications of chapter ?? suggest that one does not have to be an enterprise to
possess this information. At the same time, one can safely assume that users are not in a
position to develop an application, say for a service like Facebook, unless they are able to
master some of its technology.
The analytical exploration of the diﬀerent types of “sticky information” and “innovation
loci” used by the people developing online applications is thus required to characterise these
actors. Before that, a closer look at the literature regarding the open source paradigm as
well as the ﬁgure of entrepreneur in the innovation process is put forward for consideration.
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The exemplary case of open source
The open source phenomenon has been an exemplary case for the “free revealing and private-
collective model” of development, allowing to explore additional dimensions of user innova-
tions, such as collective learning processes (von Krogh et al., 2003a,b; O’Mahony, 2003, and
others). The activity of user-developers deployed thanks to a ‘pool’ of open source software
projects enables users to build upon existing resources (von Krogh et al., 2003a). In parallel,
the public earns from the resolution of the problem itself, as the community freely reveals
its innovations. Such a process is structured around the challenge of a common problem
resolution (von Hippel, 2007; Benkeltoum, 2008).
More speciﬁcally regarding the open source software paradigm, von Hippel and von Krogh
remark on the speciﬁcities rendering this case unique:
What may be unique to knowledge and information products is that in these
fields we see users carrying out the entire innovation process for themselves - no
manufacturer required. Thus, open source software projects encompass the en-
tire innovation process, from design to distribution to field support and product
improvement. Such “full-function” user innovation and production communities
are possible only when self-manufacture and/or distribution of innovative prod-
ucts directly by users can compete with commercial production and distribution.
In the case of open source software this is possible because innovations can
be “produced” and distributed essentially for free on the Web, software being
information rather than a physical product (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003,
p. 219).
Hence, in the speciﬁc case of software, the “private-collective” model takes a more global
dimension, through the practice of open source software. This aggregation of user innovation
characteristic of the open source software phenomenon is attributed to the speciﬁcity of
“knowledge and information products”, which gives users the possibility to carry out “the
entire innovation process for themselves”, from design to distribution and maintenance,
without the help of manufacturers. “Essentially free” distribution is then enabled by the
Web, as software is “information rather than a physical product”.
Yet, in the ﬁeld of Web 2.0 application development, one can observe the same char-
acteristics: similar to the open source software case, Web 2.0 applications can generally
be characterised as knowledge and information products, while the Web is also used for
distribution. Nevertheless, as we traced in chapter 6, an “intimate” synergy between enter-
prises providing services and UDEs is suggested. Given this identity of attributes between
Web 2.0 applications and open source software, and judging from the open source speciﬁc
characteristics as outlined by von Hippel and von Krogh, the synergy indicated in my ﬁeld
seems paradoxical: why would UDEs and providers come together if each actor could act
individually?
In other words, which model is the appropriate one to describe the activity of people
using Web services, such as Facebook or Google Maps to conceive and develop their own
applications?
At this level, we should distinguish another form of individuality beyond the user, also
discussed in innovation studies, the ﬁgure of the entrepreneur. The following paragraphs
begin by reviewing the literature connecting the two ﬁgures.
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6.2.2 The user - entrepreneur
Studies on the open source phenomenon contributed to the further orientation of literature
in user innovation towards the innovation capacities (Nassimbeni, 2001) of individual users.
While the initial conceptualisation of user innovation includes both individuals and ﬁrms
who innovate to serve their own needs (as opposed to marketing those innovations) (von
Hippel, 1976, 1977a, 2011), later research explicitly focuses on individual users (consumers)
as innovator actors. Their particularity consists in going beyond the provision of concepts
for innovation to the undertaking of the entire process themselves (von Hippel, 1978a,c; von
Hippel and Katz, 2002; Olson and Bakke, 2001), allowing for the projection of the current
era as “the age of consumer innovation” (Fa et al., 2011), where end-user innovation would
obtain autonomy from the manufacturer paradigm.
Hence, while the experienced, individual user takes a more or less central role regarding
innovation, his relationship to another ﬁgure, traditionally highlighted by innovation studies,
the entrepreneur, is less explored.
The few studies exploring the speciﬁc condition of user-entrepreneurs have already been
reviewed in Section 3.3.3 (page 63). Baldwin et al. (2006) study the case where users
become entrepreneurs. Their research is based on a design reasoning, according to which
“user innovation begins when one or more users of some good recognize a new set of design
possibilities - a so-called “design space” - and begin to explore it” (Baldwin et al., 2006).
Thus, user innovations cover this particular design space.
However, research interested in the phenomenon of user-entrepreneurship (Shah, 2003;
Lüthje et al., 2005; Shah and Tripsas, 2007; Haeﬂiger et al., 2010) concludes with a rather
linear model of transition from the user to the manufacturer paradigm, as modelled in
Figure 3.8 (on page 65) following a literature review, which is doubled in Figure 6.2 for
ease. These studies are based on cases where innovations are successfully commercialised.
However, success is mostly an exception in what regards entrepreneurship as a whole.
The Schumpeterian analysis of innovation is largely based on the ﬁgure of the en-
trepreneur. Schumpeter recognises that the vast majority of “would-be” entrepreneurs fail
(Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 116-117). Moreover, he underlines the absence of common so-
cial characteristics among entrepreneurs, who may originate from a variety of social groups
(Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 101-103). Hence, unlike the user, who can be clearly deﬁned by his
relationship with a given good, the entrepreneur can be deﬁned merely by a mind-set. There-
fore, management scholars felt the need to distinguish entrepreneurship from entrepreneurial
orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, 2001), the former being the result (e.g. a new market
entry), the latter being the way to it. Consequently, it is legitimate to argue that research
on user-entrepreneurs describing a rather linear passing from the user to the manufacturer
role, touches only on a part of the phenomenon, the tip of the iceberg, to the extent that
this research only studies successful cases.
There are two major currents in the literature on entrepreneurs. On the one hand,
there are studies highlighting the subjective characteristics, such as personality, favouring
entrepreneurship (Lüthje and Franke, 2003; Fauchart and Gruber, 2011, and others). On
the other hand, other studies highlight the objective characteristics, such as entry cost, that
constrict entrepreneurship (Willcocks and Plant, 2001; Sawhney, 1998; Iansiti and Levien,
2004; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Osterloh and Rota, 2007). In the current chapter, I explore
entrepreneurship as an aspect of the “Web 2.0” phenomenon, that enables people to develop
applications. Thence, I will focus on the objective characteristics favouring entrepreneurship,
that is the conditions rendering it possible for (more or less) charismatic people to innovate
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Figure 6.2: User-entrepreneurship steps according to Shah and Tripsas (2007) localised in
the mapping proposed by Raasch and von Hippel (2012).
using Web services. Design space opportunities (Baldwin et al., 2006) identiﬁcation will be
a guide for this exploration.
What I met in the ﬁeld and will develop in the following paragraphs, is that entrepreneur-
ship appears as a “continuous oscillation” between the service user and the service provider
roles, enabled by a common practice of the service providers, to allow innovation on their
platforms. By exploring the eventual action norm peculiarities of people developing Web
applications, I expect thus to determine in a ﬁner way the transition of the user to the
manufacturer condition.
6.2.3 An exploration framework
As already mentioned, the aim of the current chapter is to distinguish and to explore (von
Krogh et al., 2012) the action norms of people using Web services for their own appli-
cations development, in relationship to the two ﬁgures mentioned above, the user and the
entrepreneur. For this, two innovation paradigms, the user and the manufacturer ones (Bald-
win and von Hippel, 2011; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012) will be used as a reference. Still,
it should be noted that this opposition between the two paradigms is not absolute: by deﬁ-
nition “lead user” innovation comes before its manufacturer industrialisation and, thus, the
distinction is rather a matter of diﬀerent innovation phases. Nonetheless, this dichotomy will
serve more as an emphatic reference for an early form of modelling, than as a deterministic
classiﬁcation criterion.
Using similar distinction criteria as von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006), I will explore
the questions of knowledge production and value appropriation qualitatively, in respect to
application development on top of existing Web services. As already mentioned, the level of
my analysis will be at that of people developing such applications, which I will describe in
comparison with their models.
Table 6.3 outlines the main characteristics of the two paradigms. Design and development
as well as diﬀusion innovation phases are typically structured in diﬀerent ways. I review these
diﬀerences by separating action goals, judged by the actors in terms of eﬀectiveness, and
the action norms, describing the rules, the assumptions and the conditions under which the
action takes place (Argyris and Schon, 1978).
More speciﬁcally, according to the user paradigm, design and development emerges from
the incentives to satisfy personal needs, not fully addressed by an available product, and are
characterised by the use of “sticky” or “local” knowledge, lead users have from their own
experience (von Hippel, 1986, 1994, 1998; Lüthje et al., 2005, and others). In addition,
there is a variety of individual incentives for participation in the collective process, globally
characterised by the sharing of development eﬀorts and the corresponding reputation eﬀects
within the community of users (Hars and Ou, 2001; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Shah,
2003; Lattemann and Stieglitz, 2005; Shah, 2006; Arena and Conein, 2008, and others).
On the contrary, proﬁt expectations rule in a high degree design and development process
in the manufacturer paradigm. Enterprises are based on Market Research to identify and
conﬁgure potential client needs, using its results as requirements for further advancements
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Sahal, 1981; Clark, 1985; Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001, and
others). R&D is the typical enterprise norm for innovation organisation, while new product
development is managed according to the criteria of speed, quality and cost play a crucial
role in decision-making, as well as in formulating the agenda of future issues to explore (Clark
and Fujimoto, 1991; Iansiti, 1993; Verganti, 1999; Hatchuel et al., 2001, 2002; Midler and
Navarre, 2007; Midler and Beaume, 2010).
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User Paradigm Manufacturer Paradigm
Goals Norms Goals Norms
Design &
Develop-
ment
Satisfy own
needs; Share
eﬀorts
“Sticky”
knowledge;
User commu-
nity develop-
ment
Satisfy (poten-
tial) client needs;
Speed, cost,
quality
Market Re-
search; R&D
Diffusion Reputation;
Maintenance
“free reveal-
ing”; User
networks
diﬀusion
Merchandise;
Client support
Marketing; Af-
ter sales ser-
vice
Indicative
Literature
Herstatt and von Hip-
pel (1992); Shah (2003);
Lakhani and von Hippel
(2003); Lüthje et al. (2005);
Osterloh and Rota (2007);
Benkeltoum (2008)
Clark and Fujimoto (1991); Ian-
siti (1993); Verganti (1999);
Hatchuel et al. (2001, 2002);
Midler and Navarre (2007); Mi-
dler and Beaume (2010); An-
dreani and Conchon (2001);
Fombelle et al. (2012)
von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006); Baldwin and von Hippel
(2011); Raasch and von Hippel (2012)
Table 6.3: Exploration framework: norms of the two innovation paradigms.
Finally, innovation diﬀusion takes place in the ﬁrst case through user networks, where
innovators freely reveal their creations, beneﬁting from reputation eﬀects, while in the par-
ticular case of open source software they also beneﬁt from community-based maintenance
(von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006; von Hippel, 2007). The discipline of Marketing, on the
other side, has dedicated its greatest interest in determining and accessing a relevant public
to merchandise the good produced (Denner, 1971; Eiglier and Langeard, 1975; Millier, 1989;
Andreani and Conchon, 2001; Benavent and de la Villarmois, 2006; Brown et al., 2006;
Fombelle et al., 2012, and others).
From the above mentioned norms, I will use as a reference the most distinctive ones
for each paradigm. While innovating for use or for profit constitutes the major distinction
criterion between the two paradigms (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; von Hippel, 2011;
Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), there are overlapping characteristics, while when it comes
to development R&D practices, historically bounded to the enterprise context, can also be
used for user innovations, as early studies on the ﬁeld of scientiﬁc instruments innovation
have shown (von Hippel, 1976, 1977b; Riggs and von Hippel, 1994; Shaw, 1985; Lettl et al.,
2006). Hence, I will not take in account the R&D dimension in my exploration, being limited
to less ambiguous action and more singular norms.
Overall, if there are to be peculiarities in the way people developing applications act in
comparison with the above mentioned paradigms, they should be expressed on the level of
the elementary norms of action mentioned. The goal of the current study will thus be to
qualify whether or not innovation activity of these people enters one of the two paradigms
mentioned. For this, I will examine their elementary “norms of action” in relationship to end-
users and providers, following a two-steps investigation method, as developed in Section 6.3.
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Distinction Step Exploration Step
Question
Can the activity of people using Web services for their own
application development be described by the already known
innovation paradigms?
Level of analy-
sis
People developing their own goods, on the basis of existing
online services“
General Re-
search Goals
(von Krogh
et al., 2012)
“Encounter bracket peculiar-
ities”; “describe context in
broad cultural terms”; “iden-
tify inadequacy of given body
of theory and knowledge in
the field”; “identify relative
concepts for study”
“Intensify data gathering”;
“Generate more solid con-
cepts that can serve as filter
for further data gathering”;
Method Observant participation in a
Web site development pro-
cess
Systematic analysis
of“Cookbooks by and
for developers”
Outcome User-Developer-Entrepreneur
ﬁgure (early distinction); Use
of both Web services and
open source modules
From user to entrepreneur:
transformations of interest
Table 6.4: Distinction and exploration steps my methodology, based on (von Krogh et al.,
2012).
6.3 Methodology: distinction and exploration
As already mentioned in the introduction, a two step methodology will be used to distin-
guish and explore Web-based application development phenomenon. This section elaborates
the research goals and the methods used in each step. The ﬁndings will be discussed in
Sections 6.4 and 6.6.
6.3.1 Research Question and Goals
To distinguish and to explore the speciﬁc characteristics of the action of people using existing
services to develop their own ones, I will use a phenomenon-based research strategy (von
Krogh et al., 2012). Table 6.4 summarises the steps of the methodology used and will be
further analysed in the following paragraphs.
The research question is posed as follows:
Question. Can the activity of people using Web services for their own application develop-
ment be described by the already known innovation paradigms?
For this question to be answered, the activity of these people should be explored in a way
that enables the identiﬁcation of possible peculiarities (von Krogh et al., 2012), as expressed
through their action norms (Argyris and Schon, 1978). Hence, once the action norms are
identiﬁed, a comparison to the user and manufacturer paradigms (von Hippel and von Krogh,
2003, 2006; Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012) can be operated,
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as discussed in the exploratory framework, paragraph 6.2.3 and outlined in the Table 6.3
(page 104).
According to von Krogh et al., studies distinguishing a new phenomenon often do it by
using narratives. Early research into the open source phenomenon research research used
the works of Raymond (1999) and Stallman (2002), identifying its distinctive characteristics.
Both authors had been invested in the activity of open source communities and their writings
had the intention to share this experience with the other members of the community. For
Raymond this experience concerned the beneﬁts of a distributed development process, while
for Stallman those of free software and the related copyright license. Von Krogh et al.
synthesizes the following research goals for studies aiming at a new phenomenon distinction:
“encounter bracket peculiarities against existing body of knowledge”; “describe context in
broad cultural terms”; “identify inadequacy of given body of theory and knowledge in the
field”; and “identify relevant concepts for study” (von Krogh et al., 2012, p. 290). This
approach will be used during the ﬁrst step of my exploration, where I will use an “observant
participation” method by joining the process of a Web site development. I will analytically
describe this step in paragraph 6.3.2.
Then, always according to von Krogh et al., during the exploration phase, researchers
should “intensify data gathering inside and outside the focal concepts” and “generate more
solid concepts that can serve as filters for further data gathering” (von Krogh et al., 2012,
p. 290). Citing the work of Lewis (2000b) on exploration research, the authors agree that
“at the outset, a phenomenon is typically defined in terms of what it is not” (von Krogh
et al., 2012, p. 286). This approach will be used during the second step of my exploration,
to which the results of the ﬁrst step will be an entry. This step consists in the systematic
study of “Cookbooks” edited and read by developers, further described in paragraph 6.3.3.
6.3.2 First step: early norms distinction
The ﬁrst step of my research methodology is deployed through the “observant participation”
in the collective development of a Web site and aims at distinguishing (von Krogh et al.,
2012) the action norms of these people, as compared to existing innovation modes.
Exploration method: observant participation
The method used in the ﬁrst exploration step is situated on the frontiers of action-research
and participant observation. The method consists in using a ﬁeld challenge in which I
participated to identify the action norms of the ﬁeld actors, the people I collaborated with.
The challenge was the development of a Web site, where the team actors belonged to an
exemplar milieu. Sharing elements with both, it is distinguished by the exploitation of an
ephemeral group action, a fact which positions the researcher in a privileged place.
Observant participation compared with research intervention
There is a similarity of the method used to the research intervention approach, which lies in
the fact that I actively took part in the tasks of the team, and more speciﬁcally in “objectives
formulation” and “collectivity mobilisation”, while, as a researcher, I had the “opportunity
to interact with the actors on these challenges and acquire an in-depth knowledge” of the
issue (Hatchuel and Molet, 1986). Still, the collectivity in question was not an enterprise, as
in the case of most research intervention studies, while the results of my research were not
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to be “taken into consideration” by the collectivity, as the theory suggests, since the group
was to be dissolved after the three days term.
Generally, within the framework of action research, “low level implication” in the ﬁeld
has several advantages and inconveniences (Mitchell, 1993; Baumard, 1999). The researcher
is in this research mode “not considered a threat”, as long as he can “understand the specific
language of the actors”, while this “independence provides the possibility to dissociate his/her
research from the field challenges” (Baumard, 1999). Moreover, in this speciﬁc case, the
collectivity being ephemeral, everyone had a minimal engagement (of three days), making
my dissociation not speciﬁc to myself as a researcher but in fact a common ground.
Observant participation compared with participant observation
Unlike research intervention, participant observation approach privileges an external re-
searcher position. It is used as a means to “access events or groups that are otherwise
inaccessible to scientific investigation”’(Yin, 2003, p. 94). Yin highlights the importance
of the researcher being external, to avoid the danger of him becoming a group supporter.
In addition, as participant observation often goes on over a long period of time, Yin notes
the diﬃculties implied by factors such as good “timing and attention for the right observa-
tions to occur” (Yin, 2003, pp. 95-96). However, the ephemeral character of the action I
joined, rendered all group members “external” (as the participants had not met before). The
group’s limited life period also rendered observation easier, compared to long term activities
observation. Hence, my position as a researcher, provided that this investigation was parallel
to a relative familiarity with the speciﬁc terminology and technologies involved through the
corresponding “Cookbooks” (discussed in the next paragraph), was more of an “observant
participation”, since I observed the group’s action while taking part in it.
Field entry: joining the development of a Web site
The speciﬁc group I joined was built around an ephemeral project designed and developed in
three days, during a “hackathon” event for Silicon Valley Google Technologies Users Group
eﬀected in Google’s headquarters in Silicon Valley1. The team was met and formed in place
to develop a Web site, an “online application store”.
A hackathon is a three days competition, where developers and designers are called to
use a provider’s technologies to innovate. Developing teams are formed on the ﬁrst day,
after the keynote speeches, through the self-selection of members on the basis of a concept
proposal (a “pitch”). Group leaders candidates present their ideas to the participants and
form a group that will work three days (and three nights) to develop the concept.
As Silicon Valley is home to many important Web service providers - such as Google,
Yahoo, eBay, Facebook and Amazon - as well as to an important number of dynamic start-
ups (Saxenian, 1994, 2000; Sturgeon, 2000; Weil, 2010; Lecuyer, 2006; Lécuyer, 2006), I
judged that this event could provide access to an exemplary sample of Web developers to
observe.
I chose to participate in a group that was to build an online store for Web-based ap-
plications, as the concept of online markets is already familiar to management literature
1The event itself as a means to manage UDE communities will be explicitly studied in Chapter 16. While
participation on the event was open to everyone, I personally came to attend it after the proposition by a
Google Developer Community Manager, during an online interview regarding the Developer Support process.
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(Brousseau and Chaves, 2004; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Eisenmann et al., 2006). The group
had six members, myself included.
The results of this exploration will be discussed in Section 6.4 and used as input for the
second step of my methodology. Table 6.3 (on page 104) will be used as a reference for the
discussion of the ﬁndings as related to the paradigms already reviewed.
6.3.3 Second step: exploration
To further explore the peculiarities (von Krogh et al., 2012) of the activity under investigation,
the second step of this study will be based on material where a more systematic reﬂection on
their practices is undertaken, beyond isolated cases. The entry chosen for this is a set of books
providing advice to people who want to use Web services for their own development processes,
and is inspired by historical research on technological actors’ process rationalisation.
Exploration method: the study of editions “by and for developers”
The research method used in this second step is inspired by the historical research on the
rationalisation processes leading to the emergence of both new disciplines and new actors in
diﬀerent industrial contexts.
The historians Chatzis and Ribeill (2008) outline a “panorama” of editions, written “by
and for engineers” in France from 1750 to 1950. In their original study, they prove the
contribution of the technical editions and early engineering communities in the capitalisa-
tion, communication and sharing of knowledge among the early engineer communities of the
19
th century, during what is known as the second industrial revolution (railways, chemistry).
Those editions, generic or specialized, responded to a diversity of challenges of the industrial
revolution, framing the formation of the “identity” of engineers around a discourse on in-
novation.Signiﬁcantly, the constitution and the legitimacy of the “corps” of state engineers
was constructed in the middle of the 19th century around such reviews, in competition with
autonomous ones (Chatzis and Ribeill, 2008, p. 123).
The diversity of historical and technological contexts where rationalisation processes,
regarding both technological knowledge and technical actors, emerge through the coupling
of new technical communities and related editions, is encouraging for research into Web
contexts that are based on similar manuscripts.
Studying a diﬀerent period, the decades 1945-75 (the Trente Glorieuses), Chatzis (2008)
shows how new actors in French enterprises, the maintainers, managed to illustrate the value
of their work while rationalising it, through the creation of the Maintenance Department.
There, he underlines the importance of “specialized professional journals” providing “both
the infrastructure required to develop rationalization techniques and a collective self-image
for the actors involved in rationalization” (Chatzis, 2008, pp. 81-82).
Unlike archival analysis, having as its goal to answer “who” and “what” questions, in
a quantitative and non-explanatory mode (Yin, 2003, p. 6), the study of technical editions
providing advices to “peers” will be used to understand the underpinning norms, governing
the “best practices” described in those books.
Entry: Systematic analysis of “Cookbooks” for Web services-based development
Retaining this teaching on the importance of the institutional or autonomous editions “by
and for engineers” in the framing of a discourse of an innovation, regarding both the content
and the strategic importance for future evolutions in the milieu, the second investigative step
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of the current study will be based on the study of analogous editions, addressed today to
people developing applications using Web services. Still, this study doesn’t aim at presenting
a comprehensive panorama of those editions, but at a revelation of the business stakes
“hidden” in the technical discourse. More speciﬁcally, exploration will be based on the study
of “Cookbooks”, as they are often called, written “by and for developers” and providing
advice on how the development ought to be. Hence, this material will be examined as a
second-order reﬂection on developers action, not constrained by the objectives put forward
by a single, local developer group. Then, the norms identiﬁed will be compared with those
of the user and the manufacturer paradigms..
Author (Year) Title
Calishain and Dornfest
(2003)
Google hacks: [100 industrial-strength tips &
tools]
Karp (2003)
eBay hacks : [100 industrial-strength tips &
tools]
Bausch (2003) Amazon hacks
Erle and Gibson (2005) Google Maps Hacks
Bausch (2006)
Yahoo! hacks: Tips & Tools for Living on the
Web Frontier
Stay (2008)
FBML essentials : Facebook Markup Language
fundamentals
Makice (2009) Twitter API: Up and Running
Goldman (2009) Facebook Cookbook
Balderas (2011) Paypal APIs: up and running
Hudson (2012) eBay commerce cookbook: using eBay APIs
Table 6.5: List of Developers’ “Cookbooks” studied. (The books studied were edited by
O’Reilly Media Inc).
Table 6.5 provides the list of the manuals studied. Those manuals are edited by O’Reilly
Media2. Their study will be based on the categories already summarised in Table 6.3 (on
page 104), similar to the ﬁrst step. Moreover, during the second step, more attention will be
given to roles and means that people developing services are assumed or advised to adopt
by the books authors.
Data collection: “Sticky information” and innovation localisation
The second exploratory step beneﬁts from the results of the ﬁrst one: to intensify data
gathering and generate more solid concepts (von Krogh et al., 2012). As discussed in
Section 6.4, one of the results of the ﬁrst step was the indication that a “sticky information
locus” (von Hippel, 1994, 2005) of the Web site development lay in entrepreneurial knowledge
2O’Reilly Media is a reference in the developers milieu, known for editing comprehensive and action-based
manuals for new programming languages. Besides, the editor, Tim O’Reilly, is the one that has popularized
the term “Web 2.0”.
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(speciﬁcally regarding the business models of potentially competitive Web sites). Thus, in
the second step, the loci of such knowledge will be studied in a more systematic way.
Hence, regarding the loci of service users sticky knowledge, my exploration will be based
on the working proposition of distinction between the following types of users:
• End - user, consumer. This is the type of user, typically a “visitor” of the Web site
or application buyer, who is consuming whatever the service provides (information or
products).
• End - user, seller. This is the type of user corresponding to those who sell items on
eBay or those who sell books in Amazon, using the service as a two-sided market
Rochet and Tirole (2004); Eisenmann et al. (2006). Their proﬁt comes from the
transactions of the items that could be sold to other markets as well (e.g. second
hand library stock).
• Developer. This is the type of user that has the skills to develop a software program.
This skill gives him the potential to act upon the functionalities of a given platform
and construct his own extensions.
• User-Developer-Entrepreneur. This is the type of user-developer who attempts to
merchandise an application or a service, based on the features of a given service,
such as for instance Facebook games, which end-users can play with their friends or
localisation services, using Google Maps to display information to their clients.
Those types are schematically represented in Figure 6.3, along with the symbols which
will be later used for the results analysis (on page 117). The diﬀerent types are structured in
reference to the two innovation models, the user and the manufacturer one: the upper side
of the reversed pyramid includes the two types of end-users, the consumer and the seller.
The bottom of the schema is dedicated to the entrepreneur, who is closer to a manufacturer
logic. The developer role, linking the two, is put in the middle.
Figure 6.3: “Loci” of user “sticky” information.
Overall, there is a major qualitative diﬀerence between end-user knowledge and developer
knowledge, even for what the authors of those books consider as simple tasks. For instance,
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Figure 6.4: A simple Google Search form, resulting from the code provided by Calishain and
Dornfest (2003).
an elementary example of a use of the popular Google Search service is the following “very
simple search form” provided by Calishain and Dornfest (2003) in the beginning of their
book:
<!-- Search Google -->
<form method="get" action="http://www.google.com/search">
<input type="text" name="q" size=31 maxlength=255 value="">
<input type="submit" name="sa" value="Search Google">
</form>
<!-- Search Google -->
This form produces a box, like the one shown in Figure 6.4 in any given Web site, if
added in its code. Visitors can then use the resulting form to use Google Search. While this
is a “simple” example for the readers of the books under study, it is not as “simple” for the
average Google Search user. It is thus evident that, even the elementary use case described
in these books is diﬀerent from the use cases one most end-users are familiar with.
Hence, the results presented here regard a second-level understanding of users’ “sticky”
information. Since on a ﬁrst level of analysis the technicality of the knowledge provided
by the books studied is de facto putting a line between the majority of end-users and the
developers, my analysis will tend go beyond this cognitive distance to identify a possible
conceptual distance: do developers share the same needs and context of use with the rest
of end-users, or is there a “Great Wall” separating the two categories, in terms of desired
innovations? In other words, do the concepts come from the developers incentives to satisfy
their own needs as users or do they come from an entrepreneurial logic, to satisfy other users’
needs, diﬀerent from their own ones? This will be the secondary question enabling me to
judge on the “locus” (von Hippel, 1994) of sticky information.
For instance, the example mentioned above is part of advice on how to integrate Google
Search in a Web site. Hence, it is about advanced use of the service by user - developer -
entrepreneurs (UDEs), to the extent that it is a commercial site: Users, because they use
the service, developers, because they have to program to use it, and entrepreneurs because
of their commercial activity, for which the site is designed.
Regarding the means used by the developers, the three following types will be taken into
consideration:
• Free and open source software (FOSS), which is used as “communal resource” (von
Krogh et al., 2003a) by open source software developer communities.
• Proprietary platforms, which are used as a resource by ﬁrms being “complementors”
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) of platform leaders to develop their own peripherals.
• Web service interfaces (Application Programming Interfaces - APIs), which provide
information ﬂows to third party services.
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The ﬁndings of this step will be discussed in Section 6.6.
6.4 Findings (First step): development for profit
The design and development process of the online application market was characterised by
attributes of both the user and the manufacturer innovation models, without it fully “ﬁtting”
into any of the two models. Group members used “sticky” knowledge on entrepreneurship,
while they were motivated by a potential commercial success of the Web site. The following
paragraphs present the ﬁndings regarding the two diﬀerent phases: the design & development
phase and diﬀusion phase.
6.4.1 Design & Development Phase: group development for profit
Table 6.6 summarises the ﬁndings regarding the Design & Development phase of the online
service. Unlike typical user innovation, as it became clear early on in the process, potential
proﬁt had an important role in the reasoning behind the design. The group was interested in
developing an online application “mart”, where other developers were targeted as potential
clients. Hence, during the ﬁrst hour of group discussion about the nature of the service to
be developed, many of the concepts proposed regarded business-related requirements: the
way developer clients would reimburse the service for hosting their application, as well as the
means by which end-user clients would purchase available applications.
Design & Development Phase
User Paradigm Observation
Goals
Satisfy own needs ✩
Share efforts ✧
Norms
“Sticky” knowledge ✧
Community-based development ✩
Manufacturer Paradigm
Goals
Satisfy (potential) client needs ✧
Speed, cost, quality ✧
Norms
Market research ✧
Table 6.6: Design and Development phase: online service development peculiarities obser-
vation.
Symbols:
✧ → Observed; ✩ → The opposite was observed.
During the same discussion, a “draft market research” was performed, with participants
sharing information on existing application stores, such as the Apple App Store or the Android
Market Place. Then, they shared their knowledge on those services from an entrepreneurial
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perspective: those who had relative informations to share, either had already sold applications
through those services, or had friends who did. For instance, the project leader told us that
when one sells applications through the Apple App Store, he has to earn an income over
$200 per currency to get reimbursed: hence, one selling applications in the Canadian or
the UK market cannot get reimbursed for these sales unless they reach the $200 threshold.
In addition, he reported that the provider retained 30% commissions for each transaction.
Therefore, one competitive advantage of the service would be the immediate reimbursement
of application sellers, charging only 10% for our service.
Consequently, much of the group’s “local” information (von Hippel, 1994, 1998; Lüthje
et al., 2005), regarded entrepreneurship as a common experience. Yet, no systematic market
research was made at any level of development, while group members often visited web sites
to conﬁrm information mentioned in the discussion.
Eﬀorts were shared among the team on the basis of a task division. Nevertheless, those
eﬀorts were not shared with other users, neither online communities nor other participants
in the event.
In parallel, the development speed was imposed by the event itself: the Web site was to
be presented on the ﬁnal day of the event. Eventually, what was ready was a prototype of
the service, which was presented to the other participants.
The cost of the site development was very low. No member had to pay anything,
while the leader of the group oﬀered himself to “host” the project on a Web address
(www.h5mart.com).
6.4.2 Diffusion Phase: no free revealing
In the Table 6.7, I summarise the observations as compared to the two paradigms, the user
and the manufacturer ones.
Provided that the ﬁnal product was only a prototype to be presented in the competition,
there was no in-depth consideration on the diﬀusion of the service. Still, it is important
to remark that, despite the fact that the project was left incomplete, the group members
did not suggest that the source code should be revealed to other users, in order for them
to further develop it. The source code having been shared among the members during the
development, we left each other with the oral, friendly agreement that “everyone could do
whatever he or she wants with it”, with no further speciﬁcations regarding the terms of
disclosure.
At the same time, the Web site remained available for online visitors to see. There,
visitors could also read a short presentation by each member with a photo of him/her. We
also exchanged contact information after the event. This “self-promotion” and “networking”
of members reveals a desire for reputation, something however that could not be guaranteed
on a large scale given the modesty of our ﬁnal result. Other considerations, such as service
maintenance, client support, service marketing or after sales services were not discussed.
6.4.3 Other observations: the use of FOSS and Web services
While a comparison of the group action with the user and the manufacturer innovation
paradigms presents the picture of an autonomous, isolated group having no relationship with
free and open source software (FOSS) communities or service providers, a more careful look
into the source code of the project revealed a slightly diﬀerent image.
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Diffusion Phase
User Paradigm Observation
Goals
Reputation ✧
Maintenance ❢
Norms
“Free revealing” ✩
User networks diffusion ❢
Manufacturer Paradigm
Goals
Merchandise ✧
Client support ❢
Norms
Marketing ❢
After sales services ❢
Table 6.7: Diﬀusion phase: online service development peculiarities observation.
Symbols:
✧ → Observed; ❢ → Not observed; ✩ → The opposite was observed.
On the one hand, for the development of the project, group members used both FOSS
and Web services as components. Much of the instrumental part of the Web site was based
on FOSS (particularly, Python and jQuery were used in the back-end and the user interface
correspondingly).
On the other hand, diﬀerent Web services were used to integrate features to our service.
In particular, eBay API was used to enable ﬁnancial transaction, Gmail API to enable client
identiﬁcation and Facebook API for allowing visitors to comment on the applications hosted
on the Web site.
Hence, the low development cost for the group, came out of exploitation of existing
“modules”, taken either from FOSS or existing Web services. At the same time, our project
consisted in an extension of each of those platforms separately and all together, that would
have contributed (if achieved) to the extension of their user base or the enrichment of
functionalities for the existing ones.
6.5 Discussion (First step): keeping a foot in both
camps
The group observed used methods of both the user and the developer paradigms (Baldwin
and von Hippel, 2011; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), in a rather opportunistic mode. “Lo-
cal” information (von Hippel, 1998, 1994; Lüthje et al., 2005) coming from the members’
experience of application development was used though not to develop something for their
own use (e.g. a community-based “pool” of applications, such as the open source software
repositories, studied by von Krogh et al. (2006)), but to develop a commercial application
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for the market, thus seeing their peers as potential clients.
Moreover, despite the fact that, within the time-frame of three days, the Web site wasn’t
completed, group members didn’t choose to open-source it, to “freely reveal” their creation,
to share the eﬀorts with a wider user community, as the private-collective model (von Hippel
and von Krogh, 2003, 2006) would suggest. Instead, they shared both eﬀorts and source code
within the closed, intimate group, with no further speciﬁcation on its potential disclosure
terms.
Moreover, there were variations on what was observed in the two main paradigms. On the
one hand, instead of community reputation eﬀects observed within open source communities,
according to the implication of each individual (Lakhani et al., 2002; von Krogh et al., 2003a;
Auray, 2004, and others), what was observed was rather a simple “socialising”, a will to meet
(and be met by) new people active in the ﬁeld.
On the other hand, instead of the market research used by enterprises, the group produced
and used a “draft benchmarking” of other similar services that existed, based on personal
experience or even rumours, to be conﬁrmed in place, using the Web as a resource.
Group members, during the design and development process,“kept a foot in both camps”,
not only in regards to their collaboration. They also made extensive use of products coming
from both paradigms. In fact, tools and components of the both models were used as
resources for the service development: the developers used open source software as well as
Web services APIs to structure their prototype.
The above suggests that there may be two signiﬁcant implications for business practice
and theory. Firstly, a modiﬁcation of the actual narrative of user-entrepreneur innovation
is evoked. Assuming that group members were experienced users (von Hippel, 1983) of
open source and Web platforms all together, we should still recognise that this experience
in question is of a radically diﬀerent nature, when compared to the end-users one: they
have developed an expertise on services, such as Facebook, not through intensive use, but
rather through purposive design space exploration for the development of applications. Con-
sequently, they were not “accidental” entrepreneurs, as identiﬁed by Shah and Tripsas (2007)
regarding user-entrepreneurs, but they were in a more typical entrepreneurship conﬁguration,
in a conscious quest to make a business.
Secondly, ease of service prototyping in the particular ﬁeld is rather surprising. While
costs (entry costs, prototype costs, development costs) are often cited as barriers to en-
trepreneurship (Teece, 1986; Willcocks and Plant, 2001; Sawhney, 1998; Iansiti and Levien,
2004; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Osterloh and Rota, 2007), such costs were observed to be in-
signiﬁcant and largely limited to personal time investment. In turn, this fact has implications
to the overall competitive environment for providers.
Research in platforms has focussed on competition between diﬀerent providers. The use
of modules coming from diﬀerent providers has also been studied from a platform competition
perspective. Gawer and Cusumano (2002) has proposed that “complementors” should try
to anticipate platform providers’ moves to try to “assess who will win the war for platform
leadership” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 54), as complementors commit resources to their
own innovations. More recently, Eisenmann et al. (2011) proposed more complex strategies,
where a provider of a given platform can be at the same time a complementor of an other
one. Using features of one platform (say eBay) on another (say Facebook)3 is one possible
strategy to “tap in” to competitors user bases. Platform competition has been the case
since enterprises started using platforms. Still, the fact that those using existing platforms
3Such a possibility is enabled through the APIs.
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to innovate needn’t be enterprises, but can be people prototyping a new application at a
very low cost, may indicate a change in the overall “rules of the game”.
6.6 Findings (Second step): different developers
configurations
Tables 6.8 (on page 117) and 6.9 (on page 119) show the outcomes of the developer
“Cookbooks” study, regarding the design and development phase and the diﬀusion phase
correspondingly, as compared with the user and the manufacturer innovation paradigms
action goals and norms (already outlined in Table 6.3, page 104).
The results are categorised by book, as well as by role assumed by authors when proposing
an advice. Hence, advice assuming the role of end-users consumers are represented in the
tables by the rows beginning with the mark “♥”, advice for end-user sellers are represented
by the rows beginning with the mark “♠”, advice for developer with the mark “♦” and,
ﬁnally, advice for user-developer-entrepreneurs with the mark “♣”. The entrepreneur role is
assumed here through the commercialisation of an application developed by the actor, not
the selling of an object manufactured elsewhere (as in the case of the seller).
When one of the goals or norms is explicitly advised by a book author, I noted it with the
“✧” mark, in the corresponding row. When such advice is not mentioned at all, I used the
mark “”. Finally, when authors explicitly disapproved a speciﬁc goal or norm, I noted it that
using the mark “✩”. The last column summarises the ﬁndings of action norms for each role,
marking when they suggest an end-user role (U), a developer role (D) or an entrepreneur
one (E).
In the following paragraphs I present and analyse the ﬁndings of this exploration. As “a
[new] phenomenon is typically defined by what it is not” (Lewis, 2000b; von Krogh et al.,
2012), I will start with the elements of the user innovation model that are absent in the
speciﬁc innovation ﬁeld, and then I will proceed to the description of those elements of both
user and manufacturer innovation paradigms that are present, albeit taking a particular form.
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Table 6.8: Design & Development Phase: “Cookbooks” analy-
sis.
Symbols:
End-User (consumer): ♥ ; Seller (of items):♠ ; Developer : ♦ ;
UDE :♣ ;
Explicitly advised : ✧ ; Not mentioned : ; Explicitly disapproved :✩.
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Author
(Year),
Criterion No:
Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Calishain
and
Dornfest
(2003),
♥ ✧  ✧        U
♠          
♦ ✧  ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
Google
Search
♣   ✧   ✧    ✧ E
Karp
(2003),
♥ ✧  ✧        U
♠ ✧  ✧   ✧     U
♦ ✧  ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
eBay ♣          
Bausch
(2003),
♥ ✧ ✧ ✧        U
♠ ✧  ✧   ✧  ✧   U
♦ ✧  ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ D
Amazon ♣          
Erle and
Gibson
(2005),
♥ ✧  ✧        U
♠          
♦ ✧  ✧  ✧  ✧ ✧  ✧ D
Google
Maps
♣          
Bausch
(2006),
♥ ✧  ✧        U
♠ ✧  ✧   ✧     U
♦   ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ D
Yahoo ♣ ✧  ✧     ✧  ✧ E
Stay
(2008),
♥ ✩  ✩       
♠ ✩         
♦ ✩ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
Facebook ♣ ✩     ✧  ✧  ✧ E
Makice
(2009),
♥ ✧         
♠          
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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Criterion No:
Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
♦ ✩ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
Twitter ♣      ✧  ✧  ✧ E
Goldman
(2009),
♥ ✩  ✩       
♠ ✩         
♦ ✩ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
Facebook ♣ ✩  ✧   ✧  ✧  ✧ E
Balderas
(2011),
♥          
♠ ✧  ✧   ✧    ✧ U
♦ ✧  ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
PayPal ♣      ✧    ✧ E
Hudson
(2012),
♥          
♠ ✧  ✧   ✧  ✧  ✧ U
♦ ✧  ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧  ✧ ✧ D
eBay ♣          ✧ E
End of table
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Table 6.9: Diffusion Phase: “Cookbooks” analysis.
Symbols:
End-User (consumer): ♥ ; Seller (of items):♠ ; Developer : ♦ ;
UDE :♣ ;
Explicitly advised : ✧ ; Not mentioned : ; Explicitly disapproved :✩.
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♦       ✧  D
Google
Search
♣       ✧  E
Karp
(2003),
♥        ✧ U
♠ ✧    ✧  ✧ ✧ D
♦        
eBay ♣        
Bausch
(2003),
♥ ✧       ✧ U
♠ ✧    ✧  ✧ ✧ D
♦        
Amazon ♣        
Erle and
Gibson
(2005),
♥        
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Maps
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♥        
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Yahoo ♣        
Stay
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♥       ✧  U
♠        
♦  ✧       D
Facebook ♣    ✧ ✧  ✧  E
Makice
(2009),
♥       ✧  U
♠        
♦ ✧ ✧       D
Twitter ♣ ✧   ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ E
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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Goldman
(2009),
♥       ✧  U
♠        
♦  ✧    ✧  ✧ D
Facebook ♣  ✧  ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ E
Balderas
(2011),
♥        
♠     ✧    U
♦     ✧    D
PayPal ♣        
Hudson
(2012),
♥        
♠     ✧ ✧ ✧ ✧ U
♦        
eBay ♣        
End of table
6.6.1 No innovation revealing
In the books examined, there is a complete absence of two major action norms of the
private-collective model as developed and used in numerous ﬁelds, including the open source
phenomenon (Raymond, 1999; Stallman, 2002; von Krogh et al., 2003b; von Hippel and von
Krogh, 2003, and others). On the one hand, there was no advice or indication for readers
to freely reveal their own creations, as shown in the Column 4 of the Table 6.9. On the
other hand, there was no sign either of suggestions for community-based development, as
shown in the Column 5 of the Table 6.8. The fact that no book refers to such a process
reveals a “common ground” among the actors of the ﬁeld that their activity is not about
freely revealing their creations to user communities, therefore a particular description - or
even mention - of how to do it is not among the requirements of such a book.
Hence, there is no evidence of collaboration for application development on the
basis of existing services: private development is commonly considered as a rule.
A more subtle look into these books, though, suggests a sense of community, yet not
about innovation sharing itself. What developers have in common is the fact that they share
development methods and tools. This sense comes from the common development methods,
requiring the use of an expanded set of tools.
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6.6.2 Not an enterprise-based development process
While taking a distance from the user paradigm, in the sense that developments are not
to be freely shared, the development process described is not one of an enterprise either.
Typically enough, the books do not provide explicit advice on development speed, quality and
cost performance, criteria which are omni-present in enterprise new product development in
business (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Iansiti, 1993; Bhattacharya et al., 1998, and others).
Instead, authors qualify operations as “easy to do” or “not so easy to do”. Overall, the
reader, as portrayed by these books, is not a product manager running a team of developers,
he is a single developer.
Such qualiﬁcations are made along with the discussion of diﬀerent means in the disposal
of developers. These means can be open source software or proprietary platforms, as well as
the service API itself.
6.6.3 Application development: individual “innovation” palette,
common method
Application development, as presented in the books examined, is a tools - skills individual
method, a developer’s continuous eﬀort to master new tools and use them for his own
good. Goldman ’s introduction to his book, is very typical in the way it presents the “new
opportunity” opened up for developers by the Facebook platform:
The barrier to entry [in Facebook application development] is very low and re-
quires only that you retrain some of your existing web development skills (or
learn some basic new ones), all of which you can master with this very book
(Goldman, 2009, p. 4).
Overall, far from describing an organised enterprise development process, these books
describe a solitary one. Developers undertake - what during the interviews with actors of
the ﬁeld was referred to as a side project, diﬀerent from one’s day job - a personal project
that makes use of both the skills of a speciﬁc person and a variety of tools, the latter being
provided by services as well as by free and proprietary software.
In this realm, a sense of community does not come about as a result of a communitarian
spirit, as literature suggests for the open source community (Benkeltoum, 2008, and others),
but in an utilitarian mode, being “remixed” with other tools, Web APIs and proprietary plat-
forms. Hence, one of the very rare references to the participation in a developer community is
made by Goldman, in the context of free software use (namely PHP libraries) as an auxiliary
means for the development of a Facebook application. A diﬀerent sense of community is
referred to by Makice (2009), though not in what regards common modules. He refers to the
Twitter developer community in a broad sense, on the basis of a common concern on “what
kind of application” could be created, thus entering more into a perspective of qualitative
“benchmarking”, using examples and in no way as common development. A third indication
of a community sense comes from the references to online forums that the provider has
put into the disposal of developers, where they can ask for further information or address
questions on particular problems they face.
The developer forum indication will be further explored in the Chapter 17. In the para-
graph 6.6.2, I will take a deeper look into the two other indications of a community sense,
the sharing of common concerns and the use of FOSS modules.
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6.6.4 Types of “sticky information” and “innovation loci”
identified
Overall, exploration results propose that the development activity of user - developer - en-
trepreneurs (UDEs) undertakes the costs of innovation on the basis of sticky knowledge lo-
cated both in the user (user need related) and the manufacturer (technology related) sides.
In this paragraph I will further analyse the types of sticky knowledge identiﬁed, corresponding
to diﬀerent types of users.
Depending of the type of service, the nature of this information and the technical subtract
where innovation is localised diﬀers, as summarized in the Table 6.10 and illustrated in
Figure 6.5.
Development
actor
Service type Sticky
information
Innovation
locus
Books
Consumer-
Developer
Instrumental Functional Web site
development
Calishain and
Dornfest (2003);
Erle and Gibson
(2005); Bausch
(2006)
Seller-
Developer
Market Commercial Seller tools
development
Karp (2003);
Bausch (2003);
Balderas (2011);
Hudson (2012)
Developer-
Entrepreneur
Online
identity
Social Application
development
Stay (2008);
Makice (2009);
Goldman (2009)
Table 6.10: Sticky information and locus in Web services development.
Figure 6.5: Sources of use related sticky information in the ﬁeld of Web services development.
In most developer books studied (Calishain and Dornfest, 2003; Karp, 2003; Bausch,
2003; Erle and Gibson, 2005; Bausch, 2006; Balderas, 2011; Hudson, 2012), reference is
made to lead user knowledge as a requirement for development. In general, these books
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enrol a development process in the continuity of the advanced personal use, enhanced by per-
sonal development skills. Advice suggesting the normative exploitation of end-user “sticky”
information in development process comes from two diﬀerent end-user perspectives: the
consumer and the seller ones.
Development using instrumental services.
More speciﬁcally, there are, on the one hand, books tackling the issue of development on
the basis of rather more instrumental services (such as search engines, mapping or money
transfer services). There, authors explicitly provide “tips and tricks” for information and
functionalities for consumers. Sticky knowledge shared by the authors concerns the functional
aspects of the service. Consumers could beneﬁt from this knowledge as well, as early chapters
reveal information that can be exploited without having programming skills.
Still, while there is a recognition of the use as the place where valuable for development,
i.e. “sticky” knowledge resides, the authors do not assume that their readers will give away
their creations for free. Those books typically consider developers as “Webmasters”, already
developing a Web site and wanting to integrate functionalities and more competition from
other services (e.g. it appears higher in search engines’ ranking), hence for their own use:
the locus of development is, in this case, their own Web site. As a result, their Web site
becomes richer in functionalities, by integrating the service provider’s ones,
Development using Market services
On the other hand, cookbooks referring to two sided market services, provide in their ﬁrst
chapters “tips and tricks” regarding commercial knowledge, such as best online selling prac-
tices. Typically enough, the second edition on eBay is a lot more focussed on a public of
sellers than on a public of buyers. These books mainly consider developers as item sellers,
who create tools for themselves. Hence, entrepreneurial activity resides in item selling, thus
development comes about as an auxiliary process for entrepreneurship and not as a poten-
tially lucrative activity as such. In this case, the locus of innovation is the seller’s instruments,
as he uses both information and tools available for his own good, to be more eﬃcient in his
selling activity.
For the list cited in the “Seller-Developer” raw of the Table 6.10, only the last chapter of
Balderas (2011) addresses development as an entrepreneurial activity as such, when providing
information on how to develop smart phone payment applications using PayPal. Hence, in the
particular ﬁeld of online market services, the locus of innovations is found in the development
of applications for merchandise only relatively recently.
Development using online identity services
However, there is also a third way, in what regards developer - end user knowledge and
relationships. In the Facebook case, developers are explicitly called upon not to develop an
application for their own use. While the ﬁrst edition (Stay, 2008) is rather subtle in advising
this detachment (“Always look at your application through the eyes of your users”), the
second one (Goldman, 2009) is less so:
Who should I build for? Some of the most successful software products are
born out of a need their developers felt wasn’t satisfied elsewhere. If that’s the
case for you, build for yourself and your friends. However, many of you will be
reading this book because you hope to make money from your work, in which
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case you need to consider your audience more carefully. Sometimes you and your
friends aren’t the ones who are going to pay for your villa in Maui, so make sure
you spend the time to understand who is (Goldman, 2009, p. 11).
Hence, using the proﬁt motivation, one is advised to take a distance from his own
intimate circle and study the public to which his/her application will be addressed, using
typical market research methods, such as polls.
In a similar spirit, the book on Twitter (Makice, 2009) also assumes that developer’s
“sticky” knowledge is not suﬃcient for the creation of Twitter applications. On the one hand,
it advises developers to “understand the culture of Twitter users”, a culture originating from
previous online chatting communities. On the other hand, it lists a series of applications
that are representative of this culture, to inspire readers to begin development. The question
is “what kind of application” could there be to address a need, and the author performs a
qualitative “benchmarking”, using examples and in no way as common development, to
illustrate possible trajectories.
6.7 Discussion (second step)
This study has shown a diﬀerence regarding the action norms of developers as compared
to the models reviewed and proposed by von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006). These
diﬀerences are found both in the cognitive conditions and the implicit modes of value ap-
propriation’s norms of development. Moreover, this research helped reﬁne the transition
modalities from user to entrepreneur roles, in the case of Web-based application develop-
ment. While the distinction of user and manufacturer paradigms suggests the division of
innovations between the class of users and the one of manufacturers, according to the sticky
information each class possesses (von Hippel, 2005, p. 70), developers who use online services
to innovate exploit knowledge from both classes.
Globally, what is indicated by my investigation is the emergence of an intermediary way
of action, placed in-between the user and the manufacturer paradigm, where individuals may
exploit available resources coming from a set of service providers for their own good. In
the following paragraphs I will review the characteristics of what could be called a personal
investment model, as compared to the ones of the known paradigms.
Table 6.11 summarizes the arguments of comparison of the ﬁeld ﬁndings to the models of
von Hippel and von Krogh, which will be discussed in paragraph 6.7.1. Pagraph 6.7.2 elab-
orates on the transition modes from user to developer states, describing the three diﬀerent
conﬁgurations of developers identiﬁed.
6.7.1 Cognitive conditions: neither free revealing, nor R&D, an
individual “innovation palette”
In respect to developers of online applications, both as met in the Web site development
challenge and as studied through the “cookbooks”, there is no structured R&D and new
product development process, as in the case of enterprises (Iansiti, 1993, 1998; Verganti,
1999; Bayart et al., 2000, and others). Instead, innovation capacity (Nassimbeni, 2001) of
individual developers depends on their ability to use a diverse set of tools. Web APIs provide
the chance to innovate on a given service, yet additional open or closed software tools are
indispensable for the development process. On these bases, developers use both use-related
and technology related “sticky information”.
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Knowledge Value Appropriation
Model Production Sharing Private Public
Private
investment
R&D Patent Monopoly Loss
Collective
(public)
action
R&D, public
research
Knowledge
Control
Relinquishing
Reputation,
monetary
subsidies
“Common
pools” resources
Private-
collective
“Sticky”
knowledge
“Free revealing” Reputation,
Learning,
problem
resolution
“common
pools”, common
solutions
“Personal
investment”
User and
manufacturer
“sticky”
knowledge,
personal skills
No revealing Competition Public-private
pools
Table 6.11: A “Personal investment” model: comparison with the models outlined by von
Hippel and von Krogh (2003).
As I have already stated, the distinction between user and manufacturer innovation is
based on the distinction between the sticky information, the knowledge that is costly to
transfer from one actor to another (von Hippel, 1994; Ogawa, 1998; von Hippel, 2005).
Still, what I observed in action and is further supported by the study of books addressed to
developers is that in the process of developing new services or tools, UDEs normally use a
set of diverse knowledge resources, constituting a plural knowledge base.
Globally, what distinguishes developers from common end-users, is their possession of
technological knowledge, usually attributed to manufacturers expertise (Ogawa, 1998; von
Hippel, 2005). At the same time, they often exploit use context speciﬁc knowledge, typically
obtained by end-users.
An important part of the sticky information utilized for development comes from the
end-users’ “best practices". When developers use instrumental services for development
(such as search engines, mapping services or payment ones) this goes along with the use
of functional end-user sticky information. The use of market services (such as bidding or
buying services) is related to the use of commercial end-user sticky information. Finally, the
online identity services (enabling the expression of their users) utilize sticky information on
how social interaction takes place.
Exploitation of end-user sticky knowledge
Hence, sellers may develop tools for themselves (in services such as eBay or Amazon), while
Webmasters may extend the service they provide to information consumers by integrating
features of another service provider (such as Yahoo Search or Google Maps).
However, when it comes to services were the gap between developers and users is big,
such as the ones enabling the construction of an online identity, what is recommended to
developer is to take a distance from their own needs and try to seize the needs and desires
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of potential clients, thus adopting a clearer entrepreneurial posture.
Exploitation of manufacturer sticky knowledge
An omni-presence of service interfaces’ use was noted both in the setting of a Web service
development and the study of the cookbooks. This information is typically service-speciﬁc,
as the functionalities proposed by diﬀerent services are diﬀerent.
These application programming interfaces (APIs) are publicly available. Everyone can
access their use, as long as he/she knows how to use them. That constitutes a particular
kind of synergy, as no authorisation is needed. Developers using them do not enter in a
typical partnership relationship (Midler et al., 1997; Segrestin, 2006) with the provider, but
they agree instead in the terms of service.
In addition, they also use proprietary software as well as free software, in a rather oppor-
tunistic mode, in order to complete their own creation.
Similar phenomena have been studied by the platform literature, through the lenses of
modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), platform leadership (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) or
platform envelopment (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Still, my exploration reveals an actor who
keeps a foot in both manufacturer and user camps, allowing for a diﬀerent perspective on
the phenomenon of Web services innovation to emerge. While design costs have been at the
centre of interests of those studies, the low design costs of User-Developer-Entrepreneurs
opens up a new ﬁeld for entrepreneurship.
For this lowering of design costs there are both subjective and objective factors. Sub-
jective factors lie in the utilisation of user sticky knowledge (von Hippel, 1994), while the
objective factors lie in the existence of new sets of design possibilities (Baldwin et al., 2006),
simultaneously coming from diﬀerent platforms. Overall, circumstances lead to the ability
of developers to construct a plural knowledge base, utilising both user and manufacturer
knowledge. This dimension will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.
6.7.2 Three configurations of the developer figure
The study of the “Cookbooks” revealed an actor who does not enter into the typical B-B
or B-C frameworks. The three diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the developer, as related to the
user and the entrepreneur roles, are schematically illustrated in comparison to the user and
manufacturer paradigms in Figure 6.6. These conﬁgurations are clearer when seen through
the design and development criteria set out early on in this chapter, than the diﬀusion ones.
The books being more about how to create value and less about how to exploit it, diﬀusion
tips were rare.
Hence, as shown in the last column of the Table 6.8, there are three conﬁgurations of
developers. A ﬁrst conﬁguration is the one of User - Developers (UD). It regards a public that
uses the Web service tools (APIs) along with other development tools (FOSS or proprietary
software) in order to create tools for themselves, to enrich their use experience or to be more
eﬃcient in it. This is the case for the books by Karp (2003) on eBay, where the developer
is viewed as either a seller or a buyer of items on auction, but not a seller of applications for
other users. This is also the case for the book by Bausch (2003) on Amazon. The book of
Erle and Gibson (2005) on Google Maps is even more centered on use issues, as it judges it
necessary to illustrate the value of use for Google Maps, being a rather new service at the
time of its publication. This category is thus closer to the typical user innovation model (von
Hippel, 1975), even though sharing practices were not explicitly discussed in those books.
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Figure 6.6: Three developer conﬁgurations: UD, UDE, DE.
A second conﬁguration is the User - Developer - Entrepreneur. Here, applications are
initially built through a similar reasoning to UDs, that is the serving of one’s own need, or
the “buy or innovate” dilemma, as referred to by the literature (von Hippel, 2005). Still,
this innovation supports an entrepreneurial activity. On the one hand, that can be done
through its use to enrich an ongoing business. That is generally the spirit of the books
about search engines (Calishain and Dornfest, 2003; Bausch, 2006), where functionalities
such as searching can be embedded into a commercial site and add value to it. On the other
hand, there is the option to merchandise the creation as a separate good. This possibility is
more or less explored by the books on PayPal (Balderas, 2011) and eBay (Hudson, 2012),
though the user condition is still largely present.
A third conﬁguration is the Developer - Entrepreneur, where a complete distinction
between developers and end-users occurs. The needs or desires to satisfy or evoke are no
longer the ones of the developer, they are the ones of his potential clients. Hence, books on
Facebook and Twitter (Stay, 2008; Makice, 2009; Goldman, 2009) take as granted that their
readers do not develop for satisfying their own needs, but for money. Hence, a call is made
by the authors to “understand” the public to which they address, before they start designing,
while Goldman goes further, being rather tough on developers that innovate for themselves.
DEs are thus in the frontiers of the two paradigms, the user and the manufacturer one
(Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), though clearly not belonging to any of them.
6.8 Conclusion
Literature has focused on the opposition and the complementarity between user and man-
ufacturer innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006; Baldwin et al., 2006; Raasch
and von Hippel, 2012). While these two modes of innovation are clearly deﬁned by the ways
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each actor beneﬁts from innovation (for use or for proﬁt), in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of Web services
innovation I identiﬁed an actor operating in-between the two modes.
The contribution of this study, beyond the identiﬁcation of this actor, lies in the proposi-
tion of three diﬀerent conﬁgurations of developers of online applications: user - developers,
developing for their own use, user-developer-entrepreneurs, attempting to commercialize such
creations and developer-entrepreneurs, directly creating for commercialization as opposed to
innovating for use. As this activity implies the use of a multitude of tools, some provided
by enterprises, others by communities, these tools are a meeting point for diverse innovation
actors.
Strategies on innovation should thus include the existence of this actor, who may innovate
in a low cost manner, as entrepreneurship can catalyse industrial development.
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Chapter 7
Modus operandi exploration: the case
of an eBay seller application
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7.1 Introduction
In order to further report (von Krogh et al., 2012) on the potential distinctive characteris-
tics of user-developer-entrepreneurs, as explored in Chapters 5 and 6, the case of a single
application, that was developed and marketed by a single UDE, is studied in the current
chapter.
While in the previous chapter I used a rather modular approach, examining the charac-
teristics of UDE action through a norm-by-norm comparison, this case will be explore the
coherence of UDE activity during the passing from use-based to market-based innovation,
and more particularly the boundaries between UD, UDE and DE roles.
Using the story of a UDE developing and commercialising an eBay seller application as a
“spare-time” project, I further explore the action of this ﬁgure, comparing it to the literature
on open source, on the one hand, and user-entrepreneurship, on the other.
I conclude that this activity, placed in-between the user and the producer paradigms in
the speciﬁc ﬁeld of online application development, beneﬁts from both.
7.2 Theoretical concepts
As we have already discussed in previous chapters, at the core of the user innovation ap-
proach resides the notion of “sticky” information (von Hippel, 1994, 2005). Within this
framework, users are more likely to innovate by drawing on use context related information,
while enterprises are more likely to innovate by drawing on technological information. The
“stickiness” of these two kinds of information, according to von Hippel, regards the high
transfer costs, from one actor to another (as already reviewed in paragraph 6.2.1). Thus, it
is costly for enterprises to learn about the problems lead users face, while it is also costly
for lead users to master the technology of a given product. In addition, users face the “buy
or innovate” dilemma, according to which use related innovation is more beneﬁcial than
the purchasing of a product that has similar attributes. Moreover, user innovation regards
speciﬁc attributes of a given product, the ones directly utilised by users (von Hippel, 2005).
In Chapter 6, I suggested that UDEs innovate by using both user and manufacturer
“sticky” information. In this endeavour, they have at their disposal tools (APIs) that come
from a variety of service providers. I also suggested that the entry costs being relatively
low in the sector of Web services, the development of a service or an application can be
advanced, at least at a certain level, by a single individual. The current chapter further
explores this potential through a single case study.
Moreover, I generated “concepts that can serve as filter for further data gathering”
(von Krogh et al., 2012), namely the three conﬁgurations illustrated in Figure 6.6, quoted
in Figure 7.1 for convenience. Comparing the distinction between user and manufacturer
innovation models (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012),
concluding chapter 6 I suggested the distinction of three types of developers: user-developers
(UD), creating tools for their own use, user-developer-entrepreneurs (UDE), attempting
to commercialise those tools, and developer-entrepreneurs (DE), creating application for
commercialisation, as opposed to the development for own use.
The current chapter further consolidates the three conﬁguration concepts (UD, UDE,
DE), by examining a case illustrating an attempt to pass from the user to the manufacturer
paradigm. Two settings that utilise the user innovation approach and will be used to discuss
the experience of UDEs in this chapter are the one on user-entrepreneurs and the open source
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Figure 7.1: Three developer conﬁgurations: UD, UDE, DE (copy from Figure 6.6, on
page 127.
model. Table 7.1 summarises the use of the theoretical concept by these studies, that will
be reviewed in the next paragraphs.
7.2.1 User-Developer-Entrepreneur: comparison to the
user-entrepreneur approach
As already reviewed in paragraph 3.3.3, on page 63 and in chapter 6, literature on user-
entrepreneurship shares the category of user innovation approach regarding early concept
formulation and early diﬀusion, as user “sticky” information and lead user communities are
identiﬁed as start up resources for the actors (Shah, 2003; Lüthje et al., 2005; Shah and
Tripsas, 2007; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012). Moreover, this literature describes a “trans-
formation” of user to manufacturer during the diﬀusion phase, which can be summarised in
two propositions:
• User-entrepreneurship is an “accidental” phenomenon, whereas idea development, ex-
perimentation, adaptation and preliminary adoption occur before the formal evaluation
of the idea as the basis of a commercial venture.
• Once the venture succeeds, users become manufacturers, their relationship to the user
role is limited to managing the feedback of their own users.
This independence from product manufacturers is also claimed in the case of innovation
networks “by and for users” (von Hippel and Katz, 2002), though in the ﬁeld studied indica-
tions suggest the contrary. More speciﬁcally, previous chapters advanced two propositions,
in the light of Web services development phenomenon:
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Setting Design Phase Diffusion Phase Indicative
Literature
User -
entrepreneurship
“Accidental”
entrepreneur; User
“sticky”
information as a
resource
User-manufacturer
transformation;
Initial peer
diﬀusion, then
marketing and
feedback
management
Shah (2003);
Lüthje et al.
(2005); Shah and
Tripsas (2007)
Open source
model
User-developer;
User “sticky”
information +
open source as
resources
Peer community;
Free, Web-based
diﬀusion, using
“repositories”
von Hippel and
von Krogh (2003,
2006); von Krogh
et al. (2003a,b)
Table 7.1: User innovation approach for entrepreneurship and open source development
• In the case of Web services, a purposive eﬀort and personal investment is observed, of
which entrepreneurship is the fruit. Hence, entrepreneurship is often the fruit of this
eﬀort, rather than “accident”.
• In addition, the speciﬁc informational nature of the online services suggests that even
when users become manufacturers, they are still bounded to the initial service, as they
need provider’s information ﬂows for their own service to be operational.
Thus, rather than a complete, accidental transformation of users to manufacturers
through entrepreneurship, Chapter 6 suggested a distinction of three conﬁgurations link-
ing the user to the manufacturer paradigm, UD, UDE and DE. For that, a case of a user
developing a tool and the commercialising of it will be studied.
7.2.2 Comparison to the open source model
Section 6.2 has already reviewed the way open source has become an exemplary case for
user innovation studies, as it illustrates a “full function” for this approach (von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, p. 219).
Hence, user-developers utilise their “sticky” knowledge as well as existing open source
code as initial assets for innovation (von Krogh et al., 2003a,b). Then, diﬀusion takes place
by the help of online “repositories”, around which a peer community is built (von Krogh
et al., 2003a,b; Lakhani and Wolf, 2003). An exemplary case of an open source software
entirely developed by users, is the Apache Web server (Von Hippel, 2001), very competitive
in its market. As Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) mention, the wide diﬀusion of open source
software owes a lot to its particular licence, the General Public Licence, GPL, which obliges
users to further diﬀuse their work freely, to the extent that they have used free software
modules for its development.
Still, the previous chapter proposed that similar assets, such as Web-based diﬀusion and
open source software, are jointly used with Web services speciﬁc ones (APIs) to market
rather than freely reveal developers’ creations.
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7.2.3 Setting of the study
Referring to the model of users developed on page 110, I will study the case of an application
built by a seller-developer using the eBay service to innovate and then attempting to market
his creation. The oscillation between user (seller) and entrepreneur I will explore is illustrated
in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Seller - Developer - Entrepreneur oscillation: an exploration hypothesis.
The working proposition in this study will be the conclusions of the previous chapter.
Thus , I expect that such a development can take place through a “personal investment”
mode, where innovation will draw on a “plural knowledge base”, including “sticky infor-
mation” on both use context and provider technology. Development is expected to be
undertaken by the use of eBay APIs, aided by additional open and closed source software
tools. Commercialisation is then to take place within a competitive environment.
7.3 Methodology: narration as a phenomenon
illustrator
While their eﬃciency as a general method for social science is a topic of debate, narratives
have been proposed as a particularly valuable method for early phenomenon distinction (von
Krogh et al., 2012). Von Krogh et al., analysing the emergence of the academic community
studying the open source phenomenon, highlighted the importance of narratives for the very
early steps of phenomenon distinction.
Table 7.2 , synthesises the diﬀerent uses of narration in management and organisation
studies, in relation to the diﬀerent levels of analysis. The following paragraphs review each
approach. Then, the current section concludes with the need to “discover” a narration, by
contacting and interviewing a UDE, provided that no book has been identiﬁed throughout
my research that could serve that research need. Afterwards, design and diﬀusion process of
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this peculiar case are analysed and compared to the literature, through the use of multiple
sources, including interviews, archival documents and an analysis of the eventual application
design.
Type Edited by Addressed to Academic
value
Example or
method
description
Autobio-
graphical
Leaders General
public, peers
Phenomenon
distinction
Raymond
(1999); Grove
(1997)
“Narration
studies”
Researcher,
anonymous
members
(on-going
debate)
Academia Dominant
narration
critique
Czarniawska
(1998)
Story telling Knowledge
managers
Enterprise K.M. tool Soulier (2005)
Rational
myths
Researcher Enterprise Theory
testing,
rationalisation
guiding
Hatchuel and
Molet (1986)
Story
discovery
Researcher Academia Novel action
model
illustration
Current
chapter
Table 7.2: Types of narration methods
In the following paragraphs I will brieﬂy review each of the mentioned categories.
7.3.1 Leader stories for phenomenon distinction
The ﬁrst category regards narratives created by leaders and addressed to the general public
or their peers, often being autobiographical books about the deployment of their ventures.
Exemplary narratives of this kind are those of Raymond (1999) and Stallman (2002) on their
own contribution to the success of the open source phenomenon. As von Krogh et al. (2012)
analyse, these particular narratives gained an a posteriori appreciation within the academic
management community, as they contributed to the distinction of the proper characteristics
of the phenomenon, as compared to more traditional ones.
Similarly, the narrative of Andy Grove, the leader of Intel, on how his company managed to
become a leader in the sector of microprocessor platforms (Grove, 1997, “Only the paranoid
survive : how to exploit the crisis points that challenge every company and career”), has been
recognised by later research on platform management as insightful (Gawer and Cusumano,
2002; Baldwin and Woodard, 2010). Thence, in a way, it contributed to subsequent platform
management literature.
Overall, success stories written by their protagonists are privileged narratives, from which
management science may draw indications for further exploration of new phenomena. In a
way, the “truth” of their arguments is proven by the outlined phenomenon’s economic impact,
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before further academic research is undertaken (as in the case of open source software
diﬀusion or Intel ’s dominance, correspondingly for the cases mentioned above). Still, for
management science, what is more important is not the truth per se, as a static picture, but
the models of action that generate the status of truth (Hatchuel, 2005c). Thus, editions
about success stories may, in some cases, help researchers further identify and explore the
peculiarities of new phenomena.
Still, while success stories are easily shared by their actors, as well as being interesting for
manager scholars, because of their eﬀects within the business ﬁeld, failure stories are harder
to share. In parallel, entrepreneurship as a general phenomenon is far more characterised by
those failure stories than the successful ones, as entrepreneurs most frequently fail (Schum-
peter, 1939). As leadership is judged by its eﬃciency, leaders are not likely to share their
failures, unless they already have found a way to overcome them. Entrepreneurship is thus
often explored through the success stories, as can be seen in literature on user entrepreneurs
(Shah and Tripsas, 2007; Haeﬂiger et al., 2010), though leaving aside failure stories.
However, the proposition of an oscillation between user and manufacturer roles cannot
be explored, as successful cases do end up with a complete separation of these two roles.
Unfortunately, no book of a failed entrepreneurial story has been identiﬁed in the framework
of my research, which could summarise the characteristics of the oscillation between user
and entrepreneur I proposed in the previous chapter.
7.3.2 “Narration studies” and “minority report”
Narratives have been proposed as a methodological entry for organisation studies, to con-
ceptualise and highlight organisation communication phenomena (Czarniawska, 1998; Boje,
2002; Adorisio, 2009), what can be described as “narration studies”. They are addressed
to the academia, while their editing opens up a discussion on the relationship between the
researcher and the narrators.
These studies in social sciences originate from the post-modern position. As Hatchuel
(2005c) comments, this approach, of which Lyotard is one of the principal theoreticians,
challenges the possibility of common meaning creation, due to the diversity of approaches
in the ﬁeld. Hence, a model of action that would possibly include diversity management is
not included in this literature. Typically, Hatchuel mentions:
They emphasize that it is worthwhile to avoid domination and that it is important
to protect critical minorities within an academic field (Burrell, 2002). One can
also remark that in this perspective a model of collective action, the protection
of diversity, is not discussed as such and is taken as a universal solution for the
production of knowledge (Hatchuel, 2005c, p. 140).
In narration studies, the narrative is both the starting point, the question and the answer
to a critique: dominant narratives can be questioned or “de-constructed” by the existence
and the diﬀusion of diﬀerent ones. They fulﬁl the requirement described by metaphors such
as “talking pig”, for studies managing “to provoke thought and new ideas, rather than to
poke holes in existing theories” (Siggelkow, 2007) or Black Swans (Taleb, 2007) , attracting
scientiﬁc interest because they are rare, highly impactful and predictable in retrospect (von
Krogh et al., 2012). Of course, the place of the researcher is delicate in this setting, and the
distance between the story and its writing is a recurrent question in this literature.
However, what I am interested in developing in the current chapter is not limited to a
critique of the user and the manufacturer model (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), but a further
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exploration of the ﬁgure of User-Entrepreneur-Developer, on the basis of the categories
proposed on the previous chapter, exploring thus a potential intermediate action model.
7.3.3 Story telling for Knowledge Management
A third category of narratives are the ones that are created and diﬀused within the framework
of a speciﬁc organisation. While methodologically close to the previous one, this approach
emphasises the utility that narratives may have in knowledge management. Hence, stories
are seen as a Knowledge Management tool, to be used within the framework of a speciﬁc
organisation.
A typical case is the study of Patriotta (2003) on stories in Fiat industry shop ﬂoor,
while a conceptualisation of stories as Knowledge Management tools is operated by Soulier
(2005). There, the challenge of generation, codiﬁcation and diﬀusion of stories within the
enterprise through an information system is proposed as a way to manage knowledge. To the
extent that these narratives take part of the organisation’s tacit knowledge (Nonaka et al.,
1996; Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009), communities of practice can be a way to cultivate
them (Wenger et al., 2002).
7.3.4 “Rational myths”
A diﬀerent category of stories are the ones that are diﬀused and created during research
intervention. The researcher has an active role in story formulation, while the story is
addressed to the enterprise. It has both a theoretical and practical value, as it enables theory
testing and ﬁeld rationalisation.
A “rational myth” is an action model allowing the mobilisation of the organisation on the
basis of an objective in which the actors will believe (myth), though of which the formulation
and objectives will be realistic and adaptable (rational) (Hatchuel and Molet, 1986). It follows
a demand made by of enterprise actors facing a problem, seemingly due to dysfunctions or a
need for improvement. In the next step, intervention and interaction, the researcher proposes
here one of many management tools replying to the problem. The diverse reactions during
its implementation will allow an in-depth knowledge acquisition through the interaction of
the researcher and the actors on the basis of the myth. Thanks to what is learnt from the
previous experimentation phase, researchers, using their speciﬁc status, are in position to
model the attitudes of the implied actors either accepting or rejecting the rational myth
proposed. The previous questioning of the tools proposed and the associated collective
learning will induce a cross transformation process of tools and organisation (Hatchuel and
Molet, 1986).
A “rational myth” is described, in its complete expression, by a technical substrate,
knowledge on the ﬁeld of values and on “how to do better” (progress knowledge) and by
set action figures (Hatchuel, 1998). An action ﬁgure can be deﬁned by the speciﬁcation
of his intervention attributes and the relationships he maintains with other actors. Hence,
using this terminology, my ﬁeld could be described by the technical substrate of APIs, the
knowledge on how to use them to develop new services, what we described in Chapter 6
as norms of action, and the ﬁgure of UDE. Accordingly, the diﬀerence of the rational myth
to previously mentioned narratives resides in the fact that it constitutes a means to explore
an action model, from which its rigorousness and relevance depends. In addition, this myth
creation and diﬀusion is a tool for further exploration, not the objective of an intervention.
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Thus, in this very particular case, a narration becomes a working hypothesis, enabling
further exploration of a speciﬁc problem.
7.3.5 Research objective: a story of a UDE
For the needs of further exploration of potential distinctive characteristics of UDEs activity, a
new approach will be used, which can generally be described as “story discovery”, having its
objective both its identiﬁcation and formulation. Such a story is to be used in the academic
debate on user and manufacturers innovation models, while its value resides in its illustrative
capacity regarding the distinctive characteristics of Web UDEs, explored in chapter 6. For
the design of this method, elements of the previous approaches will be borrowed.
From the literature highlighting the importance of leader narrations in phenomenon dis-
tinction (paragraph 7.3.1), the objective of a distinctive narrative’s identiﬁcation will be
adopted. The narration sought is one that describes the process of line crossing between
the user and the manufacturer roles. However, in this particular ﬁeld, no book describing
this process has been identiﬁed. Such an absence may be due to the fact that entrepreneurs
would be keen on writing a book on their experience only if it had a very successful end.
Still, even if such a book was identiﬁed, a distinctive line crossing process description could
not be guaranteed.
Hence, the possibility of “non-dominant” narrations (as reviewed in paragraph 7.3.2)
will be explored. Still, the stories of the milieu, already analysed in Chapter 5 were rather
partial, focussing on technical issues and successful projects of manufacturers. In fact,
one interviewee did talk about an early phase of development, even before funding a start
up, where APIs are particularly useful (Section 5.2.2, page 88). Such stories may thus be
insightful. A diﬃculty imposed though, comes from the non-existence of an organisation for
these actors, where these stories would circulate for me to identify.
Therefore, the discovery of such a story implies the direct engagement of the researcher
in “provoking” the story telling: since no such story “circulates” in the ﬁeld, it will have
to be elicited from an actor who has experienced it. For this, I will exploit my researcher
status as a facilitator, similar to research intervention (Hatchuel and Molet, 1986), though
not being limited in the boundaries of a speciﬁc enterprise. Moreover, I will focus on the
description of the “action ﬁgure” (Hatchuel, 1998) of the UDE, to further distinguish the
speciﬁcities of his intervention attributes.
Similarly to the reasoning developed in Chapter 6, in what regards the level of analysis,
this study will focus on UDE action during the most distinctive phases, as described in the
discussion of the user and the manufacturer model (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), that is,
the design and the diﬀusion ones.
7.3.6 Use context
The general eBay service context of use has already been explored by the literature, as we’ve
seen in Section 3.2 (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and Alstyne,
2005; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Baldwin and Woodard, 2010). In this service, there are two
types of end users: sellers and buyers. Typically, a seller puts an item in auction and then
potential buyers compete on buying it by bidding. Bidding lasts a speciﬁc period of time,
after which the item is sold to the higher bidder, in so far as buyers have indeed expressed
their interest, otherwise it remains unsold.
The enterprise has a control over the transaction thanks to a rigid user registration
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process. To access the service, each eBay user has to obtain an account, for which several
steps are required, including a telephone call conﬁrmation. Users provide their personal
information by completing a form, where they also indicated their preferred payment method
(either by credit card, or by PayPal1).
The provider is remunerated on the basis of transactions operated within its service.
The elementary service that eBay provides to sellers of goods is called in the service jargon
a “listing”. A listing is the action of putting an item for sale among the end-users of
the platform. Service remuneration is previewed both for the action of “listing” and the
transaction itself, if it eventually takes place2.
While most sellers use the eBay Web site to list their goods, advanced sellers use ad-
ditional services or tools to manage their operations, once their complexity becomes more
important. Hence, a market of “tools for sellers” has been created to address those needs.
7.3.7 Case identification and exploration
The application I will study is called Auction Street. It was designed and developed to be
used by eBay sellers and can be used as a tool to handle information on transactions in
between the transactions themselves.
The identiﬁcation of the case to study came through an examination of the seller tools
listed in the service directory3. An indication that privileged the study of this particular
application is that in its Web page there4 ﬁgured a video illustrating its use, where the
narrator was the developer who created it, often speaking in the ﬁrst person. This fact
suggested that no organised enterprise was behind the development of this application, thus
the case could further enlighten us as to the action of UDEs as suggested in previous chapters.
The application was developed in 2005, by Jay Brown, a software development consultant.
The contact with the developer was rather spontaneous. One of the use tutorial videos was
not properly displayed. Hence, I visited the developing company, as featured at the bottom
of the product’s Web page5. There, a note described quite clearly what the hypothesis
suggested:
Jay Brown is the principal technical member of Heartland-IT. He wears many
hats ranging from webmaster to architect and project manager to developer.
When Jay is not consulting with business customers he is actively involved in
product development and day-to-day operations.
1PayPal was one of the ﬁrst companies active on the sector of online payments security. When PayPal
started to operate there was a great insecurity whether or not providing credit cards information was a good
practice online. PayPal handled this intermediation, between bank accounts and online transaction. Today,
despite the fact that credit cards are widely used in online commerce (with banks reimbursing a posteriori
their users in cases of fraud), an important amount of transactions are paid using PayPal. The service was
acquired by Ebay in 2002.
2Listings can take place either by auction, which is the by default method, or by immediate order (“buy
now” option). In the ﬁrst case, a starting price and an auction period is deﬁned by the seller. Each insertion
of an auction is charged from $0.10 to $2.00, according to the level of the starting price. In the case that
the item is sold, ebay gets a 9% fee over the transaction. For the “buy it now” option, ebay charges an extra
$0.50 for each listing. Yet, each listing can contain more than one item. Ebay also charges for additional
features. For instance, each listing can have one picture of the item listed for free, while each additional
picture is charged $0.15.
3Ebay seller tools applications: http://applications.ebay.com/selling?EAppsByCategory. URL visited on
August 18th, 2011.
4Web page of the application: http://www.auction-street.com/. URL retrieved on 18 August 2011.
5URL of the developing company: www.heartland-it.com/ . Visited on August 20th, 2011.
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View Jay’s LinkedIn profile.
Email him at jay.brown@heartland-it.com.
Hence, I contacted him reporting the problem on the video and asking for an online inter-
view. Following the open ended interview I conducted, I studied the design of the application
itself, as well as the additional archives on the application development he provided to me.
As it turned out, the application was developed within the framework of Brown’s course
in the University of Whichita, Kansas, USA, where he had studied computer science during
the 1980s. The documents included a full archive of courses on an “Introduction to Software
Engineering”, given in 2005, having as a laboratory project the development of an application.
This laboratory course used a project management structure to organise the development of
the application. The estimated cost of the project was minimal, as it was to use open source
tools, while Brown donated his “time and equipment”6.
While starting to investigate this case and being conscious of the fact that during ex-
ploration it is often diﬃcult for the researcher to identify and record the proper information
(Yin, 2003), as well as that Web sites, unlike documents, can be modiﬁed by their editor
any time, I downloaded the Web sites under study onto my computer’s hard disk with the
help of an appropriate software, the WebHTTrack Website Copier.
7.4 Outcome: design and diffusion of a “spare-time”
product
7.4.1 Overview
The overall creation and marketing process of the Auction Street application is schematically
illustrated in Figure 7.3. Brown used multiple resources for the development of the application
as a “spare-time” activity. These resources included user “sticky” information, himself being
an eBay seller, open source software tools and “technological” or “manufacturer” sticky
information, as he used a combination of “closed source” and Web API tools for the design
and the development of his application. Moreover, he used Web services to market it,
namely the eBay Web site, where the application was indexed for customers to buy as well
as YouTube videos, displayed in the application’s Website, illustrating its features.
Following paragraphs further analyse the design and the diﬀusion phases.
7.4.2 Design phase
Brown was teaching software engineering in the local university of Whichita, Kansas, USA, in
2005, when he developed this tool as a demonstration of software design for the needs of his
class7. He himself was an “eBay enthusiast” and from this perspective this application could
be described as a user innovation (von Hippel, 1986, 2005). The idea for the application
came about by personal problem-solving reasoning, as Brown recalls:
I had trouble keeping track of the inventory that I had up [to eBay service] for
sale8.
6Source: Auction Street Vision, Jay Brown, November 2005, class document. Provided by its author.
7Interview taken on the 22nd of August 2011 by telephone at 17:15 CEST. Interview duration: 46 min
35 sec.
8Ibid.
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Figure 7.3: Resources for personal investment process in the case of Auction Street appli-
cation.
The value of this tool was determined by use context “sticky” knowledge. Its aim was
to “manage and keep track of the inventory of the things you are going to sell, so you can
calculate profit and loss”9. As it happened, “a lot of people are using software to manage
consignment sales”10. “Consignment sales” in the service jargon signify the sales operated
by many transactions. Hence, a seller may buy an item at a low price and then resell it
on a higher one. Hence, as n item can be bought and sold in eBay multiple times by the
same seller, the tool was designed to calculate proﬁts and losses between the transactions,
including eBay and PayPal fees for the whole set of transactions.
In Brown’s course notes11, where he described the design and development process, he
makes the remarks the following organisational constraints and market assumptions:
1. Constraints
(a) Spare-time activity - no project team.
(b) Must finish by mid-December12.
2. Assumptions.
(a) Potential Customers will prefer a Microsoft Windows platform.
(b) No automated interface to Ebay will be necessary.
i. Listings will be initiated with Ebay’s web-based interface, or Tur-
boLister.
ii. Ebay and PayPal data will be manually exported to csv data files.
Hence, when the courses started, the concept had already been ﬁxed. The project was
meant to be a personal (“no project team”), “spare-time” activity, lasting few months.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11“AuctionStreet™- Vision”, Jay Brown, course notes, Wichita, Kansas, USA, 2005.
12The project had started on the 18th of August 2005.
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Assumptions about the users preﬁgured the design space (Baldwin et al., 2006) that would
be used. On the one hand, users were assumed to be using Microsoft Windows as well.
In addition, users were considered competent in managing diﬀerent interfaces to manually
transfer data from the eBay service to the tool (Web browser and comma separated values
(csv) ﬁles).
These assumptions were in-line with the developer’s resources: his equipment and time,
as mentioned earlier. On the one hand, he was actively participating to “.NET community
of users meetups”13, that is meetings of developers on how to build applications for Desktop
computers having Microsoft Windows, by the use of the dedicated programming framework,
the Microsoft .NET. His participation was motivated by the will to “ be informed on changes
to the platform and the language”, “do professional networking” and ‘‘keeping his skills”14.
On the other hand, further automating the exchange of information between eBay, PayPal
and Auction Street may have been a longer process. Hence, a Windows user being able to
manually export and import a ﬁle from his browser to his application ﬁtted the requirements
of a “spare-time” project.
Further product development was undertaken on the basis of a systematic design ap-
proach, as illustrated by the project schedule (Figure 7.4). The project uses a schedule
clearly inﬂuenced by the Systematic Design (Pahl et al., 2007) approach, where design and
development is spread in time across diﬀerent phases. By the time that the semester started,
the functional requirements had been set15.
In the next paragraph, we will look into the ﬁnal result, as it was commercialised by
Brown, and the elements used for its construction.
7.4.3 Eventual application design
The ﬁnal application design embodied diﬀerent types of concepts and knowledge. The
additional attributes, as compared to the standard eBay Website, where end-users access
the service, are shown in the Table 7.3 (analytical design analysis of the application is
available in Appendix A on page 393).
The application provided the possibility for sellers to add photos of the item to their
announcement (a service also available from eBay for an additional fee), to manage their
contacts, to calculate the proﬁts and the losses between multiple transactions on the same
item (consignments), print labels for the items to ship and review the history of the trans-
actions.
To achieve these features, a set of diﬀerent tolls where used, which were embodied as
well in the ﬁnal design. The most important was the eBay API. As shown through the design
analysis, the new attributes and functionalities depend on the attributes of an eBay item -
such as the item ID, its name (title) and description. Those attributes are common in all
applications operations, thus impose common design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) to all
applications.
In parallel, PayPal API was also used, to enable calculations on past transactions. Since
the application was “native” for Desktops usingMicrosoft Windows - i.e. it had to be installed
in the user’s computer in order to be used, as opposed to services being accessed through a
Web site - the .NET platform was also used for this reason, to enable the processing of the
service’s information locally, on the user’s computer.
13Interview, op.cit.
14Ibid.
15A document on functional requirements has been distributed in class in the ﬁrst sessions.
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Application use value for sellers
Attributes of an
eBay item
New item
attributes
New services
Item ID Extra Photos Photos adding
Title Shipping
information
Contact
management
Subtitle Acquisition
information
Proﬁt/Loss
calculation
Category Transaction
history
Label Printing
Description Transactions
review
Photo
Quantity
Price
Auction duration
Sate date & price
Table 7.3: Additional attributes and services provided by the Auction Street application to
eBay sellers.
Finally, open source tools were embodied and used during the development process. As
described in a document distributed in the class16, the tools NHibernate, sharpDevelop IDE
and NUnit, were used for the development and the testing of the application.
7.4.4 Diffusion phase
The whole process of design and development can be generally described by the framework
of user innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006; von Hippel, 2007), as both the actual
product and the development process had a value of use for the developer (to serve his
own needs as a seller and as a teacher, correspondingly). Still, the developer did not freely
reveal the application source code. Instead, he preferred to commercialise it, to“go ahead
and market the product”17. It was his ﬁrst time doing so and the only project Brown “had
with eBay”. In the Web site where one can download the software - for $29.95 - there is a
“News” page with announcements on the software updates. There are three of them, dated
2007, 2008 and 200918. Asked for the value of the product and the cost of its maintaining,
Brown commented:
This was not really a product that I made much money on. And I haven’t
enhanced it much the last seven years.
According to him, one of the reasons for its limited business value was due to the existence
of a lot of competition from other tools:
16Auction Street Vision, class document, Jay Brown, 2005.
17Interview, op.cit. All quotes in this paragraph refer to the same interview, unless stated otherwise.
18Announcements on the Auction Street Product. News page URL: http://www.auction-
street.com/Articles.aspx Web page retrieved on 26th August 2011.
142
When this was developed, the eBay tools were not free and they weren’t really
geared towards inventory management, they were geared towards just sales.
They’ve since offered some free tools and then there is this Auctiva which is a
Web-based product which does everything mine does and more. It is out-there,
it’s rather inexpensive, so I’ve seen a competition now that we didn’t have in
2005.
While building an application “that worked” was a result of the process described above,
moving into a larger market presented additional challenges. A principal issue was client
support:
Releasing software, it’s gotta be a little bit higher quality that something you’re
just writing for yourself. Otherwise, it could be difficult to support in the long
term. One of the reasons so many software packages fail is that the users install
it, and if something goes wrong or it’s not really easy to get started the people
don’t want to invest much time in making it work, so they’ll probably search for
something else.
Hence, the relationship with clients consisting in providing a product that could be us-
able to customers without them having to “invest much time to making it work”, was
considered by the developer as a diﬀerence between “writing for yourself” and “releasing
software”. Moreover, Brown seemed to have regretted the design choice to develop a Desk-
top application and not an entirely Web-based service, when talking about commercialisation
perspectives:
The problem is I do not want to invest too much time in it because I think when
these products are more popular, at this point . . . I mean when I designed it, it
was modelled after Microsoft Outlook, with pop-up forms and that kind of style
. . . It’s not Web-based so I don’t think there is really much market for [it] right
now.
In fact, when contacted, Brown was focussing on consulting for Web-based software
development, experiencing what (Cusumano, 2008) characterised as a move from products
to services, in software business. According the developer “that’s definitely what companies
want right now”. One of its contracts is “taking Desktop software and making a Web-site
out of it”. This way his clients could “get more customers and have more opportunities for
sales”. Yet, that is a “kind of a challenge”, as Desktop software “performs very well, because
it is installed in your computer”. They will have to re-design the software using ‘‘HTML5
and a lot of Javascript”. In this they will have to “send and receive information to the server,
without bothering the user”.
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Figure 7.4: Auction Street class project plan. Organisation of the project uses a Systematic
Design structure. Source: Auction Street Vision, Jay Brown, 2005.
7.5 Discussion: Design and knowledge issues in
third-party application development
Table 7.4 summarises the ﬁndings of the study and compares them to the attributes of open
source and user-entrepreneurship models, as described by the literature. Paragraph 7.5.1 will
discuss the case studied in relationship to the open source phenomenon and paragraph 7.5.2
in relationship to the user-entrepreneurship literature.
On the whole, synthesising the ﬁndings of the current chapter with those of Chapter 6,
I argue that UDE activity beneﬁts from both user and producer paradigms. As I illustrate in
Figure 7.5, UDEs beneﬁt from both use-related and technology-related “sticky information”
(von Hippel, 2005) during the design process, they utilise both open and closed source
software, to be able to use Web APIs for online application development and, ﬁnally, they
have a relationship with both end-users and service providers once the product is on the
market, as in the ﬁrst case a feedback management is required, while in the second one they
can use online services as diﬀusion channels.
User Innovation 
and Diffusion 
Paradigm
User-
Developer-
Entrepreneur
Innovation
?
Producer Innovation
and Diffusion 
Paradigm
User Developer 
Entrepreneur 
action
Use-related 
"sticky information"
Technology - related 
"sticky information"
FOSS 
tools
Web APIs,
proprietary
 software
Feedback
Diffusion
channels
Figure 7.5: UDEs beneﬁting from both models. A synthesis.
7.5.1 Comparison with the open source software model
As shown in the Table 7.4, there are two major diﬀerences between the case studied and the
ones described by the literature on open source software. The ﬁrst regards the developer
resources, while the second regards diﬀusion modes.
Regarding developer resources, open source software development is based on pre-existing
modules, which are re-used freely, under the condition that the development result is also
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freely disposed to the public (Stallman, 2002; von Krogh et al., 2003b; von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, 2006). As Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) mention, open source is usually
published under the GPL licence, which obliges the developer to freely reveal all source code
being produced on the basis of open source modules, and thus is “viral”.
However, what was found in the case of Auction Street was that open source software
is combined with the use of both proprietary and Web-based tools. Hence, unlike cases like
the “Apache” web server software, where all knowledge used was user related, since it was
developed by users (Von Hippel, 2001), there was a utilisation of both “user” and “man-
ufacturer” sticky knowledge in the development of this application: beyond understanding
the needs of an eBay seller, the developer needed to understand the technologies of multiple
providers, including Microsoft, eBay and PayPal.
Moreover, the resulting application was not “freely revealed” to the community of eBay
users, it was sold as an application. Thus, it entered competition with other services propos-
ing similar features, also facing marketing challenges. On the one hand, the developer
initiated some advertisement, through the publishing of YouTube videos explaining the appli-
cation’s features to potential clients. On the other hand, he faced the challenge of customer
support - and not community based maintenance, as the open source model suggests - to
further develop the application to be easier to use by a greater clientèle. Typically enough,
he cited a competitor (Auctiva) who managed to create a service providing similar features,
though in a more eﬃcient way.
7.5.2 Comparison with the user entrepreneurship literature
The case studied did not reveal an “accidental entrepreneur” process. Much eﬀort was
invested into the development of the application and its commercialisation. That said, the
application did have a value of use for the developer himself, as he can be qualiﬁed as a lead
user.
Still, the attributes of the eventual application reveal an impossibility for the developer to
exit the user role, even when passing to the manufacturer one: his application will always need
to be updated with information from the eBay service to be functional. The design analysis
of the application showed that the developer used the design space (Baldwin and Clark, 2006)
provided by the Web APIs, to provide an extended service for eBay users. This dependence
on the initial service platform resembles the particular case of user-entrepreneurship studied
by Haeﬂiger et al. (2010), where the attributes of the initial service become starting points
for user creative development.
Similar to the literature on user entrepreneurship, competition, marketing and client
support have been challenges faced by the UDE. What is peculiar is the little amount
of investment (characterised by a “spare-time activity”) that was needed for this venture.
Hence, I observed a relatively low “entry cost” (Utterback and Suárez, 1993) for developers,
since having already at their disposal a set of tools to start designing and developing their
own good, “investment” is largely limited to dedication of personal time.
Moreover, the development was based on a multitude of knowledge bases (use context
related, provider related, tool related), which heavily inﬂuenced the design itself. Charac-
teristically, the fact that Brown participated in the .NET community, is correlated to the
fact that he used it as a tool for his project. Hence, the investment of learning was mini-
mal, as he could re-use previous knowledge for this new venture. However, the use of this
tool meant that his clients would access it by a speciﬁc interface (a Desktop application),
thus it would not be an “entirely Web -based” service. When contacted for the interview,
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Brown seemed to regret this “strategic” choice, as after the development of the applica-
tion he turned his activities towards the second business model, surmising that “that’s what
business do” currently.
The most important diﬀerence between user entrepreneurship, as studied by the literature,
and as faced in the particular ﬁeld, seems to be the “easiness” of investing and de-investing
in the development of applications, without being limited to a sole product, but always being
dependent on a given service provider.
7.6 Conclusion
User-Developer-Entrepreneurs beneﬁt from both user and producer paradigms, by developing
their own applications. While in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of Web-based application development
creating a ﬁrst version of an application does not require much resources and can, thus, be
undertaken as a “spare-time activity”, further customer support necessitates more investment
from the entrepreneur side. In parallel, when the innovation makes use of Web service
provided information in its design, development and use, its use is determined by a continuous
information ﬂow from the service provider to the application user, rendering the application
dependent on the initial service provider.
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8.1 Problem addressed
The current part addressed the question of “what is Web-based application development”,
exploring the possibility of it being a novel phenomenon (von Krogh et al., 2012). The
possibility of a peculiar modus operandi has been investigated in relationship to the synthetic
distinction between user and manufacturer innovation paradigms (Raasch and von Hippel,
2012).
This investigation has been based on the breaking down of the question into an actor,
means and reasons identiﬁcation problem. The resolution of such a problem had already
been known in management, since enterprises are called to reply to similar challenges when
faced by the need for a new rationalisation, as induced from my reading of the work of
Hatchuel and Weil (1992).
Hence, to reply to the initial question, I had to explore the questions of “who, how and
why” in respect to the development of Web-based applications.
8.2 Methodology used
The methodology used utilised four diﬀerent angles, enabling me to identify the Web-based
application development modus operandi by a gradual exploration of its elements.
Initially, in Chapter 5, I explored the potential of new online innovation phenomena by
means of some early indications within the discourse of platform providers, composed after a
series of semi-directed interviews. The indications I found regarded the means of application
development, as well as a ﬁrst sketch of the ﬁgure to identify, the developer.
Then, in Chapter 6 I used a double step methodology to access, distinguish and describe
the ﬁgure in question, as well as his means and reasons of action. Using the work of
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von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006) on the distinction between “private investment”,
“collective action” and “private-collective” models, I constructed an analytical framework for
this research step. Both methodological steps used a phenomenon-based research strategy
(von Krogh et al., 2012), consisting in distinguishing the phenomenon of this activity and
then further exploring it by the proposition of alternative research concepts.
The ﬁrst step focussed on the ﬁgure as a result of “what they do”, by joining an ephemeral
development team and observing the means they used and the motives for their action (“ob-
servatory participation”). In the second step of the same chapter I used a more focussed and
systematic approach to further explore this ﬁgure through the study of “what he reads”, i.e.
how he acquires the knowledge required for the development process. There, I investigated
the action norms (Argyris and Schon, 1978) assumed by the authors for their readership and
compared them to the ones described by the “private investment” and the “private-collective”
models (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006).
Finally, in Chapter 7 I examined a particular case of such an innovation, which was
exemplary not because of its impressive outcomes but because of its compliance to the
concepts explored and elaborated in the previous chapters. The reason behind this Auction
Street application’s development was initially self-use, though in the process its developer
decided to commercialise it. This story further explored the modus operandi in action,
investigating the “boundary case” of the passing from the user to the entrepreneur modes.
8.3 Part outcomes
Figure 8.1 synthesises the outcomes of the current part. Three actor ﬁgures have been
identiﬁed, all being placed in-between the user and the manufacturer innovation paradigms
(Raasch and von Hippel, 2012):
Figure 8.1: Actor ﬁgures identiﬁed as compared to the model of Raasch and von Hippel
(2012).
1. The User - Developer (UD), who uses his development skills to innovate for personal
use, much like an “lead user” as described in user innovation literature (von Hippel and
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Katz, 2002; von Hippel, 2005; Franke et al., 2006), though possessing both “use-related
sticky information”, attributed by von Hippel (1990) to users, and “technological sticky
information”, attributed to manufacturers.
2. The User - Developer - Entrepreneur (UDE), who, while having a similar starting point
with the UD, does not “freely reveal” his creation, as the “private-collective” model
suggests (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006), but he decides to go on, and try
to commercialise it.
3. The Developer - Entrepreneur (DE), who, unlike the previous two ﬁgures, does not
innovate for his own use, but he does so for others, having a commercial goal from
the outset of his design process.
At the same time, all three actors use the same means to develop their own applica-
tions, combining open source software (which is extensively explored by the literature) with
enterprise-provided software, namely Application Programming Interfaces. Both kinds of re-
sources constitute for developers an “innovation palette”, constituting for them the material
conditions to create things they wouldn’t have been in position to beforehand.
8.4 Further research
As already discussed, the conﬁguration of the Web-based application development modus
operandi was undertaken by considering one of its known elements (actor, means or reason),
while distinguishing and exploring the others.
As a result, the identiﬁcation of the three actor ﬁgures remains static. Chapter 7 dis-
tinguished a speciﬁc case where the modus operandi identiﬁed is put in action as a whole,
though there are questions that remain open.
More speciﬁcally, the dynamics of the three ﬁgures action should be further explored,
while the question of the conditions of appearance of this peculiar modus should also be
identiﬁed. In addition, a return to the starting point should be enacted, that is identiﬁcations
of some means through which enterprises can manage this phenomenon.
Part II further explores this modus operandi as a whole, by examining whether or not
it has appeared in diﬀerent industrial settings. For that, the histories of the enterprise
computer, the personal computer and the radio industry will be reviewed, on the basis of my
speciﬁc research problem.
Subsequently, Part III will return to the ﬁeld of Web-based application development,
studying the particular conditions for the appearance of “UDE settings”, exploring some
ways in which enterprises can harness the eﬀect of the phenomenon.
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Conclusion de la première partie
Problème de départ
Cette partie a posé la question « qu’est-ce le développement des applications Web », en
explorant la possibilité d’un nouveau phénomène (von Krogh et al., 2012). Lemodus operandi
particulier a été étudié en rapport avec la distinction synthétique de Raasch et von Hippel
(2012) entre les paradigmes d’innovation usager et industriel.
Cette investigation a été basée sur la considération de la question comme un problème
d’identiﬁcation des acteurs, des moyens et des raisons d’action particuliers de ce domaine.
La réponse à ce type de problèmes a déjà été connue dans la gestion, vu que les entreprises
elles-mêmes sont appelées à résoudre des questions similaires, quand elles se trouvent face
à des épreuves de rationalisation (Hatchuel et Weil, 1992; 1995).
Par conséquent, aﬁn de répondre à la question initiale, nous avons été obligés d’explorer
les questions de qui, comment et pourquoi développe ce type d’applications.
Méthodologie utilisée
La méthodologie utilisée a traité le problème de recherche en adoptant quatre angles d’investigation,
nous permettant d’identiﬁer le modus operandi du développement des applications Web par
une exploration progressive de ses éléments constituants.
Tout d’abord, le Chapitre 5 a exploré l’éventuelle existence d’un nouveau phénomène
d’innovation en ligne, comme indiqué par le discours des fournisseurs de services Web - un
discours qui a été restitué à partir des entretiens d’experts d’entreprises. Ces indications
suggéraient l’existence des nouveaux moyens de développement, les APIs, fournis par les
entreprises à des tiers pour qu’ils créent leurs propres applications. De plus, nos interlocuteurs
nous ont indiqué qu’il y avait des individus qui « le font », n’étant « même pas de start-
ups », puisque leur activité avait un caractère exploratoire, opérée en amont et ouvrant la
possibilité d’innovation. Les indications obtenues par ce chapitre on été utilisées par la suite
pour une exploration plus approfondie de la manière dont se créent les applications Web en
comparaison avec la synthèse de Raasch et von Hippel.
Ensuite, le Chapitre 6 a fait usage d’une méthodologie à deux étapes, aﬁn d’accéder,
distinguer et explorer l’action de la ﬁgure en question, ses moyens et ses raisons. En utilisant
le travail de von Hippel et von Krogh (2003; 2006) sur la distinction entre les modèles
diﬀérents d’innovation, nous avons construit un cadre d’analyse pour cette exploration. La
première étape a étudié la ﬁgure d’acteur comme un résultat de « ce que l’on fait », en faisant
partie d’une action éphémère de développement d’un site Web (« participation observante
»), nous permettant d’observer les moyens et les raisons d’action en question. Lors de la
deuxième étape, nous avons utilisé une approche plus systématique, en étudiant la ﬁgure
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d’acteur comme un résultat de « ce que l’on étudie aﬁn d’agir », c’est-à-dire le savoir exigé
pour le développement des applications. En explorant les normes d’action (Argyris et Schon,
1978) assumées par les auteurs de ces livres, nous avons été en mesure d’en faire une
comparaison avec les modèles décrites par von Hippel et von Krogh.
Enﬁn, le Chapitre 7 a examiné un cas particulier d’une telle innovation, qui fut exemplaire
non pas en raison de ses résultats étonnants, mais en raison de sa conformité aux concepts ex-
plorés et élaborés dans les chapitres précédents. La raison du développement de l’application
étudiée étant facilement identiﬁable, ce cas nous a permis d’approfondir l’exploration du
modus operandi et de mieux saisir le cas où une innovation se conçoit d’abord aﬁn d’être
utilisée par son propre développeur, et qui se commercialise par la suite.
Résultats de la partie
La Figure 8.1 (page 150) synthétise les résultats de cette partie. Trois ﬁgures d’acteur
ont été identiﬁées, toutes étant positionnées entre les paradigmes d’innovation d’usager et
d’industriel, comme décrites par Raasch et von Hippel. Ces acteurs sont les suivants:
1. L’Usager-Développeur (UD), exploitant ses compétences de développement aﬁn d’innover
pour son propre usage, semblable au « lead user » décrit par la littérature sur l’innovation
par l’usager (von Hippel et Katz, 2002; von Hippel, 2005; Franke et al., 2006), sauf
qu’il dispose à la fois d’informations liées à l’usage («use context sticky information
»), attribuées par von Hippel aux lead users, et d’informations liées à la fabrication («
technological sticky information »), attribuées par von Hippel aux entreprises.
2. L’Usager-Développeur-Entrepreneur (UDE), ayant une démarche similaire à l’UD, sauf
qu’il ne révèle pas librement ses innovations, comme le suggère le modèle « collective
privatif » de von Hippel et von Krogh, mais poursuit sa commercialisation.
3. Le Développeur-Entrepreneur (DE), dont la démarche d’innovation est diﬀérente de
celle de deux ﬁgures précédentes, comme la démarche d’une propre usage n’est pas à
la base de son activité innovante. En revanche, il innove pour les autres, ayant des
préoccupations de proﬁt dès le départ.
En parallèle, tous les trois acteurs utilisent les mêmes moyens pour développer leurs appli-
cations, en combinant à la fois le logiciel open source (déjà exploré par la littérature en
gestion) et des dispositifs fournis par les entreprises, les APIs. Ces ressources constituent
une « palette d’innovation » pour les développeurs, dessinant les conditions matérielles de
leur activité potentiellement innovante.
Perspectives de recherche
Comme il a été déjà discuté, la conﬁguration du modus operandi du développement des
applications Web a été entreprise en explorant à chaque fois deux de ces éléments constituants
(acteurs, moyens ou raisons), tout en considérant l’un des trois connus.
Il en résulte que, l’identiﬁcation des trois acteurs reste statique. Le Chapitre 7 a étudié
un cas spéciﬁque où le mode opératoire identiﬁé est mis en action dans son ensemble, sauf
qu’il y reste encore des questions ouvertes.
Plus précisément, la dynamique des trois ﬁgures d’acteurs doit être étudiée de manière
plus approfondie, au même titre que les conditions d’apparition de ces acteurs devraient
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être identiﬁées. Par la suite, ces explorations devraient être utilisées pour la proposition des
moyens de gestion de ce genre d’activité par les entreprises.
La Partie II approfondira l’exploration du modus operandi identiﬁé dans son ensemble,
en répondant à la question de ses conditions d’apparition. À ce propos, l’histoire des trois
cadres industriels proches sera relue sous l’angle du problème étudié dans cette partie.
Par la suite, la Partie III reviendra au champ du développement des applications Web
pour étudier les conditions spéciﬁques d’apparition des dispositifs des UDEs, en explorant
des méthodes pour que les entreprises soient en mesure d’exploiter les eﬀets de ce modus.
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Part II
A historical perspective: the role of
UDEs in industrial development
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Une perspective historique : le rôle des
UDEs dans le développement industriel
La première partie de cette étude a été consacrée à l’exploration et la conﬁguration d’un
acteur semblant avoir un rôle important dans l’innovation sur le Web. Trois conﬁgura-
tions de cette ﬁgure ont été identiﬁées: l’usager-développeur, exploitant ses compétences
pour innover à son propre usage, l’usager-développeur-entrepreneur, poursuivant ses eﬀorts
à la commercialisation de ces innovations, et le développeur-entrepreneur, innovant pour les
autres, ayant une démarche de proﬁt. Une limite de cette exploration a été sa nature «
statique », vu que le souci initial de notre recherche était la caractérisation de cette ﬁgure
d’acteur, et non pas la description de la dynamique mettant en rapport les conﬁgurations
diﬀérentes de ces acteurs.
La présente partie de cette recherche a émergé comme fruit d’un travail parallèle à
l’exploration des phénomènes d’innovation sur le Web. Comme déjà discuté dans la première
partie, quant on se trouve face à des phénomènes potentiellement nouveaux, lors de leur
propre émergence, il est nécessaire que le chercheur puisse prendre une distance du champ
qu’il est en train d’étudier, aﬁn de pouvoir résister à des eﬀets de mode.
Elle est consacrée aux aboutissements d’un exercice de « problématisation » du rôle
historique qu’a joué la ﬁgure identiﬁée dans la première partie au développement indus-
triel. À ce propos, nous allons proposer une nouvelle lecture de l’évolution historique des
cadres industrielles proches, à savoir les industries de l’ordinateur d’entreprise, de l’ordinateur
personnel et de la radio, une lecture basée sur le travail des historiens. Curieusement, ce
qui ressortira de cette lecture est une apparition assez fréquente de la ﬁgure de l’usager-
développeur-entrepreneur (UDE), durant des phases de développement industriel très en
amont, accompagnant l’apparition d’une nouvelle technologie illustrant un grand potentiel,
dont la valeur reste néanmoins à explorer.
À partir de la première expérience étudiée, celle de l’industrie d’ordinateurs d’entreprise,
nous avons induit un modèle selon lequel les UDEs semblent jouer un rôle décisif dans
le développement industriel, lorsque de nouvelles théories et matérialisations d’objets les
incarnant émergent, faits qui conduisent à une émergence de marché précoce. Le rôle de ces
acteurs s’étend également dans la phase où ce marché précoce se déploie, tout en explorant
le potentiel de la nouvelle technologie. Le rôle dominant des entreprises arrive plus tard,
quand une rationalisation de la conception, de la production et de la commercialisation du
nouvel objet pourra être proposée. La mise en épreuve de ce modèle dans les histoires des
cadres industriels de l’ordinateur personnel et de la radio montre une pertinence inattendue.
Bien que ce travail reste incomplet, il a une contribution double dans la recherche en
business : d’une part, en ce qui concerne la méthodologie d’exploration de l’originalité
d’un phénomène potentiellement nouveau, qui fut par ailleurs la démarche initiale de cette
étude historique, cet exercice fournit un premier cadre d’étude comparative. D’autre part,
159
le modèle qui se dégage de cet exercice de manière peu prévisible, contribue à la meilleure
compréhension des dynamiques industrielles entre les innovations des usagers et celles des
entreprises, qui semblent être catalysées par l’action des UDEs.
La structure de la présente partie suivra le raisonnement initial de notre exercice. Tout
d’abord, nous relirons l’histoire du cadre industriel de l’ordinateur d’entreprise, d’où nous
induirons un modèle selon l’analyse de ses phases de développement successives. Par la
suite, nous utiliserons ce modèle pour analyser l’histoire du cadre industriel de l’ordinateur
personnel. Enﬁn, nous utiliserons la même méthode pour le cas de l’industrie de la radio.
Concernant le modus operandi identiﬁé dans la première partie, nous concluons que ses
acteurs (UD, UDE et DE) n’ont qu’un rôle temporel, qui sert à explorer un potentiel donné
avant qu’une rationalisation industrielle soit conçue et mise en place.
Synthèse synoptique du modèle et de la présente partie
Une synthèse synoptique de la présente partie est illustrée au Tableau 9.1 (page 168) , où
les éléments majeurs de chaque étape de recherche sont soulignés en rapport avec modèle
aboutissant.
La première colonne comprend les caractéristiques majeures de toute phase de développe-
ment industriel identiﬁé (« Matérialisation précoce », « Émergence de marché », « Compéti-
tion dans le brouillard »). Ensuite, les trois autres colonnes sont consacrées à chaque cadre
industriel étudié, celui de l’ordinateur d’entreprise, celui de l’ordinateur personnel et celui de
la radio.
Les deux premières phases peuvent être étudiées sur une distinction assez claire du proces-
sus de développement à la base soit d’un concept ancien, « mieux incarné » dans la nouvelle
technologie, soit d’un concept nouveau, constituant un « nouveau rêve » à atteindre. Cette
distinction n’est plus le cas dans la phase de la « Compétition dans le brouillard », puisqu’il
y a une fusion des directions d’exploration des anciens et des nouveaux concepts.
Inspiré par Lefebvre (2013), qui propose qu’un cadre industriel peut être étudié en trois
axes, la distance conceptuelle, la distance cognitive et les relations d’acteurs sous-jacentes,
tous les trois cas seront étudiées à trois niveaux, le conceptuel (marqué dans le Tableau 9.1,
page 168, en couleur bleu-vert), le cognitif (marqué en couleur orchidée) et le relationnel
(marqué en couleur lavande).
Notre étude s’intéresse davantage à la ﬁgure de l’usager-développeur-entrepreneur, dans
les conﬁgurations identiﬁées dans la première partie de ce travail, et à sa contribution spé-
ciﬁque au développement industriel. Par conséquent, la ﬁgure de l’UDE déﬁnira également
le niveau de notre analyse.
La limitation majeure de cette étude réside dans l’absence d’une exploration systématique
de deux phases, très en amont, identiﬁées mais pas explorées durant ma recherche. La pre-
mière, précédant la phase de la « Matérialisation précoce », est la phase de la « Construction
d’une théorie ». Ainsi, cette partie n’explore pas l’émergence des théories de la Cyberné-
tique où celle de l’Électromagnétisme, même si elle en tient compte dans l’investigation des
cadres industriels correspondant. La seconde phase peu explorée est celle de la « Ratio-
nalisation industrielle », suivant celle de la « Compétition dans le brouillard », et qui a été
l’objet d’études renommées, comme celle de Baldwin et Clark (2000) sur la modularisation
de l’industrie d’ordinateurs et la théorie de la modularité où celle de Hatchuel et Weil (1992)
sur la rationalisation en général.
Les paragraphes suivants exposent les grandes lignes des phases identiﬁées et explorées.
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La phase de « Matérialisation précoce » : des projets uniques, pour
des clients uniques
Cette phase est déterminée par l’action des usagers-développeurs (UDs), qui créent des
prototypes illustrant un nouveau potentiel. Durant cette phase très en amont, il est exigé
que les UDs aient une compréhension profonde des nouvelles théories, sur lesquelles est basé
le potentiel en question. Leurs créations correspondent à leurs propres besoins ou leurs
propres rêves, et, pourraient donc être décrites comme des innovations d’usagers von Hippel
(1976). Plus précisément, on peut distinguer deux types de matérialisations précoces:
• De « meilleures solutions », reposant à un concept connu précédemment et, sont donc
comparées à des critères de performance existants, mais dont le développement fait
usage du nouveau potentiel.
• Des « nouveaux rêves », incarnant un concept nouveau, souvent reposant sur la projec-
tion d’un mode de vie diﬀérent, et introduisant de nouveaux critères de performance
lors de leur développement.
De plus, bien que le développement d’un prototype soit souvent un projet individuel, les
UDs sont liés par des collectivités désinvoltes mais intimes, où les théories sous-jacentes sont
discutées ainsi que la possibilité d’exploration de leur potentiel d’application. Ces collectivités
sont souvent construites autour des structures académiques ou institutionnelles, sans pour
autant être formalisées. Néanmoins, à ce niveau, la valeur des innovations potentielles est
loin d’être reconnue par un public pouvant former un marché. Un facteur clef de cette phase
est l’existence d’un client singulier, souvent une entreprise ou une institution, qui ﬁnancera
cette matérialisation précoce pour son propre usage.
La Section 10.2 étudiera le déroulement de cette phase dans l’histoire de l’industrie
d’ordinateur entreprise, la Section 11.2 l’étudiera dans celle de l’ordinateur personnel, tandis
que la Section 12.2 l’étudiera dans le cas de l’industrie radio.
La phase de l’ « Émergence du marché » : le tout début de la «
production de masse »
Lors de cette phase, qui suit celle de la « Matérialisation précoce », il y a une activité parallèle
à la fois sur la base de l’ancien concept et sur la base du nouveau. Comme identiﬁé, c’est
d’abord l’ancien concept qui attire l’intérêt des acteurs établis du marché. Par des variations
conceptuelles, le nouvel objet est commercialisé dans un cercle plus grand de clients, une
mise en marché qui repose sur les savoirs produits dans la phase précédente, à la fois en ce
qui regarde son développement et son usage. Les eﬀorts d’innovation se concentrent sur des
aspects (modules ou caractéristiques) des matérialisations précoces. Les UDEs développent
le produit pour leur propre usage, en même temps qu’ils cherchent des opportunités de
commercialisation. Ils peuvent être des individus ou des institutions, mais en tous cas la
relation marchande entre fournisseur et client du nouveau produit reste diﬃcile à clariﬁer.
Par la suite, le développement sur la base d’un nouveau concept prend lieu, utilisant le
même savoir, bien qu’il aﬃrme une nouvelle valeur. La conception de son extension par des
tiers donne la possibilité d’une exploration conceptuelle plus approfondie, où les UDEs jouent
un rôle important.
Dans tous les deux cas, des « cercles intimes » discutant le processus sont de grande
importance, car ils permettent un premier partage des avancements conceptuels ou cognitifs
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majeurs parmi les UDEs et les entreprises qui ont rejoint l’épreuve, à prendre en compte par
la suite pendant le processus de développement.
La Section 10.3 étudiera le déroulement de l’émergence du marché dans le cas de
l’ordinateur d’entreprise, la Section 11.3 l’étudiera dans celle de l’ordinateur personnel, tandis
que la Section 12.3 le fera pour le cas de l’industrie radio.
La phase de la « Compétition dans le brouillard »
Durant cette phase, il y a une expansion du marché précoce, caractérisé par une pléthore
de produits utilisant le nouveau potentiel. Un ensemble d’acteurs divers exploitent commer-
cialement ces produits, bien qu’ils explorent encore le potentiel de leurs propres produits.
Au long de cette phase, émerge un « écosystème d’aﬀaires », décrit par la coexistence des
entreprises, des consommateurs et des développeurs-entrepreneurs (DEs). Un point critique
de la compétition est la gestion du rapport entre les entreprises qui sont actives dans ce
marché et les DEs, vu que celles qui ont déjà cultivé des rapports intimes avec les UDEs
de la phase précédente sont dans une position privilégiée. Le savoir est caractérisé ici par
son segmentation, et repose sur des modules, puisqu’une nouvelle synthèse reste à devenir
possible.
La Section 10.4 étudiera le déroulement de cette phase dans le cas de l’industrie de
l’ordinateur d’entreprise, la Section 11.4 l’étudiera dans celui de l’ordinateur personnel, tandis
que la Section 12.4 l’étudiera dans celui de l’industrie radio.
La fracture dans le cycle
Dans un des cas étudiés, bien que la phase de la « Compétition dans le brouillard » suivi
d’une phase de « Rationalisation industrielle », des DEs ont réussi de s’en sortir du cycle,
en revenant en arrière, c’est-à-dire en s’adressant de nouveau aux UDs. Il s’agit du cas
de DEC, et du dispositif qui a été appelé plus tard un mini-computer. DEC s’est adressé
à des hackers pour qu’ils complètent le développement de leurs produits, des PDPs. Ces
ordinateurs ont introduit une série d’innovations (notamment en ce qui concerne l’usage des
semi-conducteurs dans leur développement ainsi que leur usage en réseau), qui étaient des
aspects peu valorisées dans la rationalisation conçue et implémentée à l’époque par IBM. Ce
cas sera étudié dans la Section 10.6.
Comparaison avec quelques approches sur le
développement industriel par l’innovation
Tandis que la démarche de cette étude historique ne portait pas sur une discussion de
la littérature existante sur le développement industriel, mais elle visait à prendre un recul
historique de l’objet d’étude (le développement des pplications Web) et mettre à l’épreuve
la ﬁgure d’acteur conﬁgurée, aﬁn de se rendre compte de son originalité ou de sa généricité,
les aboutissements de notre étude pourraient avoir un apport dans la grande discussion sur
le développement industriel. La Section 9.2 discute le modèle induit en rapport avec les
approches conceptuelles les plus proches.
162
Sur le dilemme de l’innovateur
La paragraphe 9.2.1 discute le célèbre travail de Christensen (1997), The innovators dilemma.
Dans sa recherche, Christensen met en avant l’importance des « disruptions », des cas où
d’innovations technologiques, a priori peu performantes et adressées à des marchés non sig-
niﬁcatifs, arrivent à obtenir une part de marché importante et, au fur et à mesure où la
technologie avance, ces nouveaux acteurs arrivent à déplacer des entreprises établies aupar-
avant. Le dilemme de l’innovateur consiste à savoir s’il doit poursuivre la commercialisation
d’une nouvelle technologie, tant qu’un marché qui correspondait à son potentiel n’est pas
identiﬁé.
À ce propos, la relecture des histoires des trois cadres industriels étudiés conﬁrme, d’une
part, le phénomène décrit par Christensen. Par exemple, l’ordinateur a progressivement
remplacé d’autres équipements d’entreprises, IBM étant le cas exemplaire de la réussite de
cette transition. D’autre part, il y a des cas des « sauts » qui ont une nature diﬀérente :
c’est le cas où ni la technologie, ni le marché ne sont encore là, mais les acteurs impliqués
partagent une estimation de possibilité d’aboutissement d’une innovation, sans pour autant
être sûrs sur l’ampleur de l’eﬀort à fournir pour atteindre les résultats projetés. Un cas très
typique était celui de l’exigence d’une mémoire d’ordinateur temporelle et dynamique, lors
des années 1950. La valeur d’une telle mémoire a été pointue très tôt par des entreprises
aériennes, projetant la possibilité de réserver des billets « en ligne » , terme qui à l’époque
était utilisé pour décrire une opération « lorsqu’un ordinateur est déjà en train de traiter
des données ». Plusieurs développeurs-entrepreneurs ont exploré la technologie de mémoire
à la base d’un « tambour magnétique », se retrouvant au bord de la faillite. Un peu plus
tard, IBM inventera la RAM, sur la base d’une technologie diﬀérente, pouvant satisfaire les
spéciﬁcations en question.
Sur la diffusion des innovations
Les paragraphes 9.2.2 et 9.2.3 discutent les approches sur la diﬀusion d’innovation, notam-
ment le modèle de Rogers et le positionnement de la littérature de l’innovation par l’usager
à ce modèle.
Selon cette littérature, une innovation s’opère au sein d’une communauté des « lead users
» avant qu’elle soit reprise par les entreprises, qui la diﬀuseront aux « early adopters », et, plus
tard, à une majorité de consommateurs. L’étude actuelle met en lumière la transition dès «
lead users » aux entreprises : dans tous les trois cadres industriels étudiés, il est observé une
transformation progressive des acteurs, des objets, des usages et des marchés avant que le
développement du produit se rationalise. Des UDs aux DEs, l’impulsion entrepreneuriale ainsi
que les responsabilités qui vont avec vont privilégier des concepts à explorer plus que d’autres.
Les « early adopters » du départ, ne sont pas de simples consommateurs : ils participent
au développement de l’objet, en ayant des liens proches avec les UDEs. Même dans une
conﬁguration d’écosystème d’aﬀaires, il n’est pas seulement question d’une seule diﬀusion,
sans innovations supplémentaires, agissant sur la nature de l’objet et explorant des usages
et des marchés possibles, avant une rationalisation industrielle. Cette rationalisation, même
si elle n’arrête pas l’innovation, impose néanmoins des règles de conception en commun,
conduisant à un marché segmenté, où la diﬀusion passe à une « majorité d’usagers ».
Méthodologie de recherche
Christensen (1997) a étudié l’histoire de l’industrie du disque dur, à la suite d’une suggestion
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d’un ami. Christensen s’était intéressé à explorer les raisons pour lesquelles des grandes
industries échouent, et cette histoire se promettait avantageuse pour la discussion de cette
problématique, car l’industrie en question est caractérisée par son déploiement selon des
cycles particulièrement courts.
Exigeant une mise en rapport de notre approche méthodologique avec des réﬂexions
scientiﬁques portant sur l’étude de l’histoire, la méthode que nous utiliserons dans cette
partie de notre étude peut être décrite comme une «problématisation limitée». Faisant usage
des apports des études en histoire adoptant l’approche de Foucault (Castel, 1994; Lefebvre,
2005; 2009; Kendall et Wickham, 1999; Aggeri et Labatut, 2010; Chatzis, 2008), nous allons
explorer les « conditions de possibilité de déploiement » Lefebvre (2005) du modus operandi
identiﬁé dans la partie précédente en étudiant le champ du développement d’applications
Web, dans le développement industriel, comme rencontrées dans les expériences des trois
cadres industriels à étudier.
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The ﬁrst part of the current document was dedicated to the exploration and the conﬁgu-
ration of a ﬁgure appearing to have a particular role in Web services innovation. I identiﬁed
three conﬁgurations of this ﬁgure: the user-developer, using his skills to innovate for his
own use, the user - developer - entrepreneur, attempting to go on and commercialise this
innovation and the developer - entrepreneur, trying to innovate for others, for an audience
having diﬀerent needs and desires to himself. A limit of this exploration lay in its “static”
perspective, as my research interest was focused in the characterisation of this ﬁgure and
not in the description of the dynamics, linking the diﬀerent actor conﬁgurations.
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The current part of my research emerged as the fruit of parallel work during the ex-
ploration of the Web services innovation phenomena. As already discussed in Part I, when
facing potentially novel phenomena while they occur, there is a need to take a distance
from the ﬁeld, in order not to be carried away by the trend. Hence, this part is dedicated
to the outcomes of an exercise of a “problematisation” of the historical role of the speciﬁc
ﬁgure, the User - Developer - Entrepreneur (UDE) in industrial development. To do that, I
revisited the evolution of close industrial settings, namely the computer industry, as studied
by historians of technology and business.
Surprisingly, I found that this ﬁgure appears quite often in industry, during phases where
new technologies appear, illustrating a great potential, of which the value remains to be
explored. I induced a model from the experience of the computer industry, according to which
UDEs appear to have a decisive role in industrial development when early materialisations of
new theories emerge, leading to the very beginning of a new market, as well as during the
phase where the early market is deployed while exploring the potential of a new technology.
The dominant role of enterprises comes later, when a rationalisation of the design, production
and commercialisation processes can be proposed. The same model has been tested in the
history of a diﬀerent industrial setting, the radio industry, where it also appears to be valid.
While this work remains incomplete, it has a double contribution to make to business
research: on the methodological side, which has been the initial motivation for this study, it
can provide a comparative framework for the study of new phenomena while they emerge. A
second, unexpected contribution, is the emerging model itself. This study opens the ﬁeld for
further research into the interplay between enterprise and user innovation during the passing
from one paradigm to another, as the UDE ﬁgure appears to have a catalytic role in this
transition.
The structure of this document will follow the research reasoning used during my study.
Initially, I will review the history of the commercial or mainframe computer industry, and
induce a model through an analysis of its successive phases. Then, I use the model to review
the history of the personal computer industry. Finally, I will apply the same model to the
radio broadcasting industry.
Regarding the speciﬁc ﬁeld of Web services, I will be then in a position to draw conclusion
about the limits of UDE ﬁgure I identiﬁed in the ﬁrst chapter which has a temporal role,
composed of those who explore the potential of Web services, while exploiting the use values
discovered by the process, until a new encompassing rationalisation is proposed.
9.1 Model and part overview
An overview of the current part is shown in Table 9.1, where the main points of each research
step are highlighted in relationship to the resulting model.
The ﬁrst column includes the major characteristics for each industrial development phase
identiﬁed (Early Materialisation, Market Emergence and Foggy Competition). The three
other columns are dedicated to each of the industries studied, the enterprise computer,
the personal computer and the radio ones. The two ﬁrst phases can be studied by the clear
distinction of the process on the basis of either an old concept, “better embodied” in the new
technology, or a new concept, constituting a “new dream” to explore. On the contrary, this
is no more the case for the Foggy Competition phase, as the diﬀerent exploration directions
merge and new ones emerge through the process itself.
Inspired by Lefebvre (2013), who proposes that industrial settings may be studied using
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three axes, the conceptual distance, the cognitive distance the study and the encompassing
actor relationships, in each of the three phases study is undertaken on three levels, the
conceptual (marked in the Table 9.1 in blue-green), the cognitive (marked in the table in
orchid) and the relational (marked in lavender).
A particular emphasis is given to the ﬁgure of user-developer-entrepreneur - as already
identiﬁed in Part I for the ﬁeld of Web services - and his particular contribution to industrial
development. Thus, the UDE ﬁgure will also be a level of analysis.
The major limitation of the current study lies in the absence of investigation into two
phases, which were identiﬁed during my investigation though not further analysed. The
ﬁrst, preceding the Concept Materialisation phase is the one of Theory Building. Thus, the
current part does not explore the emergence of Cybernetics theory or the one of Electro-
magnetism, though it takes them into account in the investigation of the computer and the
radio industries respectively. The second phase left unexplored is the one of the Industrial
Rationalisation, which follows the Foggy Competition phase and has been the object of some
renowned studies, such as the one of Baldwin and Clark (2000) on modularisation of the
computer industry and modularity theory and Hatchuel and Weil (1992) on the rationalisation
process in general.
9.1.1 “Early materialisation” phase: unique projects for unique
clients
The “Early materialisation” phase is determined by the action of user - developers (UD),
creating prototypes that illustrate a new potential. During this very early phase, it is required
UDs have a deep understanding of new theories, on which the new potential is based. Thus,
very often, these users are high level researchers. Their creations correspond to their own
needs or “dreams”, thus are typical user innovations (von Hippel, 1976). More precisely,
there are two kinds of early materialisations:
• “Better solutions”, that is materialisations based on a previously known concept and
its corresponding performance criteria, yet are produced by the use of the new tech-
nologies.
• “New dreams”, that is original concept materialisations, based on the imagination of
a diﬀerent mode of life and introducing original criteria for their production.
In addition, while the prototype development process is usually an individual undertaking,
UDs are tied to loose still “intimate” collectivities, discussing the underpinning theories and
exploring the potential of applications. These collectivities are usually based around academic
and institutional structures. Still, at this level the value of the innovation is not yet recognised
by a public that could form a potential market. Another important factor during this phase
is the existence of a singular client, usually an enterprise or an institution, ﬁnancing this early
materialisation development for its own use.
Hence, in the case of mainframe or enterprise computers, the well-known ENIAC elec-
tronic calculator was developed as a faster ﬁre table calculation machine, using the theory of
cybernetics and the knowledge on electronics to illustrate the new potential of what came to
be the computer. Its developers, John Eckert and John Mauchly, were high-level researchers,
also participating in a series of “intimate circles” discussing the potential of cybernetics and
electronics, of which the most important was the Association of Computer Machinery, emerg-
ing in parallel with the computer industry. While ENIAC was a single purpose computer, the
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Phase Industry
Characteristics Enterprise Computer Personal Computer Radio
Early Materialisation : unique projects for unique users
→ Old Concept
“Better embodiment”
Electronic calculator
(ENIAC, 1945)
Microcomputer (Micral,
1973)
Radio telegraph (Marconi,
1897)
“Use Theory”
“Mechanical Mind”, Elec-
tronics
Computer Science, semicon-
ductors
Electromagnetism
Comparison to previous criteria Faster calculation Cheaper solution Cheaper telegraph
“Intimate circle” ACM [not identiﬁed]
Family & Bologna University
circles
UD Researchers Researchers Researchers
→ New Concept
“New dream”
“Universal Computer” (ED-
VAC, 1949)
“Personal Computer” (Al-
tair, 1974)
“Spread music in the air”
(Audion, De Forest, 1906,
FTC)
Proof of concept “Stored programs” “Personal use” Piano concert broadcasting
New criteria “Computer architecture” “User Interaction” “Signal ampliﬁcation”
“Intimate circle” ACM Altair User Group Institute of Radio Engineers
UD Researchers “Hackers” Researchers, user-developers
Market Emergence: very beginnings of “mass production”
→ Old Concept
Concept variations
Defence calculator (IBM
701)
Microcomputer (Micral)
Radio-telegraph for com-
mercial ships (Marconi)
Component innovations Use of magnetic tape Prologue Software Range transmission increase
Previous knowledge exploita-
tion
Computer architecture
Operating System, Pro-
gramming Language
Use radio-telegraph
“Intimate circle”
IBM - Von Neumann rela-
tionship
[not identiﬁed]
Marconi-Flemming relation-
ship
UDE “Special project” Micral users “Wireless Age” readers
→ New Concept
Concept value affirmation
“Universal Computer” (UNI-
VAC)
Macintosh
Broadcasting, (Westing-
house, 1920)
Extension design Software tools Third party applications Radio programs
Previous knowledge exploita-
tion
Computer architecture User Interface Radio receivers
“Intimate circle” ACM Apple-Xerox relationship
Conrad’s garage - Westing-
house
UDE Technical Support Developer Community “Attic radio manufacturers”
Foggy Competition: parallel exploration & exploitation; enterprises, DE, consumers
Trajectories fusion, Parallel Ex-
ploration
Multiple computers designs
IBM PC 5150, Macintosh,
Commodore, Compaq . . .
Broadcasting “chaos”
Component-based knowledge,
Synthesis Required
Memory, processor, data
processing techniques &
Computer Science emer-
gence
USB key & Wintel model
emergence
Battery-less, living room box
receiver & Emergence of a
theory for radio engineers
Product diversity
ex. Multiple IBM product
lines
A multitude of PCs
A mulitude of device and
manufacturers & Broadcast-
ers
Provider DE Community
ex. Third party IBM com-
puter leasing
ex. Compaq Dev. Commu-
nities
ex. FTC - UDE relationship
“Business Ecosystem”
University Spin Oﬀs & Man-
ufacturers & Enterprise-
clients
UDEs & Manufacturers &
Consumers
UDEs & Manufacturers &
Audiance
Table 9.1: Synthesis: Early Materialisation, Market Emergence and Foggy Competition
phases for the three industries studied.
EDVAC one, was developed by the same team having as their ambition to build a “universal
computer”. EDVAC was a ﬁrst materialisation of many elements still deﬁning a computer,
such as the stored program, and proposed a “computer architecture”, what became known
as the “Von Neumann Architecture”. Both ENIAC and EDVAC had been singular products,
addressed to a speciﬁc client, the US army.
In the case of the personal computer, an early materialisation of a “better solution”
was the one of the “microcomputer”, designed by Thi Truong in 1973 as a project for the
French institute INRA, in order to be used in the measurement of evaporative transpiration.
Micral, as it was named, was designed as a smaller and cheaper computer to operate similar
tasks with the mainframes, though less demanding in resources. On the contrary, there
have been many materialisations of the concept of a “personal computer”, initially meaning
a computer one develops for oneself. The Altair computer was the product that managed
to advance the exploration of what a personal computer could be, through the close ties
of the manufacturing start-up, MITS, with its UD community. Characteristically enough,
Microsoft was initially founded to develop Altair ’s programming language. New criteria, such
as user interaction, were explored by a large community of “hackers”, where researchers and
user-developers had come together.
Similarly, the case of radio industry ﬁnds its early materialisation phase initially through
the use of radio frequencies to provide a “better solution” for the telegraph. Marconi,
exploiting family contacts, had the ﬁrst contract with British Army in 1897 to develop a
“radio telegraph” which was experimentally created in house, using knowledge taught in
Bologna University. Later on, the contract would be generalised and Marconi would build
an empire on “wireless telegraphy”. In parallel, Lee De Forest, an American researcher who
did his PhD on Hertzian waves would develop and experiment some years later with “radio
broadcasting”, where “music could be spread”. The “audion” or “triode” used to amplify
signals was required for such a use and was invented by De Forest in 1906. Later on, De
Forest would play an important role in the creation of FTC, a UD-market oriented radio
manufacturer.
9.1.2 “Market Emergence” phase: very beginnings of “mass
production”
During the Market Emergence phase, which follows the Concept Materialisation one, there
is a parallel activity of both old and new concept based development. Initially, the old con-
cept attracts the interest of established market actors. Through conceptual variations it is
marketed in a larger circle of clients, using the knowledge produced by the earlier phase for
its production, while innovations concern aspects (components or features) of the early ma-
terialisation. User-Developer-Entrepreneurs, developing the product for their own use while
exploring the potential of its commercialisation, can be “free riders” or institutional actors,
nevertheless they are linked by a client-provider relationship, often diﬃcult to formalise.
Then, new concept based development takes place by using the same knowledge of
the early phase, though aﬃrming the new value. The design of its extension provides the
opportunity of further conceptual exploration, where UDEs play a crucial role.
In both cases, “intimate circles” are of high importance, as can enable the early sharing
of major conceptual or cognitive advancement, between UDEs and enterprises, to be taken
into account during the development process.
Hence, in the enterprise computer industry case, old concept based development was
deployed by use of the previous phase knowledge, namely the Von Neumann computer
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architecture, while innovations regarded components - such as the use of a magnetic tape
as a memory substrate. The IBM 701 has, thus, been described as a defence calculator
and its production was organised as a special project within the enterprise. The intimate
relationships between IBM and Von Neumann were proven valuable to the former, as the
EDVAC/Von Neumann architecture was the basis of the new product.
In parallel, a new trajectory of the computer was deployed through the UNIVAC project
by the developers of the ENIAC. Always based on the same architecture and discussed in
the same intimate circle, the ACM, further steps had been started towards the design of
its expansion. Software tools were introduced for its users to be able to adapt it to their
own particular needs. For that, a close relationship with those users, a technical support
structure, was necessary for them to be able to extend the computer.
In the case of the personal computer industry, Micral further advanced its ﬁrst model and
managed to create a market for the microcomputer. R2E, its manufacturer, used previous
knowledge in computer science to enrich the computer with an operating system and a
programming language, which could be utilised by its users to adapt the computer to their
own, speciﬁc tasks.
In parallel, the Macintosh computer, created by Apple a few years after its foundation,
marked the end of the perception of the personal computer as a Do It Yourself (DIY) com-
puter and began the era of the personal computer as a commercial product. Macintosh had
exploited previous knowledge, most importantly conceptual exploration operated within the
Xerox PARC, Xerox being one of the early investors in Apple. While Apple’s founders had
already taken part in the early UD community, Macintosh marked also the “professional-
ization” of this community, with a developers community building software applications for
it.
9.1.3 From Early Materialisation to Market Emergence: design
strategies & tactics
Figure 9.1 schematically outlines the design strategies observed in the transition from Early
Materialisation to Market Emergence phases, inspired by the works on CK theory (Hatchuel
and Weil, 2009; Gillier et al., 2010; Lefebvre, 2013, and others). The central part of the
schema refers to the diﬀerent trajectories of the new and the old concepts. The left part
refers to the intimate relationships developers construct, while the right part refers to the
knowledge related to each level. The levels (reading them top-down) are structured from
abstract to more speciﬁc concepts.
As already established in the previous paragraphs, there are two major design strategies to
be used by developers during these two early phases: one which explores an old concept using
the potential of a new theory (e.g. “radio telegraph”, “calculator” or “minicomputer”) and
another which explores a new concept (e.g. “radio broadcasting”, “computer” or “personal
computer”).
Then, there are two complementary tactics, that developers may follow to be able to
materialise their conceptual projections. I name the ﬁrst one “abstraction”. It is the tactic
according to which developers’ early materialisations are task-speciﬁc, while the next ones are
steps towards the materialisation of a more abstract and, thus, general concept. Typically,
Eckert and Mauchly began with a task-speciﬁc computer (ENIAC) though having in mind
the construction of a “universal computer” (materialised with EDVAC). The importance of
this tactic lies in the fact that task-based products during Early Materialisation serve a known
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Figure 9.1: From Early Materialisation to Market Emergence: Design strategies.
and identiﬁed value, despite the fact that they use “bizarre technologies”. This way an early
inventor can have access to resources, in order to continue their exploration.
A second tactic is to try to materialise an abstract, general concept from the outset
and then specialise it to speciﬁc markets. This is the case for instance of Garry Kildall who
developed very early on a generic operating system for microcomputers. Still, during market
emergence, Kildall lost in competition with Microsoft (as MS DOS had greater commercial
success than Kildall’s CP/M during Market Emergence). An even more typical case is the
well-known example in STS discipline history of the Diesel engine (Bryant, 1976), which
was not eventually commercialised by the heroic ﬁgure of Rudolf Diesel but, instead, by
MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg). Diesel wanted to commercialise a universal
machine, but from the beginning, faced multiple commercial and technical disappointments,
while MAN was able to tackle the issue with in a more systematic way.
9.1.4 “Foggy competition” phase: parallel exploration &
exploitation. Enterprises, DE, consumers
During the “Foggy competition” phase, there is an expansion of the market, characterised by
considerable product diversity. Actors commercially exploit their goods, while they still ex-
plore the potential of their own products. During this phase, there is a “business ecosystem”,
portrayed by co-existence of enterprises, consumers and developer-entrepreneurs (DEs). A
critical point for competition, is the management of the relationship between the enterprises
that have emerged during the earlier phases and the DEs, where those having already created
intimate relationships with UDEs are in advantageous position. Knowledge is characterised
here by segmentation and is based on components, while a new synthesis is required. Such
a synthesis may include both the academic level and the enterprise one.
Hence, during the foggy competition phase of the enterprise computer industry, a great
diversity of computers was available in the market, with multiple manufacturers (General
Electric, Western Electric, IBM, RCA, Burroughs, to cite a few) proposing diﬀerent materi-
alisations of what a computer could be. Design variations depended on the diﬀerent market
niches addressed and the corresponding modules of the computer architecture added a value
to that direction. For instance, an airline computer client valued a computer memory that
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could be modiﬁed “online”, that is while the computer was processing, advantaging a direc-
tion that would later be materialised by RAM, a temporary computer memory component.
This nebulous period ended with the dominance of IBM. IBM managed to dominate the mar-
ket through the proposition of a rationalisation through modularisation, with the legendary
S/360 computer series (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), a little bit after the term “Computer
Science” was coined. DEC, an MIT student founded start-up, managed to compete in this
environment based on a community of “hackers”.
In the case of the personal computer industry, the 1980’s were characterised by a great
diversity of “personal computers”, most of which did not look like the ones the broader
public met with after the dominance of the Wintel model (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) in
the 1990s. The Wintel model along with the USB key managed to rationalise the Personal
or Desktop Computer. While the basic elements of this model were included in the “IBM
PC”, as well as the earlier ones, the role of Compaq, based on a DE community, wasa a
catalyst in its establishment.
9.1.5 Breaking a cycle, beginning another
In all three industrial settings, a phase sequence was observed: Early Materialisation, where
UD played an important role, Market Emergence, where UD started entrepreneurship (be-
came UDE), and Foggy Competition, where the entrepreneur orientation dominated the user
one (DE). Then, there followed an Industrial Rationalisation, mainly by a synthesis that was
at the same time both scientiﬁc and productive.
Still, in one case, this circle was broken. This was the case of DEC, building PDP, de-
scribed by the enterprise as “not a computer” and addressing it to UD - while in a period
of Foggy Competition, just before IBM proposed the rationalisation that helped them dom-
inate the enterprise computer market. DEC’s minicomputer, as it was later named, gained
ground through a close collaboration with the university ’hackers’, who used and extended
its products. It followed a parallel trajectory to the enterprise and the personal computer,
which generally lasted until the rationalisation of the latter one.
9.1.6 From Foggy Competition to Industrial Rationalisation:
design and market strategies & tactics
Figure 9.2 illustrated design and market strategies during the transition from the Foggy Com-
petition to Industrial Rationalisation phases. In parallel to the old/new concept trajectories
of the two ﬁrst phases, other trajectories are explored and exploited in parallel, drawing on
newer or older concepts.
Such a case is for instance found in radio programs, as opposed to the early, “peer-to-
peer” radio communication. Similarly, during the 1950s for the enterprise computer industry
or during the 1980s for the personal computer industry, a great variety of “computers” where
available in the market, produced either by large companies, such as IBM, or by start-ups. At
this level, there were no common criteria hence the market looked more like a “bazaar” than
a “tidy”, market-niche segmented one. Typically, IBM engineers admitted back in 1950’s
that they knew very little about what computers can do, while the company already produced
and marketed diﬀerent computer products.
Most usually, the shift towards “newer or older” concepts is undertaken by a “jump”.
This jump can be led by a market opportunity, calling for a technological innovation, or
inversely, a new technological potential seeking a market niche. Yet, whether or not this
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“matching” will be realised, is an open question. Hence, during the 1950s, airline companies
were much interested in the possibility to book tickets using computers. However, such
a task demanded a diﬀerent architecture than EDVAC ’s one, as a “dynamic” memory was
required. Component innovations (namely “magnetic drum memories”, as in the case of RCA
and Burroughs Corp. - section 10.4.1 and 10.4.1) illustrated the potential of fulﬁlling such
a requirement. However, the manufacturers that tried that out failed, as more innovations
were required in order for such components to serve those tasks in a professional way. This
entrepreneurial mode is not a singular characteristic of DEs, as enterprises also act in the
same way.
Foggy competition ends with a new synthesis, which takes into account all exploration
experience of this phase and provides an encompassing concept that can introduce common
criteria for all known markets and technologies. A famous example is the IBM System 360
series which allowed the enterprise to reorganise its entire product lines and propose common
price/performance criteria. Most competitors had to copy those criteria and follow the same,
from then on dominant, design, resulting to a segmented market. Still, as DEC has shown,
a jump is always possible, opening up a new circle that does not comply with the dominant
design.
9.2 A comparison with the innovation-based industrial
development approaches
While the starting point of my research was not to discuss the existing literature on industrial
development but rather to take a historical distance from the object of Web innovation and
the particular ﬁgure of the User-Developer-Entrepreneur to “measure” their genericness, the
results of my study may contribute to the discussion on industrial development. Hence, in this
section I correlate my ﬁndings with the major analytical frameworks used by business scholars,
participating this way in the large and open-ended discussion on “where does industry come
from”.
This Section reviews the major conceptual approaches and positions my model has in
respect to the academic discussion.
9.2.1 The innovator’s dilemma: a new enterprise function?
In his seminal work, The innovator’s dilemma, Clayton Christensen (1997) addresses the
question of “how can great firms fail?”. He proposes an interpretation by the distinction
between sustaining and disruptive technologies. Sustaining technologies “foster improved
product performance” , while the disruptive ones are “innovations that result in worse product
performance, at least in the near-term” (Christensen, 1997, p. 11), though they have some
interesting characteristics:
First, disruptive products are simpler and cheaper; they generally promise lower
margins, not greater profits. Second, disruptive technologies typically are first
commercialized in emerging or insignificant markets. And third, leading firms’
most profitable customers generally don’t want, and indeed initially can’t use,
products based on disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997, p. 12).
Moreover, disruptive products have another characteristic, which contributes to their
diﬀusion in a very small - insigniﬁcant for large enterprises - market: they propose a new
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value (Christensen, 1997, p. 175). Christensen also outlines a series of “principles” making
large ﬁrms vulnerable at disruptive innovations. He observes thus that “markets that don’t
exist can’t be analysed” as “the only thing we may know for sure when we read experts’
forecasts about how large emerging markets will become is that they are wrong” (Christensen,
1997, p. 15). Thus, he formulates the innovator’s dilemma as follows:
In many instances, leadership in sustaining innovations - about which information
is known and for which plans can be made - is not competitively important. In
such cases, technology followers do about as well as technology leaders. It is in
disruptive innovations, where we know least about the market, that there are such
strong first-mover advantages. This is the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen,
1997, p. 15).
Christensen does not provide an answer to the innovator’s dilemma, but he indicates
some observations, a methodology that can be helpful for managers, a set of principles.
Firstly, he proposes that “trajectories maps” may help analyse the conditions and situate
the company when faced with a disruption potentially threatening its business. Secondly, he
remarks upon the diﬃculty of allocating resources to disruptive innovation concepts, as the
return on investment will probably not be suﬃcient, until those innovations really come to a
mature state. Thirdly, he also remarks upon the diﬃculty of identifying a market that would
appreciate the new value introduced by the disruption. Fourthly, he notes that enterprise
capabilities are set within the framework of an expertise and are thus very diﬀerent from
the new ones required for the production and the marketing of a disruptive product. Fifth,
he points out that decision making is very diﬃcult, as the risk is high. Sixth, regarding
strategy, he underlines that companies don’t always have to be leaders in all their activity
ﬁelds. And seventh, regarding entry barriers, he argues that entry is more diﬃcult than
economists claim, as such barriers are related to “things, such as assets or resources, that
are difficult to obtain or replicate” (Christensen, 1997, p. 172-174).
Hence, as Christensen shows, the adoption of an enterprise level analysis renders the
identiﬁcation of disruptive innovations a very risky and diﬃcult task. The analysis by tra-
jectory mapping he suggests will be used in the current study as well and will be further
discussed in the methodology section. Still, while he notes that disruptions introduce new
values, he studies their trajectories in comparison to the old performance criteria. Moreover,
Christensen illustrates how the typical enterprise structure lacks the tools to envision and
address innovations that potentially could ex post be proved as disruptive. Therefore, he
suggests that “disruptive technology should be framed as a marketing challenge, not a tech-
nological one” (Christensen, 1997, p. 173), as the typical R&D structure fails to properly
situate the issue.
Disruption as a jump during Foggy Competition
The model that resulted from my study may help further describe the phenomenon of dis-
ruption. Figure 9.3 shows the model by emphasizing the jump strategy. In fact, Christensen
(1997) describes the disruption of a speciﬁc market by an innovation regarding a new value.
This innovation however has to meet a speciﬁc market niche to succeed. While this market
may be insigniﬁcant, further development may threaten pre-existing designs.
Hence, disruption can be described as a jump from a speciﬁc trajectory to a new one.
Moreover, this jump can not only be triggered by a technological advancement of a speciﬁc
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enterprise seeking a market, as described by Christensen, but by a speciﬁc market niche
demanding a breakthrough in existing technologies while they are not yet rationalised.
This was the case for instance of computer companies during the 1950’s dealing with
airline enterprises. The requirements the latter imposed (to be able to modify data during
program execution) demanded technological advancements (a dynamic memory) that those
enterprises hadn’t been in position to develop - thus leading to severe economic damages.
Beyond modelling disruption, this model also proposes a way in which established en-
terprises may face it: by providing a new synthesis, by rationalising the design and the
production of the diﬀerent trajectories explored by the whole set of actors, and creating
some common design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), on the basis of which diﬀerent prod-
uct families may be produced, addressing every known market segment. Of course, new
jumps may occur, towards concepts that are not included in the synthesis, as they hadn’t
been explored during the Foggy Competition phase by other actors. This was the case for
instance of DEC’s PDP (later called the minicomputer), which managed to compete with
IBM’s S 360 computer series in a speciﬁc market, the one of University developers (later
known as the first computer hackers).
To do such a synthesis, as Christensen notes, an enterprise should have the knowledge
to do it. Hence, a monitoring of the business environment is required to spot the new
trajectories that emerge and be able to anticipate future synthesis necessary. In fact, as we
will discuss in Part III, this is what major Web service providers actually do today.
9.2.2 Lead users and UDEs: on the emergence of markets
In line with Christensen’s proposition that the emergence of disruptive innovation should
actually be an issue for marketing, early studies on lead users highlighted the value user
innovation may have for marketing research. Thus, von Hippel (1978b) proposed that,
beyond conducting research for the measuring of already identiﬁed needs and desires, a
challenge for enterprise marketing is “to search out data on user prototypes, analyse the
utility these have displayed in field use, and estimate their potential as commercial products”
(von Hippel, 1978b, p. 19). Later research though, focused on the capabilities of user
communities to innovate and diﬀuse their innovations without the implication of enterprises,
leading to an innovation model parallel to the manufacturers’ one (von Hippel and Katz,
2002; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), as already
discussed in Chapter 6.
The implications of the research on lead users are to be found in a series of ﬁelds, varying
from market forecasting (Funk, 2005), to further enabling users to innovate via tool-kits (von
Hippel and Katz, 2002; Baldwin and Clark, 2006) or policy (von Hippel, 2005; Gault and von
Hippel, 2009). Still, as the ﬁgure of the lead user is central in this approach, his positioning
in industrial development is also crucial for the understanding of industrial dynamics.
Positioning the activity of lead users in comparison to the well-known model of Rogers
(1962), Churchill et al. (2009) propose the schema shown in Figure 9.4.
Therefore, lead users are the ones who ﬁrst innovate for their own use, as opposed to
early adopters, who are the ﬁrst clients of an emerging market. The existence of a market
is thus the vertical line separating the two ﬁgures. In addition, user innovation literature
(von Hippel, 1994; Ogawa, 1998; von Hippel, 1998, 2005; Lüthje et al., 2005) suggests that
there is a division of “sticky information” between the technological level, retained by the
manufacturers, and the use context one, maintained by lead users. Thus, user innovation is
based on the latter information, allowing a “design division” of innovation process between
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Figure 9.4: Positioning of lead users in Roger’s model. Source: Churchill et al. (2009).
manufacturer and user.
However, my ﬁndings suggest a diﬀerent perspective, both in what regards Roger’s model
and in what regards “sticky information”, or knowledge.
On the one hand, they suggest that there is no “sudden” passage from lead users to
manufacturers and early adopters. Instead, there is a progressive transformation of both
the actors and the objects of innovation, as markets emerge and competition is unleashed.
On the other hand, UDEs hold both technological and use related knowledge or “sticky
information”, while they also create a new knowledge base, related to potential markets.
More speciﬁcally, the ﬁgures of UD, UDE and DE, as analysed in Part I are active on
the frontiers of market emergence. Figure 9.5 illustrates this positioning, as will be further
explored in the current part of this thesis. While User-Developers ﬁt the criteria of lead
users, in the sense that they innovate for their own use, once entrepreneurial opportunities
begin to appear, their action norms begin to shift. Thus User-Developer-Entrepreneurs
share characteristics of both lead users and entrepreneurs, but their importance lies in the
fact that they are the ﬁrst to explore the possibility of a new market emergence. Soon after
market emergence, Developer-Entrepreneurs do not innovate for themselves any more, but
for existing and potential clients, these clients being early adopters.
In parallel, UDEs have to develop both use-context related knowledge and technological
knowledge, as noted in the Figure 9.6, as they are the ones to create the early materialisations
for their own use before attempting to market them. In their entrepreneurial quest, they also
develop the ﬁrst knowledge about the possibility of markets, at this level insigniﬁcant for
enterprises, as Christensen notes.
9.2.3 Innovation diffusion and industrial development phases
The diﬀerent innovation phenomena are very often analysed on the basis of the model of
innovation diﬀusion proposed by Rogers by his seminal work in 1962. In a later version,
Rogers (2003, ﬁfth ed.), formulates his model as shown in Figure 9.7. The ﬁgures identiﬁed
by Rogers met during innovation diﬀusion are the following: (1) innovators, who “must
be able to cope with a high degree of uncertainty about an innovation at the time he
or she adopts”, (2) early adopters, who “help trigger the critical mass when they adopt an
innovation”(3) early majority, who “follow with deliberate willingness in adopting innovations
but seldom lead”, (4) later majority, for which “most of the uncertainty about a new idea
must be removed before the late majority feel that it is safe to adopt” and (5) laggards, who
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Figure 9.5: The position of UD, UDE and DE in the positioning of Churchill et al. (2009).
Figure 9.6: UDEs “sticky information”: use-context, technological and market related.
“tend to be suspicious of innovations and of change agents” Rogers (2003, p. 361-366).
Figure 9.7: Adopter Categorization on the Basis of Innovativeness by Rogers (2003, p. 361).
The model I propose can be situated in relationship to Rogers’ one as shown in Fig-
ure 9.8. As it is schematically shown in the ﬁgure, the overall “S-curb” is the aggregation
of many smaller ones. Initially, during Early Materialisation two can be identiﬁed, as already
stated, the old and the new concept trajectories. Then, the Market Emergence phase is a
lot shorter, and because of this can be characterised as more of an event, when compared
to the Early Materialisation and the Foggy Competition phases. The delivery of the ﬁrst
UNIVAC by the creators of ENIAC or the period from Apple II to the ﬁrst Macintosh are
such events, illustrating the market potential and triggering the period of Foggy Competi-
tion. Then, multiple DEs “enter the game”, designing and selling products of similar kinds,
though still exploring the potential of both the technologies and the market and, thus, in-
venting new trajectories. A new “jump” can emerge before Industrial Rationalisation (such
as DEC’s minicomputers), that can disrupt the industry in the future, unless included in this
rationalisation. Industrial Rationalisation, again, can also be considered an event, as things
radically change: the market segments already explored are afterwards coupled with speciﬁc
product series and product lines and market variety is structured through new, “universal”
criteria. For IBM it took three years of Research and Design to propose a new set of design
rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) and more years to fully deploy its System 360 computer
series.
Industrial Rationalisation establishes a “dominant design” by “embodying the require-
ments of many classes of users of a particular product” and “enforces standardization so
that production economies can be sought”, eventually leading to a situation where “effective
competition can then take place on the basis of cost as well as product performance” (Utter-
back and Abernathy, 1975; Suárez and Utterback, 1995). For this synthesis to be possible,
additional innovations are required in order to “connect the dots”, as Steve Jobs used to
say, and propose a design that takes into account the exploration of the Foggy Competition
phase.
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Figure 9.8: Positioning of the model I propose in Rogers’ one.
9.3 Research Methodology
Christensen (1997) studied the history of the disk drive industry following a friend’s advice,
since in this industrial domain “market structure, global scope, and vertical integration
have been so pervasive, rapid, and unrelenting”, in a manner that could be metaphorically
compared to fruit flies very short life cycle: they are “conceived, born, mature, and die all
within a single day” and are studied by “those who study genetics” for this very reason
(Christensen, 1997, p. 20).
Garel and Mock (2012) studied the story of the famous Swatch. This joint work of an
academic and an entrepreneur, the latter having taken part in the process studied, used the
C-K theory (Hatchuel and Weil, 2009). Unlike the disk drive industry, the watch industry is
characterised by very large cycles. In fact, as the authors show, Swatch was a revolution, as it
has been that an industrial production of watches - in terms of the capacity of manufacturing
of millions of similar products - which required a transformation of both the object and the
process of its development.
In a similar way, I will study the patterns on three industrial settings, the enterprise
computer, the personal computer and the radio. The life cycles of these industries have
been greater than the one of disk drives and shorter that the one of watches.
Christensen was interested in answering the question “why do great companies fail?”,
hence required a history with frequent enterprise failures. Garel and Mock (2012) exposing
the history of one of the rare though revolutionary innovations in the watch industry were
capable to study the problem of radical innovation “in the making”. My research aims
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to further explore the question “what is the role of UDEs in industrial development”. This
question emerged from the ﬁrst part of my study, where I identiﬁed a ﬁgure acting in-between
the user and the manufacturer innovation paradigms (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), in the
particular ﬁeld of Web services development. The goal of the current part is to identify
whether this activity, poorly explored by the literature so far, is a peculiarity (von Krogh
et al., 2012) of the Web services phenomenon, or, on the contrary, is an activity recurrently
appearing in industrial development in general. For this, I have chosen to study industrial
settings that are as vast enough to be able to be compared to the Web services domain.
While Christensen’s question - enterprise failure - led him to investigate short living industries,
mine obliges me to study their “death”, and I chose to study longer cycles, for this peculiar
actor ﬁgure to be identiﬁed, and then studied, within the course of industrial development.
My study is inspired by genealogical approaches to the study of history, where the starting
point of historical research is a question of the present and the objective is to explore the
“conditions of specificity deployment possibility” (Lefebvre, 2005). This posture is diﬀerent
to the one of longitudinal studies which are interested in studying the dynamics of a particular
system (e.g. an organization), on the basis of “how” questions and in terms of an input-
process-output analysis (van de Ven and Huber, 1990).
Genealogical approaches are based on the work of Foucault and the notion of “problema-
tization”, even though, as Castel notes, “the work of Michel Foucault does note explicitly
accord a central place to the notion of problematization”. More generally, the impression
I had during my own study of Foucault’s work, is that, despite the pluralism of terms and
methods he introduces, he rarely uses deﬁnitions at all, being against the idea that something
(anything) can be deﬁned in a singular and universal way, beyond a speciﬁc “problemati-
zation ﬁeld”. At the same time, he suggested that his work be used as a “tool-kit” for
researchers (Kendall and Wickham, 1999). Castel cites Foucault concerning the issue of
material treatment:
Whoever, on the other hand, wishes to study a problem that has emerged at
a given time must follow other rules: the choice of material as a function of
the givens of a problem; the focus of the analysis on those elements likely to
resolve it; the establishment of relationships that permit this solution. Hence the
indifference to the obligation to say everything, even to satisfy the assembled
jury of specialists (Castel, 1994, p. 242).
Hence, many scholars interested in the history of business use this approach to inves-
tigate the transformations in time of a present problem. Aggeri and Labatut (2010) use
a genealogical analysis to study the theoretical approaches in management that have been
based on management instruments, Lefebvre (2009) studies the genealogy of the work con-
tract, , Garel (2003) proposes a history of project management, Chatzis (2008) studies the
history of the creation of the maintenance activity in the enterprise context.
Still, while the genealogical approach values the moment of emergence of a speciﬁc “prob-
lematization” and further explores its transformation in a long chronological scale (Castel,
1994) - typically, many of the problematizations studied by Foucault started in ancient Greece
- my goal is not to identify the beginnings of the role of User-Developer-Entrepreneurs in
industry. My ambition being more modest, I will use a “limited problematization”, aiming
to explore whether or not UDEs have existed in other industries during the previous century
and if they have, whether or not the study of other settings may provide us useful insights
on the “conditions of the UDE speciﬁcity deployment possibility”, to enable us to better
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understand the kind of stakes and challenges to which today’s online services business are
called to respond.
Research Material: works on history and user-developer Press
A major reference for my study will be the seminal work of Paul Ceruzzi (2003) A history of
modern computing. Taking a distance from the “social constructivism” approach, Ceruzzi
reviews the history of computing after WW II methodically examining the computer as seen
from the “engineer’s workbench” (Ceruzzi, 2003, p. 5). My reading of Ceruzzi’s history will
be based on the problematization of UDE’s role in industrial development. Thus, placed in
between what Ceruzzi calls “social constructivism” and the “engineer’s workbench”, I will
be interested in the workbench, its engineers and the conditions for them to work on the
bench.
A second reference work will be the one of Patrice Flichy (1995a), “Dynamics of modern
communication : the shaping and impact of new communication technologies”, which I will
use as an entry for the study of the radio industry. While Flichy studies communications as
a social phenomenon and is positioned in the debate between historians which highlights the
competition of individual actors, my approach will be based, as previously, in the problema-
tization of UDE’s role, while the level of my study will of be themselves as a ﬁgure-type and
their “bench”.
This approach will lead me to look at aspects that the two authors consider as secondary,
although they provide precious references in their endnotes to continue the investigation. For
instance, Bill Gates is a prominent ﬁgure both in the history of computing and today’s world
business. Still, the fact that he wrote technical articles addressed to the user-developers for
the review of a company producing a computer kit called “Altair” which had an “insigniﬁcant”
market, is not something historians will value as a fact of historical importance - incidentally,
neither has Computer Science - which is why it is not referred anywhere. Yet, when compared
to the givens of my problem, it obtains a diﬀerent meaning, as it is registered in one of the
necessary phases for industrial development, namely the passing from Early Materialisation
to Market Emergence. Such information was possible to trace thanks to the Web, as many
Web repositories, like the DigiBarn Computer Museum ( www.digibarn.com), have done
precious work in gathering and publishing online historical user-developer addressed Press.
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The historical study begins with the examination of the enterprise computer industry.
While popular culture remembers ENIAC as “the ﬁrst computer”, the decades that followed
were not just a period of “innovation diﬀusion”. Developer-entrepreneurs commercially ex-
ploited the “new machine”, while exploring its potential and experimenting with diﬀerent
designs. The “foggy competition” phase in the “mainframe” computers ended with IBM’s
System 360 computer family rationalisation.
10.1 Introduction
The emergence of the computer industry that started after WWII is a complex case, an
adventure engaging multiple actors and illustrating the dialectical relationship between in-
novators, emerging uses, markets and technologies, which frames the course of industrial
development.
The current study reveals a richer picture of innovation and its market diﬀusion than
the one provided by the approaches previously reviewed. In fact, there is no clear distinc-
tion between innovation and its diﬀusion, as put forward by Rogers, before an industrial
rationalisation: innovations continue to be necessary and critical during market expansion.
During the Foggy Competition phase, developer-entrepreneurs, often originating from the
early circle of user-developers, have a catalytic role both in exploring and exploiting a new
technology.
Enterprise computer “early adopters” deﬁne new requirements, apt in their own context
of activity and the projection of use they make of an innovation. In the case of enter-
prise computer industry, developers had to further innovate in order to provide computers
that could be used in diﬀerent contexts, while these new machines were being diﬀused in
businesses.
The computer can be generally seen as a disruption (Christensen, 1997) in the enterprise
equipment and machinery market. However, innovators’ dilemmas were not limited to the
identiﬁcation of an appropriate market: the computer was shaped through the interaction
between developers, potential and early adopters, previous equipment manufactures. This
interaction occurred on the basis of technologies and theories available or emerging. Early
user-developers, such as the developers of the ENIAC, opened up a market which would
take about two decades to be rationalised and, thus, segmented in clear niches and the
corresponding product diversity. Equipment enterprises, such as IBM or Remington Rand,
embraced the new technology, though further development and understanding of it was not
a challenge that could be faced with old performance and organisational criteria.
Since the ENIAC early materialisation, the question “how to compute” has been the
basis of an exploration providing diﬀerent computer and calculator architectures, as well as
software itself. As ﬁgure 10.1 suggests, the distinction of early and later phases was not
based on a “task division” between lead users, carriers of “use-context sticky information”
and manufacturers, carriers of “technology related sticky information”, as user innovation
literature suggests (von Hippel, 2005). In practice, what can be ex post distinguished as
a dilemma between “sequential computing” and “parallel computing” has been decisive for
innovation both in regard to the use context and the technologies. On the one hand,
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sequential computing covered much of the requirements of administrative use context, such
as the need to calculate and print payrolls every month. The requirements for memory in
this case were quite ﬂexible and diﬀerent technologies (from punch cards to electronic tubes
and, much later, semiconductors) helped perform this task eﬃciently.
On the other hand, services, being based on client interaction, such as airline companies,
required much more frequent or “real time” calculations. Hence, while payrolls, for instance
are printed once and can be calculated before that, every ticket reservation changes the
ticket availability and the next client should be able to take that into account. Here, parallel
computing had a speciﬁc value for services. Still, a “dynamic” memory was required for such
a task, one which could not be embodied within existing technologies. Those developers
active in the ﬁeld innovated with “magnetic drum memory”, having quite poor results. Until
IBM’s engineers invent the RAM, passing through the “magnetic disk memory”, the use of
the computer for “real time” programming was a very dangerous “jump” for developers, as
compared to other architectures.
Figure 10.1: The emergence of the enterprise computer industry. Early Materialisation,
Market Emergence, Foggy Competition and Industrial Rationalisation.
10.1.1 Chapter overview
Table 10.1 outlines the structure of the current chapter. The chapter begins with the Early
Materialisation phase, reviewing the well-known case of the ENIAC computer as well as a less
known but more important computer, the EDVAC (Section 10.2). Yet, before that, a review
of the intimate circles of user-developers which had emerged some years before this project
(paragraph 10.2.1) and their contribution to the ENIAC project is judged necessary for the
better understanding of their developer’s actions. The section continues with the review
of ENIAC development, which can be analysed as an Early Materialisation of a computer:
while addressing the functional requirements of its user, the US Army, for being a single
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task machine, for its developers ENIAC was a ﬁrst illustration of the new potential, enrolled
in a more ambitious design goal. Using their experience as well as their relations, a second
materialisation, EDVAC, was the ﬁrst “universal computer”, a future-oriented universalism
emphasising computer potential. Its architecture constituted a ﬁrst knowledge base for the
next phase. New criteria, such as the “stored program” were introduced. The exploratory
activity of Mauchly and Eckert was discussed and attended by a user-developer “milieu” now
more stabilised. This milieu has also been the place where Mauchly ﬁrst searched for clients
to ﬁnance the development of the ﬁrst commercial computer. This early experience created
a “how to” that was later proven to be crucial for the industry to emerge.
Section 10.3 pursues the story of Eckert and Mauchly with the development of UNIVAC,
the ﬁrst commercial computer. While the two actors and the company they built did not
manage to systematise computer production to ﬁt previous criteria (such as manufacturing
robustness), their business was acquired by an equipment manufacturer, Remington Rand.
One year after the ﬁrst computer delivery, IBM, with the help of von Neumann who had
studied EDVAC ’s architecture, created its IBM 701, which was internally called a “defence
calculator” as a “separate” project. Market Emergence signiﬁed two major changes: on the
one hand, other actors would soon begin to enter the game. On the other hand, utilising
the “universal computer” in diﬀerent use contexts was proven to be a great challenge, as
client support required both the establishment of a training process and the continuation of
innovations.
Hence, a period of foggy competition started thereafter, where multiple actors entered
a market that was still “under construction” (Section 10.4). Computers were generally pro-
duced and marketed as “machinery”, while exploitation went hand to hand with exploration.
A typical case in this phase is the one of Burroughs company (paragraph 10.4.1). It was cre-
ated by the developers of ENIAC ’s memory and attempted to question the “von Neumann”
architecture, trying to address the requirements for tasks such as airline ticket booking. This
“jump” was proven to be far too ambitious and Burroughs exited the enterprise market,
though it continued business through military projects. This problem was solved by the
invention of RAM by IBM engineers Hence, while the industry still under emergence had
inherited from previous theories an early market, some starting points of exploration and a
theory, the business ecosystem had yet new trajectories to explore, new uses to invent and
new markets to create, while in competition. A wide, empirical exploration was the result of
this phase, which was exploited to propose a synthesis, an industrial rationalisation.
Section 10.5 brieﬂy reviews the rationalisation of the computer development by IBM.
IBM was based in the previous phase learnings, of which an important event had been the
invention of RAM and the IBM 1401 “universal computer” success, developed by RAM
inventors. The IBM System 360 computer family covered almost every market niche that
had been previously explored by synthesising the existing know-how and proposing common
performance/price criteria. This was achieved by the institution of common design rules and
the modularisation of computer architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2000).
Still, not all trajectories had been included within the S/360 family. During the late
1950s, DEC drew a diﬀerent trajectory, that would later be called “minicomputer”, using the
latest inventions on semi-conductors (Section ??). DEC was targeted at user-developers in
the university, who became known as the early hackers, and collaborated with them in the
further exploration and development of its PDP “data processors”.
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10.2 Early Materialisation: from ENIAC to EDVAC
ENIAC was a fundamental stage in the emergence of the computer industry. Paragraph 10.2.2
will look into the project itself, as well as the role of its two designers in this adventure. While
Ceruzzi (2003) begins his history of modern computing from that period on, it is equally
important to note the emergence of the very concept of a ‘universal computer’, that played
such a decisive role as we will see. As most historians note, the concept had emerged some
years before the actual project of ENIAC began.
10.2.1 The “universal machine” notion and its early UD circles
An important contributor to this early phase, as the historian Yates (1997) shows, was Ed-
mund Berkeley. Berkeley was not an engineer, neither did he invent any computer. However,
he was deeply involved in the study of life insurance methods, a ﬁeld also present in the foun-
dations of modern computing methods, such as of Babbage’s early work, A Comparative
View of the Various Institutions for the Assurance of Lives (Babbage, 1826).
After earning a BA in mathematics and logic from Harvard University in 1930, Berkeley
joined the British Prudential Mutual Life Insurance of New York as an “actuarial clerk”.
He later moved to the methods department, where as a mathematician he investigated
the enterprise’s methods and processes, especially symbolic logic types and new types of
computing machinery.
Berkeley played an important role in the gathering together of all actors interested in
computing methods into an intimate collectivity. One of the early collectivities he animated,
was the New York Symbolic Logic Group, in 1941. In fact, he kept extensive notes on his
activity, on which the research of Yates (1997) is based1.
Berkeley’s contribution in the ﬁrst phase of the emergence of the computer concept thus
included networking, though it went beyond it. He was actually implied in the cognitive part
of what came to be the discipline of computing and was also active in creating a place, a
milieu for researchers, entrepreneurs and scientists working in enterprises and institutions to
share knowledge and concepts on computing machinery.
Following the research of that time and Alan Turing’s theory on “universal machines”2,
he was the author of a series of papers on the potential applications of “symbolic logic” to
insurance company problems during WWII and later of the ﬁrst popular book for computers,
Giant Brains, or Machines That Think (Berkeley, 1949).
In parallel, Berkeley visited equipment manufacturers at the time, including General
Electric, IBM and Bell Labs, in order to identify whether there could be computing machinery
useful for his insurance company. As Yates mentions:
While neither of these machines was well-suited to insurance uses, his reports
from these contacts indicate that these potential vendors were learning about
1Yates notes about the consistency of this group:
The group that met to form this association included several professors from New York uni-
versities, as well as several individuals from the “application side of symbolic logic,” including
Dr. Claude Shannon of Bell Labs (the father of information theory) and three representatives
of insurance ﬁrms (including Berkeley himself) Yates (1997, p. 63).
2For an extensive review of the emergence of Alan Turing theory see the collective work of Husbands
et al. (2008), The mechanical mind in history.
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market needs from him at the same time that he was learning more about the
technology3.
We could assume that the fact that this intimate collectivity started in New York may
be related to the realisation of the World’s Fair in 1939 in this city. In fact, Mauchly, one
of the designers of ENIAC, recalled in an interview in 1973 getting in touch with Remington
Rand enterprise in this fair, and learning from the company’s electrical multiplier, one of
the elements he used in the design of ENIAC 4. Mauchly actually had to get in touch with
the companies support service and look into the manual to acquire further knowledge. As
we will see later, Remington Rand was to play an important role in the computer industry
during the 1950s.
The legacy of this ﬁrst intimate circle includes the creation of the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM), which would follow up ENIAC ’s development long before it
became one of the major computer societies, as it is known today. ACM did not emerge by
a formal decision. In 1947 Berkeley was already connected with every enterprise, researcher
or administrative oﬃcial related to computing. He himself initiated the ACM, in an informal
way, by gathering the most prominent members of the community that had emerged, John
Mauchly and Dick Bloch, the programmer of another computer project in Harvard5.
In ACM’s early conference, there would also be illustrations of prototype computers, while
user-developers would exchange information on “how to build a computer”6.
A few years later, ACM, together with the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, and
the Institute of Radio Engineers formed the two computer conferences, the Western Joint
Computer Conference (WJCC) and the Eastern one (EJCC), that began in 19517. In 1961,
the American Federation of Information Processing Societies (AFIPS) was to be formed, and
the two conferences were to be renamed Spring and Fall Joint Computer Conferences, an
Association that would be dissolved in 19908, after being the “umbrella trade organisation
of computer societies”.
10.2.2 The development of ENIAC : an early materialisation based
on an old concept
The ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), the machine weighing eighty
tonnes, has often in the past been praised by the scientiﬁc community and the popular press
3Yates (1997, p. 64).
4Tropp (1999, p. 62).
5Here is how he recalled the initiative he undertook in 1947, twenty years later, during an anniversary
meeting of the ACM:
I started putting together a small group who would call for the formation of some kind of an
association, a temporary committee for an Association for Computing Machinery, and Dick
Bloch was on the committee and John Mauchly was on the committee and I was on the
committee and a few more people were on also and we rapidly put something together Tropp
(1987).
6Tropp (1987).
7Bureau of Ordnance, U. S. N. D. B. of. (1948). Proceedings of a Symposium on Large-Scale Digital
Calculating Machinery, 7-10 January 1947. In Symposium on Large-Scale Digital Calculating Machinery (p.
370). MIT Press.
8Ceruzzi (2003, p. 305).
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as the “ﬁrst computer”. However, this “lust” for identifying the “ﬁrst” of computers9 over the
years has often overshadowed the factor that positioned, in my view, ENIAC in a prominent
place in the modern history of computer industry: the activity of its own designers, John P.
Eckert and John W. Mauchly. Seen from Mauchly’s perspective, we could say that ENIAC
was an intermediary project, something more than a prototype, an early materialisation.
Following their activity, through the work of historians, as well as documents of the time
(mainly commercial material or speciﬁcations) we will retrace their entrepreneurial trajectory
which will provide us with useful insights for today’s business.
John Mauchly was interested in computing machines since the 1930s. His extensive use
of such machines began after he completed his Ph.D. in Physics at Johns Hopkins University,
when, motivated by his passion for weather forecasting, he engaged in research in the area of
meteorology10. In 1941 he enrolled in an Engineering - Science - Management War Training
Course (ESMWT) oﬀered by the Moore School of Electrical Engineering of the University
of Pennsylvania, and designed to teach electrical engineering to scientists to enhance their
skills for wartime work11.
In 1942, Mauchly wrote a memorandum to the School administration, describing the
computational advantages of an electronic machine12, that would exploit the electronic
technology already developed in the radar industry. He discussed his proposal with Eck-
ert, a young research assistant in Moore School and a highly skilled technical engineer. Still,
the undertaking of such a project became feasible only when the government needed high
calculating performance for the needs of the war13. Once the contract for ENIAC was even-
tually signed, Mauchly became principal consultant and Eckert chief engineer14. The ENIAC
project, contracted in 1943, was delivered in 1945.
ENIAC was an electronic computer using vacuum tubes, designed to calculate ﬁre tables
for the U.S. Army. This task, though very speciﬁc, involved the repetitive solution of complex
mathematical expressions15. In fact, ENIAC automated computing tasks16 by synchronising
them with an electronic clock pulse17. Many authors agree that the value of ENIAC resided
9Some, going back the to he Antikythera mechanism, dated around 100 BCE and the Hellenistic Period,
discovered in the beginnings of the 19th century by sponge drivers in a wreck near Antikythera island. The
function of this mechanism, re-established decades later, was to calculate astronomical positions. In modern
times, astronomical calculations began to be done in accounting machines during the 1920s: IBM Type 405
accounting machine could operate an astronomical calculation involving 12 implicit multiplications in 42
hours (Cortada, 2000, p. 134).
10Stern (1979).
11Stern (1979).
12John W. Mauchly, “The Use of High-Speed Vacuum Tube Devices for Calculating,” Aug. 1942; reprinted
in Brian Randell, The Origins of Digital Computers (New York, 1975), pp. 329-332.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
15Ceruzzi (2003, p. 15).
16“Computing tasks” had already been deﬁned during the 19th century. Charles Babbage, an English
mathematician, philosopher, inventor and mechanical engineer, had designed a automated mechanical com-
puter, though he hadn’t been able to complete its construction. Its design was the result of his studies ‘On
the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures’. There, he had proposed that ‘the division of labour can
be applied with the same success to mental as to mechanical operations’. This proposal was based on his
experience of the ‘French Tables of Logarithms’, which was the response of the ‘most distinguished French
philosophers’ to the desire of French government to ‘produce a series of mathematical tables, to facilitate
the application of the decimal system which they had so recently adopted’. Babbage has also illustrated that
these computing tasks could be mechanically operated by the use of coordinating clocks. Charles Babbage,
’On the Economy of the Machinery and Manufactures, London, 1835, pp 191-202.
17ENIAC’s arithmetic calculations were performed by ’counting’ pulses. As Flichy (1995b) mentions, it
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in its capacity to mathematically compute complex mathematical expressions18, something
that Mauchly had early on envisioned. One major step in ENIAC design was the utilisation
of vacuum tubes (a mature technology at the time, industrially exploited in West Coast radar
factories) for a computing machine. This step was to be further explored and expanded with
the EDVAC computer. Yet, the universality of this value was to be illustrated and further
deployed a few years later, through the entrepreneurial adventure of the two designers.
Discussion : ENIAC, an “early materialisation”.
Entrepreneurial activity often faces the diﬃculty of a high “entry cost”, that is the initial
capital for Research and Development needed (Utterback and Suárez, 1993). Moreover,
when the market does not yet exist (in our case a commercial market) the initial cost is
even more important: exploration costs can be even higher, as radical innovation consists in
operating in the unknown, making it impossible to predict the costs.
Seen from its designers’ perspective, ENIAC was an early materialisation: it allowed
them to advance their knowledge on computers as well as the design towards the projected
concept of an electronic universal computer (ENIAC did use electronic tubes, even though
it was not ‘fully’ electronic). In parallel, this contract ensured an institutional and ﬁnancial
framework for the two entrepreneurs to operate in.
It is important to note here a double property of its design, which might seem contra-
dictory: ENIAC was task-speciﬁc (ﬁre tables calculation), though its design opened the way
for new innovation trajectories. A look into the speciﬁcations may enlighten us to this pos-
sibility: on the one hand, the requirements were imposed by its sole client (the U.S. Army)
to complete a speciﬁc operation, thus not a class of users in a market. Nevertheless, the
design was completed in a way that the “requirements of many classes of users” (Suárez
and Utterback, 1995), could be addressed, thus a dominant design could emerge. In other
words, we propose that ENIAC can be characterised as an early materialisation because it
integrated the potential of addressing many classes of users in its design, beyond the speciﬁc
client who commanded it, though having satisﬁed the latter.
In this sense, an early materialisation is diﬀerent from half-designed solutions (Hatchuel
and Weil, 1999), not-yet-complete design (Baldwin and Clark, 2006) or ‘incomplete design’
(Garud et al., 2008). In those cases, design is not complete, thus there is no evident value
of use, as third parties need to intervene in its design and development in order for end users
to buy it. In ENIAC ’s case, the product was complete, fulﬁlling buyer’s speciﬁcations, yet
its design opened new possibilities for the entrepreneurial activity of its two designers.
10.2.3 The development of EDVAC : an early materialisation
based on a new concept
An important step forward for the two scientists, as well as for the history of computer
business, was the EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable Computer) project. It was a project
signed between the Army Ordnance Department and the Moore School in 1944 and was
to be a complementary project to the ENIAC, though incorporating major design changes.
EDVAC was the ﬁrst “all electronic” and “universal computer” and was delivered in 1949.
While the institutional context for the two computers was the same, EDVAC was an early
materialisation of the new concept of a computer, managed to establish the requirements of
had a capacity of 200.000 pulses per second.
18For instance Ceruzzi (2003); Flichy (1995b).
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a “universal computer”, on the basis of which a reference design would emerge.
EDVAC incorporated many innovations that remained a reference for the industry that
was to emerge a few years later. Without going into details, we can say that the major
requirements (Suárez and Utterback, 1995) that constituted this early materialisation, were
the following:
1. EDVAC was an “extended electronic computer”, as it completely replaced punched
cards with electric tubes.
2. It introduced the module of “stored programs” using the same method to store both
information (data) and information processing methods (programs)19, setting out the
foundations of the computer programmer profession.
The ﬁrst characteristic mentioned above revolutionised the machine, as it incorporated
in its architecture “state of the art” industry of that time. On the one hand, production
of electronic tubes had already been rationalised. On the other hand, their utilisation in
EDVAC enabled not only faster calculation power but faster programming time. In terms
of knowledge, Mauchly and Eckert exploited existing knowledge for the development of a
radically new concept.
At the same time, the materialisation of the principle of stored programs (conceptualised
on a theoretical level by the English mathematician Alain Turing before the war), opened the
way for the creation of a new profession, the one of programmers, that was to be actively
present in all the transformations that capitalism met after the war.
Architecture disclosing and conceptualising
EDVAC ’s design was discussed between the two designers and John von Neumann, a promi-
nent mathematician leading research for the U.S. Army, in March and April 1945, few months
after the contract was signed. In the next weeks, EDVAC ’s architecture was described by
von Neumann in his First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC and was soon diﬀused in military
and academic circles20. This action caused the disappointment of the two entrepreneurs,
who envisioned the patenting of their computer21. In fact, they ﬁled a patent a year later,
to which Moore School administration did not agree. The patent was rejected in the 1970s,
as von Neumann’s report had disclosed its main principles.
Thus, EDVAC ’s architecture remained known as the “Von Neumman architecture”. This
report, while incomplete, clearly described the interfaces of the artefact and remained a refer-
ence for Computer Science (except for the human-computer interface). Few years later, von
Neumann wrote a three volume book, the Planning and coding of problems for an electronic
computing instrument, report on the mathematical and logical aspects of an electronic com-
puting instrument, explicitly stating the principles of computing for the Engineering Schools
public.
Through this controversial episode, not only was the knowledge diﬀused, but EDVAC -like
computers were widely developed in the framework of the “Manhattan project”, under the
direction of von Neumann. Though not the only computer developed for the Army (another
19While ENIAC was at the time very fast on calculating, programming the machine necessitated days of
work in manipulating its cable connections.
20Baldwin and Clark (2000); Norberg (2003); Ceruzzi (2003).
21Ibid.
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one was the SAGE command and control system, developed by IBM)22, EDVAC surely
installed a considerable knowledge base, both practical and theoretical, into the scientiﬁc
community of the time.
Entering the path of commercialisation.
At the same period and while computers continued to be seen as scientiﬁc and military in-
struments, Mauchly and Eckert wanted to commercialise their invention. The ﬁrst business
opportunity that opened up for them was their contract to undertake a study for the develop-
ment of a computer for the U.S. Census Bureau23. Initially, the two proposed to the Moore
School administration EDVAC ’s commercial exploitation, beginning with this contract. Yet,
after the disagreement of Moore School administration the two left to form a partnership in
1946, the Electronic Control Company which was incorporated as Eckert-Mauchly Computer
Corporation (EMCC) two years later24.
During these two years, John Mauchly undertook a market study identifying twenty-
two industries, government agencies or other institutions that could be interested in such a
machine and this despite other studies (such as the one by the National Research Council
in 1947) stating that there was no place for such an instrument in the market. One crucial
reason for Mauchly’s market research was the fact that the resources of the contract signed
for the ﬁrst computer study (at a ﬁxed fee of $ 169 000) was quickly proven insuﬃcient for
his ambitious project25. The list of potential clients included the Army Map Service, the
Bureau of Aeronautics, theMetropolitan Insurance Company and various aircraft companies.
Mauchly and Eckert were conscious that they were starting a new industry.
However, client demand itself had to be created. In other words, clients had to be
seduced by the utility of a new object in their speciﬁc enterprise context. While Mauchly
undertook this task during his early market search, by contacting organisations that could
potentially be convinced to buy a computer, the University undertook a role in knowledge
diﬀusion, necessary for the product to get wanted. Ceruzzi comments:
Customers took the initiative and sought out suppliers perhaps after attending
the Moore School session in 1946 or visiting a university where a von Neumann
type machine was being built. These customers, from a variety of backgrounds,
clamoured for computers, in spite of a reluctance among UNIVAC or IBM sales-
men to sell them (Ceruzzi, 2003, p. 45).
22SAGE computer designed and manufactured by IBM for the U.S. Air Force opened the conceptual space
of the User Interface. This computer was a “command and control” device, allowing military oﬃcials with
low technical skills to control a wide amount of radar information concerning approaching aeroplanes and
command actions. The SAGE contract generated half a billion dollars in revenue for IBM in the 1950s.
Despite the fact that by the time the system was delivered, missile technology was advanced and, thus, its
utility to trace aeroplanes was out of date, this project for IBM and the emerging computer industry was of
a great importance. As Ceruzzi (1989, p. 77) mentions, with SAGE the computer industry (especially IBM)
learned how to produce high-performance machines on a serial basis in decent production runs.
23Stern (1979, p. 10).
24Ceruzzi (2003); Stern (1979).
25Stern (1979, p. 11).
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10.2.4 Discussion. Early materialisation: Conditions for the
transition to Market Emergence.
During the phase studied in the previous paragraphs, there has been no innovation diﬀusion
during this early phase, where the model of Rogers (1962) could be discussed. In addition,
describing these early user-developers as “lead users” could be problematic, since there was
no evident product that they commonly used before the invention of the ﬁrst computers.Both
use-related and technology related knowledge (von Hippel, 2005) were, yet, to be invented
- for that to be a competitive advantage later, when computers would disrupt (Christensen,
1997) the business machinery market.
It is important to note however that Mauchly and Eckert entered their adventure with
UNIVAC having a concept in mind. Hence, while the concept of “universalism” is too
abstract to grasp, it led as we’ve seen to the non-linear design process through diﬀerent
projects (ENIAC, BINAC, UNIVAC) and achieved a design genericness.
In Mauchly and Eckert’s activity, the way to address this barrier was by constructing an
intermediary product, ENIAC. This product had an autonomous identity that didn’t depend
upon future research. It complied to the buyer’s speciﬁcation and, thus, its development
could be ﬁnanced autonomously. What assured the continuity between the ENIAC and the
projects to come, was a design reasoning (the one described in Mauchly’s memorandum
in 1943) in which this product could be attributed an intermediary position. As we are
going to see in the next section, the intermediary product method was followed by the two
entrepreneurs during the following years as well.
Then, EDVAC, exploiting the same institutional and ﬁnancial conﬁguration, was an ad-
vanced materialisation of the concept (in particular in what concerns the full exploitation of
electronic technology to enable Turing’s concept embodiment regarding stored programs).
However, those elements wouldn’t be suﬃcient to permit the dominance of this design
in the market to come. Firstly, the two entrepreneurs had to engage in a journey to the
market, which - as we are going to see - posed new challenges for them. Secondly, the fact
that von Neumann disclosed and rationalised on the theoretical level EDVAC ’s architecture
was a necessary condition for it to become a ‘knowledge platform’: Manhattan project
computer development as well as academic knowledge on computers were based on these
design restrictions. When ﬁnally the two entrepreneurs managed to get the ﬁrst computer
to the U.S. market, there had already been an institutional support for the new business
profession necessary for the product to be used: the programmers. Of course, this entry also
implied an openness to competition.
Thus, to summarise, we identify the following steps of a strategy for the emergence of a
reference design:
• Developing intermediary products which
– are positioned within a broader design reasoning of which they constitute neces-
sary steps.
– They satisfy a particular demand and can, thus, be separately ﬁnanced, dimin-
ishing exploration costs.
• Disclosing architectural knowledge on the interfaces, on a theoretical basis, in a way
that learning can be possible for third parties. These conditions open up a risk and an
opportunity:
196
– the opportunity for others to invest in the design, diﬀusing it and supporting
its dominance; reinforcing path dependency (Robinson et al., 2007, and others),
widening user base (Farrell and Saloner, 1986, and others) and beneﬁting from
future lock-in eﬀects (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007, and others)
– the risk that competition enters into the same market, questioning the enterprise’s
dominance, though not the design (this potential will be discussed in the next
Section).
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10.3 Market emergence. Entrepreneurship and
enterprises: early production systematisation,
innovation and marketing.
According to Suárez and Utterback (1995):
A dominant design has the effect of enforcing standardization so that production
economies can be sought.
The design of EDVAC was not in position to produce eﬀects of an economy of scale.
However, it served as a reference for the early user-developer-entrepreneurs to further explore
and develop computers.
Still, despite the fact that they shared the same design principles, the path from EDVAC
(a university project having the army as its client) to UNIVAC (a commercial computer of
which the success was uncertain at that time) was not linear. Back then, imagining that
there could be other classes of clients for computers beyond the Army was rather audacious.
Besides, in what concerns the business trajectory having as a sole client the U.S. Defence
Department - being thus a monopsony - it went on until our days26, proving that it generally
was less a risky choice for an entrepreneur to stay in military equipment business. Thus, in
UNIVAC ’s case, Mauchly and Eckert had to invent a new commercial market, and to prove
that a universal computer product business was feasible. Moreover, while the EDVAC project
had already explored the principal attributes of a universal computer, UNIVAC (initially called
by its designers EDVAC II), had to be re-designed in parallel with the emergence of the
computer industry to ﬁt its speciﬁc needs. The ﬁrst commercial computer was eventually
delivered by Remington Rand in 1951, an enterprise that acquired Eckert and Mauchly’s
company.
However, from 1946 to 1951, various steps were to be followed by the two entrepreneurs to
arrive to their objective. A look into this very process can provide us with precious insights for
its speciﬁc needs, as the model of start-up acquisitions still constitutes a business expansion
mode regarding the Web platforms sector.
10.3.1 Other materialisations and the limits of UDEs
In 1947, EMCC signed a contract with the Northrop Aircraft Company of Hawthorne, Cal-
ifornia for a small-scale computer, called BINAC (Binary Automatic Computer). A few
months earlier, Northrop had hired Mauchly as a consultant to explore the adaptability of
electronic digital equipment to suit its needs27. It was to be a single-purpose computer,
for in-ﬂight navigational control of missiles28. Yet, for Eckert and Mauchly the project was
another case of an intermediary product, a necessary step towards UNIVAC - though their
client wasn’t aware of it. BINAC incorporated innovations such as the stored program as the
use of magnetic tape as a data substract (initially similar to the one used in taper recorders,
later, in UNIVAC, replaced with a more reliable tape treated with an iron oxide coating)29.
26See for instance Ceruzzi (2008).
27Stern (1979).
28Stern (1979).
29Ibid.
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Ultimately, the result exceeded the requirements of the contract in terms of design. Nev-
ertheless the artefact presented defections30. On the one hand, its manufacturing quality was
heavily criticised, on the other hand its complexity and novelty made it diﬃcult for Northrop
engineers to re-assemble. Concerning their contract, which described the expectations the
client had from the provider, it did not clarify whether or not the equipment’s construction
should also be rigid31. The client asked for additional technical support, yet EMCC was
instead invested in the building of UNIVAC 32. Eventually BINAC wasn’t ever put into use
and Eckert and Mauchly focused all of their technical attention on completion of the six
UNIVACs which were on order (three for the government, one for the Prudential Insurance
Company, and two for the A.C. Nielsen Company 33).
While this product met the intermediary design goals set and brought the two en-
trepreneurs a step closer to their ﬁnal product design, it exceeded the anticipated exploratory
costs: while the computer was contracted for $100 000, its development costed about $278
00034, putting both EMCC ’s and UNIVAC ’s future in question.
10.3.2 Acquisition and further developments
During the late 40’s, the start-up, despite a considerable progress both in the development of
the technology; market exploration and contracts, was confronted with a debt accumulation.
So, the company was acquired by Remington Rand35.
Remington Rand re-negotiated the contracts signed by EMCC by augmenting the price.
The ﬁrst UNIVAC was delivered to the Census Bureau and many corporation clients followed.
UNIVAC was rent at a monthly cost of $ 22 41036.
Large scale production of computers implied an industrial challenge which needed an
important production experience to undertake. Actually, completing such a task was an
argument for Remington Rand to use in its marketing37. Early steps of computer modularity
30In particular, the computer worked during the demonstration in EMCC ’s headquarters in Philadelphia,
yet it didn’t work when moved to California.
31Ibid.
32Stern (1979).
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35Remington Rand had been active in the typewriting machines since the 19th century and had undergone
many organisational and market challenges, arriving to a reinforce its market position after the WW II, also
having close ties with military and the Manhattan Project. Being one of the major suppliers of oﬃce
machinery during those years on an international level, Remington Rand had both the network and the
experience to support a commercial computer, as a new product of enterprise machinery. See for instance
Cortada (2000); Stern (1979); Schlombs (2008).
36Speciﬁcally in Europe, where the computers capacities were way beyond enterprises needs, Remington
Rand followed a diﬀerent business model. They created a computing centre in Frankfurt and rented time to
European customers (on hourly basis), provided professional personnel for programming jobs, and trained
company employees (Schlombs, 2008) .
37In a UNIVAC commercial ﬂyer, the enterprise presents this challenges as follows:
There are 975,000 parts in each Univac, ranging from tiny crystal diodes to the sturdy beams
that support the computer frame. This equipment is the most complex ever built, involving
intricate scheduling of parts and careful coordination of complicated workloads. These prob-
lems and the layout of production and assembly areas have all been carefully worked out to
enable Remington Rand to keep pace with the ever-increasing demand for Univac Systems.
The same ﬂyer mentioned that components were manufactured by “experienced craftsmen”. However, the
fact that these craftsmen were women and, by that time, women labour was largely un-qualiﬁed, illustrates
that an advanced rationalisation of this work had been undertaken. For instance, in the case of the semi-
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for the needs of mass production had also been undertaken, with “small, removable service
units called ‘chassis,’ many of which are interchangeable” and can be replaced in case of
defection. . However, it was not until the 1960’s and IBM System/360 that modularisation
became a complete managerial method in computer industry.
Since the two developer-entrepreneurs set up their company, EMCC, and started devel-
oping their computer, one of their ﬁrst preoccupations had been to provide new users with
applications as well as tools to build their own. Of course, in both cases, user training
has been thought as a requirement for the business to operate. While user training was a
business practice already met during the 1930s in the domain of administration machinery,
enabling users to build their own extensions was a novel concept.
In the case of UNIVAC, user innovation (von Hippel, 1986) was not only something that
‘could happen’, it was a user potential designed by the company, providing speciﬁc means for
users to extend it (something that von Hippel and Katz (2002) would call toolkits for user
innovation). UNIVAC eventually was an open product (Chrysos et al., 2010), prescribing
speciﬁc uses while enabling user-developers to create their own, secondary products.
This dual relation between (manufacturer) enterprise and (enterprise) user, characterised
by product-related knowledge diﬀusion, on the one hand, and a product extension on the
other has since marked the development of this particular industry.
To that aim, EMCC acted on two levels. Firstly, Mauchly created a speciﬁc department
charged with the development of applications for the UNIVAC, as well as the development
of what we would call today software tools. Applications were focussed to speciﬁc, identiﬁed
market niches (such as payrolls). Software tools were addressed to enterprises that could use
the computer as a platform to create their own applications. Many of the people employed
for this task had already worked for the ENIAC project, and organised their work through
design conferences38.
Provided that Mauchly himself had taken the responsibility of commercial research, the
activities of this engineering design group were twofold:
• satisfying the requests of potential customers for speciﬁc applications and tools (such
as building task-speciﬁc applications, like payrolls, procedural ﬂows, accounting and
purchasing).
• extending the design of the computer39.
However, as already mentioned, EMCC did not manage to sell any UNIVAC computer
before being acquired. On the organisational level, one of the ﬁrst actions of Remington
Rand was to build a commercial-engineering support department. This department produced
a documentation of the computer, trained and assisted the clients. Ultimately, this depart-
ment was merged with the engineering design department Eckert and Mauchly had already
developed, as an in-depth knowledge of UNIVAC’s structure was necessary in order for the
conductor industry which emerged about a decade later, the introduction of women labour in the production
signiﬁed its rationalisation by dividing work in simple tasks that non-qualiﬁed workers could perform, after a
training conceived by the enterprise, namely the Fairchild Semiconductors. See Lecuyer (2006); Weil (2010).
38During the “design conferences” of the staﬀ many decisions on the features of the computer and, thus,
the research questions to address, were made. Norberg (2003).) mentions the Conference on the EDVAC II
Design that took place in March 1947, where a series of design issues emerged, building up an agenda for
the year to follow.
39Norberg (2003).
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advices to clients to be eﬃcient. Internal engineers’ conferences continued to go on, and the
enterprise came up with some important extensions of the initial computer 40.
10.3.3 Discussion. Market emergence: a return to the platform
debate: extension design and organisation.
Ceruzzi summarized the period we examined as follows:
Commercial computing got off to a shaky start in the early 1950s, Eckert and
Mauchly, who had a clear vision of its potential, had to sell their business to
Remington Rand to survive. Remington Rand however did not fully understand
what it had bought. IBM knew that computers were something to be involved
with but it was not sure how these expensive and complex machines might fit
into its successful line of tabulating equipment (Ceruzzi, 2003, p. 45).
To proceed to the commercialisation of their computer, Mauchly and Eckert were based
in the initial UD circles in diﬀerent ways: the used it as a pool for developers recruitment
and as a pool for their ﬁrst clients (computer early adopters). Moreover, keeping up with
the concept of a universal computer, they design early on its extension, by speciﬁc tools and
applications for its user-developers.
However, the transition from user-developers to developer-entrepreneurs required the
compliance to those early adopters. In particular, a robustness equivalent to the ones of
existing machines was attended. For that, an industrial production of the computers was
required, something that Remington Rand eventually undertook. Still, the two developers
continued their work within this enterprise, organising the interaction with the early adopters.
This way, the computer concept passed from a user to a manufacturer innovation model
(Raasch and von Hippel, 2012). Still, this passage did not mean a transition to an era of
innovation diﬀusion (Rogers, 1962; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012): additional innovation
were required for this transition to become possible (such as the keyboard input) while yet
many more were to follow. The business rationale of this transition is outlined in Table 10.3.
The phase of market emergence marked the evolution of the computer industry at the
following levels:
• It provided it with the general principles, the main functions of a computer, as de-
scribed by von Neumann (processing unit, memory, stored program, input/output),
the functional design according to Pahl et al. (2007), where the main ‘tasks’ of a
computer system were deﬁned and which would be the reference of the industry for
the years to come.
• It provided an initial model of design extension, providing task-speciﬁc application as
well as generic tools for the construction of new ones.
• It provided a labour design, resulting from the design of use that would dominate
the industry for decades. Valid for the use case of the Census Bureau, it consisted
in a sequential use of the elements of the computer (program development, input,
processing, output), that was crystallized by a centralised organisation of computer
40This team further advanced the the UNITYPER (an input keyboard that looked much like a typing
machine), developed a card-to-tape converter (enabling the transformation of data that written in punched
cards to magnetic tape format) as well as printers (Norberg, 2003).
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operations, having at its centre what were known as the ‘clerks’, controlling the input
and the output of the computer and its peripheral actors, namely the programmers.
• It linked computer production with previous equipment industry. This link provided
robust business methods to the industry-to-be (such as marketing, customer support
as well as machinery manufacturing), of which the relevance to the new object was
however later to be questioned.
One could claim that through the acquisition of EMCC, Remington Rand managed not
to be disrupted (Christensen, 1997) by the computer innovation. However, much remained
yet to be invented, in order for the actors of the ﬁeld to be in position to understand the
potential of this new object.
10.4 Foggy competition: business ecosystem creation,
design experimentations
In this section we are going to study the ﬁrst period of computer business growth, when com-
mercial computers started being introduced to the market. We are interested in conﬁguring
the “computer value” promotion and exploitation, as well as the conditions for this.
Eckert and Mauchly managed to establish a reference design, whilst pioneering in the
emergence of the commercial computer industry41. Von Neumann played a crucial role in
this process, by producing the theory behind the architecture, as both his Draft report on the
EDVAC and his book on computer engineering became the standard reference for computer
science for years to come. One shouldn’t neglect the fact that this architecture was also
used for the computers of the Manhattan Project.
This does not mean that, once the possibility of a market for computers was veriﬁed with
the delivery of the ﬁrst UNIVAC, other architectures did not emerge. In fact an important
number of diﬀerent computer architectures emerged during the 1950s42. Yet, EDVAC had
already been the reference point for both learning and developing computer systems: the
common knowledge base of the early computer history was built according to its architecture,
while the production systematisation process followed by Remington Rand had diminished
the cost by a signiﬁcant level. By the end of the 1960s, 6000 general-purpose electronic
computers were installed in the U.S.A, nearly all of them being descendants of the EDVAC
computer43.
From 1951 when the ﬁrst UNIVAC was delivered by Remington Rand to the Census
Bureau to the mid-50’s, the environment had radically changed:
• Von Neumann’s theory had contributed in the rationalisation of computer science itself,
allowing computer science to be taught in Universities as such.
• UNIVAC had illustrated not only that a market for commercial computers existed, but
that computers could provide great productivity growth in a series of organisational
and industrial activities.
41We should note that, at this level, we cannot refer to a dominant design (Abernathy and Townsend,
1975; Abernathy and Clark, 1985), since there has been no market in which to dominate.
42For instance the BIZMAC computer by RCA (Ceruzzi, 2003, p. 56), which included important architec-
tural innovations though didn’t meet a commercial success.
43Ceruzzi (2003, p. 58)
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• Diﬀerent enterprises had entered the market, exploring diﬀerent technological trajec-
tories, always having one foot in the military and the other in commercial markets.
UNIVAC had become the synonym fom computer, gaining ground in the public opinion
as the technology of the future44 and had illustrated the potential of this new product.
Moreover, the introduction of computers in the industry passed from the large scale use
of UNIVAC in General Electric : payroll, material scheduling and inventory control, order
service and billing, as well as general cost accounting were among the ﬁrst tasks that were
‘automated’ within the enterprise by the use of computers. Besides, as Ceruzzi notes,
the spirit of automation, popularised by John Diebold (1959), was inspiring the industrial
transformations of the time45.
During the early years of the 1950s computers appeared as ‘special’ enterprise equipment
in the pre-existing market of business machinery. In this context, the product systematisation
we have seen in the previous section mainly concerned the rules of construction and less
the identity, the design of the object. At the end of that decade, common performance
criteria were established and society, businesses as well as computer manufacturers themselves
all realised the great potential of these devices. Similar to the role of Diesel’s engine,
which opened up a new industrial era and established petrol as a “universal value” for the
economy, computers in the 1960s were transformed from enterprise tools to the engines of
the information economy46.
During the 1950s, with economic growth and the Cold War inﬂuencing the general busi-
ness environment, a wide range of computers and enterprises ﬂourished in the U.S. Computer
market which started to blossom, as a niche, high-tech market. Given the fact that many of
the features described by von Neumann architecture (including memory and user interface)
had yet to become robust enough for them to be suitable for a commercial market, it was
generally a decade of costly innovations that didn’t provide high revenues. Moreover, as
many historians note, the enterprises that, during this period, assumed the role of computer
production rationalisation didn’t quite well understand the speciﬁcities of this new object
and practically included it in their strategy as just another type of equipment: the potential
of computer was to be gradually explored by its same manufacturers and users. More over,
new uses - mainly the use of computers by airline companies - were to question the reference
design, on the basis of a diﬀerent labour design than the one assumed in the beginning. As
booking systems necessitate a continuous interaction of the agent with the data, the sequen-
tial design of labour in the beginning (with Input/Output being controlled by the clerks) did
not ﬁt for this new case. However, a new type of memory, easily accessible and modiﬁable
was to be invented for this purpose. While drum memories gave a ﬁrst solution, a second
one was to be introduced with the invention of the RAM and its embodiment by integrated
circuits.
In Figure 10.2 we see the revenues of selected computer and electronics manufacturing
ﬁrms in 1955. General Electric was the largest electronic equipment manufacturer in the
U.S. at the time, being at the same time the largest electronic tube supplier of IBM, with
44Two of the most notable tasks operated by UNIVAC computers, the prediction of Eisenhower’s victory
over Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election and the “complete Fiscal Budget estimate for airborne
equipment spare parts”. See Johnson (1952); Ceruzzi (2003).
45Ceruzzi (2003), p.32
46Following the spirit of Babbage and the ‘French Tables’, we could say that computers were automating
intellectual labour. This industrial trend came to join previous research in the emerging ﬁeld in computer
science and the work of Alan Turing on ‘mechanical intelligence’ and ’mind machines’. See for instance
Turing et al. (2001) and Husbands et al. (2008).
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Figure 10.2: Revenues of selected computer and electronics manufacturing ﬁrms in the
1950’s. Source: Ceruzzi (2003).
sales of almost $ billion and over 200 000 employees (compared to IBM’s sales of $461
million and 46 000 employees or Remington Rand ’s $225 million and 37 000 employees in
the same year47.
At the same time, electronic manufacturing was not synonymous to computer manufac-
turing. A fact that is little emphasised by the scholars of that period is that, from 1955
onwards, the major actors of early computer manufacturing were retired from this activity,
creating the space for new ones to emerge.
The following paragraphs will brieﬂy review the adventures of the major actors of com-
puter manufacturing during the foggy competition phase. Eventually, the commercial success
of the IBM 1401 Universal computer would trigger a great shift in the enterprise and in the
industry, illustrating the commercial potential and triggering the System 360 rationalisation
process.
10.4.1 Computers to the market (of machinery): exploring value
and technologies
Remington Rand: constructing the enterprise computer value
A look into the way Remington Rand marketed UNIVAC and as well as the way IBM
re-designed the computer will allow us to understand the transformation of the business
environment and the breakthrough from a technical substratum to an engine of the new
economy.
Although Mauchly undertook market studies at a very early stage of their endeavour,
relations with enterprises and marketing were part of Remington Rand ’s business expertise
47Ceruzzi (2003, pp 54-55).
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that the two entrepreneurs could not reach.
In Remington Rand ’s commercial campaign for UNIVAC we can identify the core business
models that accompanied the ﬁrst era of the commercial computer.
A ﬁlm produced by Remington Rand in 1955 describes the value added by the installation
of the computer within the enterprise, using the enterprise-centric performance criteria, values
related to the tasks of the employees and management48. In the same ﬁlm, Remington
Rand describes how the installation of a computer within an enterprise takes place. Their
description on payroll automation illustrates a reﬂection on the task-related operations in
order for them to be automated49.
UNIVAC was either sold (at the price of one million dollars) or leased. In both cases,
Remington Rand assured technical support for its clients50.
A new actor: the early role of IBM
As we already have mentioned, one of the characteristics of this design was the existence of
internally stored programs, what gave birth to software. In fact, the hardware standardisation
that was imposed by the initial inﬂuence of the EDVAC design in the early market, opened
the way to the software expansion. Yet, it was not Remington Rand who exploited in the
best way this new potential.
One year after the ﬁrst UNIVAC’s delivery, IBM announced the 701, a stored-program
computer (called “electronic data processing machine”) in the same class. The ﬁrst shipment
48In this ﬁlm, UNIVAC is described as follows:
A complete electronic system for sorting, classifying, computing and decision making.
The same value representation was also marketed in the ﬁlm by the use of their ﬁrst contract with the
Census Bureau for marketing end:
UNIVAC is handling automatically and economically unbelievable volumes of statistical work
for the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Work that formely took weeks and months to do, is now
being done in a matter of hours by UNIVAC.
Remington-Rand Presents the Univac, Duration: 17:31, in 2:06 and in 2:20.
49The ﬁlm mentions characteristically:
Prior to the actual installation, a team of programmers assists in making a complete analysis
of the factory’s pay system. Breaking it down into piecework, hourly pay rate, salaries and
commissions and other classiﬁcations. They provide for overtime rates, tax deductions of all
the many variations, social security deductions, insurance deductions, union dues and anything
else that aﬀects an individual pay record. Once the necessary tapes have been recorded,
and placed on UNISERVOS, the payroll operations become automatic, simply a matter of
processing data through UNIVAC. In less than four hours per week and with only a small
operating staﬀ, UNIVAC can complete the computation for this payroll for 15 000 employees.
A saving in time and money that is tremendous
Film, op.cit., min. 13:10.
50Here is how UNIVAC’s renting model was described by an advertising ﬂyer of the 1950s :
You and your company can proﬁt from this experience in either of two ways: First, if you want
to explore the possibility of purchasing or renting a computer for full-time use, Remington
Rand oﬀers a series of training courses in electronic computing equipment. Second, if you
have an immediate application for the Univac System which can be handled by occasional
use, Univac equipment and personnel are available through our Computer Center services.
Operating 24 hours a day on a contract basis, these services are currently being used by
business, industry, and government to solve all types of data-processing problems.
UNIVAC System, Remington Rand Rand, INC, 1955, p. 10.
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of the 701 outside IBM was to the nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos in 1953. It
was based on an advanced design of a computer built by von Neumann - who became its
consultant - in the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton51.
The IBM 701 was known as Defence Calculator within the enterprise, illustrating its
perceived market. In fact all of the 19 models were installed either for the U.S. Defence
Department or military aerospace ﬁrms52. However, as Ceruzzi reports, IBM 701 was used for
similar tasks as the ones the UNIVAC was performing: logistics for a military agency, ﬁnancial
reports, actuarial reports, payrolls. Moreover, the development of FORTRAN programming
language by IBM for arithmetical calculations, opened the way towards software 53.
While, as we already mentioned UNIVAC could be bought (at the price of one million
dollars), IBM followed a rent-only business model for its 701 (with initial rental fees at $15
000 a month)54. However, the enterprise had already been condemned by the U.S. Justice
Department, which had alleged that it violated anti-trust laws in conducting its punch card
business (before entering the electronic computer market). Thus, a new business model was
“forced” to IBM, with companies buying its computers and selling their services55.
IBM engaged in a process of computer evolution on the basis of its 701. However, as
Usselman (2007) comments, even with a rental price of thirty thousand dollars per month,
the 705 could never generate substantial revenue, as the enterprises where not ready to
implement computer technology.
Overall, this period was not limited in the diﬀusion of an innovation, the computer, by
the enterprises. Many elements were yet to be invented, while both commercial opportunities
and technological potential were explored. Either directly, or indirectly, those participating
in the early user-developer circles around the developers of the ENIAC.
Remington Rand’s inability to follow up innovation.
In the middle of the 1950s, Remington Rand had serious problems in coordinating its diﬀerent
departments, and speciﬁcally research. After IBM’s entry to the game, and while having
installed about 700 computers, Remington Rand merged with Sperry, and then was acquired
by the latter to form Sperry Rand.56
Sperry was an enterprise that had been very active in gyroscopes and radar technologies
since the 1910s, and thus had an extensive experience with tube-based electronic devices.
51Ceruzzi (2003, p. 34)
52Ceruzzi (2003, p. 35)
53Another computer language was textitCOBOL developed by the American Ministry of Defence as a
standard for business computing), providing a design space to customers. Enterprises could thus build their
own programs, using the language delivered along with the computer by the provider. There is an interesting
parameter on the etymology of the words “software” and “language”. Ceruzzi mentions:
The word “software” [compared to the word “language”] has less to do with its physical form
than with its changeability and intimate connection with the system’s purpose, supplied by
the computer user (Ceruzzi, 1989, p. 198).
On the other hand, COBOL - Common Business Oriented Language was imposed as a standard by the
U.S. government in order to allow managers to program. The debate of “high-level” languages, trying to
immitate human language and, thus, reduce the level of expertise needed to access the development process
always remains critical.
54Ceruzzi (2003, p. 35)
55Ceruzzi (2003, pp. 67-68)
56Gray and Smith (2004).
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Through various re-organisations, Sperry Rand didn’t manage to follow the way to suc-
cess, mainly for two major misses:
• Reference architecture: The successors of UNIVAC, Univac File Computer (UFC) line,
broke from the von Neumann architecture57 of a ‘universal’ computer. At the same
time, IBM developed the FORTAN language for its 701.
• Expertise: given that electronic tubes had been a mature technology, already mastered
by Sperry, moving away from it and following the semi-conductors revolution was rather
diﬃcult.
These two mistakes had been, as we will see, the most common for the industries of the
time. Sperry Rand eventually managed to survive thanks to a late entry into transistorised
computers, that assured the company’s transition to the new era, although it had great
diﬃculties keeping up with production, research and support for the previous generation.
General Electric: not entering the market of commercial computers.
General Electric produced a commercial computer in the late 1950’s, called ERMA (Elec-
tronic Recording Machine Accounting), a system developed along with the Stanford Research
Institute and the Bank of America. ERMA computer was one of the ﬁrst to be “transis-
torised”, that is, to use the semi-conductor technology developed in late 1940s by Bell Labs
and commercialised during the 1950s.
However, GE’s management was not interested in entering the commercial computer
market, as they decided to concentrate on projects such as jet engines and nuclear power58.
In fact, at the time the computer market was hardly proﬁtable and existed only as a com-
plementary product to equipment businesses.
AT& T (Western Electric): opening the space for a new market.
Western Electric was the manufacturing arm of AT&T. The company was however a reg-
ulated monopoly and excluded from the computer market. As Ceruzzi (2003) notes, the
company had enough business installing telephones in the booming postwar suburbs. After
seven years of litigation, the company settled a lawsuit brought by the U.S. Justice de-
partment in 1956 and applied from 1958 and thereafter, according to which AT&T was
prohibited:
from engaging in any business other than provision of common carrier com-
munication services; prohibited Western Electrics from manufacturing types of
equipment other than those sold to AT& T for use in furnishing common carrier
communication services; and required licensing of certain AT& T patents (Enis
and Sullivan, 1985, p. 127).
From this moment on, there were two parallel processes: on the one hand, AT&T was
forced to diﬀuse the knowledge about semi-conductors.For this, they organised a conference
between the licensees to share their knowledge. In this context, the research results were also
57UFC didn’t support stored programs, thus had similar problems with the ENIAC in programming Gray
and Smith (2004).
58Ibid.
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diﬀused. As Gordon Moore, the founder of Intel as well as the “Law Moore” on semiconduc-
tors recalled, this was the starting point for Fairchild Semiconductors manufacturing ratio-
nalisation process. Characteristically, in his paper for Bell Labs Journal, Morris Tanenbaum,
the inventor of the ﬁrst silicon transistor, along with his colleague, Thomas,(Tanenbaum and
Thomas, 1956) described the transistor fabrication processes, its electrical characteristics,
the properties of its structure and the rules of calculation of its design parameters.
On the other hand, Bell Labs continued producing computers, mainly for their telecom-
munication network, beyond some military projects. Through this internal network, some
years later, the UNIX system was to emerge, which was to mark the beginning of the history
of the internet.
RCA: a media actor entering the computer industry.
RCA (Radio Corporation of America) was an enterprise created in the aftermath of WWI,
in the framework of the competition between U.S. and English businesses.It had been a
subsidiary enterprise of AT& T that during the 1920s was delegated radio stations, while
the latter obtained the control of telecommunication networks. GE and Westinghouse were
also shareholders of this enterprise, while the American administration was represented in
the ﬁrm’s council (Flichy, 1991). In fact, RCA was created after WWI as a patent-pooling
enterprise, to oblige the diﬀerent actors to engage in a cross-licensing strategy, in order for
the national telecommunications to evolve, suspending the standards war between the two
enterprises (for the latter see Shapiro and Varian (1999a)).
Hence, RCA continued as an autonomous enterprise, active in radio and soon, the tele-
vision network, becoming one of the major electronic tubes manufacturers. That had placed
it in an important position concerning the use of vacuum tubes, elementary components of
electronic computers, before the dominance of silicon transistors.
RCA entered the computer market in the early 1950s, focussing on core memory. While
innovative, with the ﬁrst commercial computer being BIZMAC, the new architectural charac-
teristics didn’t manage to compete with others as textitspeed was already a well-established
performance criterion, and BIZMAC was slower.
The following RCA computers (RCA 301 and RCA 501) also followed the von Neumann
architecture.
National Cash Register: computer assembling
National Cash Register (NCR) had been a company specialising in the manufacturing of cash
registers since the end of the 19th century, having a dominant place in the market during
the 1920s. This case has been studies as an example illustrating the need for enterprise
“dynamic capabilities” by Rosenbloom (2000), as a company that managed to “survive the
waves of change”.
During the 1950s, its activity included three product lines: register, accounting and
adding machines59.
It was in the niche of accounting machines that NCR felt the pressure of the computer’s
introduction. In 1952, it began its entry into this market by acquiring Computer Research
Corporation (CRC)60, a company that had been founded by former Northrop employees.
59Mueller (1953).
60Expanding national cash acquires electronic computing machinery plant. (1952). Journal of Accoun-
tancy (Pre-1986), 94(000006), p. 739.
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This company was integrated into the pre-existing “Product Development Department” of
NCR, having as a function the deﬁnition of questions for the Research and Development
department (Rosenbloom, 2000).
A major strategical move was the introduction of the Class 31 “electromechanical ac-
counting machine”, described at that time as:
a combination of an electric typewriter and accounting machine (Mueller, 1953).
This machine, not only would operate as an accounting machine but would be the
interface for the diﬀerent computers to be launched at the suite.
In 1954 it sold its ﬁrst computer, based on the work of CRC, of which the staﬀ had grown
to 360 employees (85 in engineering, 186 in manufacturing), a relatively small number, if we
consider that the company had 45 000 employees worldwide in manufacturing at that time
(Rosenbloom, 2000).
However, NCR was the only company of which the computers were assembled by others
Krickx (1995). Having participated in the ERMA project along with GE, an agreement
emerged according to which:
GE would build the central processor and the memory for both companies and
would buy high-speed card-readers, printers and other peripherals produced by
NCR (Rosenbloom, 2000, p. 1090).
This agreement was based on the previous market context and, thus, division of labour,
according to which GE was an expert in electronics (tubes) while NCR was an expert in
printers (ink), an agreement that frustrated CRC ’s founder, now working for NCR, who felt
it “taught GE everything it knew about computer design” (Rosenbloom, 2000, p. 1090).
While at the time computers represented a small fraction of the revenue of NCR (about
2%), the fact that it didn’t manufacture computers itself would render its manufacturing ca-
pacities, at one time its strongest advantage, obsolete. The ﬁrm, after many re-organisations
and market pressures, managed to transform its manufacturing capacity for the electronic
computer production era in the late 1970s.
Honeywell and Raytheon: the “multi-purpose” enterprise
Raytheon was one of the largest electronic tube manufacturers back in the 1930s. Raytheon
was engaged in the design process within the project “Hurricane”, in 1950, the object of
which was to track and control ballistic missiles61, though was characterised by an openness
on exploring and exploting new concepts62.
Regarding the computer Raytheon had to deliver for the project “Hurricane” (the RAY-
DAC, for Raytheon Digital Automatic Computer), which followed ENIAC ’s design, had how-
ever advanced features in data storage and error checking. Delivered in 1952, it was too slow
for real-time missile guidance and tracking, and was thus considered a failure63.The project
however provided the functional requirements for the next one (leading to SAGE, discussed
61Ceruzzi (1989); Valley Jr (1985).
62Typically, during the research in micro-waves, that had already started already in 1945, a Raytheon
employee, Percy L. Spencer, by stepping close to the micro-wave device (the magnetron tube), observed
that the chocolate he had in his pocket melted. That was the beginning of the micro-wave oven concept,
that Raytheon got to the market, supporting Spencer’s accidental experience and idea (Singer and Piluso,
2010)
63Ceruzzi (1989, p. 58)
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in the next section), however Raytheon’s computer division was acquired by Honeywell a
couple of years later64. Raytheon itself continued in the missile technology market.
Honeywell was event before WWII an industry that managed to combine diﬀerent market
lineages on the basis of its competencies. While heavily engaged in military projects, it was
also active in markets such as home equipment65.
When, in 1957, it oﬀered a computer to the market (the Datamatic 1000), its design
was already obsolete. It used vacuum tubes, whereas it had to be clear that transistors could
be used for commercial computers66.
Honeywell would return to the commercial computer market after acquiring Computer
Controls Corporation (3C), in 1966. 3C had be founded by RAYDAC ’s designers, among
whom Louis Fein67 was the one who coined the term “computer science” (Fein, 1959, 1961).
The importance of 3C ’s computers did not lie in their market position, but in the fact that
they were later chosen for the ARPA project, because of their design.
Burroughs Corporation
Burroughs had started as a calculator company in the beginnings of the 20th century, and
diversiﬁed its oﬀerings to business equipment (mainly ﬁnance) until WWII68, while it had
knowledge on the design of the ENIAC memory69. The enterprise’s activity was mainly axed
towards military projects70.
The machine it oﬀered was the E-101, introduced into the market in 195471 at a low
price, for about $35 000. However, its design did not follow the von Neumann architecture
as it lacked a stored-program part72. Moreover, like other computers of the time, it applied
a speciﬁc memory technology (the magnetic drum)73, that hampered its speed. This “jump”
towards a diﬀerent kind of memory was not by chance: magnetic drum memory presented the
virtue of enabling an “online” computer operation, that is the possibility to manipulate data
in “real time”, while the program was under execution. Practically, this design parameter
could be used to address the requirements of “dynamic” ticket booking. As it was proven by
the facts, Burroughs did not manage to advance this technology, while the market demand
was already there. Hence, it was a typical case of a “jump”, as opposed to the “disruption”,
where technology exists but market demand does not.
However, Burroughs remained in the computer industry, managing to develop its ex-
pertise through military contracts, mainly the SAGE and the Atlas intercontinental ballistic
programs74. Burroughs also introduced an innovative design of a transistorised computer
64Ceruzzi (2003, p. 54).
65For instance, the initial core competencies of the enterprise being .in eating and industrial-process control
equipment, the enterprise was active both in military instruments and home thermostats (Kita, 2009, p. 77).
66Ceruzzi, op.cit.
67National Museum of American History (U.S.). (1969). Computer Oral History Collection.
68Gray and Smith (2003).
69According to Ceruzzi Burroughs Corporation had designed the memory for ENIAC Ceruzzi (2003, p. 50).
However, Gray and Smith (2003) are more analytical on this aspect: Burroughs had hired Moore’s School
Electrical Engineer Professor Irven Travis, who was implied in the ENIAC project, and with whom Eckert
and Mauchly had argued on the patent issue.
70Gray and Smith (2003).
71Koss (2003).
72Caillaud and Jullien (2003, p. 67)
73Koss (2003, p. 43).
74Ceruzzi (2003, p. 67).
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quite late, in 196375.
IBM: the beginnings of the dominance.
One of the major computer projects during the 1950s was the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground
Environment) project. The SAGE computer was the “nerve centre for a complex system
of radar installations, aircraft, ships and command centers”76. The ﬁrst computer for the
system was delivered in 195677, while the system became fully operational in 196378. It
remained functional until 1983, while its overall cost was $8 billion, of which half a billion
revenue was generated for IBM in the 1950s79.
Its design followed the one of Whirlwind, a descendant of ENIAC developed by MIT
Lincoln Lab, which, given the experience of RAYDAC had a very fast memory. Without
going into details, we should note that this computer was the only one to achieve a fast
magnetic drum memory.
The property of this technology was to enable an interactive, command and control
mechanism, as users (usually non-computer specialists of the military) could interact with
it by a “touch screen” (input-output screen)80. Eventually, IBM’s engineers replaced drum
memory with a disk drive, which has continued until today as RAM (Random Access Memory)
- the name signifying the direct ability to access any piece of data.
The breakthrough of IBM in the commercial marketwas with the IBM 1401, following
the “universal computer” architecture, in 1959. At that time, semi-conductors technology
was mature enough, and Fairchild Semi-conductors in the Silicon Valley had already been
proven to be a reliable partner81.
While the number of previous models installations (UNIVACs and 701s) was thirty to
forty, eventually over ten thousand 1401s were installed82.
At the time, IBM made available various computer models (IBM 650, IBM 1401, IBM
7070-7074, IBM 702-705-7080, IBM 701-704-709-7090, IBM 7030), incompatible with each
other. By the initiatives of Donald Spaulding (corporate technical staffer) and T.V. Learson
(vice president), a corporate - wide strategy committee was convened, under the leadership
of John Haanstra, responsible for the 1401 product line83. Their report, in 1961, called for a
New Product Line that would be a success for all existing product lines84. A corporate-wide
eﬀort then began, described by Baldwin and Clark (2000) as modularisation, that eventually
marked the company’s as well as the industry’s future.
10.4.2 Discussion. Foggy competition: Producing and marketing
while exploring its identity.
He now came to a road branching in four directions, and immediately
he was reminded of those cross-roads where knights-errant used to stop
75Gray and Smith (2003).
76Ceruzzi (1989, p. 70).
77Ceruzzi (2003).
78Ceruzzi (1989, p. 71).
79Ceruzzi (1989, 2003).
80Ibid.
81Ceruzzi (2003); Lecuyer (2006).
82Ceruzzi (2003, p. 75).
83Brooks (2010, p. 316).
84Ibid.
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to consider which road they should take. In imitation of them he
halted for a while, and after having deeply considered it, he gave
Rocinante his head, submitting his own will to that of his hack, who
followed out his first intention, which was to make straight for his
own stable.
Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote.
Like Don Quixote, enterprises are often found in crossroads leading to unknown directions,
once ﬁnding themselves in an environment of foggy competition. Like Rocinante, Don
Quixote’s horse, they may choose to return to their stable, their ﬁeld of expertise and
speciﬁc market. However, in Cervantes’ book, the choice to return home did not prove to
be the safest, as Don Quixote met one of his most painful experiences on the way home.
Louis Fein, the man who coined the term “Computer Science”, a consultant of Stanford
University during the late 1950s and one of the ﬁrst to found a Computer Science School,
reported in his article on “The role of the University in Computers, Data Processing, and
Related Fields” on the situation during that period:
Today, one can sometimes scarcely identify teachers, researchers, designers, and
development people as members of a university, industry, or government, for
each is involved to a considerable extent with all three. (Fein, 1959, p. 120).
He summarized the period we studied in this chapter as follows:
...the government has set up RAND Corporation(s) for research and project
work; it has set up and supported institutes at universities for research and
project work; it has indirectly supported development, if not exploratory work, it
these fields as by-products of government contracts to industry.
Industry and business have set up separate departments charged with overall
responsibility of applying these techniques to company operation, management,
design, manufacturing, sales, etc. Graduate-level schools for instruction of pro-
fessionals in these fields are being run by industry itself.
The scholars and practitioners in these new fields are uncertain both as to the
nature and structure of the fields and their relation to each other. As would be
expected, new societies and magazines devoted to these fields have sprung up.
He then stressed in his article the importance of IBM education programs for Universities,
as well as the need to form autonomous computer science departments.
We could describe the period of Foggy Competition as a dialogue between enterprises
and society. Enterprises propose diﬀerent versions of the new, while society declares its
preferences. The case of what ended up as being RAM is very characteristic: a series of
enterprises, such as airlines, desired a feature that would provide “interactive data-bases”.
That is, they wanted to be able to modify information “online” (while the computer oper-
ated). This case was not contemplated by von Neumann, as none of the computer uses until
then had such a requirement. For instance, missile technologies, that constituted the major
innovation trajectory for the American DoD during the 1950s were content with traditional
algorithmic operations: ﬁrst the trajectory was programmed and then it was executed. After
missile launch, no modiﬁcation of the program was either necessary or desired.
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However, this way of processing did not suit the requirements of ticket booking, as one
has to consult available places (retrieve data) and reserve places (modify the data base) in
a “random” way.
For this reason, as we’ve seen, many enterprises tried to rationalise ‘drum memory’
production and liability, as it corresponded to such a requirement. Finally, IBM - having
experienced one of the rare military computers that also had a similar requirement, the
SAGE - arrived at the RAM invention that satisﬁed this requirement. RAM became thus an
integral part of the design that would dominate the market.
Similarly, while IBM had a great variety of products, after the surprising success of its
1401 model, it took the risk of re-organising its entire production facility on the basis of a
plan, of which the head was responsible for the 1401 computer.
10.5 Industrial rationalisation: IBM System 360 and
“the power of modularity”:.
The next phase in the history of computer business was introduced by IBM and its System
360 modular family of computers. By doing so, IBM not only replaced all previous product
lines with a ‘universal’ one, but it also set the standards for the entire industry. This case is
very well known in contemporary management studies, as it constituted the major case for
Baldwin and Clark’s theory of modularity. Therefore, our study on this case will be based
on their work, ‘Design Rules, The Power of Modularity’ (Baldwin and Clark, 2000).
Baldwin and Clark also place System 360 rationalisation in an historical context where
computer knowledge had already been very advanced:
By 1962, knowledge about computers had grown to the point where not only
could a list of design rules be constructed but designers could argue for and
against different choices based on experience with real machines (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000, p. 183).
Consequently, we can say that innovation on computers was not the primarily aim of the
project. The objectives of the new design addressed requirements of production rationalisa-
tion, under the imperative of product line uniﬁcation.
10.5.1 The effects of modularisation.
This product line signiﬁed a major transformation of IBM itself, which managed at the same
time to set the standards of price/performance for the entire computer industry85.
Baldwin and Clark describe the elements coming from the System 360 that assured
IBM’s dominance in the market for the years to come:
• A unified corporation and strategy, providing credibility and continuity at
an internal and external level.
• A compatible family of computers, rationalising production of different
models and giving customers the opportunity to “customise” their choice,
excluding or adding components from IBM’s list.
85Fisher et al. (1983, chap. 5).
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• A strong technical-commercial department, enduring customer relationships
and the possession of a deep knowledge of customer’s systems, assuring a
“technological follow up” by frequent system upgrades.
• A strict property model: computers could be rented, not bought. Interfaces
were proprietary (competitors could not build complements unless licensed
by IBM).
Baldwin and Clark (2000).
As we’ve already mentioned, the last point, leasing, was the “by default” business model
for IBM86 even before the computer and despite anti-trust regulations in 1954 that forced
the enterprise to sell its machines as well. In addition, the strong technical-commercial
department was also one of the historical advantages of the enterprise, too.
The novelty that System 360 achieved however was in the rationalisation of production
(according to a price/performance matrix) as well as the compatibility between diﬀerent
models. On the one hand, compatibility allowed customers to enter computing and then
upgrade their system, keeping the same software. On the other hand, it gave the possibility
for more advanced computers to be used for programming software for less advanced ones
(“downwards” compatibility)87.
Designing diﬀerent components that were reusable in other systems (compatibility) and
interchangeable in case of defectiveness, gave IBM the possibility to make important marginal
beneﬁts, during what Utterback and Abernathy (1975) would describe as a cost minimising
phase. Moreover, on the organisational level, modularisation provided IBM with a higher
capacity to organise intellectual and manual division of labour along the lines of the modu-
larised object, augmenting the expertise on each speciﬁc ﬁeld along the lines of the overall
computer architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), something that has been observed in other
industries as well (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).
Baldwin and Clark compare business in computing before and after modularisation, where
“design options” appeared, causing “the market value of design options to go up by a lot”
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 237).
However, in the framework of our research, we are interested in answering the following
question: How did this transition occurr? The answer is signiﬁcant in two ways. Firstly,
regarding our genealogy, this case can help induce the general modes of transition between a
period of competition through innovation with no clear market characteristics and the period
of a dominant design establishment. Secondly, the “design of the modularisation process”,
or “the design of the design”, as one of IBM’s chief designers of the time put it in his recent
book (Brooks, 2010), can help us understand the modularity design of contemporary Web
platforms.
Hence, we are going to revisit the case of the SPREAD (Systems Programming, Research,
Engineering and Development) Committee, which was attributed to design the new design
rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, pp. 173-194).
86Fisher et al. (1983, p. 105).
87This ability, also called emulation was to become a standard method in computing having various
implications, one of which has been the use of mainframe computers to develop software for the PC, by
emerging companies like Microsoft, in the early era of the PC (see Chapter 11). In addition, many concepts,
such as the “control program”, the heart of the operating system (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 191), were
to be transposed in the early PC platform (see Section 11.2.1), playing a decisive role in its emergence.
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10.5.2 Designing the design: the team to rationalise the industry
During the 1960s, the computer industry was to shift to another dominant design. On the
one hand, IBM advanced its production line, by modularising computer architecture and
generating the System/360 family of computers Baldwin and Clark (2000). On the other
hand, the advances in the semi-conductors led to the emergence of Silicon Valley and the
beginning of the information revolution.
IBM’s vice president, Vincent Learson, established a group of thirteen people drawn from
the company’s research, development and marketing units in 1961, forming the SPREAD
committee (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 173)88. This committee was conducted informally, as
keeping projects secret within the enterprise was one of the organisational methods followed
at the time by IBM89. However, what is surprising is the fact that we have the establishment
of an intimate environment among the designers and developers of the project. One of the
means of this, were design competitions90. This type of “rule breaking process” was oriented
towards performance optimisation, a criterion to which both the group’s composition and
schedule was subject91.
Regarding the design method itself, the group used the systematic design approach.
While the intermediary product method that emerged from the practice of Mauchly and
Eckert helped them organise the design process in their long entrepreneurial journey, a sys-
tematic design method (Le Masson et al., 2006) provided IBM with its development processes
framework since its early involvement in computer manufacturing. Moreover, even in the
case of pre-war tabulating machines, production was organised by IBM in a modular fashion
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 162).
Once IBM entered the computer market along the lines of von Neumann computer
architecture, it started standardising its diﬀerent components. Yet, after the semi-conductors
88The decision to establish this committee came about after a relative failure in the production of a
“supercomputer” or a “state-of-the-art” computer, the STRECH. It was the most powerful computer com-
mercially available at the time and helped IBM further explore the limits of computing. However, despite
major innovations that were developed and embodied in the computer, Tom Watson, Jr., IBM president,
announced that the computer would be sold at half the price projected as it didn’t meet performance criteria.
The announcement was made in the Western Joint Computer Reference, Fisher et al. (1983, p. 49).This
conference, was jointly organised by the Association for Computing Machinery, the American Institute of
Electrical Engineers, and the Institute of Radio Engineers since 1951.
89Wise (1966), Pugh (1995, p. 47).
90Brooks recalls in his book a moment where a speciﬁc design, on which the group worked for months,
didn’t meet the cost requirement. The design responsible, Amdahl, set up a competition:
I reckon the design competition, originally suggested by Gene Amdahl, to have been immensely
invigorating and fruitful. It put everyone hard to work again after a demoralizing cost estimate.
It got each person deeply involved in all aspects of the design, which greatly helped morale
and proved valuable in the later design development. It produced a consensus on many design
decisions. And it produced a good design (Brooks, 2010, p. 76). (. . . )
Amdahl’s proposal for a design competition when our ﬁrst design ran aground proved very
fruitful. It produced great concurrence on many issues, and it quickly spotlighted the crucial
diﬀerences (Brooks, 2010, p. 328).
91In fact, IBM management closely watched the project and did not hesitate to change the SPREAD
responsible, Haanstra and send the entire team to a hotel, under the new direction of Evans, to boost
the process Wise (1966). The major reason for that is reported to be the fact that Haanstra continued
supporting research on the 1401 computer, while the System 360 was to replace every previous computer
line (Pugh, 1995). However, as Brooks notes, the two years’ time provided was a comfortable time frame
for the group to experiment and prepare its report (Brooks, 2010).
218
industrial revolution, the ﬁeld was set for mass computer production92. Beginning from a
‘side project’, IBM redesigned the entire production line, transforming at the same time the
computer’s architecture, its own organisation and the market for enterprise computers.
The operation of industrial re-organisation for IBM to correspond to the demands of
productivity is described as a process of modularisation. The aim of this operation is to split
the design of reference to small tasks by establishing some common design rules (Baldwin
and Clark, 2000)93.
10.6 Cycle break: DEC’s network computer and the
birth of hackers.
DEC was created in 1957, a few years before the rationalisation of computers by IBM94.
It was founded by two MIT students, having worked on a computer named TX-0 95. This
computer was one of the ﬁrst to use transistors and was used as an auxiliary instrument
to test a bigger one. Because of its auxiliary role, its experimental nature, as well as the
mentality of MIT Lincoln Lab researchers, TX-O operation did not follow the rules already
established in the commercial computer market: students could interact with the computer
with no mediation of what became known as the ‘clerks’ (technicians charged with the
responsibility of the control of the input and output of computers)96: students could simply
sit in front of a computer and program it (instead of giving the clerks the program on a
punch card and waiting for them to return the results). Hence, they had the possibility
to ‘play’ with the computer during the nights, when it was available and be creative with
it. Programs such as games or songs were created in this context, away from the typical
trajectories of the time97.
DEC integrated this culture in its operational mode and built an original business model
out of it. As Fisher et al. (1983) note. DEC managed to be one of the principal competitors
92The emergence of the semi-conductor industry, after which Santa Clara valley was named Silicon Valley,
was a critical step in the genealogy of the computer industry. The enterprise that evaluated from a start-up
to the major actor of the industry, Fairchild Semiconductors, managed not only to take advantage of the
economical, cultural, technological and scientiﬁc traditions of the region, but also to conceive and project
the rules of the industry ever since. Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Fairchild Semiconductors and,
later, Intel, invented - amongst others - the Moore’s Law, during the early production rationalisation process.
The entire semiconductor business and the corresponding ecosystems was developed since according to this
Law, promising that the performance of a chip, measured by the number of its transistors and its speed,
doubles approximately every two years. See Freiberger and Swaine (1999); Ceruzzi (2003); Lecuyer (2006);
Weil (2010).
93We are not going to enter here the details of the IBM S/360 family development. For a detailed study,
see Baldwin and Clark (2000, pp. 169-217).
94For the rationalisation of computer manufacturing see section 10.5.
95Ceruzzi (2003, p. 243).
96During the 1960s a second kind of “computer as a service” emerged, this time in the interior of large
organisations (universities or enterprises). This was the case of the “priesthood of technicians” Ceruzzi
(2003) or “clerks” Levy (2010). Here is how Ceruzzi describes the operation of this internal service:
A typical transaction began by submitting a deck of cards to an operator through a window
(to preserve the climate control of the computer room). Sometime later, the user went to a
place where the printer output was delivered and retrieved the chunk of fan-fold paper that
contained the results of his or her job.
97Levy (1984, pp. 26-32).
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of IBM in a very speciﬁc market:
DEC marketed most of its machines announced in the 1960’s to “experienced”
and “moderately experienced” users.98
Since it did not use an “attendant staﬀ of operators”, the PDP (DEC ’s minicomputer)
was about 20 percent cheaper than the equivalent IBM’s 360/50. Moreover, DEC introduced
a decentralized way of using computers: instead of using a mainframe, one could use many
diﬀerent computers to perform the same task, at a much lower cost99.
Regarding the value exploitation method, DEC used to sell rather than lease its products.
Moreover, not only did it allowe, but it encouraged its customers to modify and extend their
machines100. To this end, it published detailed descriptions of the inner workings of its
products and distributed them widely101, unlike all other business practices of the time.
Founded in 1957 with an initial capital of $70 000 (provided by a hedge-fund ﬁrm), it had
accumulated over $3 million in retained earnings by the end of its 1964 ﬁscal year102. While
IBM imposed quasi-universal price/performance criteria in the computer industry through
its System 360 computer family, DEC inaugurated a radically diﬀerent modus operandi.
Ceruzzi notes about DEC ’s ﬁrst product, the PDP-1 :
Clearly the economics of mainframe computer usage, as practised not only at
commercial installations but also at MIT’s own mainframe facility, did not apply
to the PDP-1103.
DEC ’s products were described by the enterprise’s management as not being computers.
Fisher et al. (1983) mention characteristically that people involved in the electronic data
processing “could not believe that in 1960 computers that could do the jobs could be built
for less than $ million” (Fisher et al., 1983, p. 273). Thus, DEC ’s products were marketed
as “Programmed Data Processors (PDP)”, later called minicomputers.
While IBM’s rationalisation largely consisted in establishing standard interfaces among
well-known components (even though that task necessitated the invention of new ones), in
DEC ’s case, the components to be added by the users were unknown by deﬁnition, they
were yet-to-be-conceived. Hence, inducing interfaces from the components was impossi-
ble. Therefore, DEC introduced a ‘skeleton’, a device were future components were to be
‘plugged-in’. What was standardized in this case was the output of this device, that could be
used as a design parameter (DP) for the conception of the new components. This device,
called the bus, incorporated all the necessary knowledge for experienced users to further
expand the computer.
The ﬁrst client of DEC was a consulting company that was to play a crucial role later,
regarding the Internet, Bolt Beranek and Newman (BBN). DEC products embodied and
fostered the hacker culture. Those working on a PDP would have to discover themselves how
the minicomputer worked, write their own programs and invent their own uses. And as they
were frequently researchers, like in the MIT Lincoln Lab, they would share their knowledge
on the computers as well as their programs.
98Fisher et al. (1983, p. 278).
99Ibid.
100Ceruzzi (2003, p. 142).
101Ibid, p. 143.
102Fisher et al. (1983, p. 271-272).
103Ceruzzi (2003, p. 143).
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10.7 Conclusion
The computer has been a disruption (Christensen, 1997) for the business machinery industry.
Still, identifying a market was not the only dilemma for innovators. Until a rationalisation
was proposed by IBM, two decades after ENIAC, computers transformed business as they
themselves were being transformed.
For its developers, Mauchly and Eckert, ENIAC was proven to be an early materialisation,
allowing them to continue the eﬀort of constructing a “universal computer”. Still, once
UNIVAC got in the market, innovation diﬀusion was not just a matter of adoption, as
Rogers proposes, nor a question of user-manufacturer sticky information division.
What followed the market emergence was neither a simple adoption (Rogers, 2003)
nor a clear division between user and developer “sticky information” (von Hippel, 2005).
Technological innovations went hand in hand with computer penetration in diﬀerent use
settings. During the Foggy Competition stage, when no-one fully understood what computers
could do or what they could be, exploitation and exploration were two parallel processes,
nourishing while threatening each other.
IBM’s System 360 synthesised a long period of exploration by proposing a rationalisation
for computer production and marketing that set the standards for the industry and established
a dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). Still, DEC, still a young enterprise,
managed to survive through “turning the clock back” and opening a new cycle, by creating a
“mini-computer” for user-developers, exploiting the new technologies, theories and relations
(semiconductor, cybernetics, ARPAnet community).
As for the enterprise computer industry itself, as Baldwin and Woodard notes, “the
computer industry became more vertically disintegrated” (Baldwin and Woodard, 2010,
p. 34), with enterprises specialising in diﬀerent components of the dominant architecture.
In the following chapters the model induced for the role of user-developer-entrepreneurs
will be tested in other industrial settings, namely the personal computer and the radio
industries, attributing more emphasis to the early phases, where UDEs are found to play a
more important role.
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11.1 Introduction
The Personal Computer revolution, as it is often characterised, was based on a wide explo-
ration period during the Early Materialisation phase of the 1970s. Industrial rationalisation
came about during the early 1990s with the Wintel model, when Microsoft and Intel com-
bined allowing the sharing of their diﬀerent enterprises’ scope(Gawer and Cusumano, 2002).
Le Masson et al. (2010) note that computers - unlike watches - have undergone signiﬁcant
identity changes over time. As this chapter will show, the Wintel rationalisation managed
to propose a way to integrate not only the exploration experience of the Foggy Competition
phase, but a method for permanent identity exploration, as well. This rationalisation can
be described as an “open product” (Chrysos et al., 2010) strategy: on the one hand, task
speciﬁcity is addressed by applications. On the other hand, user and developer interfaces
assure that a wide variety of applications can be developed, exploiting the resources of the
entire computer, as produced by the coordination of industry-wide forces. The PC cycle
was disrupted (Christensen, 1997) by the Web browser application, questioning the bound-
aries of the PC, as earlier deﬁned by the Wintel model. Though Microsoft eventually won
the “browser war” (Cusumano and Yoﬃe, 1998), the new cycle of Web-based innovation
continues.
The current chapter studies the “conditions of specificity deployment possibility” (Lefeb-
vre, 2005) of the personal computer industry as we eventually have come to know it. The
separation between “technology” and “use context sticky information” (von Hippel, 1990,
1994, 2005) came about as solution to the wide diversity of use contexts explored in early
phases, that are in general included in the “personal computer” concept. Figure 11.1 provides
a synoptic schema of those trajectories.
Figure 11.1: A synoptic schema of the Personal Computer exploration trajectories.
The study of personal computer Early Materialisation phase has attracted the interest
of researchers from many diﬀerent ﬁelds. The most well-known narration of this phase is
edited by Freiberger and Swaine (2000) in their book Fire in the Valley, which includes
details on the pioneers’ private life experimentations. The speciﬁc life mode of early user-
developer communities is also highlighted by social science scholars, arguing that the role
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of the cultural atmosphere of the West Coast during the late 1960s and early 1970s was a
critical source of inspiration for those pioneers (Turner, 2006; Cardon, 2010, 2012). In fact,
the exploration of the personal computer concept required the exploration of personality, as
well. The fact that no communities of similar importance were deployed in Texas, home for
a ﬂourishing semiconductor industry and of “rocket scientists”, where the Altair computer
was “manufactured” (see paragraph 11.2.5), supports this argument.
However, what ended up being the dominant design of the PC had little to do with the
identities projected by those early communities, as Ceruzzi (2003) notes. In fact, the work
trajectory, as opposed to the home computer trajectory, was proven to be the one that could
economically support the emergence of a world industry. Still, PCs for enterprises were not
identical to enterprise computers, as the “microcomputer” concept suggested. Instead of
beginning from administration or service processes, the work trajectory remained personal,
having as its point of reference the metaphor of the employee’s “desktop”. Apple also showed
that a speciﬁc market satisfying the requirements of both leisure and work, for what are also
called “creative workers”, such as graphic designers, existed. Hence, to the extent that
computers became products, those products primarily served oﬃce related tasks.
At the same time, “desktop” computers could also be personal. That not only owed to
the cost reduction which followed the Moore’s Law for semiconductors. It was also based
on the possibility of the same computers to be extended in a variety of ways, constituting
an innovation starting point for developer-entrepreneurs and subsequently for enterprises.
Hence, computer technology itself was transformed by exploration of the personal computer
and many of these technological “disruptions” or “jumps” are to be found in the early
materialisation and the foggy competitions phases.
This chapter will thus retrace the conditions of possibility (Lefebvre, 2005) of the personal
computer industry speciﬁcities and the speciﬁc role of UDEs, focussing on the concepts that
were proven valuable for its rationalisation and using the model developed in the previous
chapter. Figure 11.2 shows a schematic outline of the PC industry’s development, in terms
of trajectories explored and the related knowledge and developer relations for the diﬀerent
phases.
Unlike the enterprise computer rationalisation, where the IBM System 360 computer
series covered the greatest part of the known market, the Wintel model rationalisation
synthesised industry-wide design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), yet the diﬀerent market
segments were to be covered by multiple enterprises, based on this model. Those enterprises
had emerged during the earlier phases of the computer industry. This model of enterprise
coordination originates from the early materialisation phase, when Do It Yourself (D.I.Y)
computers, and most importantly Altair computer developed by the MITS start-up, had
previewed hardware interfaces enabling user-developers to create their own, personal com-
puter. MITS controlled this interface, although they taught users how to use it as a basis
for their own computer creation. Microsoft emerged as a start-up to provide those users
with a software development language, opening the era of software commercialisation.
While MITS failed to scale production as the demand augmented, the IMSAI computer,
created by former IBM engineers, added a second interface, the CP/M operating system,
enabling user-developers to create and use in parallel their own software. IBM PC would
later be based on these D.I.Y. systems to deﬁne the architectural principles of its computer,
providing the possibility for Microsoft to develop and diﬀuse its own operating system, MS-
DOS, while keeping control of the hardware interface.
Foggy competition was marked by two “waves”. Initially, “IBM clones” appeared by
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“reverse engineering” the IBM PC. Those developer-entrepreneurs grew to be businesses
that deﬁned the competition in the late 1980s. Then, the commercialisation of “windows”
graphical user interfaces (GUI - initially materialised during early 1970s in Xerox PARC)
facilitated learning processes for end-users, making it possible for the PC to be sold to a
non-developer public. From 1984, when the Macintosh windows interface appeared, a set
of computer manufacturers used the same concepts for their computers. Microsoft coupled
its windows GUI with its operating system, leading the passage from “software programs”
to “applications”. MS Windows and MS DOS interfaces, while closed, enabled the activity
of third party developers thanks to the cultivation of a close relationship with software
and applications developers. Much later, Linux communities would disrupt the PC industry
through the provision of shared windows GUI and operating system interfaces (Raymond and
Young, 2001; Lee and Cole, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003a; Benkeltoum, 2008, and others).
During the late 1980s, the “gang of nine” (enterprises that had emerged by cloning
the IBM PC) questioned again the control of IBM over its product, by reverse engineering
their hardware interface. At the same time, they “set free” Intel and Microsoft, who would
from then on have a direct collaboration with those enterprises on the basis of the common
interface.
IBM’s choice to opt for the enterprise market and focus on mainframes computers left
the space for Microsoft to grow from the growing market of microcomputers. At the same
time, applications such as Office and Spreadsheet gave computers an oﬃce character that
contributed to their penetration in the business markets, while keeping the architecture open
for diﬀerent kinds of applications and markets. One of such applications, the Web browser
would later disrupt the PC industry by opening up the way for the Web (Cusumano and
Yoﬃe, 1998).
This reading suggests that a critical challenge for the PC industry has been the design of
the means of computer expansion, allowing third parties to transform the computer through
their action. More speciﬁcally, developers and end-users had been attributed a “design space”
(Hatchuel, 2001; Baldwin and Clark, 2006) of the PC through particular innovations:
• Developers were able to “plug” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) their components into
the device thanks to the BUS system, introduced in PCs during early materialisation
phase by Altair (see paragraph 11.3). Later, developers were able to create “periph-
erals”, thanks to the USB system (an “external BUS”), introduced by Apple during
the Foggy Competition phase. In parallel they could develop and use software for per-
sonal computers thanks to innovations that allowed both the use of the same piece of
software in diﬀerent computers (thanks to the BIOS) and the use of diﬀerent software
programs on the same computer (thanks to the Operating System). Finally, they could
develop applications, thanks to the rationalisation of the graphical user interface by
the windows metaphor.
• End-users were able to transform their computer by choosing diﬀerent software pro-
grams, peripherals, components and applications, when the market oﬀer grew. As
the industrial rationalisation advanced, end-users could choose only peripherals and
applications, without having, for instance, to “create” their computer by selecting the
components one by one.
227
11.1.1 Chapter Overview
Table 11.1 provides a synopsis of the current chapter, using the same categories as Table 10.1
of the Chapter 10.
Section 11.2 studies the Early Materialisations phase of the personal computer industry
through user-developers experimentations. Paragraph 11.2.1 begins by the study of early
“microcomputers” development, computers that tried to “imitate” the previous ones though
in a very small scale, using the advancements in semiconductors. Thence, the very early mi-
crocomputer operating system (OS), CP/M, developed by Gary Kildall (paragraph 11.2.1)
embodied the criteria of mainframe computers OS to the micro scale. Still, the commerciali-
sation of Intellec-8 by Intel in 1972 using it was proven too premature. In parallel, the Micral
computer in France was an ad hoc microcomputer project developed for the INRA institute
(paragraph 11.2.1) though was never seen as a personal object nor was it addressed to a
user-developer community. Alto workstation, developed in Xerox PARC by former ARPA
researchers (paragraph refsec:altoWS). While it was never commercialised, it has been the
basis for a set of early materialisations, especially regarding graphical user interfaces, that
would largely deﬁne business during the Foggy Competition phase in the 1980s. The Per-
sonal Computer concept was coined by UD-based press, as a computer to develop for one’s
own use (paragraph 11.2.3). Within this framework, the Altair D.I.Y. computer developed
and marketed to user-developers by a start-up, would become an experimentation and ex-
ploration object for those communities (paragraphs 11.2.5, 11.2.6 and 11.2.6). Many of the
concepts developed by this community would later be adopted by the IBM PC.
Section 11.3 studies the Market Emergence phase for the PC industry through user-
developer-entrepreneurs incentives. Apple I and Apple II computers, of which the designer
was part of such a PC user-developer community, would open the way to the PC commer-
cialisation, illustrating that there was a market for such an object. Still, the ﬁrst buyers of
those computers were still the UDs of the beginning. Apple collaborated with developers to
further extend its computer, while Xerox ’s investment in the start-up would be the start of
the commercialisation of a series of graphical interface materialisations. These two elements
(collaboration with developers and creation of an end-user interface) would be later proven
to be critical assets for the enterprise as well as the industry as a whole.
Section 11.4 studies the Foggy Competition phase for the PC industry. The entry of IBM
in this early market would be the beginning of the parallel exploration and exploitation of the
PC concept (paragraph 11.4.1). As happened in the enterprise computer case, the potential
of this new object was yet to be discovered. Soon after the IBM PC appearance in the
market, in 1981, developers-entrepreneurs would clone it, progressively becoming important
enterprises in the new industrial setting. Still, a market expansion to a broad public would
not come without a graphical user interface, allowing the separation between developers and
end-users, enabling the later to use the computer. To this goal, the contribution of Apple
was decisive (paragraph 11.4.2). Such a process was not linear, neither for Apple nor for the
rest of the industry, though the eventual synthesis by Microsoft would provide a solution for
the greatest part of the new economy.
Section 11.5 studies the eventual Industrial Rationalisation of the PC industry by theWin-
tel model. As this period as been widely studied by management literature and speciﬁcally
Gawer and Cusumano (2002), this section brieﬂy reviews how the Wintel model managed
to synthesize and rationalize the explorations of the previous period.
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11.2 Early Materialisation: the possibility of a Personal
Computer
In this section we are going to examine two cases that occurred in parallel, the one in the
U.S. and the other in France.
It is about two inventions of the “microcomputer” (a term of which was coined by our
second inventor, Thi Truong). In the section 11.3.1 we are going to discuss these cases from
the perspective of the two conditions we deﬁned in 10.2.4 (page 197) for a dominant design
to emerge (the knowledge condition and the market condition).
In later sections by applying this principle in the case of the PC we will see the interference
between the two: the market which a product targets re-determines the product as well as
the knowledge one has about its identity. In fact, the case of the emergence of the Personal
Computer platform illustrates a speciﬁc property of a market-to-emerge, that of a public.
11.2.1 Old concept: Microcomputers that were not personal
Kildall and the possibility of using software
One of the ﬁrst micro-computers reported is the one made by Garry Kildall in 1972. Kil-
dall had received a Computer Science Ph.D. from the University of Washington and was
teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California1. Along with teaching,
he started experimenting with the new chip of Intel, the 4004 2, marketed by Intel as “a
micro-programmable computer on a chip”3. The speciﬁcity of this chip was that it was the
ﬁrst “computer on a chip”, in the sense that it incorporated the elements of Von Neumann’s
architecture (processor, memory, and Input/Output interface4 ), though it lacked one organ,
the stored program. It was an “ENIAC in a chip”.
Kildall used the System 360 computer at his workplace to “emulate”5 this microprocessor
- as Intel only sold the chip at a low price ($25) to volume purchasers6 and developed a
programming language for it7, with the use of Intel ’s manual8. Active as a consultant in
1Freiberger and Swaine (2000, p. 21)Allan (2001, p. 7/1), Ceruzzi (2003, p. 223)
2Allan (2001, p. 7/1).
3Faggin et al. (1996).
4In that case we had a double phenomenon of generic design.
The 4004 chip was developed by Intel for a Japanese calculator company, Busicom. At the time, calcula-
tors had been among the main markets for the maturing semi-conductors industry. A speciﬁcity of Busicom’s
requirements was that the chip should be able to be used in a family of products, not just one. Hence, the
ﬁnal design was what was called a microprocessor.
It was generic for Busicom, as it allowed them to build not a single, but a family of calculators. At the
same time it was generic for Intel as well, as it opened the possibility for micro-computers to emerge, far
beyond single purpose chips.
Intel’s 4004 was as fast as the ENIAC (running at 108KHz). At that same time, mainframe computers,
such as the PDP-10, ran at 1MHz. Today’s smartphones run at 100MHz.
4004 had a 4-bit central processing unit (CPU), a 256 by 8-bit read only memory (ROM), a 320-bit
random access memory (RAM) an a shift register for input/output (I/O) (Allan, 2001; Lecuyer, 2006).
5Emulation was a part of the computer industry rationalisation processes, enabling a computer to behave
as a previous model (see section 10.5). While initially conceived to allow interoperability by backwards
compatibility (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), it was used here as a method to pass from mainframe computers
to what would later be the personal computer.
6Freiberger and Swaine (1999, p. 171).
7The Programming Language for Microcomputers, PL/M (Allan, 2001, p. 7/1).
8Freiberger, op.cit.
230
parallel with his teaching activities, he was assigned by Intel to develop a “stored program”
for its next microprocessor, the 80089.
Intellec-8 Development System appeared on the market by Intel in 1973, having the new
processor and Kildall’s new Control Program for Microprocessors (CP/M). The computer
itself was marketed as a complementary product for enterprises, as a debugging tool to be
embedded in existing systems and had a very poor market success for Intel10.
However, Kildall’s software, as well as his entrepreneurial activity since, was of a decisive
role for the years to come, supplying basic modules for the personal computers, namely
what became to be known as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and DOS (Disk Operating
System)11.
At that early point, the personal use of a computer was an enigma. It is reported that Intel
primed the watches as a privileged consumer market for semiconductors12 , while Kildall’s
early projects concerned an “astrology machine”13. However, the initial capital that Kildall
gained from his activity as developer and consultant allowed him to found a startup, Digital
Research that was to play an important role at the end of the decade and until IBM’s entry
in the market, in 1982.
The case of MICRAL
Micral was the ﬁrst micro-computer commercially available. It was built by the enterprise
R2E (Réalisations d’Études Électroniques) in May 1973. It was designed by Thi Truong and
the engineers Francois Grenelle and Ben Chetrite on the basis of an Intel 8008 microprocessor.
The ﬁrst mini-computer was and ad hoc, task-based materialisation, ordered by the French
institute INRA, in order to be used in the measurement of evaporative transpiration, and more
precisely the measurement of atmospheric water and temperature, an innovative process that
was soil-independent.
The computer was conceived as a “complete product”. It was characterised by a modular
architecture, that included a “bus” component. A “bus”, ﬁrstly used in the computer industry
by DEC ’s PDP-8 mainframe computer, was a hardware device that had as its purpose
the management of diﬀerent computer components interfaces. Instead of connecting the
diﬀerent components to one another (as in the case of IBM S/360 family of mainframes),
all components were connected to this bus, which then controlled and distributed current,
signals and data between the diﬀerent parts of the system.
In addition, Micral was equipped by an operating system, also built by the enterprise,
the SYSMIC, later renamed PROLOGUE. In a similar way to the bus, an Operating System
controlled and distributed data, calculating power and memory between diﬀerent software
programs, giving multitasking capabilities to the micro-computer (that is the ability to exe-
cute various programs at the same time).
After satisfying the contract with INRA, R2E further commercialised the computer. One
of the ﬁrst moves of R2E was to apply for patents both in France and in the USA. The
patent concerning the bus, the device where peripherals could be connected, was ﬁled in
1976 and granted one year later14.
9Allan (2001, p. 7/1), Ceruzzi (2003, p. 223).
10Ceruzzi (2003, p. 223).
11Allan op.cit.
12Freiberger and Swaine (1999, p. 174).
13Ibid.
14Patent US4040026 - Channel for exchanging information between a computer and rapid peripheral units,
231
In the ﬁrst year of its launch, R2E sold 500 Micrals. Its clientele was mainly enterprises
and administration, not individual users (or user communities). Micral was sold at the price
of $1950 and was marketed as a low cost alternative to mainframe computers, already in use.
In an eﬀort to expand in the US market, Micral was presented in the National Computer
Conference Exhibition in Chicago in May 1974. The slogan of the advertisement was: “You
don’t need a hammer to crush a ﬂy”, illustrating the purpose of the micro-computer.
The advantages ofMicral, as perceived by R2E and, thus, marketed lay in its low cost and
technological integration15. Yet, despite the fact that Micral was the ﬁrst micro-computer to
be commercially available, as well as the fact that it was fully functional and had integrated
innovative concepts in its design (such as a bus and an operating system), Micral didn’t
manage to determine the opening PC market. While the technical architecture of a micro-
computer and a Personal Computer ended up being very close, the concept of personal use
was absent from Micral’s strategy.
During the micro or personal computer era, the question of the business model was also
posed to the ﬁrst enterprises that tried to commercialise this potential.
On the one hand, R2E used its Micral computer in a similar way to that ﬁrst period of
computer commercialization, promoting a use for already well-known ﬁelds and often renting
its equipment, while supporting the installation with a technical service, in a way similar to
Intel ’s Intellec-8 use scenario16.
11.2.2 New concept: Alto “workstation” and its interfaces for
profanes
A signiﬁcant computer project that was never commercialised alibeit the source of many
innovations to form the personal computer concept, as we encountered it in the 1990s,
was the Alto “workstation”, developed in Xerox PARC in Silicon Valley and used by its
developers. Xerox PARC was characterised by a greater researcher autonomy and was the
home for a set of early materialisations that would be explored by entrepreneurs during the
foggy competition phase in the 1980s.
Xerox, a copier manufacturing company, decided to develop Xerox PARC in 1970, after
acquiring a data processing company (Scientific Data Systems) as a research centre for
inventor: Francois Gernelle, Patent number: 4040026, Filing date: Nov 24, 1976, Issue date: Aug 2, 1977,
USPTO.
15In Micral ’s Manual edited by R2E, Micral is described as follows:
MICRAL is the ﬁrst of a new generation of mini-computer whose principal feature is its very
low cost.
• Low Hardware cost resulting from:
1. use of integrated micro-processor (MOS-LSI circuits);
2. modular structure allowing minimal HARDWARE conﬁguration for a given system;
3. no need of loading peripheral due to the use of Read Only Memories.
• Low operating cost through the use of non-specialized personnel;
The above automatically implies, in the system’s basic design, complete integration between
SOFTWARE and HARDWARE (Micral Manual, 1974, p.73, 77).
This manual provided knowledge on hardware conﬁguration operations as well as basic software commands.
16For instance, the report of Malet (1984), describes how the library of the University of Sorbonne installed
a book - lending program, by the use of rented Micral computers with the help of R2E ’s technicians.
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exploring the market of electronic printing (Smith and Alexander, 1988; Chesbrough, 2006).
Luckily for Xerox, ARPAnet, an early materialisation of the internet, was by that time
reducing its activities17. As a result, many of the pioneers of computer science of the time
were recruited in Xerox PARC. A key recruitment was the one of Robert Taylor, one of the
leaders of the ARPAnet project18, who then recruited many of the project’s scientists and
developers19.
The Alto computer project was developed and used internally by those scientists and
incorporated many of the concepts that would become known in the wider public during the
1980s and had been invented during the late 1960s. Engelbart, a prominent scientist who
became distinguished during late 1960s for his concept of human-computer symbiosis, as it
was imagined by another prominent scientist, Licklider, materialised these concepts in Xerox
PARC.
The mouse, the windows graphical user interface, the ﬁrst WYSIWYG (What You See Is
What You Get) editor, the NLS (oNLine System) hypertext system - an early materialisation
of what would become the Web - were among the materialisations realised in the PARC, most
of them based on theoretical concepts developed by researchers of the ARPAnet during the
1960’s (Myers, 1998). An underpinning idea in all these materialisations was the possibility
of computer use by profanes. A very typical example was the SmallTalk application - itself
introducing many concepts about windows graphical interfaces - conceived with the intention
to be so simple that a child could use it to program.
While Xerox never commercialised those innovations, they would be a source of inspi-
ration for many developers, for many of the research results of Xerox PARC would be soon
diﬀused in the developers’ community. Characteristically, Ted Nelson’s pamphlet “Computer
Liberation - Dream Machines”, edited in 1974 would amongst others, present Xerox PARC ’s
achievements20. Representative of the inﬂuence of this pamphlet is the fact that it would
be re-edited by Microsoft Press thirteen years later, in 1987.
However, the most systematic exploitation of Xerox PARC’s explorations would be made
by Apple (discussed later), through the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
11.2.3 New concept: the Personal Computer
It wouldn’t be wrong to claim that, in the case we are going to study, the concept of a
personal computer emerged in the press and was developed by its audience. The concept
of the personal computer was materialised through a long process of collaboration between
user-developers in many U.S. cities. However, Silicon Valley, named after its semiconductor
industry at the late 1960s proved to be a fertile ground for PCs as well, with one of the most
active and creative user communities which illustrated the potential of a Personal Computer.
17Freiberger and Swaine (2000, p. 306).
18Abbate (2000).
19Turner (2006, p. 111).
20The conception of the term “hypertext” is attributed to Ted Nelson. This term was suggested to describe
the “branching” of texts, as a sub-category of “hypermedia”. Other “hypermedia” concepts proposed by
Nelson have been the “branching” of ﬁlms (“hyperﬁms”), audio, music and slide shows (Nelson, 1974, p. 85).
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11.2.4 Before Altair: the emergence of a user community for the
PC-to-come.
In July 1974, a radio user-developer journal, Radio-Electronics, published an article on the
design of a kit called Mark-8, based on the Intel 8008 micro-processor (as did the microcom-
puters studied in sections 11.2.1 and 11.2.1)21. The design was realised by Jonathan Titus,
a graduate student of Virginia Polytechnic University. The complete design was sold apart
from the magazine, in a booklet costing $5. Radio-Electronics promoted the kit on its ﬁrst
page as follows:
“Build the Mark-8: Your Personal Minicomputer.”
To build their personal computers, readers would have to buy the components from
diﬀerent suppliers22 and write the programs themselves. Characteristically enough for the
nature of the design, as well as for its public, the magazine suggested that users use a
keyboard and a TV terminal to facilitate use.
Mark-8 was presented as a “complete minicomputer which can be used for a number of
purposes”, including its complementary use for sending data to a larger computer as well as
its use as a teaching tool.
A Mark-8 user group emerged using a Newsletter. The newsletter included software
code, bug reports, places where the components of the computer could be purchased, as
well as a list with the names and addresses of the community members, outlining their
particular interest in building the computer (as a small business equipment, leisure activity
and other23).
Mark-8 illustrated that there was a particular kind of market: people who were ready
to pay and to work in order to build their own, personal computer. Moreover, it showed
that these people were capable of self-organising to share knowledge on the design given, its
materialisation and optimisation, as well as its extension.
It was a free-revealing of the design of a kit, in the sense that it is used in free software
(citations), as it was open to everyone. In fact, at that time, the “hacker” culture according
to which knowledge should be shared was already diﬀused in the universities, where Titus
came from.
However, Mark-8 was to be just the prelude for the computer kit that meant to organise
the community of hackers until the market emerged.
11.2.5 Altair: a personal computer kit for the community
As a response to the publication ofMark-8 designs, Popular Electronics, another radio maga-
zine, ordered the construction of a Personal Computer from the MITS company. MITS (Mi-
cro Instrumentation and Telemetry Systems) was an enterprise founded by Edward Roberts,
a former researcher of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory in Albuquerque24, and two col-
leagues of his. The initial interest of this enterprise was in building toy rocket systems for
user developers25. Yet, as this project didn’t work, Roberts bought out the company from the
21Radio Electronics, Computer, Jonathan A. Titus, July 1974, pp. 29-33.
22Indicative prices listed circuit broads for $ 47.50, as well as the Intel 8008 chip for $120.
23MARK-8 User group newsletter, 29 September 1974.
24Allan (2001, p. 4/8).
25Rocket technology had been the major innovation trajectory for the U.S. military since the 1950’s.
Computer evolution had followed that trajectory as well. See Ceruzzi (1989).
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other founders who resigned. In 1971 MITS launched a calculator (the MITS 316), which
was featured in Popular Electronics. It managed to sell thousands of them, before cheaper
ones entered the market. After the publication of Mark-8, Popular Electronics ordered from
MITS a computer to illustrate to the ﬁrst volume of 1974, given their previous collaboration.
Roberts designed and sent the computer to the magazine at the end of 1973. The device
was featured in the January issue. Yet, while the photos of the ﬁrst MITS Personal Com-
puter were published, the prototype never arrived at the magazine’s oﬃces, due to a train
strike26. This accidental fact presented the occasion for the Altair (the name of the PC) to
be re-designed.
The new design included a bus. Yet, no software was available with the device. MITS
organised a user group, providing additional information for developers to build software and
other components.
The editorial of this issue made the following claim:
THE HOME COMPUTER IS HERE!
For many years we’ve been hearing about how computers will be one day a
household item. Therefore, we’re especially proud to present in this issue the
first commercial type of minicomputer project ever published that’s priced within
reach of many households - the Altair 8800, with an under-$400 complete kit
cost, including cabinet.
Other radio and electronics magazines welcomed the new device also with enthusiasm. In
Figure 11.3 we see the cover of the ﬁrst Issue of the Interface Age user developer magazine
(December 1975) presenting Altair as the embodiment of the “People Computer”.
Altair used the Intel 8080 microprocessor, just introduced. While Intel had quoted a
price of $360 for small qualities, MITS bought them for $75 each. At a lower cost, with a
more eﬀective microprocessor and with all its components put together, Altair was accepted
with enthusiasm by the radio user developers communities.
MITS was clearly a D.I.Y. kit. Eddie Curie, a friend of Roberts who joined him early on
when the start-up couldn’t keep up with the demand, described the initial service:
One of the nice things about the kit [from MITS’ point of view] was you didn’t
have to test the finished units. You just put all the stuff in envelopes and shipped
them. It was left to the poor customer to figure out how to put all those bags
of chunk together27.
11.2.6 User communities: the case of Homebrew Computer Club.
Many Altair user groups arose within the USA. Amongst them, a user group that was to have
an historical inﬂuence, the Homebrew Computer Club, based in the San Francisco Bay Area.
This area had already a long history of radio user developers, linked with the computers and
semi-conductor industry28.
The ﬁrst newsletter of this community referred to the success of the ﬁrst meeting as well
as the contact with MITS, writing:
26Freiberger and Swaine (1999).
27Quoted in Levy (1984, p. 195).
28a expliciter, plein de references la-dessus
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Figure 11.3: Altair computer ﬁguring in Interface Age user-developer magazine’s ﬁrst cover
as the People Computer (December 1975). Source: http://www.vintage-computer.com.
Are you building your own computer? Terminal? TV Typewriter? I/O device?
Or some other, digital black-magic box? Or are you buying time on time-sharing
service? If so, you might like to come to a gathering of people with likeminded
interests. Exchange information, swap ideas, talk shop, help work on a project,
whatever . . .
This simple announcement brought 32 enthusiastic people together on March
5th at Gordon’s garage. (. . . ) The group contained a good cross section of both
hardware experts and software programmers.
While many members of this emerging group had already been working on devices based
on the 8008 processor, the leader of the group, Steve Dompier, a computer user developer
who used to rent time in time-sharing computers29 in Berkley, had visited MITS’ oﬃces:
Steve gave a report on his recent visit to MITS. About 1500 Altairs have been
shipped out so far and MITS expects to send out 1100 more this month. No
interfaces or peripherals are available until they catch up with the mainframe
back orders.
The meeting was organised by Fred Moore and Gordon French, two members of the
Popular Computer Company that pre-existed in the region. Amongst the user developers
that attended the meeting ﬁgured some of the most skilled engineers of the industry (amongst
them Stephen Wozniak, who worked at the time at HP). Lee Felsenstein, one other member
of the PCC community, who was to invent the ﬁrst portable computer some years later,
commented on the meeting’s participants:
a bunch of escapees, at least temporary escapees from industry, and somehow
the bosses weren’t watching. And we got together and started doing things that
didn’t matter because that wasn’t what the big guys were doing. But we knew
this was our chance to do something the way it should be done30.
The next appointment of the group was given at Stanford’s Artificial Intelligence Labo-
ratory Conference room.
At the same time, Homebrew Computer Club organised its functions on a standard basis,
with meetings - usually held in Stanford University - and newsletters. While sharing software
was a common practice at that time, PC development was private: each member built his
computer at home, while the community was there to provide knowledge, as well as contacts.
This user community wasn’t a “large public” community. MITS didn’t provide software
or an operating system to its users. New comers were always welcome in this community,
yet amongst the members of this community one could ﬁnd experienced computer scientists
and designers, working in the industry of the region or researching at its universities.
Regarding community organisation, the club’s Newsletter remained the main tool for
knowledge and information, as well as for user networking. Overall, it was a skeleton of the
hobbyists’ market. There, one could ﬁnd the news about emerging computer stores and
the emergence of retail outlets, source code for computer programs, workshops organised by
platform providers, universities or consultants, access to the club’s library.
Moreover, the community undertook initiatives to organise this user developer based
market. The “West Coast Computer Faire”, starting in April 1977, was co-organised by a
29For time-sharing computers, see section . . .
30Levy (1984, p. 206).
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number of UD computer communities, Bay Area chapters of the well-known Association of
Computing Machinery (ACM), Stanford University’s Electrical Engineering Department31.
Besides, this is where Steve Wozniak, one of the members of the Homebrew Club, along
with his friend Steve Jobs were to present Apple II in 1977, the ﬁrst market-oriented personal
computer.
A user-developer based PC potential exploration
As we’ve seen in sections 11.2.1 and 11.2.1 on the early microcomputers, vendors (Intel
and R2E ) marketed their product assuming a similar use trajectory to previous computers,
though a minor one, leading to the identity of a “support equipment” for larger information
systems.
Still, when similar devices (mainly the Altair kit) came to user communities, there was a
far more extensive exploration of possible uses. In fact, the exploration of diﬀerent trajectories
for the microcomputer was one of the founding elements of these communities. The ﬁrst
newsletter of the Homebrew Computer Club summarised their discussion as follows32:
What will people do with a computer in their home? Well, we asked that
question and the variety of responses show that the imagination of people has
been underestimated. Uses ranged from the private secretary functions: text
editing, mass storage, memory, etc., to control of house utilities: heating, alarms,
sprinkler system, auto tune-up, cooking, etc., to GAMES: all kinds. TV graphics,
x - y plotting, making music, small robots and turtles, and other educational uses,
to small business applications and neighbourhood memory networks. I expect
home computers will be used in unconventional ways–most of which no one has
thought of yet.
In this small excerpt, we trace a creative exploration of the Altair and more generally
the Personal Computer potential that was a result of a process that resembles brainstorming
(Osborn, 1953), already in use by computer companies (Clark, 1958). This plethora of ideas
cited can be categorised as follows:
1. Concepts related to already known instrumental aspects of computing in general (such
as text editing, mass storage, memory etc), to be implemented at the level of the
microcomputer.
2. Concepts related to domains of productive activity (small business, private secretary).
3. Concepts related to private life, including issues of the house (heating, security) or
spare time activities (games, music).
4. A concept of the use by a local collectivity (neighbourhood memory project).
Moreover, the richness of the imagined uses gave the feeling to the writer of the newslet-
ter, and probably to all the participants, that there was a great expansion potential that
remained to be discovered.
31Homebrew Computer Club Newsletter, Robert Reiling, Editor, Mountain View, CA, vol. 2., Issue 9,
September 15, 1976.
32NEWSLETTER, AMATEUR COMPUTER USERS GROUP HOMEBREW COMPUTER CLUB, Issue
number one, Fred Moore, Editor, 2100 Santa Cruz Ave., Menlo Park, Ca. March 15, 1975.
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As the community grew, MITS became more systematic, opening retail stores. There,
one could ﬁnd videotapes from the seminars that continued to go on, while qualiﬁed personnel
in the stores could advise customers33. Regarding the computer stores, it became clear since
the ﬁrst one, in California, that users were willing not only to buy a computer, but to spent
multiple amounts of money to purchase extensions (extra memory, video terminals, disk
drives etc.34).
In fact, less than a year after the launch of BASIC, MITS organised the World Altair
Computer Convention, attended by several hundred participants, most of them coming from
User Groups35. Those conferences were attended by what Gawer would call complementors,
small enterprises that build peripherals for Altair. Some of them did Robert’s support, as
they were active in new domains, others did not, as they were developing peripherals MITS
developed as well36. Lee Felsenstein, a member of the HCC, presented in this Convention a
Visual Display Mode prototype37. This unit permitted the linking of a video display directly
to the Altair’s RAM, an innovation that, for the ﬁrst time, made possible obtaining a highly
interactive personal computer, and opened the ﬁeld for uses such as video-games. Processor
Technologies, built a board that could be connected to Altair’s bus and provide additional
memory.
From the client support challenge to commercial software
Among the ‘tasks’ of community support, MITS had to extend its platform, the Altair, to
enable further extensions by the user community. One of the most important was a software
language, a feature that was developed outside the enterprise to be quickly integrated in the
product.
Bill Gates, student at the time at Harvard, and Paul Allen, working as a programmer
at Honeywell, developed a version of the BASIC programming language38 for the Altair,
which was distributed along with the computer for an additional cost of $500. As Kildall
had done, Gates used a mainframe computer to “emulate” the Altair. Allen became director
of software for MITS39, to found “Micro Soft”, later “Micro-Soft” retaining the rights for
the software40. Microsoft would later develop the operating system for the IBM PC, having
already invented a new business model for software as a product41, on which the software
industry would be based for the decades to follow.
Apart from accepting visitors, MITS edited a magazine available at a low price, the
Computer Notes. The content of this resembles to the forums and blogs that platform
providers have today, written by engineers:
33MITS mobile caravan seminar, Computer Notes Volume 1 Issue 11 - April, 1976.
34Freiberger and Swaine (2000, p. 232).
35Freiberger and Swaine (2000, p. 226).
36Freiberger and Swaine (2000, p. 62,63).
37Computer Museum Report, Fall 1986.
38BASIC programming language had been developed in Dartmouth University and had been diﬀused
through the academic community and the computer enterprises through the time-sharing project (Ceruzzi,
2003, p. 203).
39Allan (2001, p. 4/10), Ceruzzi (2003, p. 235).
40Ceruzzi (2003, p. 235).
41Until then, software was shared among the user developers, as well as among the professionals. On a
symbolic level, Gates’ “Open Letter to Hobbyists”, published in Homebrew Computer Club’s Newsletter in
1976, stating that software should be ruled by copyright, as with music, marked this conceptual rupture, yet
to be implemented some years later.
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• Questions & Answers, on the ‘right’ use of Altair ’s conﬁguration and problems to be
ﬁxed.
• Specialised articles to master speciﬁc functionalities, options, tests and conﬁgurations
of the hardware as well as short introductions to software programming (the latter,
Software Notes, was often edited by Bill Gates).
• Information about new extensions (such as the ﬂoppy disk system or the static memory
card).
In addition, user contests were organised by the magazine, constructing a common knowl-
edge base for Altair ’s User Group, also reﬂecting the expertise advancement of the commu-
nity. Concerning a software contest, Gates wrote:
We started receiving programs for the Altair Users Library a few months ago,
and are getting more and more every day. As the Users Group grows and users
become more sophisticated at programming their Altairs, we expect the library
to grow at a fast rate and become a valuable resource for Altair users42.
In the same journal, its editor would later address Altair users trying to convince them
to actually pay for the use of Basic43. In fact, software had not been commercialised in the
previous computer industries, as it was something that either the computer provider company
or the using institution would develop. In addition, software sharing had been one of the
basic arguments for the development of the university network (the ARPAnet), to diminish
the costs. In this sense, one can say that Microsoft had invented commercial software,
by demanding that software royalties should be paid by user developers. The letter Gates
addressed to the UDs and was sent out by the Homebrew Computer Club in February 1976,
had a symbolic value for this “jump”. Typically, Gates noted44:
The feedback we have gotten from the hundreds of people who say they are using
BASIC has all been positive. Two surprising things are apparent, however, 1)
Most of these “users” never bought BASIC (less than 10% of all Altair owners
have bought BASIC), and 2) The amount of royalties we have received from
sales to hobbyists makes the time spent on Altair BASIC worth less than $2 an
hour.
In a sense, this letter was the ﬁrst declaration of the software market’s emergence, which
would later on develop and wherein Microsoft would maintain a dominant position until this
day.
11.3 Market Emergence: the possibility of a
commercial PC
As time went by, the demand by hobbyists was getting bigger, new start-ups entered the
hobbyist kits market and MITS continued to be unable to satisfy the demand. One of the
42Gates, Bill. Software Contest Winners Announced, Computer Notes, Vol. 1, Issue 2, MITS, Inc.
Albuquerque, New Mexico, July 1975. Source: New Mexico Museum of Natural History and Science.
43Bunnell, David (September 1975). “Across the Editor’s Desk”. Computer Notes (Albuquerque NM.:
MITS) 1 (4): p. 2.
44Gates, Bill, AN OPEN LETTER TO HOBBYISTS, February 3, 1976.
240
major competitors was IMSAI, an enterprise found by a former IBM engineer, that introduced
an Altair “clone” and got connected to the hobbyist communities. In addition, it contacted
Kildall and agreed with him to use his operating system on the computer (Altair didn’t have
an operating system at the time)45.
In 1976, Steve Wozniak, an engineer working at the time at HP and a member of the
Homebrew Computer Club, along with Steve Jobs, presented their new computer, the Apple
in the Homebrew Computer Club meeting. Wozniak described the aim of Apple I and Apple
II (the latter presented one year later) as follows:
The Apple I and II were designed strictly on a hobby, for-fun basis, not to be
a product for a company. They were meant to bring down to the club and put
on the table during the random access period and demonstrate: Look at this, it
uses very few chips. It’s got a video screen. You can type stuff on it46.
Steve Jobs managed to sell ﬁfty complete boards to the Byte computer shop47 (Apple
I did not have keyboard, a box nor a power supply). Moreover, he then managed to raise
funds for the next computer, with the aid of a former Intel employee, Mike Markkula, he
hired Mike Scott, a former Fairchild Semiconductor manager, as a CEO48. He also hired
Jerry Mannock, a former HP designer, to design a beige plastic case with rounded corners
for Apple II49.
Apple II was presented in the West Coast Computer Faire in April 197750. By the end
of 1977, the company was making a proﬁt and doubling production every three to four
months51. It was a computer in a box, for personal or business use, for which users did not
have to assemble its parts, though they could “plug in” the desired peripherals.
A year later, Paul Allen had left MITS to join Microsoft, that started licensing its BASIC
to a series of computer enterprises, having a revenue for its ﬁrst year of over one hundred
dollars52. This caused a controversy between the two enterprises. In early 1977 MITS was
acquired by Pertec Computer Corporation. However, in late 1977 the arbitration process
that started before the acquisition oﬃcially accorded Microsoft the right to sell BASIC to
other suppliers as well, thus denying Pertec an exclusive right53.
An article in the IEEE in 1978 (Doerr, 1978) observed that Altair ’s skeleton (the S-
100 bus), that allowed the product’s expansion had been used by a great number of small
enterprises building peripherals and had been copied by competitors. In 1983, IEEE would
extensively describe and expand the speciﬁcations of the S-100 bus having as an objective,
among others:
• To provide the microprocessor computer-system user with compatible de-
vice families which will communicate in an unambiguous way without mod-
ification, from which a modularly expandable computer system may be
constructed.
45Ceruzzi (2003, p. 239).
46Wozniak, S (1984). Homebrew and how the Apple came to be. In Ditlea, S., Digital Deli, Retrieved
July 18, 2012, from http://www.atariarchives.org/deli/homebrew_and_how_the_apple.php
47Laing (2004).
48Levy (1984, p. 257).
49Laing (2004).
50Freiberger and Swaine (2000, pp. 276-277).
51Freiberger and Swaine (2000, p. 282).
52Allan (2001, p. 6/10).
53Allan (2001, p. 6/10).
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• To enable the interconnection of independently manufactured devices into
a single system54.
One of the successful and decisive extensions of the Apple II computer was the VisiCalc
spreadsheet and the WordStar word processor. These two programs enabled users to utilize
the computer for oﬃce tasks. The low cost of the computer (at $800 dollards, compared to
the $10000 Xerox Alto production cost) made it aﬀordable for a large base of customers55.
Moreover, they indicated the trajectory where a market for Personal Computers could be
directed, a principal use: the personal computers of the eighties would focus on the docu-
ment trajectory, not the applications one. Applications would have an auxiliary function for
document processing56.
The contribution of Jobs to the history of the personal computer was not only the
PC commercialisation, but also the exploration since of the early materialisations of Apple
computers. During the passage from the Apple I computer board to the Apple II, there had
to be a power supply. However, Jobs made an additional requirement: a power supply that
didn’t require a cooling fan, for the computer to be silent in operation, compared to the
competitors’ noisy fans57. For this design task, he hired an expert as a consultant58. Noise
reduction was not within the requirements of the computer industry bat the time, and one
could say that PCs continued to be noisy compared to the ones built by Apple for decades.
Jobs’ capacity of inventing new requirements and recruiting the people that had the
necessary knowledge to undertake the design, led Apple’s steps from being a start-up to
becoming a large enterprise. In this endeavour, Jobs made the best of the tradition of the
Silicon Valley, regarding ties between industry, university, venture capital and technological
communities. Even during the 1980s, when Apple was one of the leading enterprises of the
domain, it preferred its suppliers to be installed in the region, “next door”, as the materials
director had said59
One of the fundamental knowledge bases that Jobs managed to exploit was the one in
the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), regarding Human-Computer Interaction 60
At the time, Xerox, a leading enterprise in printers had established a price/performance
model, based on speed, per-copy costs and printer size (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995,
p. 241). However, they had a serious problem in the commercialisation of the PC. The Alto
computer, possessing many innovations that would be introduced in the market by other
computers later, was too costly for users to buy.
Hence, Xerox invested in Apple, which had proven to be a dynamic start-up. Because
of the important demand from investors, Jobs managed to negotiate beyond the $1 million
54IEEE, IEEE Standard, 696 Interface Devices, 1983.
55Moggridge (2006, p. 80).
56Moggridge (2006, p. 81).
57Allan (2001, p. 5/8).
58Ibid.
59Jim Bilodeau, Apple materials director, quoted in Saxenian (2000, p. 152).
60For Chesbrough (2003a) the case of of Xerox is a typical case of closed innovation, the following question
is posed:
How could a company that possessed the resources and vision to launch a brillian research
center - not to mention the patience to fund the center for more than thirty years, and the savvy
to incorporate important technologies from it - let so many good ideas get away(Chesbrough,
2003a, p. 1)?
A series of innovations in Xerox PARC were commercialised by spin-oﬀs.
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Xerox oﬀered to license some key technologies developed in Xerox PARC. Moreover, many
Xerox PARC joined Apple, where they contributed their knowledge and experience.
The Apple II computer, while serving the ambition of a mass-consumer market, continued
to be addressed to experienced users, as did the Altair, though more advanced and following
a diﬀerent architecture (mainly because it was based on a diﬀerent chip than Intel ’s one).
Jef Raskin, the designer of the Macintosh computer, in an internal Apple report in 1981,
referred to a memo written by another Apple employee, “Too many variations on a theme”
by Brien Howard (1980), was charged to write the Apple II manual:
In writing [a manual] I have, once again, come across an exasperating problem:
just what IS an “Apple Computer”? Apples now come in a bewildering variety
of flavours61.
In addition, Apple cultivated a close relationship with user-developer-entrepreneurs, as
“it encouraged independent software developers to write programs for its machine”. (Moore,
1993, p. 77).
11.3.1 Discussion: the distance between the microcomputer,
workstation and the personal computer
For both inventors-entrepreneurs and their start-ups (Kildall with the Digital Research and
Thi Truong with R2E ) their inventions allowed them to be among the ﬁrst to enter a new
market-in-emergence, both on the level of competencies developed and the one of knowledge
acquisition and development.
In this early stage, we observe that for all above mentioned actors, the market assumed
was identical with the one that pre-existed. A microcomputer was considered as a very
small computer, thus performing tasks already known. Hence, their devices were conceived
and marketed as auxiliary instruments for larger, professional information systems and not
as a product that could be used for personal use. Thus, we could speak about a fixation
effect (Hatchuel et al., 2011) in this early phase, a phenomenon often observed in innovation
processes, restricting the perception of the ﬁeld of possible to pre-existing concepts.
On the level of knowledge we’ve seen that a series of notions and methods developed
during the era of enterprise computers were mobilised by the two entrepreneurs in the context
of the development of a really small computer, a micro-computer. The use of emulation
by Kildall, Von Neumann’s architecture for the two, as well as the bus-architecture for
Truong were some of the core competencies that were transposed from the existing computer
platform to the emerging ones. That was a design and development accomplishment that
one should not underestimate, as it demanded the re-designing of the whole frameworks to
ﬁt the speciﬁc parameters of the new microprocessor. It is not by chance that the two were
scientists working in some of the ﬁnest research institutions of their country.
On the level of the market though, their initial concepts were not addressed towards
something that could be described as a personal computer. In the case of R2E, whileMicral ’s
design was very close to what a personal computer would ultimately be, it was neither
conceived or marketed as such. Like Intellec-8, it was conceived and marketed either as a
small and cheap computer for institutional use or as a complementary machine for existing
61Quoted in the internal Apple report Raskin, Jef, Macinthosh project genesis and history, Feb. 1981, p.
1/5.
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computing installations. On the other hand, Kildall’s initial intuition on a “astrological
machine” didn’t meet a market.
However, we should note that a personal computer was not an intuitive concept at that
time. Computers had a radically diﬀerent status, as we’ve seen in the previous chapter, being
either a scientiﬁc, a military or an enterprise machine. Moreover, computer science was still
an early discipline, and users would have to acquire new competencies in order to use a
computer. Thus, the question of knowledge diﬀusion should be considered a barrier to the
new market emergence, as technical manuals were addressed and conceived for engineers,
and personal use was not in their paradigms or philosophy.
This knowledge - market gap was to be progressively covered by a user developer public
that sprang up.
Going back to Table 10.3 on page 203 regarding the two ﬁrst phases of a dominant
design emergence, we can see that converning Micral and R2E we can make some important
observations.
First of all, the same challenges were posed in the ﬁrst phase, the one of concept ma-
terialisation and R2E did manage to respond to most of these challenges. Micral did have
a generic design as well as the tools (software, operating system) to restrict this design to
speciﬁc applications. The project was initially ﬁnanced by a single client, INRA, and the
computer could be conﬁgured to operate market speciﬁc tasks.
At the same time though, Micral was not based on a new theory about computers. It was
conceived as a really small computer (a microcomputer), addressing the same tasks with the
pre-existing mainframe and minicomputers, as well as the same market (ex. administration).
The PC wave, that started almost simultaneously as we are going to see, while based
on the same knowledge on computers, it was carried by a projection of a diﬀerent concept
of a computer, that is a computer that could be personal. In the next section we will see
how this ‘little’ diﬀerence (from an engineering point of view) caused a major transformation
of business rationales, in the path to concept materialisation, creating a new trajectory for
innovation.
11.3.2 Conversation. The emergence of new first phase collective
rationales, replacing traditional ones.
The case of the PC concept emergence and the attempts of its materialisation created
new collective rationales that radically diﬀered from the traditional ones. The concept-
oriented challenges, as well as the market-oriented ones that were address until now with
traditional business methods (see Table 10.2 on page 198), where now undertaken by “hacker
communities”.
Pre-existing knowledge on computer science had been diﬀused to the public either by spe-
cialised magazines (such as the Radio Electronics Popular Electronics), or by user developers
themselves (such as Jonathan Titus).
We’ve described two ways in which the question of generic design was addressed in this
early phase. On the one hand, Mark-8 was just the diﬀusion of a design by a radio user
developer magazine. A diﬀusion that created a dynamic of communities that were self-
organised and networked by a newsletter. Thus, in place of the market potential exploration
we’ve seen in the case of Mauchly and Eckert, we have a community vision emerging and
moving towards the materialisation of the concept.
For this development, instead of having single client, targeted projects, as both EMMC
and M2E did during their ﬁrst steps, we have a Do It Yourself (D.Y.I) approach, where user
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Traditional Business Rationale Community-based rationale
Marketing by potential → Community vision
Single client, targeted projects → D.I.Y
Businessmen - University intimacy → Hacker communities
Table 11.2: Hackers’ rational replacing traditional business rationale. The case of MITS
ﬁrm.
developers create their own, personal computer, based on the common knowledge.
Later, we had the appearance of business in the form of MITS start-up. Popular Elec-
tronics, representing what we could call the “public will’ of its readers, ordered the computer,
without Roberts having to perform any market research. Since then, and until its end, his
start-up generated proﬁt for him, though he never managed to satisfy the growing demand.
With Altair there was a combination of the D.I.Y. approach and the product one. It
was a computer addressed to a speciﬁc public, hacker communities, that could obtain the
necessary knowledge to use it as well as to extend it.
The Businessmen-University intimacy we’ve encountered in the case of EMMC, that
played a crucial role in knowledge diﬀusion, demand creation and uses exploration, was
now replaced by the “hacker community intimacy”, with the communities acting within the
universities that advanced computer science (the case of the Homebrew Computer Club
being emblematic), the industry experts being part of them.
This ‘hybrid’ form of a product, this ‘half way solution’ (Hatchuel and Weil, 1999) or
‘not-yet-complete design’ (Baldwin and Clark, 2006), putMITS in the position to continue to
the second phase, the one of market emergence. Here, the Engineering Design Department
for Altair was the user communities, with the most advanced of the users building their own
(complementary or competitive) start-ups.
In the Table 11.2 we outline the replacement of the elements of the traditional rationale
met in section 10 with the one met in the current section.
Thus, the Table 10.2 (page 198) is transformed to the Table 11.3 (page 246).
Here, the theoretical object description concerns more the potential of the object on
the basis of community ethics or interests. Further design development concerns personal
use, as we are in a user innovation realm (von Hippel, 1986). For the enterprise launching
the semi-designed product, communities constitute networks of potential clients as well as
contractors. Given the shared view amongst community and provider of the emerging phase
of the product, there is also a grace period, similar to the “beta version” we observe in
software business (Windrum, 2004) or Web services (Evans and Schmalensee, 2007; Evans,
2010). Here, environmental changes and ﬁrm strategy co-evolve, as happened in the case of
the Flash memory invention at the late 1980’s (Burgelman, 1991) through platform potential
exploration.
We should note that at this point, the business model only concerned the device (Altair
computer) and not the software. Concerning the latter, one can trace here the origins of free
and open source software, of which the development is still undertaken in a similar mode
(Hars and Ou, 2001; Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001; von Krogh et al., 2003a; Lakhani and
von Hippel, 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Osterloh and Rota, 2007; O’Mahony,
2007; Benkeltoum, 2008, and others)
Hence, this diﬀerent rationale determined the way in which MITS entered the second
phase, the one of market emergence, when the ﬁrst signs of a mass market possibility for
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personal computers started to appear.
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11.4 Foggy Competition: the case of the IBM PC and
the Apple Macintosh.
While the early phase of concept emergence, studied in the previous section, is practically
ignored by management scholars, as it has never been a study ﬁeld for the discipline, what
followed next has been extensively examined. Hence, we are going to retrace the genealogy
based on existing management research.
11.4.1 IBM PC
Like in the case of the System 360 modularisation (section 10.5), the IBM PC was designed
and developed by a team working apart from the rest of the organisation. IBM built a
separate shop at the IBM plant in Florida, and focussed on getting the new product ready
fast62. For this, IBM chose to use components from actors that were already in the market.
Having as a ﬁrst choice the CP/M operating system (see section 11.2.1), they eventually
decided on a collaboration with Microsoft, which developed MS-DOS for that reason, having
many similarities with the CP/M63. The ﬁrst IBM PC, launched in the market in 1981, also
used an Intel processor.
At the same time, IBM tried to control the architecture of its computer by patenting
the ‘skeleton’, the internal device where other components could be ‘plugged’ into, the bus
or PCI. In order for third party developers to extend the IBM PC, they needed to obtain a
license from the company.
However, both Microsoft and Intel were allowed to sell their products to other manufac-
turers as well. Beginning with COMPAQ, a series of IBM - clones ﬂooded the market during
the 1980s. In 1989, the IBM clones sales began surpassing the IBM ones.
Meanwhile, throughout the 1980s, the design of the computer was not stabilised. Many
products did not include monitors, while the mouse - already invented in Xerox PARC during
the 1970s - was to be introduced on a commercial scale in the mid-eighties.
As described above, by the mid-eighties, the elements that described the dominant design
of the Desktop Computer since the nineties were set. On the one hand, IBM’s entry
continued the trajectory of the Homebrew Computer Club’s computers. On the other hand,
Apple survived competition through the importation of features that were unknown to the
computer user developers, thanks to the strategic alliance with Xerox.
However, these were not the only designs that arose during the eighties, neither was
a linear trajectory visible for the entrepreneurs of the time. Dozens of computers were
developed by various competing companies64. Among them, the Osborne ‘transportable’
computer in 1981 (also using the CP/M operating system and costing less than $2000)65,
Radio Schack ’s TRS - 80 Pocket Computer in 1980 and the TRS - 80 Model 100 early
62Moggridge (2006, p. 78).
63An Operating System is a “spinal cord” for diﬀerent software applications. In a way similar to the bus for
hardware, the DOS enabled the sharing of computer resources (such as memory and computing power) by
diﬀerent programs. In fact, the DOS was mainly a set of interfaces, the Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs). As the scholars note, these interfaces enabled the growth Microsoft ecosystem, that is developers
producing applications for the Windows.
64An extensive list of the main computers of this era can be found at Laing (2004).
65Ceruzzi (2003, p. 278).
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‘laptop’66 and the Compaq Portable in 198267. However, of all these actors of the new
market, Compaq was one of the few that managed to obtain an ecosystem for extending its
platform, and did so by following the design of the IBM PC.
11.4.2 Lisa VS Macintosh: the challenge of windows GUI
materialisation
Lisa and Macintosh were two computers that were launched in early 1984 and marked the
computer industry trajectories for the eighties. Both were document-oriented, rather than
application-oriented. Earlier, the enterprise was re-structured, following a product-oriented
organisation (instead of a functional one)68
In 1979, when Xerox invested in Apple, it allowed Jobs and his team to visit Xerox PARC
and learn about their inventions on the Graphical User Interface (GUI)69. The concept of the
mouse and the metaphor of the Desktop, intially invented by Douglas Engelbart in Xerox,
was re-considered, by the requriements of being twenty times cheaper, “being able to use it
on Formica and my blue jeans”, as well as to enable actions on the window environment,
such as drag’n’drop or smooth scrolling (documents that did not lurch line by line as users
scrolled through them, but instead ﬂowed smoothly).
However, despite the innovations Lisa computer embodied, it was not a commercial
success: on the one hand, its ﬁles were not compatible with either IBM or Macintosh. On
the other hand, its price was too high. Hence, Lisa was discontinued in 198570. However,
many of those innovations would be embodied in later Macintosh computers and become
elements of the dominant design of the computer of the nineties.
While Lisa was a computer that explored the potential of things invented in Xerox PARC
by introducing them to a PC platform, the Macintosh computer was the computer that gave
Apple its character. Initially designed by Jef Raskin, professor in San Diego University, the
Macintosh was designed to be a mass market product. Its ﬁnal price ($ 2 495, more than
the $1 000 Raskin was aiming for) made it more expensive than an IBM PC, yet aﬀordable,
given the fact that the innovations introduced did not enter any of the trajectories on which
the PC had been developed.
For Macintosh, a re-organisation occured in Apple, putting Jobs and the head-designers
of Lisa computer in charge of the product development71. While initially projected to appear
on the market in 1982, it was eventually released in 1984. The main reason for the delay
was the fact that the product was to embody a rationalisation of the extension capabilities:
extensions were to take place only by software, thus the hardware was ‘closed’ in a box,
unlike Altair ’s case.
For that, a set of programming platforms were developed for Apple under Job’s su-
pervision: Microsoft developed a spreadsheet program (Multiplan) and a Microsoft BASIC
interpreter for theMacintosh. Apple’s employees developed an operating system, a word pro-
cessing program (MacWrite), a graphics program (QuickDraw) as well as other functional
programs72.
66Allan (2001, p. 11/2).
67Ibid p. 11/10
68Allan (2001, p. 10/2).
69Isaacson (2011, p. 96,97).
70Allan (2001, p. 10/18).
71Allan (2001, p. 10/15).
72Allan (2001, p. 10/10-10/12).
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In the following years, Apple organised the community of the developers around meetings,
the AppleWorld conferences, where it announced the new products.
As the initial concept of Macintosh closure regarding hardware had limited the expansion
capabilities of the computer, a few years later, in 1987, the Macintosh SE - (System Ex-
pansion) - targeted to business markets - would embody an expansion slot73 and the Apple
Desktop Bus, both enabling the plug-in of third party hardware, in the way Homebrew Com-
puter Club members could do on the Bus of the Altair computer, or with Intel ’s PCI and
USB devices later (for the latter see Gawer and Cusumano (2002)). Provided the ‘closure’ of
the computer within the box, the ﬁrst interface addressed ‘internal’ extensions of the com-
puter (such as hard drives) while the second one ‘external’ extensions (such as keyboards or
mice). Later, the transposition of these two features in the IBM PC ecosystem - including
its clones - and their rationalisation from Intel would provide the latter the with platform
leadership for the Desktop Computer, as described by Gawer and Cusumano (2002).
11.5 Industrial rationalisation: the dominance of the
Wintel model.
Industrial rationalisation in the PC industry did not come from a single enterprise. The
synthesis of the late 1980s to early 1990s that included foggy competition explorations
was also one that opened the way for future explorations. Microsoft and Intel were its
protagonists, though the ﬁeld was not the same as when they joined the early IBM PC
development back in 1981. The rationalisation regarded the way a computer could be a
common ground for developers (now enterprises) and users (now not necessarily developers).
A ﬁrst condition has been the “emancipation” of “IBM clones” manufacturers from IBM.
Concretely, this meant the opening up of the interface allowing the fabrication of a computer
through the combination of diﬀerent components, the BUS. IBM had kept a ﬁrm control of
this device allowing the connection of the (Intel) microprocessor to the other components of
the computer. Through forming a consortium and proposing industry-wide speciﬁcations for
the Bus, the “Gang of the nine” opened the way for a new form of enterprise collaboration.
As Gawer and Cusumano (2002) contend, Intel practised a more open method for the Bus
management, making sure that a roadmap based consensus was developed with the computer
manufacturers, ensuring that the whole ecosystem went together with the advancement of
the microprocessor (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, 2012).
A second condition was the ability of diﬀerent software enterprises to develop programs for
the PC. Microsoft had covered this space with MS-DOS early on. In addition, it developed
a practive of discussing with its developer community the speciﬁcations and the changes to
the operating system, so that they could exploit its potential.
Thirdly, the windows graphical user interface as developed by Microsoft went along
with the evolution of the computer as a whole, while facilitating computer use for users
beyond developers. In addition, it helped software developers to pass from “programs”
to “applications”, proposing common design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) for end user
interaction. As Andy Grove, CEO of Intel, put it later, graphical interfaces “brought with
them a uniformity for all the application programs that were based on them: You learned
one and you learned them all” (Grove, 1997, p. 113).
Fourth, workstation applications, such as text and spreadsheet editors, have attributed to
73Allan (2001, p. 10/24).
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the microcomputer the “workstation” identity, ensuring income from enterprise users and for
providers. Ceruzzi reports that by 1991, 50% of Microsoft revenue came from applications,
especially Office (Ceruzzi, 2003, p. 313). Still, the use of applications instead of a speciﬁc
workstation product line, rendered the computer capable of addressing diﬀerent market niches
in parallel.
Gawer and Cusumano (2002) study the emergence of the PC dominant design, which
became known as the Wintel model. According to this design and following the fundamental
division between hardware and software, Intel built a platform for the hardware architecture,
while Microsoft the one for the software.
The emergence of Intel ’s leadership came along with the realisation of the need to
establish a close relation with those complementors, rendering the bus a common ground of
reference for the industry:
The willingness of firms to adopt this architectural change, moving from one
bus (IBM’s ISA) to another (Intel’s PCI), and from following one firm (IBM)
to another (Intel), would mark the beginning of a change in leadership in the
computer industry. Until then, who designed or made different parts of the PC
pretty much followed the template IBM had introduced with the original PC
in 1981. But IBM failed to continue as the platform leader for all PCs being
manufactured in the industry. IBM’s weak and unsuccessful attempt in the
mid-1980s to recapture the architectural lead by trying to get the industry to
switch to yet another new proprietary bus technology, MicroChannel, may have
contributed to the decline in its influence.
Intel, by contrast, did not try to benefit from proprietary architectural interfaces
for the PC. Instead, the company made sure that the new PCI specification was
free and open to everyone (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 29).
As we’ve seen in Section 11.3, the bus skeleton of the initial Altair platform - which
became the prototype for IBM PC - had been the actual platform for third party entrepreneurs
to build additional features of for this early PC. Both IBM and Intel inherited its structure.
Hence, it becomes interesting from an architectural point of view to look into the properties
of this feature, as related to the quest for platform leadership.
In a similar mode, Microsoft DOS (and later Windows) controlled the developer and
the user interfaces through the PC platform. On the business level, it meant governing the
terms of innovation for 4.5 million developers at the beginning of the millennium (Gawer and
Cusumano, 2002, p. 135). Regarding the case of Microsoft, Gawer and Cusumano describe
it as a case of an “open but not open” platform. Based on the initial materialisation of the
operating system CP/M (see section 11.2.1), MS DOS (Disk Operating System)
These features are the predecessors of the Web-based APIs, that we met in Part I. As
we’ve also seen in the case of Web 2.0, providing clear manuals on their functionalities
(inputs-outputs) is a crucial issue for third party developers to be able to exploit the re-
sources of a computer (or the network, in the case of the Web) and manufacture compatible
applications. For Baldwin and Clark, these manuals constitute “visible information” on the
interfaces (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 290)
Gawer and Cusumano note:
The industry as a whole had a shared, specific problem - the insufficient capacity
of the bus - but only the solution proposed by Intel was capable of solving that
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common problem while also creating a technical and industrial environment in
which Intel’s future innovations could find the PC system as a convenient cradle.
The PCI and chip set designs introduced a local modular architecture into this
part of the PC that decoupled Intel’s zone of innovation from the rest of the
computer (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 31).
On the other hand, Gawer and Cusumano, describing howMicrosoft used these interfaces
to exercise the other two leviers of platform leadership, “product technology” and “relation-
ships with external complementors”, as they note that knowledge on interfaces wasn’t always
visible to everyone.
Product technology refers to the architecture of the product, the degree of openness of
the interfaces and how much information about the platform and its interfaces to disclose
to outside ﬁrms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 8, 9). Relationships with external comple-
mentors refer to how collaborative versus competitive the relationship should be between the
platform leader or contender and the complementors, since achieving a consensus with their
partners includes dealing with potential conﬂicts (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 9). They
refer to a controversy within the Microsoft ecosystem, which illustrates the use of these two
levers by the ﬁrm:
Not surprisingly, the possibility that Microsoft used these levers to create an
unfair advantage in applications development was a major issue in the antitrust
trial. Some competitors had access not only to Windows engineers but also to
“undocumented calls” or low-level APIs found in Windows, which they might
use when writing applications (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, p. 144).
Hence, the control of interfac related information is strongly related with the attribution
of design space to third parties. This information is necessary for developing extensions, or
applications, a ﬁeld that the platform provider may also reserve for himself, as in the case of
Microsoft Office or Internet Explorer (Cusumano and Yoﬃe, 1998; Benkeltoum, 2008).
11.6 Cycle breaks: the Web browser and Linux
Two innovations introduced the breaking of the cycle of the PC industry.
In April 1994, Marc Andreessen, a leader of the hacker group in the University of Illinois
that had developedMosaic, the ﬁrst “universal” browser operating for diﬀerent devices, along
with Jim Clark founded Netscape. At the end of the year, they released Navigator, their ﬁrst
product, which quickly became the preferred browser for the early Internet user community.
A few months later, Microsoft responded by giving away its Internet Explorer for free along
with Windows. Not being able to compete, Netscape was acquired by America On Line
in 1998 (Cusumano and Yoﬃe, 1999). Some months that, Netscape would “liberate” its
Navigator, turning it into free software (Benkeltoum, 2008).
Hence, while the browser market was still under emergence, both Microsoft and Netscape
returned to a previous phase, the one of non-commercial use of software. The Web browser
became thus a “feature” of the computer, while Web market emergence would deploy with
“portals” during the dot.com bubble and in recent years with Web-based applications.
A second cycle break was that of Linux. As Gawer and Cusumano (2002) mention,
tight control of Application Programming Interfaces by Microsoft caused a dissatisfaction of
developers, who returned to a previous phase of non-commercialisation, especially in what
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regards software development interfaces. Linux would give birth to a variety of user-developer
communities (Benkeltoum, 2008), while it would become a basis for developer-entrepreneurs
to create Web services.
11.7 Conclusion
The invention of the PC ended up being a disruption (Christensen, 1997) for the business of
enterprise computers. Still, this disruption possibility was very diﬃcult to anticipate before
the early 1990’s, when the progressive rationalisation of what once was considered to be
a “home” computer contributed to the deployment of the potential for enterprise use. In
parallel, this rationalisation was largely based on a conception of the computers further
extension, since it has been largely based on both the design and the sharing of developers
and users’ interfaces.
Early computer materialisations were undertaken by user-developer communities during
the 1970s. While many of the later commercial PC concepts ﬁnd their origin in this period,
market emergence has not simply been an issue of innovation diﬀusion and adoption, as
proposed by Rogers (1962, 2003). Beyond the scaling of production - itself being a crucial
challenge for early developers-entrepreneurs - additional innovations were required for the PC
to form an expanding market. The case of a graphical user interface, initially introduced into
the market by Apple to be later re-framed by Microsoft for the entire industrial setting, has
been a critical innovation for end users to be able to appropriate the new object and, thus,
for diﬀusion to penetrate to a public other than that of its initial developers. As was also
the case after the enterprise computer market emergence for IBM engineers, the question
“what can our computer do?” also preoccupied Apple designers for years after their PC
commercialisation.
Early user-developer innovations were decisive for the exploration of the PC concept.
Still, user innovation norms (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006) had to be questioned
for the market to emerge. In the PC case, this rupture came “from inside” of the early UD
communities and not from the enterprises. On the one hand, PC device commercialisation
was widely welcomed by the community, as computers had already been commercialised
before. On the other hand, software commercialisation was more controversial, since it had
not been envisioned as a separate market before.
Wintel, the eventual rationalisation model, required a “platform leadership” (Gawer and
Cusumano, 2002) based on a division of “scope” between the diﬀerent enterprises that had
emerged from early developers-entrepreneurs during foggy competition.
Phase breaks came through the questioning of the dominant design either by questioning
the Wintel rationalisation (in the case of Linux shared programming interfaces) or by using
it to question the boundaries of the PC (as in the case of the Web browser application).
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The invention of the Radio
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12.1 Introduction
12.1.1 Chapter overview
The current chapter examines the development of the radio communications industry. Ta-
ble 12.1 provides a synoptic overview of the chapter.
Section 12.2 studies the Early Materialisation phase and its input from the previous
research communities. The potential of a “radio telegraph” concept was projected within
the discussion of a scientiﬁc community exploring the possibilities of electromagnetic theory
use. Marconi, who could be characterised as a user-developer-entrepreuner, had participated
in the discussion of this milieu and the development of a device, solving the problem of long
distance transmission. Using family contacts, Marconi managed to access the early British
exploratory collectivity and to ﬁnd his ﬁrst client, for whom the early materialisation would
be undertaken, the British Navy. The Early Materialisation phase would last until the World
War I. Despite the eﬀorts at a market emergence, initiated by national governments, the
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radio system remained conﬁned to ad hoc settings for speciﬁc uses. Marconi exploited his
patents to block others from exploiting the radio telegraph. Diﬀerent innovations during
this phase opened up the potential of cheap, continuous signal transmission and reception,
though many developers-entrepreneurs would not manage to compete with Marconi. Radio
communications would also be explored during the same period by user developer clubs,
as knowledge of radio transmission had been diﬀused by technical magazines as well as by
Marconi’s Press.
After the war, the US would meet the expansion of radio user developer communities.
Market Emergence (Section 12.3) would come as a surprise, when RCA (an alliance taking the
place of American Marconi) would realise that the sales of its radio receiver ’side-products’
exceeded every prediction. A business ecosystem was created, exploring the trajectory of
radio broadcasting and radio programming.
Eventually, the advertisement-based economic model and the creation of broadcasting
associations, along with the rationalisation of radio production and radio frequency use would
provide the principles of radio broadcasting as it was eventually diﬀused (Section 12.5).
Disruption of the radio broadcasting industry would come from the radar, developed
before the WWII.
12.2 Early Materialisation
12.2.1 Intermittent signal transmission: the “radio telegraph”
concept
Marconi, a young developer-entrepreneur, managed to materialise the radio telegraph by ex-
ploiting the theory and the concepts that had been elaborated and discussed by the scientiﬁc
community, as Table 12.2 brieﬂy summarizes.
A crucial point in the history of radio waves exploitation was the invention of Hertz.
Heinrich Rudolf Hertz, a German physicist, managed through his experimental device not
only to prove Maxwell’s theory, but to actually develop a way to produce, transmit and
receive electromagnetic - or Hertzian - waves, in 18871. Thereafter, scientists from diﬀerent
countries would immediately begin to produce alternative materialisations of radio wave
transmitters and receivers. Still, much of this research would remain in the framework of
academic circles, until Marconi created an early materialisation of a “radio telegraph” for
the English Navy in the late 1890s.
Just as in the the early phase of the mainframe computer2, as well as in the case of
the personal computer3, the new object was developed and sold on a phenomenologically
1Hong (2001).
2See Section 10.2.
3See Section 11.2.
Key telegraph functions Technologies First used by/in
Signal Generation Spark gap Hertz (1887)
Signal Transmission By grounding Marconi (1894), (telegraphy)
Signal Reception Coherer Branly (1890)
Table 12.2: Key architectural elements of the radio telegraph materialisation by Marconi.
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“old identity” of the object (“the telegraph”), until developer communities further explored
the value of the new object. Some years after Hertz’s invention, the concept of a “wireless
telegraph” was projected by the British physicist William Crookes. In his 1892 article for the
Fortnightly Review4, Crookes reviewed the undergone recent experimentations about radio
transmission and forecast the concept of a telegraphy without wires as follows:
"Here, then, is revealed the bewildering possibility of telegraphy without wires,
posts, cables, or any of our present costly appliances."
Crookes claimed to having assisted in home experiments where messages were transmitted
from one place to another5 and went on to describe the requirements of a radio telegraph:
the ability to generate signals of any desired wave-length, the ability to receive and respond to
those messages between certain deﬁned limits, the ability to direct the signal. While Crookes’
article did not attract the interest of the general public before the activity of Marconi deploys,
it did attract the interest of early inventors6, who began experimenting.
Another British physicist, Oliver Lodge, studying lightning, formulated in the same period
the theory of a possibility to produce an electromagnetic oscillation through a ﬂash7. The
presentation of his ideas caused a public controversy with the “electricians”, led by William
Preece of the Post Oﬃce in 18888. Lodge further continued his work and in 1894, during
a memorial lecture at the Royal Institution a few months after Hertz’s death, he presented
the results of his research leading to the creation of a simple though eﬃcient way to create
a radio receiver (or “coherer” ). The design of the coherer (generally constituted by ﬁne
copper ﬁlings in a glass tube) had been outlined earlier, in 1891 by the British journal The
electrician that had published the translation of a related article of the French physicist
Edouard Branly describing the setting9.
A few months later, when invited to Oxford to give the same speech, Lodge illustrated
experimentally a way to transmit “sparks”10. However, the transmission of Morse signals
was experimentally undertaken by a Russian physicist, Aleksandr Stepanovich Popov, a bit
later and was published in the Journal of the Russian Physico-Chemical Society in January
189611. Nevertheless, the challenge of the possibility of long distance radio waves transmis-
sion remained opened.
Guglielmo Marconi, an Italian 20-year-old user-developer, developed a radio telegraph in
his parent’s farm, managing to transmit a signal over a two mile distance. In 1886, when he
was 22, after his parents failed to convince the Italian government to exploit his invention,
Marconi went to London. There, using his mother’s Irish-born connections in London, he was
introduced to Preece of the British Post Oﬃce and subsequently to the English government12.
Regarding the “how to”, Marconi solved the long distance transmission issue, by using the
same principle that had enabled the transmission of wired telegraph signals earlier: through
4“Some possibilities of Electricity”, William Crookes, Fortnightly Review, February 1, 1892, pages 174-
176.
5According to Garratt (1994) this early experimenter has been David Edward Hughes, in 1879 and
demonstrated to a number of distinguished scientists, including Crookes in 1880. Still, the discouraging
comments he received did not help him advance his exploration.
6Sterling and Kittross (2002a, p. 28).
7Garratt (1994, pp. 51-58).
8Ibid.
9Hong (2001, p. 4).
10Ibid. 65-66
11Ibid. pp.71-74
12Sterling and Kittross (2002b, p. 28).
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grounding the one scale of the circuit to the earth - and using radio waves for the other13. A
design that surprised the community by its simplicity, once revealed by his patent application
in 1897, as many researchers had tried to solve it.
Marconi is often described as a “practician”, although he was awarded the Nobel Prize
for Physics in 1909, along with German physicist Karl Ferdinand Braun. Here is how Marconi
described his association with radiotelegraphy in his Nobel lecture14:
In sketching the history of my association with radiotelegraphy, I might mention
that I never studied physics or electrotechnics in the regular manner, although
as a boy I was deeply interested in those subjects.
I did, however, attend one course of lectures on physics under the late Professor
Rosa at Livorno, and I was, I think I might say, fairly well acquainted with the
publications of that time dealing with scientific subjects.
He became aware of the research progress on the concept by attending University of
Bologna courses on electromagnetic theory,15 and by joining a community of scientists and
electricians of the time, through talks and articles16.
While not being an academic was one of the distinctive characteristics of the young
Marconi in relation to the early exploration community, having an entrepreneurial orientation
was the most important. In fact, he founded his enterprise (the Wireless Telegraph & Signal
Company) in 1987, and by exploiting family contacts, he collaborated with British Navy
oﬃcials and managed to have a ﬁrst order in 1897. Marconi’s system would be a ﬁrst
successful materialisation, in the sense that it provided a use value for a speciﬁc task.
Some years later he signed a full contract with the navy for a telegraph system (in 1903),
having already installed more than a hundred new stations17.
Marconi had inherited from previous researchers a theory, an exploratory collectivity and
a projection of the potential of a radio telegraph. He had yet to develop a manner of how
to, compared to previous criteria, stabilize a collectivity and create new criteria. A great
challenge was the transantlantic transmission, which experimentally succeeded in 1901. The
criteria for radio telegraphs evolved to be the distance of transmission and the quality of
reception.
Still, Marconi’s telegraph has been the de facto leader of a new emerging market and was
thus widely discussed in the press, while he had close relationships to most of the scientists
of his time, recruiting scientiﬁc radio pioneers to his enterprise18.
Radio telegraph was further developed until WWI and is often described as a competitive
technology to submarine cables. Still, it introduced a use value that was radically new, the
possibility for maritime communication, either to shore stations or ship-to-ship. After the war,
Marconi’s technology was a standard for the domain. This success triggered the involvement
of the USA. Action was taken by the US government, leading Marconi to abdicate ownership
of his American division as well as the related rights19. Hence, a new era began in the US,
with a multitude of actors taking over market exploitation.
13Hong (2001, p. 23).
14GUGLIELMO MARCONI Wireless telegraphic communication Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1909,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1909/marconi-lecture.pdf .
15Flichy (1995a); Aitken (1985).
16Flichy (1995a).
17Flichy (1995a)
18Hong (2001, p. 27).
19Hanson (1998).
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12.2.2 Continuous signal transmission: from “radio telegraph” to
“radio telephone”
In the beginnings of the 20th century radio was still used for telegraphs by Marconi’s stations
using Morse signals. The passing to voice transmission required additional innovations. The
invention of the “audion” enabled the transmission and reception of a continuous wave and,
thus, voice and music. The key elements of the radio-telephone are outlined in Table 12.3.
With the radio telephone most of the elements of radio broadcasting have been there for
radio broadcasting, except for a public equipped with receivers.
Key telephone
functions
Technologies First used by/in
Signal Generation Alternator Fesseden & GE (1903)
Audion De Forest (1906)
Signal Transmis-
sion
By grounding Marconi (1894), (telegraphy)
By stronger signal (Alterna-
tor)
Fesseden & GE (1903)
By signal enforcement (Au-
dion feedback)
De Forest (1906)
Signal Reception Coherer Branly (1890)
Audion
De Forest (property discov-
ered later)
Table 12.3: Key architectural elements of the radio telephone materialisation by de Forest.
From 1902 to 1906 a set of inventions made voice transmission possible. In 1900, Lodge,
a renowned British scientist, while presenting the advances in radio telegraphy in his book
“Signalling through space without wires: Being a description of the work of Hertz & his
successors” noted that they had observed in the laboratory that a telephone device could be
used as a receiver of telegraph waves20. One year later, Reginald A. Fessenden, university
teacher and a former partner of Edison21, who was working for the U.S. Weather Bureau,
experimentally demonstrated that voice transmission could be done. In 1902 he founded
the National Electric Signalling Company for the development of this concept, claiming that
this could be achieved by a continuous wave, on which modulations would be superimposed,
instead of a wave interrupted with intermittent impositions, as in the case of the radio
telegraph22. He had asked General Electrics to build an alternator, a big and expensive
device that could however produce an almost continuous signal. In Christmas 1906 he would
make the ﬁrst voice and music broadcast to those in Massachusetts who had a receiver
mainly ships and newspapers)23. General Electrics would thus become an actor in the radio-
telephony industry for the next years.
20Lodge, Oliver. Signalling across space without wires: being a description of the work of Hertz and his
successors, 1900, p.23.
21Flichy (2004, p. 163).
22Hilliard (2005, pp.7-8).
23Sterling and Kittross (2002b, p. 30-31).
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In 1904 in England, the engineer Sir John A. Fleming, also a scientiﬁc advisor of Marconi,
showed that a vacuum tube (a diode) could be used as a receiver24. In 1906, an American
researcher who did his PhD on Hertzian waves, Lee de Forrest, would introduce a third
element to the diode, creating the audion (or triode). While it was initially created for signal
generation (oscillator), some years later it was discovered that it could make a suitable
reception device (detector), as it managed to amplify the signal and enable long distance
voice transmission25.
In 1908, de Forest travelled to Paris, where he organized a spectacular presentation of
the radio from the Eiﬀel Tower, receivable at a distance of 800 km. He made a transmission
programme along with his wife, who played the piano26. Hence, this early materialisation
of De Forest’s concept to “distribute sweet melody broadcast over the city and the sea so
that in time even the mariner far out across the silent waves may hear the music of his
homeland”, as he described it in his diary27, illustrated the potential for radio broadcasting.
De Forest’s invention would be proven fundamental for the further development of the radio,
and despite the fact that he had patented his audion early on, he did not manage to succeed
in the commercial steps. Financial problems led him to sell some of his rights to AT&T.
AT&T then used audio as a components of its telephone network to transmit telephone
signals over long distances.
12.2.3 Silicon detectors and the UD-based exploration of radio
communication
A less recognised invention was the one of Greenleaf W. Pickard. Pickard, after having
studied in Harvard and in MIT, worked for AT&T from 1902 to 1906, where he experimented
with radio telephony. He engaged in experimentations for constructing an alternative receiver
(reportedly, he tested more than 30,000 combinations of materials for detectors). Pickard
ended up with a design of a crystal detector using silicon. Unlike other detectors, this was
very cheap, light and easy to fabricate. Soon, it became the basis for user-developers to join
the radio waves28.
The ﬁrst radio transmission closer to radio broadcasting as we know it today was the
radio station operated by Charles Herrold in San Jose, California. Herrold had set up a radio
station and distributed crystal receivers to the town inhabitants in 1909, mainly in hotels,
and operated it until the outbreak of WWI, when all user developer radio transmissions were
prohibited. For Herrold it was a “side-project”, as his main activity had been the “Herrold
College”. During the war, the college became one of the places were radio technicians were
trained29.
Around the same period, the ﬁrst UD radio clubs began to spring up. In 1909, ﬁve
adolescents created in New York one of the earliest radio clubs, the Junior Wireless Club
Ltd, two members of which would some years later create one of the earliest radio stations30.
Similar groups would spread across the USA, with the ones in San Francisco to become more
24Flichy, Hilliard, op.cit.
25Flichy, op.cit, Hong (2001, p. 119).
26Flichy (1995a, p. 107), Hijiya (1992, p. 126).
27Barnouw (1966, p. 20).
28Sterling and Kittross (2002b, p. 37); Greenleaf W. Pickard - Biography, IEEE Global History Network,
http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/index.php/Greenleaf_W._Pickard
29Sterling and Kittross (2002b, p. 45), Sturgeon (2000).
30Walker (2001, p. 13).
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important as the new technology was particularly useful to the sailors of the region. Before
that, electrical user developer magazines had provided the know-how for developing wireless
telegraphs at a small cost31.
Marconi’s neglected contribution: a privileged relationship with UDs
Having a second reading of the history or radio industry one can identify similarities between
the cases studied on computer industry and the radio one, rethinking the role of the Marconi
and his enterprise.
While aggressive towards potential competitors, American Marconi cared a lot about
providing users with the necessary knowledge not only to use its equipment, but also to
experiment with new uses. Thus, they founded a dedicated company, Marconi Publishing
Corporation to undertake this challenge. It is from these editions that the organisation of
radio clubs, embryos of the radio professional and business class, would be further organised.
The Wireless Age Magazine
Wireless Age magazine was ﬁrst published by Marconi Publishing Corporation and speciﬁcally
its subsidiary, Wireless Press, in 191332. After the war, during the RCA’s emergence, when
Marconi was led to sell his US enterprise as well as the intellectual property related to it, the
magazine continued being published by Wireless Press, though under the ownership of RCA
in 192033, to eventually stop being issued in 1925.
The initial title of the magazine was 34:
“The Wireless Age. An illustrated Monthly Magazine of RADIO COMMUNICA-
TION”.
Incorporating the Marconigraph
By the time Wireless Age magazine was published, the user developer public had begun to ob-
tain visibility, mainly through electrical engineering magazines35. The term “Marconigraph”,
31See for instance the article “HOW TO CONSTRUCT AN EFFICIENT WIRELESS TELEGRAPH APPA-
RATUS AT A SMALL COST”, Frederic Collins,Scientiﬁc American Supplement, February 15, 1902, pages
21,849-21,850. Available in the following URL: http://earlyradiohistory.us/1902cons.htm
32Beyond Wireless Age magazine, Wireless Press also published a plead of radio user developer handbooks.
33(Wenaas, 2007, p. 32).
34Wireless Age, April 1914, Vol. 1, no7.
35Thomas White, editor of the Wireless Age, recalls in his book:
In mid-1908, Modern Electrics notiﬁed its readers that it was preparing a "Wireless Registry" of
amateurs, and was planning to publish an annual national “Blue Book” listing - its July, 1908
review of the Wireless Registry listed the ﬁrst ten members. A few months later, the January,
1909 issue of Modern Electrics announced its formation of a free “Wireless Association of
America” - by January, 1910 the W.A.O.A., now claiming 3,000 members, was rallying its
membership to ﬁght the proposed Roberts bill, warning that “Congress threatens to pass a
law licensing all amateurs”. Meanwhile, in its September, 1908 issue, Electrician and Mechanic
reviewed the 114 charter members of its own free organization in The Wireless Club, which
promoted both national and local groups of amateurs. The magazine’s ﬁrst locally aﬃliated
group, “Wireless Club 1”, was formed in Chicago, Illinois, and beginning with its October,
1908 issue, a new monthly Wireless Club column featured news of interest to amateurs and
experimenters.
Thomas White, United States Early Radio History, Pioneering Amateurs (1900-1917). URL:
http://earlyradiohistory.us/sec012.htm Retrieved on 2/12/2012.
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not referred in the literature, was however an intermediary term, reﬂecting the richness of
Marconi’s devices, beyond the concept of the radio telegraph, for which Marconi’s equip-
ment was, at the same time, the standard. After WWI, the orientation of the magazine
towards user developers of radio broadcasting became more evident, as radio broadcasting
illustrations ﬁgured on most of its cover pages.
In this magazine, one could ﬁnd articles on the components as well as use cases (initially
related with the role of radio telegraph to sea communication). Speciﬁc tribute was given to
user developers themselves, where they published their own designs improving or modifying
“Marconigraphs”, hosted in the speciﬁc column “From and for those who help themselves,
Experimenters’ Experiences”, their comments in the column “Comments and Criticism” and
had their questions answered in “Queries Answered”. While generally focussed on Marconi’s
platform, the magazine presented equipment from other enterprises as well, either in the
form of paid advertisement or in the form of review articles.
An interesting ﬁgure for this magazine - though neglected by the scholars of the period
- was Elmer Butcher, a Marconi engineer who passed to RCA along with other Marconi
executives. Like Bill Gates for the Alto User Group, Butcher was responsible for supporting
the community of UDEs by providing them twith he necessary knowledge. This knowledge
included detailed speciﬁcations on Marconi’s platform structure, a know-how that Butcher
had from being a Marconi engineer36. However, the knowledge base that Butcher diﬀused
to the public of the magazine through his articles was not limited to technical speciﬁcations.
Butcher became a supporter and an advocate of Radio Clubs providing advice on their
animation. His pamphlet on how to conduct a radio club was promoted by Wireless Magazine
and appeared in multiple editions (Figure 12.1).
Developers-Entrepreneurs and their “parallel economy”
In fact, Butcher preferred the term “radio experimenter” to the one of “amateur”. Besides,
as indicated by late 20th century institutionalist researchers’ approaches for the “amateur
problem” (Leblebic et al., 1991), the status of the amateurs at the time polarised public opin-
ion, in a similar fashion to the way the term “hacker” does today. Butcher characteristically
mentions in the author’s note to the 1920 edition37:
It is an error of statement to characterize the whole army of wireless exper-
imenters in the United States as mere “amateurs.” Hundreds of men, young
and old, who have been classed as wireless amateurs are in fact physicists of
the highest calibre. They find experimentation in radio not only an instructive
mode of recreation, but many of them engage in the work with serious intentions
hoping thereby to contribute their mite towards the general progress of the art.
That many have made good in that respect is a matter of historical record.
The amateur wireless experimenter is no longer considered a menace. His status
is now settled. He proved his worth in the recent European conflict as Govern-
ment officials have publicly acknowledged. The amateur radio expert today is
36In the framework in his engineering work in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America, Butcher
has been issued some patents for radio technologies. See for instance patents in USPTO Number 1263204,
Issue date: Apr 16, 1918 and Patent number: 1257672, Issue date: Feb 26, 1918. Source: Google Patents,
http://www.google.com/patents/US1263204 and http://www.google.com/patents/US1257672 . Retrieved
on 2/12/2012.
37Butcher 1920, p. III.
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Figure 12.1: How to conduct a radio club. A promoting article of the book in the Wireless
Age. Source: The Wireless Age (February, 1918), 5, no.5, p. 433. Available online at the
URL: http://archive.org/stream/n05wirelessage05nyne#page/432/mode/2up
recognized as a safeguard against possible future emergencies. He has the back-
ing of America’s foremost scientists, the good will of the Army and Navy, and
the commercial company sees in him a potential engineer or expert operator.
The above mentioned testimonial goes along with the observation of Barnouw (1966)
that amateur communities became the pool of radio professional recruitment, an observation
which questions a view that opposes user-developers and enterprises. In fact, the
By the time of the RCA’s emergence through government regulations, the thousands of
radio user-developer-entrepreneurs were forming a parallel economy, not limited to being the
ﬁrst clientele for radio receiver components before the RCA’s product, but also engaging in
commercial activity:
All over the country amateurs - they now numbered tens of thousands - were
buying parts and putting sets together. People wanted to buy these, so the
amateurs sold them and got more parts and made more sets. Amateurs were
also making transmitters, often using one or more parts sold by RCA. (. . . )
The amateur-made transmitters were leaving garages and attics and were, in
many cases, appearing up the buildings of newspapers, department stores, hotels.
AT&T was up in arms. These transmitters were not being used for amateur
purposes but - said AT&T- for telephony as a service, in many cases with a
business purpose (Barnouw, 1966, p. 86).
So called “attic radio manufacturers” provided the public the components and the books
to build their own radio transmitter or receiver. Moreover, the early UDE public became a
pool for the emergence of radio professionals. According to Barnouw, “many of those who
started and directed radio broadcasting in the 1920 were ‘amateurs’ in the fertile time before
the WWI”38.
12.3 Market Emergence: the radio receivers sales
surprise
By the time of their spectacular market emergence in 1922, UDEs had expanded across the
USA. In 1917 the government had issued 8500 emission licences, while the number of radio
stations was estimated at 12300039. Table compares the situtation of radio broadcasting
during market emergence and after the rationalisation of the 1930s. During the early 1920s,
user-developers-entrepreneurs assured the entire process of radio broadcasting, from both
device and content production to distribution. Early adopters would buy the devices and listen
to the programs. After the rationalisation, discussed in the following sections, device and
content production were made by enterprises, while radio was no longer used for conversation.
However, the role of UDEs is not equally valued by all scholars. Typically enough, Leblebic
et al. (1991), studying the history of American broadcasting, saw amateurs as a “pirates”
creating a “problem” for “stability”, which the RCA sought to solve:
Such pirating posed serious threats to stability, since equipment sales were the
only economic transactions available to participants in the earliest days of radio.
In 1921 the problems were addressed by a pooling agreement between the major
38Barnouw (1966, p. 28).
39Barnouw (1966, p. 55).
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Market Emergence Industrial Rationalisation
Radio Elements UDE
Early
Adopters
Manu-
facturers
Media Users
Device Transmitter ✦ ❢ ✦ $ ❢
Receiver ✦ $ ✦ ❢ $
Content Program ✦
listen
only
❢ ✦
listen only
(Ads)
Conversation ✦ ❢ ❢ ❢ ❢
Table 12.4: The state of radio broadcasting during Market Emergence and Industrial ratio-
nalisation.
Symbols:
✦: Production undertaken by actor,
$ : Good purchased by actor,
❢ : Actor not interested in the feature.
patent holders, including GE (General Electric), AT&T (American Telephone &
Telegraph), and International Radio & Telegraph. Westinghouse, together with
its own radio station, KDKA, joined the pool several months later (Leblebic
et al., 1991, p. 341).
Nevertheless, as we have already mentioned, the merchant value of radio broadcasting
became evident for enterprises once it had been explored and expanded by numerous UDE
communities. Besides, the very debate on patents had prohibited a market emergence before
the war, rendering exploitation and exploration processes extremely precarious. The war
ended these controversies, as all knowledge on radio was nationalised.
Still, as Flichy notes, the performance of those radio amateur broadcasts was mediocre,
in terms of signal clarity and bandwidth40. For Flichy, in order for the radio to become a
general public medium, an industrial production as well as a large scale commercialisation of
receivers was necessary, an initiative that was ﬁrst undertaken by Westinghouse 41, who had
acquired Fessenden’s patents after the war42.
The RCA (Radio Corporation of America) came about as a result of government inter-
vention. It was a particular kind of consortium company, putting together diﬀerent electrical
and telecommunication companies, General Electric, AT&T, Westinghouse, the latter having
been previously active in the telegraphy and radio components business43. Still, we should
note that Marconi’s knowledge transfer to the RCA might nothave been as successful with-
out the recruitment by the RCA of a number of Marconi employees, such as Sarnoﬀ44, a
40Flichy (2004, p. 169).
41Ibid. p. 171.
42Sterling and Kittross (2002b, p. 31-32).
43Hanson (1998).
44Sarnoﬀ started in his early years as an “oﬃce boy” in American Marconi enterprise, to become a
telegraph operator a few years later in the same enterprise. He became known in the US public when he was
21 years old, as he was the operator that received the SOS message from the Titanic in 1912, diﬀusing the
information to the media and organising the rescue operation through the ships that were close45. During
the WWI he was Commercial Manager of Marconi Telegraph Company of America (Wireless Age, July 1917,
p. 707.
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Marconi’s executive, who moved to RCA and played a crucial role in its business strategy46.
The RCA begun its operations following the already known trajectory and competing on
the telegraph market, enforced by the fact that the new technology allowed oﬀering lower
prices47.
As business in wireless telegraph was going well, the emergence of the radio broadcasting
market was a surprise for RCA. In its 1922 Annual Report, RCA mentioned48:
At the time your Corporation was formed in 1919, for the purpose of building up a
world-wide international wireless communication system, wireless telephony had
not passed out of the experimental stage, and it was not at that time foreseen
that the broadcasting art would ever reach the high point of popularity that it has
in the last year. The engineers and scientists had anticipated the development
of wireless telephony for communication purposes, but no one had visualized the
phenomenal expansion of wireless telephony as used today for broadcasting.
In the last year the number of broadcasting stations has grown from less than
twenty to almost six hundred. The art itself is advancing very fast, and the
ultimate effect of broadcasting upon the economic, social, religious, political,
educational life of the country and the world, is comparable only with that of
the discovery of printing 500 years ago.
In fact, the number of in-home radio receivers grew from 5 thousand units in 1920 to
25 million units in 192449. Figure 12.2 shows how the revenues from radio receiver sales
outstripped all other commercial activities of the enterprise during 1920s. The comparison
between revenues from radio sales and other business models used during the 1920s by the
RCA is overwhelming. As Hanson mentions, “merely the presence of a radio station in a
town created a rush to buy radio sets”. .
For economists studying the history of the radio industry (Long, 1987, and others) this
is the time when radio business begins. However, the spectacular growth of radio receiver
sales indicates that when major enterprises entered, the market was already there, as also
happened, for instance, a lot later when IBM entered the PC market in 1981.
46For an extensive review on Sarnoﬀ’s role in RCA and radio industry, see Bilby (1986).
47Hanson (1998) reports that RCA’s prices for a telegraph to Norway from the USA costed 30% less that
with the conventional one.
48Cited in Hanson (1998, p. 50).
49Sturgeon (2000, p. 16).
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Figure 12.2: RCA revenues during the 1920s. Source: Hanson (1998).
12.4 Foggy competition
In the Popular Science magazine in November 1921, a user-developer, Armstrong Perry,
published an article on his experience on using radio. It was entitled “How I Listen on the
World by Radio”50. Given the experience we have today about radio listening, the author’s
description may seem awkward:
It is not a passive sport, this radio game. With my transmitting apparatus I can
exchange messages with neighbours five to ten miles away. And, all the radio
adventures that I am having, any man or woman, boy or girl, can duplicate. I
began when I was forty and only with a few dollars’ worth of apparatus. With
just my old mineral detector and a single phone on July the second I heard the
description of the Dempsey-Carpentier prize-fight, blow by blow, given by an
expert at the ringside.
In some lines, Perry describes the use of a radio device he developed by mixing compo-
nents of other devices, to enjoy things we enjoy today through the Web, though ones that
have been provided by a set of diﬀerent services during the previous century. Hence, he ex-
changed messages with distant neighbours (an activity typically enabled today by telephone
or chat services), these messages were copied by other users (an activity commonly observed
today in blogging or social networking services) and he listened to sports radio transmissions.
The last activity is the only one that is still served by radio broadcasting, while the others
are not consistent with the radio as we know it today.
During foggy competition, the division of business domains was not clear. Radio devices’
manufacturing as well as radio emission production were undertaken by the same entity,
50“How I Listen on the World by Radio”, Armstrong Perry, in Popular Science, Nov. 1921, Bonnier
Corporation, 122 pages, p. 108.
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be it UDE or enterprise. Hence this design and work division between radio devices and
broadcasting content has since deﬁned the industry, in a similar way that “hardware” and
“software” divisions marked the computer industry later. Regarding radio broadcasting,
diﬀerent economical models were proposed for its ﬁnancing: state tax to the receivers,
charging the transmitter, advertisement, the latter model being eventually accepted by the
US government51.
12.5 Broadcasting rationalisation: regulation,
professionalisation, engineering.
The rationalisation of the radio broadcasting business came with the foundation of two
broadcasting companies, NBC and CBS. For Patrice Flichy, once CBS was created, the
fundamental principles of the American radio broadcasting were established and remained
unchanged since52. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) came out of the union between
diﬀerent local broadcasters, supported by RCA, Westinghouse and General Electric, in 1927
53. This initiative came four years after the foundation of NBC (National Broadcasting Com-
pany), the latter having emerged from the AT&T initiative to build a centralised, national
network, in the image of its telephony one.
Still, knowledge about radio frequencies had to be rationalised as well. A ﬁrst synthesis
regarding the use of radio frequencies came out of members of the radio community. Rudolf
Duncan and Charles Drew, engineers engaged both in military use and in radio clubs wrote
the book “Radio telegraphy and telephony, a complete textbook for students of wireless
communication” and was ﬁrst published in 1929.
A second, scientiﬁc synthesis was the work of Stanford professor, Fred Terman. Terman
was largely engaged in the entrepreneurial activity in the West Coast, helping his students
in their ﬁrst steps54. In 1932 he published a Radio Engineers Handbook, which was later
republished including newer knowledge. This Handbook became the reference for the protag-
onists of the industry. As mentioned in a later edition “the purpose of the ‘Radio Engineers’
Handbook’ is to provide a reference book summarizing the body of engineering knowledge
that is the basis of radio and electronics”55. The Handbook was written in a way in which
the reader “does not need to have an entire library within arm’s reach in order to obtain the
answer to most problems, and yet knows just where to go for further information” 56.
This book included knowledge on circuit elements and theory, vacuum tubes and elec-
tronics and other radio system components, radio wave processing and transmission theory as
well as measurements techniques. Overall though, it was a book written for action, drawing
not only from the teaching of Stanford’s lab, but from other major corporations as well.
Finally, in 1934, the US government created the Federal Communications Commission,
in charge of regulating the use of radio frequencies. At that time more than 60% of the
country’s homes had radios in 1934, and radio sets could be found in more than 1.5 million
automobiles57.
51Flichy (2004, p. 173).
52Flichy (2004, p. 174).
53Barnouw (1966); Flichy (2004).
54His most known students were Hewlett and Packard, who created the homonym enterprise in 1935.
55Terman (1943, p. v).
56Ibid.
57Hilliard (2005, p. 72-73).
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12.6 Conclusion
The early materialisation phase of the radio industry was largely ruled by an entrepreneur,
Marconi, who managed to use the knowledge of early research exploratory collectivities
and add the missing elements to commercialise the ’radio telegraph’. Marconi managed
to integrate additional innovations by recruiting a network of scientists as advisors, while
he made use of his patents to protect his monopoly. Additional innovations by researchers
opened up the possibility for radio broadcasting, though their inventors had a hard time in
commercialising them. UDEs, though, managed to advance radio broadcasting, based on
the knowledge their magazines provided, once cheaper ways to transmit and receive radio
signals were invented.
After the war, the emergence of the radio market came as a surprise. Initially, radio has
been introduced as a disruption (Christensen, 1997) of the telegraph market. However, as
RCA came to realize, the radio broadcasting market was a lot more proﬁtable than the radio
telegraph one. Radio has been diﬀused as an innovation (Rogers, 2003) by UDEs, though
the nature of broadcasting did not imply a business model for radio emission. Users had
been using radio in an horizontal way (von Hippel and Katz, 2002), while a division of tasks
according to use-related and manufacturer related knowledge (von Hippel, 1990) was not
yet the case.
The foggy competition phase consisted in the exploitation of radio broadcasting while still
exploring ways to produce a program and beneﬁt from it. Early user-developers became the
pool where entrepreneurs and the professionals of the new ﬁeld emerged from. Eventually,
rationalisation came by the division of manufacturing, broadcasting and listening - process
which required both a knowledge synthesis and a business regulation.
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Chapter 13
Conclusion of Part II
While in the ﬁrst part of my research, user-developer-entrepreneurs (UDEs) appeared to be
a peculiarity of Web-based application development, as they did not enter the frameworks of
analysis of either user or manufacturer innovations paradigms (von Hippel and von Krogh,
2003, 2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), the study of the history of diﬀerent industrial
settings has shown that the activity of those ﬁgures is not peculiar to the ﬁeld of Web
services, as phenomenon-based research suggests.
The “problematization” of UDEs activity though, constructed in the ﬁrst part, allowed me
to revisit the work of historians on three industries (enterprise computer, personal computer
and radio), revealing a diﬀerent reality of industrial emergence than the one already described
by prominent scholars such as Rogers (1962), Christensen (1997) and von Hippel (2005).
Still, the fact that other industries had also met such actors does not render my ﬁndings
irrelevant to the Web service innovation phenomenon. On the contrary, it adds new insights
to the way such actors contribute in the parallel exploration and exploitation of the industrial
potential, and it brings in new knowledge on pro-active methods which enterprises of the
ﬁeld can use to face potential disruptions. By using such methods, disruption is not solely a
“threat” but it is at the same time an opportunity for established actors.
13.1 The role of UDEs in different phases of industrial
development
The study of the emergence and the development of three industrial settings has led to the
identiﬁcation of the possibility to analyse industrial development in the following phases:
Early Materialisation, Market Emergence, Foggy Competition and Industrial Rationalisation.
The Early Materialisation phase consists in the construction of the ﬁrst objects that make
use of a new theory illustrating a value potential. Such objects are created by user-developers
(UDs), usually close to academic circles, often Ph.Ds (e.g. Mauchly and Eckert), though not
necessarily (eg Marconi). These materialisations are more than prototypes, as they are able to
satisfy the requirements of a particular use. We can distinguish two types of materialisations,
those drawing on an old concept (such as a “calculator” in the case of ENIAC) and those
drawing on a new concept (such as a “computer” in the case of UNIVAC). An “intimate
circle” of user-developers is framing this process, discussing the underpinning theories and
exploring the means and the goals of the materialisation (such as the ACM in the case of
ENIAC or the Homebrew Computer Club in the case of Altair). While old concepts are
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compared to previous performance criteria, proposing a “better embodiment”, new concepts
introduce new criteria projecting a “new dream”. In both cases, the materialisation may be
ﬁnanced by its single user, such as an institution or an organisation (such as the US Army
in the case of ENIAC or INRA in the case of Micral).
User-developers don’t only have to possess use-context related “sticky information”, as
theorized in the case of lead users (von Hippel, 1995, 2005), but they also have to possess
technology-related “sticky information”, traditionally residing within manufacturer’s expertise
(von Hippel, 1995, 2005). At this level, there is no market, not even insigniﬁcant ones, so
that such innovations could be characterised as disruptions according to Christensen (1997).
Still, even within this very early phase, one can distinguish more than one trajectory, the
trajectory based on an older concept proceeding the trajectory based on a newer concept.
A design tactic can be identiﬁed in this phase, to begin with task-speciﬁc innovations and
advance toward more abstract and generic materialisations - as did Eckert and Mauchly - as
the cost for these ﬁrst materialisations should be ﬁnanced, despite the fact that it is diﬃcult
to estimate beforehand.
Market emergence comes when an “oﬀer” is formed and the search of potential clients by
user-developer-entrepreneurs begins. Typically enough, the delivery of the ﬁrst UNIVAC or
the presentation of Apple II in a computer fair triggered the interest of both potential buyers
and potential manufacturers, the latter being established actors of similar business ﬁelds. It
can be the same actors of the ﬁrst phase that continue in the second one (e.g. Eckert and
Mauchly) or others (e.g. the passing from MITS to Apple). Still, it is the same intimate
collectivity of user developers that discusses and follows up the developments of the new
object, much like user innovation communities are described (von Hippel and Katz, 2002).
Yet, once the market potential appears, those early UD collectivities will become an embryo
for the potential clients, manufacturers and professionals of the ﬁeld (e.g. Radio professionals
who emerged from the early materialisation phase). User-developer- entrepreneurs continue
to have as a point of reference their personal view of the object, while the separation between
UDE and DE happens when satisfying potential clients becomes a priority (this typically was
been the case with the passage from Apple II to Macintosh).
However, one of the contributions of this research is the proposition that market emer-
gence is not equal to a development process where market growth is the only parameter.
In fact, until a new rationalisation is proposed by a synthesis which “connects the dots”, a
great number of potential directions are explored in parallel to the exploitation of the new
product. The fact that IBM engineers admitted during the 1950s that they did not yet know
what a computer was, is very illustrative of this fact. Entrepreneurs and enterprises try to
explore neighbouring directions, though their “jump” may be bigger than estimated, or they
can be lead to disruptive innovations (Christensen, 1997) for which the market remains to
be identiﬁed. Thus, “decision making” during this period is very uncertain, not only because
of the risks that reside in the challenges, but because of the impossibility of risk estimation.
This Foggy Competition phase ends with the provision of a new synthesis, establishing a
dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975), on the basis of which market diversity
and diﬀerentiation can be deployed using the same performance, eﬃciency and cost criteria.
Still, new “jumps”, can “turn the clock back” to the Early Materialisation phase, where UDs
play an important role, as did DEC with its PDP, opening this way a new cycle, not included
in the rationalisation synthesis.
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13.2 Lessons from Enterprises that took UDEs into
consideration
Throughout the history of the three industries studied, some enterprises did take into account
the role of user-developers. This dimension of their activity is largely underestimated even
by scholars who study these very cases. Hence, the Marconi Corporation helped in the
emergence of radio UDs, by providing through a speciﬁc magazine, the necessary knowledge
to innovate on devices initially designed for radio telegraph systems. Mauchly and Eckert
envisioned early on the provision of tools and support to the early community of UNIVAC
users, though this move was not further continued by Remington Rand. IBM, while often
portrayed as a company hostile to “hackers”, has had a relationship with user-developers
and developers-entrepreneurs since the 1960s, though in a more formalised way: either
by providing support as an after sales service, or by leasing its machines to developer-
entrepreneurs. Similarly, while Macintosh has been a “less open” computer than the Apple
I, the latter addressed to “hackers”, it did invent the USB, opening up the opportunity for
a PC peripherals market.
Those companies that did take into account the UDE dimension managed to survive the
Foggy Competition phase. Typically, IBM took the leasing experience into account during
its rationalisation, while Apple managed to survive the competition by IBM. Moreover, the
designs as such managed to survive in many cases, even though their initial creators didn’t.
Thus, many of the elements of the early Altair computer are to be found in the ﬁrst IBM PC,
while von Neumann’s “First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC” has been used as a reference
for computer architecture during Foggy Competition. Overall, the exploration by UDEs can
be beneﬁcial for enterprises, though it has an independent value for industrial development,
as it may contribute to the formulation of what a dominant design can end up being.
Overall, those companies while acting in diﬀerent times and cultural contexts, had some-
thing in common: they provided the necessary knowledge for UDEs to further explore the
potential of their products, either for own use or for market opportunities. Speciﬁc “insti-
tutions” were previewed for this activity, including specialised press, developer meetings or
conferences, mail lists and clubs fostering the creation of “intimate milieus” of users, sharing
their passion, knowledge and ideas on a given technology and its future.
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Conclusion de la deuxième partie
Bien que dans la première partie de notre étude, les usagers-développeurs-entrepreneurs ap-
paraissent comme une particularité du champ du développement d’applications Web, com-
parés aux modèles distingués par Raasch et von Hippel (2012), l’étude de l’histoire des trois
cadres industriels entreprise dans cette deuxième partie, a montré que le modus operandi en
question ne constitue pas une spéciﬁcité du Web.
La relecture des histoires des cadres industriels de l’ordinateur entreprise, de l’ordinateur
personnel et de la radio sur la base d’une problématisation à partir du modus operandi
spéciﬁque, nous a permit de réviser le travail des historiens dans ces domaines en mettant
en lumière les aspects les moins développés. Il en résulte qu’une discussion concernant les
approches du développement industriel faites par Rogers (1962), Christensen (1997) et von
Hippel (2005) est possible.
Bien que les aboutissements de cette recherche historique suggèrent que le modus en
question ne signiﬁe pas une spéciﬁcité du Web, ils ne rendent pas pour autant les résultats
de la première partie moins pertinents sur le champ du Web. En revanche, ils ajoutent une
perspective dynamique en ce qui concerne la façon dont les acteurs identiﬁés contribuent à
l’exploration et à l’exploitation en parallèle d’un potentiel industriel, et ajoutent du savoir sur
les manières dont les entreprises peuvent agir en amont, et faire face à des « disruptions»
(Christensen, 1997) éventuelles : l’histoire montre que le même phénomène pouvant mettre
en cause les entreprises établies peut devenir un avantage compétitif, quand il est mis dans
une dynamique d’innovation.
Le rôle des UDEs dans les différentes phases du
développement industriel
L’étude historique de la partie actuelle a conduit à l’identiﬁcation de la possibilité de décrire
l’émergence d’un cadre industriel selon les phases suivantes: « Matérialisation précoce », «
Émergence du marché », « Compétition dans le brouillard » et « Rationalisation industrielle
».
La phase de la « Matérialisation précoce » se caractérise par la construction des premiers
objets utilisant une nouvelle théorie et illustrant un nouveau potentiel de valeur. Tels objets
sont construits par des usagers-développeurs (UDs), le plus souvent proches à des milieux
académiques, pouvant être des chercheurs (eg. Mauchly et Eckert) ou pas (eg. Marconi).
Ces matérialisations sont plus que des prototypes, à partir du moment où elles peuvent
satisfaire aux exigences d’un usage spéciﬁque. On peut en distinguer deux types : celles
conçues à la base d’un concept ancien (comme le calculateur dans le cas de l’ENIAC), et
celles conçues à la base d’un nouveau concept (comme le computer dans le cas de l’UNIVAC).
Un « cercle intime » des UDs, encadrant ce processus exploratoire, étudie les théories sous-
275
jacentes et explore les moyens et les objectifs possibles de ces matérialisations (comme la
ACM dans le cas de l’ENIAC ou le Homebrew Computer Club dans le cas de l’Altair).
Tandis que les matérialisations à la base des anciens concepts sont comparées à des critères
de performance préexistantes, en proposant une « meulière incarnation », celles à la base de
nouveaux concepts, en introduisent des nouvelles, en projetant un « nouveau rêve ». Dans
les deux cas, c’est souvent une institution ou une organisation qui ﬁnance leur construction
pour son propre usage (comme l’armée américaine dans le cas de l’ENIAC ou INRA dans le
cas du Micral).
Durant cette phase, les UDs n’ont pas que du savoir lié au contexte d’usage (« use-
context sticky information ») comme c’est le cas pour les usagers (von Hippel, 1995, 2005),
mais ils ont également du savoir technologique (« technology related sticky information »),
attribué par la littérature de l’innovation par les usagers aux entreprises. À ce niveau très
en avance du développement industriel, il n’y a pas de marché du tout, donc il ne s’agit
pas encore des « disruptions » (Christensen, 1997). Cependant, même dans cette phase en
amont, on parle déjà de plusieurs trajectoires qui se dessinent, et non pas d’une seule qui reste
à être diﬀusée. Une tactique de conception identiﬁée lors de cette phase consiste à démarrer
le processus de développement ayant comme objective des matérialisations intermédiaires
et spéciﬁques à des tâches dont la valeur est déjà reconnue, et à avancer par la suite à la
matérialisation des concepts plus abstraits et génériques, comme on l’a vu dans le cas de
Eckert et Mauchly. Une telle tactique permet de répondre au problème du ﬁnancement de
l’exploration, le coût pouvant être couvert par des produits intermédiaires.
L’ « Émergence du marché » arrive une fois qu’une oﬀre est formulée par des UDEs,
durant la recherche de clients potentiels. De façon assez caractéristique, la livraison du
premier UNIVAC ou l’exhibition de l’Apple II dans un salon d’ordinateurs ont déclenché
l’intérêt à la fois des acheteurs potentiels et des potentiels fabricants, ces derniers étant
des acteurs établis dans des marchés proches. Il se peut que les acteurs de la première
phase fassent la transition à la deuxième (comme Eckert et Mauchly) ou qu’elle se fasse
par de nouveaux acteurs (comme le passage de MITS à Apple). Cependant, c’est la même
collectivité des UDs qui discute et suit le développement de l’objet nouveau, de manière très
semblable à la celle décrite pour le cas des communautés d’usagers innovateurs (von Hippel
et Katz, 2002). Cela dit, une fois que le potentiel d’un marché apparaît, ces communautés
d’UD précoces deviendront l’embryon des futurs clients, fabricants et professionnels (comme
par exemple les professionnels de la radio, qui ont émergé des collectivités de la phase de
Matérialisation précoce). Par la suite, la vision personnelle du potentiel de l’objet demeure
une référence pour l’activité novatrice des UDEs, tandis que la séparation entre UDEs et DEs
prend lieu une fois que la satisfaction des exigences des clients devienne prioritaire (comme
dans le cas typique du passage de l’Apple II au Macintosh).
Néanmoins, une des propositions de cette recherche est que l’émergence d’un marché
n’équivaut pas à un processus de développement caractérisé exclusivement par la taille du
marché et de la production. En eﬀet, avant qu’une nouvelle rationalisation soit proposée en
« connectant les points », une pléthore de directions d’innovations potentielles est explorée,
en parallèle de l’exploitation des nouveaux produits. Le fait que les ingénieurs d’IBM recon-
naissaient dans les années 1950 ne pas savoir encore ce qu’est un ordinateur, illustre bien ce
propos. Des entrepreneurs et des entreprises essaient d’explorer des directions voisines, bien
que le « saut » d’une direction à l’autre puisse s’avérer plus grand que prévu, pouvant égale-
ment conduire à des « disruptions » (Christensen, 1997), pour lesquelles un marché reste à
identiﬁer. Par conséquent, la prise des décisions au long de cette phase demeure incertaine,
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non seulement à cause des risques compris dans les enjeux technologiques et commerciaux,
mais surtout à cause de l’incapacité de spéciﬁer les risques à rencontrer en amont. La phase
de la « Compétition dans le brouillard » ﬁnit avec la conception et la mise en place d’une
nouvelle synthèse, établissant un « dominant design » (Utterback et Abernathy, 1975), sur
la base duquel la segmentation et la diﬀérentiation du marché puissent être déployées, en
faisant référence à des critères de performance, d’eﬃcacité et de prix comparables. Cepen-
dant, même dans cette phase de maturité, de nouveaux « sauts » peuvent prendre lieu, en «
retournant l’horloge à l’arrière », à la phase de la « Matérialisation précoce » , où des UDs
jouent de nouveau un rôle important, comme l’a fait DEC avec son PDP, ouvrant ainsi un
nouveau cycle, basés sur un concept qui n’a pas été compris dans la synthèse rationalisante.
Ce qu’on apprend par les entreprises qui ont pris en
compte les UDEs
Au long des histoires des trois cadres industriels étudiés, quelques entreprises ont pris en
considération dans leur action les ﬁgures des usagers-développeurs-entrepreneurs. Cette
dimension de leur activité est largement sous-estimée par des chercheurs qui ont étudié ces
cas. Comme on l’a vu, la Marconi Corporation a contribué à l’émergence des UDs de la
radio, en éditant un journal spécialisé fournissant à ses lecteurs le savoir nécessaire pour
innover sur la base des appareils initialement conçus en tant que télégraphes radio. Par
ailleurs, Mauchly et Eckert on envisagé très en amont la mise en disposition aux premiers
usagers-développeurs des ordinateurs; des outils d’extension des appareils, même si cette
démarche n’a pas été poursuivie par Remington Rand, rachetant leur start-up. IBM, même
s’il s’agit d’une entreprise souvent décrite comme hostile aux « hackers », a eu en fait des
rapports proches avec des UDs et des DEs depuis les années 1960, bien que ce rapport soit
plus formel : il consistait soit en la provision de support en tant que services après vente,
soit au leasing d’ordinateurs à des développeurs - entrepreneurs. De façon similaire, bien
que le Macintosh soit un ordinateur « moins ouvert » que l’Apple I, ce dernier s’adressant
à des hackers, le Macintosh a en fait introduit le précurseur de la clef USB, ouvrant ainsi
l’opportunité aux DEs de construire un marché de périphériques.
Ces entreprises qui ont pris en compte la dimension des UDEs ont réussi à survivre la
phase de la Compétition dans le Brouillard. Typiquement, IBM a pris en compte l’expérience
du leasing pour la rationalisation de l’industrie par le System 360, tandis que Apple a réussi
à survivre à la compétition d’IBM en se posant à des DEs. En outre, les designs de leurs
produits ont réussi à avoir une vie longue, souvent plus grande de celle de leurs concepteurs.
Ainsi, plusieurs éléments de l’ordinateur Altair peuvent être retrouvés au premier IBM PC,
tandis que le First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC de von Neumann fut utilisé comme
référence architecturale pour l’ensemble des acteurs de la phase de la Compétition dans le
Brouillard de l’ordinateur entreprise.
Dans l’ensemble, ces entreprises, bien que leur activité se soit étendue dans des périodes
historiques et des contextes culturels diﬀérents, ont eu une caractéristique en commun :
elles ont envisagé la provision du savoir nécessaire aux UDEs, aﬁn que ces derniers aient les
conditions de possibilité d’une exploration plus approfondie des produits initiaux, soit à leur
propre usage, soit à des ﬁns commerciaux. Des « institutions » spéciﬁques ont été conçues
à ce propos, y compris de la presse spécialisée, des listes de diﬀusion, des conférences de
développeurs ou des réunions, et des clubs encourageant l’émergence des lieux d’intimité
parmi les UDEs, permettant d’y partager leur passion, leurs idées et leur savoir sur l’avenir
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d’une technologie donnée.
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Part III
Harnessing UDE activity. Exploration
and exploitation methods
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Gérer l’activité des UDEs. Méthodes
d’exploration et d’exploitation.
Introduction à la Partie III
La première partie a exploré le modus operandi du développement des applications Web,
largement basé sur la capacité individuelle d’innovation des développeurs, permise par un
ensemble de technologies disposées soit par de fournisseurs de services, soit par des commu-
nautés open source. En ce qui concerne la distinction entre les paradigmes d’innovation par
l’usager et par le industriel (Raasch et von Hippel, 2012), les normes d’action (Argyris et
Schon, 1978) de ces développeurs peuvent être décrites par le modèle d’innovation par les
usagers (modèle « collectif-privatif » selon von Hippel et von Krogh), dans le cas des usagers-
développeurs (UDs), par un modèle d’investissement privé dans le cas des développeurs-
entrepreneurs (DEs), et par un modèle entre les deux dans le cas des usagers-développeurs-
entrepreneurs (UDEs).
La deuxième partie a placé ces trois ﬁgures d’acteurs (UD, UDE et DE) dans la dynamique
du développement industriel, à la base de l’étude des l’histoire des trois cadres industriels,
celui de l’ordinateur entreprise, celui de l’ordinateur personnel et celui de la radio. Cette
étude a suggéré que les ﬁgures identiﬁées ne sont pas spéciﬁques au contexte du Web, et
qu’elles jouent un rôle important dans les phases en amont d’une rationalisation industrielle
dans les cadres industriels où elles sont retrouvées.
Bien que l’exploration de la Partie I ait utilisé davantage des entrées au terrain privilégiant
les aspects cognitives, en étudiant les conditions de possibilité d’action de ces acteurs dans
le champ particulier du Web par des biais comme les technologies particulières et les « livres
de cuisine », la Partie II a montré également l’importance de dispositifs de conversation sur
les technologies, les usages et les marchés entre les acteurs d’un champ industriel émergent.
Cette troisième partie rentre au champ du développement des applications Web et, tout
en demeurant au même niveau d’analyse, elle approfondit l’exploration des dispositifs de
conversation particulières, en proposant trois méthodes de gestion du rapport entre les UDEs,
ainsi qu’entre les UDEs et les entreprises.
Nous allons donc explorer les conditions et les manières possibles de faire face à ces inter-
actions, pouvant servir aux besoins d’exploration et d’exploitation en parallèle des nouvelles
technologies, leurs usages et leurs marchés. Le Chapitre 15 pose la question de la possibilité
d’émergence des communautés et des réseaux de développeurs, et explore un dispositif de
conversation, les « Barcamps », qui crée les conditions à la réalisation de ce but. Par la
suite, les deux autres chapitres proposent quelques réponses à la question plus spéciﬁque de
l’exploitation de l’activité des UDEs par les entreprises. Le Chapitre 16 aborde la question
de l’usage des UDEs pour l’exploration du potentiel d’une nouvelle technologie, en étudiant
un mode original d’organisation de l’activité d’exploration, les « Hackathons ». Enﬁn, le
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Chapitre 17 aborde la question de l’usage des UDEs pour l’exploitation du potentiel d’une
technologie, en étudiant une manière permettant que les UDEs discutent leurs problèmes
avec les entreprises, les forums de support de développeurs.
Le Chapitre 14 qui suit juste après, examine quelques concepts théoriques qui seront
utiles par la suite, et fournit une vue d’ensemble de cette dernière partie. La Section 14.2
discutera l’ambigüité que l’on retrouve dans la littérature de gestion quant à l’usage des
notions de « réseaux » et de « communautés », surtout quand elles sont abordées du point
de vue de l’innovation. Cette section suggère une synthèse permettant a) la distinction
des deux notions et b) l’exploration des conditions de possibilité de leur émergence. Elle
conclue à la proposition d’un cadre d’analyse d’interactions informelles uniﬁé, qui place la
conversation et l’action collective entre les deux notions. Ensuite, la Section 14.3 décrira
l’approche méthodologique à utiliser dans la présente partie. En utilisant une stratégie de «
phenomenon-based research » von Krogh et al. (2012), nous étudierons les trois dispositifs
sur la base de deux méthodes: la participation observante, déjà utilisée dans la première
partie, et l’analyse de monuments d’interactions. Enﬁn, la Section 14.4 fournira une vue
d’ensemble de cette partie.
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14.1 Introduction
Part I explored the innovation capacity of individual developers within the framework of
Web services, enabled by a set of diﬀerent technologies oﬀered either by service providers
or by open source communities. Regarding the distinction between user and manufacturer
innovation paradigms (Raasch and von Hippel, 2012), the action norms (Argyris and Schon,
1978) of those developers can be described by the “private-collective” model (von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2003, 2006), in the case of user-developers (UDs), by the “private investment
model” (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006), in the case of developer-entrepreneurs
(DEs) or by a mix of the two, in the case of user-developer-entrepreneurs (UDEs).
Part II positioned these three actor ﬁgures (UDs, UDEs and DEs) in the dynamics of
industrial development through the study of the history of three industrial settings, 1) the
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enterprise computer, 2) the personal computer and 3) the radio. The outcome of this study
was the suggestion that these ﬁgures play an important role particularly in phases preceding
market emergence or industrial rationalisation.
While Part I focussed mainly on the cognitive conditions (technologies and “cookbooks”)
for the possibility of the existence of those actors in the particular ﬁeld of Web services de-
velopment, Part II has additionally shown the importance of settings enabling a conversation
amongst UDEs, as well as between UDEs and enterprises, about technologies, uses and mar-
kets of an emerging industrial ﬁeld. The current part returns to the ﬁeld of Web services
development and, while keeping the same level of analysis, it now focusses on the particular
settings enabling this conversation, proposing three diﬀerent conﬁgurations.
The current part explores the conditions and the possible ways of interaction between
service providers and user-developer-entrepreneurs, serving the need for parallel exploration
and exploitation of new technologies, their uses and their markets. Chapter 15 addresses
the question of the possibility of emergence of developer communities and networks and
explores a conversational setting, the Barcamps, which can provide this possibility. The
following chapters provide some responses to the question of how enterprises can harness
communities and networks for innovation. Chapter 16 addresses the question of the use of
developers-entrepreneurs for new platform potential exploration, exploring an original mode
of exploratory action organisation, the Hackatons. Finally, Chapter 17 addresses the question
of the use of developer-entrepreneurs for platform potential exploitation, exploring a way in
which providers and developers can discuss the problems the latter meet and the ways to
solve them, through developer support forums.
The current chapter reviews some theoretical concepts that will be useful for the chapters
to follow and provides a part overview. Section 14.2 will discuss the ambiguity existing in
management literature regarding the use of the “community” and “networks” notions, specif-
ically when addressed by an innovation perspective. This section suggests a synthesis which
allows a) the distinction between the two notions and b) the exploration of the conditions
of their possibility of emergence. It concludes with a joint analytical framework which puts
collective action and conversation in-between the two notions. Section 14.3 will describe the
methodological approach that is to be used in the current part. Using a phenomenon-based
research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012), I will study three diﬀerent ﬁelds based on two
diﬀerent methodologies: observant participation, already used in the Part I, and “monument
analysis”, which will be discussed in this section as well. Finally, Section 14.4 will provide an
overview of the current part.
14.2 Literature review: how do informal collectivities
emerge and how can they be harnessed?
This section initially reviews the use of the terms “networks” and “communities” by the
Open and User innovation literature. Identifying an ambiguity in this use, it then proceeds
to a second-order review of the literature speciﬁcally addressing these terms. It concludes
with the proposition of a joint framework of analysis, valuing the notions of collective action
and conversation in both distinguishing and using the two terms.
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14.2.1 Innovation beyond firm boundaries : the blurred frontiers
between networks and communities
Regarding innovation beyond the frameworks of a speciﬁc ﬁrm, two “schools” have been
the reference point for management scholars. On the one hand, the “Open Innovation”
(Chesbrough, 2003b; Chesbrough et al., 2006) framework, on the other hand, the “User
Innovation” (von Hippel, 1976, 2005) one. For both, the questions of how networks or com-
munities emerge as well as how enterprises may harness the beneﬁts of their activity remain
largely open. Both approaches value the role of “communities” and “networks” for the de-
sign and the diﬀusion of innovative goods. Still, both sets of literature use these two notions
depending on the context without really making a distinction between the underpinning ac-
tion norms corresponding to each. Furthermore, they often assume that communities and
networks already exist, while generally recognising that the relationship between enterprises
and organisations on the one hand, and communities and networks on the other are far from
being clear.
Thus, the following questions remain open:
1. How can knowledge and ideas be informally shared when no networks or communities
exist?
2. How can enterprises harness the beneﬁts of user-developer-entrepreneurs’ activity to
• explore the potential of their own service and
• exploit the potential of their own service.
The ﬁrst question will be explored in chapter 15, while the second will be explored in
chapters 16 and 17 for the speciﬁc case of developers in the ﬁeld of Web services.
Open Innovation and the value networks concept exploration
In a debate animated by Technovation journal on the question Is open innovation a field of
study or a communication barrier to theory development? Chesbrough’s approach is chal-
lenged by the question on whether or not it is diﬀerent to the supply chain management
approach (von Hippel, 2010; von Krogh, 2011), were inwards and outwards knowledge ex-
changes also occur. Consequently this critic challenges whether or not an “open innovation
era” is something new. In parallel, Gassmann, Enkel and Chesbrough stressed that one of the
challenges lies in the fact that “the operational functioning of open innovation depends on
firms’ ability to manage decentralized innovation processes and often includes participants
who are not even on the company’s payroll” (Gassmann et al., 2010, p. 7), for which the
management modes remain to be explored. Therefore, a current of literature has focussed in
further exploring the concept of a “value network” (Chesbrough, 2003a) that is not a supply
chain.
Simard and West (2006) tackle the issue of the role of the ﬁrm’s external context,
building upon prior research on networks. They formulate thus the concept of “knowledge
networks”, to describe contexts “such as the fabric of Silicon Valley” (Simard and West, 2006,
p. 220). Of course, the Silicon Valley innovation phenomena have been studied by many
scholars, as they are based on numerous, historically constructed, parameters (Saxenian,
1994; Lewis, 2000a; Sturgeon, 2000; Saxenian, 2000; Lecuyer, 2006, and others). Still,
the knowledge network concept is proposed as a way to address relationships beyond the
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enterprise boundaries, either with other enterprises or with individuals. Of course, this
concept does not refer to networks within a knowledge ﬁeld, such as semantic networks. The
term is borrowed by Hansen (2002), who claimed that “knowledge transfers and synergies
in multiunit firms should pursue new perspectives that combine the concepts of network
connections and relatedness in knowledge content”(Hansen, 2002, p. 232). Thus, it concerns
the research into a combination between network connections and knowledge ﬁelds. Building
on the work of (Granovetter, 1983) advocating for “the strength of weak ties”, Simard and
West (2006) argue that ‘wide’ ties privilege innovation, as they provide access to diversiﬁed
knowledge, though they imply diﬃculties in coordination, when with other ﬁrms, or to
compare to the ﬁrm’s activities.
Always in the same question, West and Lakhani (2008) in their article “Getting clear
about communities in open innovation” note that there is a need for a better deﬁnition of
the community construct in open innovation and operate a ﬁrst typology. Their typology
begins with the insightful question “communities of what?”. However, their reply rather
refers to an answer to the question “communities of whom?”, as they focus on the subject
(the actors participating in a community) and not the object of a community (e.g. the
“knowledge domain” and the “practice” for the communities of practice (Wenger et al.,
2002)). Thus, the authors propose a framework for community analysis distinguishing diﬀer-
ent levels in relationship to the ties between communities and enterprises: a) communities in
which enterprises participate as simple members, b) communities which are sponsored by an
enterprise, c) interactions between the members belonging in the same community (member
types and organisational forms).
While the issue of communities and networks puzzles open innovation scholars, user
innovation literature also shares this problematization.
User innovation and the mix of communities and networks
Von Hippel supported that user innovation can be undertaken by horizontal user networks. By
user network he referred to “user nodes interconnected by information transfer links which
may involve face-to-face, electronic or any other form of communication. User networks
can exist within the boundaries of a membership group but need not” (von Hippel, 2007,
p. 295). The attributes of such networks were deﬁned as follows: “(1) at least some users
have sufficient incentive to innovate, (2) at least some users have an incentive to voluntarily
reveal information sufficient to enable others to reproduce their innovations, and (3) user-
self production can compete with commercial production and distribution”. In the cases
of such networks, user innovation can be deployed entirely independently of manufacturers.
Von Hippel contrasts the concept of user networks to the one of user communities, the latter
characterised by a sense of belonging, and calls for further research on the speciﬁcities of
user communities, as opposed to user networks. He gives the example of the open source
software Apache server user network as a typical case of eﬀective competition of users to
manufacturers.
This emphasis on the concept of networks rather than communities seems to contradict
previous conceptualisations of user innovation. Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) studying the
Apache server user community showed how the sense of belonging in a community animates
the collective action of developers. The importance of a community as the basis of sharing
and its related processes have been the object of interest in a great range of user innovation
studies (von Krogh et al., 2003b; Franke and Shah, 2003; Auray, 2004; Baldwin et al., 2006;
Osterloh and Rota, 2007; Benkeltoum, 2008, and others).
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In fact, despite the great amount of research on user innovation scholars have undertaken
over recent decades, literature on user innovation does not share a common understanding
of what a community or a network is, how it emerges and what its relationship to enterprises
is, even though user organisation has a fundamental position in the common understanding.
In addition, West et al. (2006), in their article “Open innovation: a research agenda” evoke
the issue of whether or not there exist “factors that explain the differences in the ability of
firms to utilize user-generated external innovations” (West et al., 2006, p. 289).
More generally, business studies value diﬀerently relationships between the enterprises
and external developers, according to the emphasis given by the researcher to the object
produced and marketed. Studies emphasizing the importance of the attributes of the object
in common (e.g. a platform), tend to highlight the cognitive aspects, while studies interested
in the diﬀusion aspects tend to highlight the relational ones. A typical example is the open
question of platform organisation. On the one hand, Gawer (2010b) observes a “Chinese
Wall” between the developers of the core of a platform and the developers of the peripheral
elements. Benavent (2011) on the other hand, addressing the issue from a marketing per-
spective, observes “no Chinese Walls”, but rather porous boundaries between an enterprise
and its clients.
Hence, in order to be able to use the terms of user networks and communities (in
our particular case referring to developers), a clariﬁcation of these two notions should be
attempted.
14.2.2 A return to the basics: networks and communities
conceptualisations
Both communities and networks are socially constructed and their activity is carried out in
social contexts. Thus, a distinction in absolute terms, in vitro, would not have a speciﬁc
meaning. These notions describe a part of the social activity, highlighting diﬀerent aspects
and, thus, enable the further investigation of those aspects. The current paragraph aims at
the identiﬁcation of the particular aspects of each, as studied by recognised scholars of each
approach. This identiﬁcation will then help me to identify the factors of correlation between
the two notions, providing in this way a better understanding of networks and communities.
Then, this understanding will be used in the current part to explore the ways in which user-
developer-entrepreneur networks and communities emerge, as well as the possible modes of
management of their relationship to enterprises.
Social networks and connected individuals
In their more abstract form, networks are chains of connections. Individuals connected do not
need to share any other thing beyond their connection, to constitute elements of a network
analysis.
The conceptualisation used by (von Hippel, 2007) of networks as “user nodes intercon-
nected by information transfer links” is common to the greatest part of the literature in
social networks. He also notes that the user network concept applies independently of the
technical support for the connection, to interactions operated “face-to-face, electronic or
any other form of communication”.
Some of the most used concepts in network analysis were introduced by Granovetter
(1973, 1983). Granovetter deﬁned three general natures of ties that are widely accepted and
used in social networks analysis: strong, weak or absent (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361). He
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speciﬁed that “the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time,
the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which
characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361). Granovetter argued that the “strength
of weak ties”, that is the value of connections that do not belong to one’s close circle, lies
in their “likelihood of being bridges” between diﬀerent social groups and are very likely to
become the channels of new information, knowledge as well as innovations throughout a
network. On the contrary, people with few weak ties will become isolated from receiving new
information from outside circles, constrained to hear the same, re-circulated information
within their own clique comprised of close friends. This approach is useful to the Open
Innovation approach, which focusses on “inﬂows and outﬂows of information” through the
company boundaries (Chesbrough, 2003a). Hence, the value of a network, as opposed to the
value of a group having strong ties, resides in this very potential, which Simard and West
(2006) also name “wide” ties. Both the genericness and the limitations of this approach is
its independence to the speciﬁc conditions of knowledge creation, “measuring” its diﬀusion.
For instance, if an individual learns something but never shares it, keeps it a secret, his
knowledge will be invisible through the analytical concepts of network analysis.
This theoretical approach becomes clearer in the action of sociological research. Lazega
(1994) provides a rigorous methodology for the analysis of networks according to precise
procedures. In what regards the editing of social networks representations in graphs, before
analysing them, as met in research articles, software tools such as Pajek (Batagelj and
Mrvar, 1998) or, more recently Gephi (Bastian et al., 2009) enable sociologists and other
social scientists to visualise and analyse large actor networks. Hence, White and Harary
(2001) use Pajek to illustrate their methodological proposition regarding a way to measure
the cohesiveness of a group by the number of independent paths that connect every pair
of nodes in the network, Casper (2007) uses Pajek to visualise and analyse social network
formation and inter-ﬁrm mobility within the San Diego biotechnology cluster, Benkler et al.
(2013) uses Gephi to study a public debate over proposed legislation in the United States.
The use of such tools satisﬁes (and imposes the satisfaction of) the elementary requirements
of network theories: the researcher should decide whether or not two nodes (actors) are
connected (e.g. whether the actors collaborate or not). Hence, for a network of n actors,
the researcher should provide the information of whether or not each actor is connected with
the other n− 1 actors. The resulting graph can then be used for a network analysis, looking
into more sophisticated factors, such as the place of each actor in the network or the local
density of relationships.
Therefore, social network research in action, while being very rigorous on the criterion of
whether or not two individuals are connected, is more relativist on the criterion of what those
individuals know, stating that if they are “weak ties” they will possibly know very diﬀerent
things. According the lines of this approach, a researcher cannot, for instance, state that
two physicians - one being in San Francisco, the other being in Marseilles - are connected
by the discipline of medicine. To state that they are connected, he should illustrate that
they know each other (ﬁrst degree) or the have somebody in common (second degree) and
so on. The paradox of “non relationship” between physicians can however be answered
within the frameworks of the same approach by the “small world problem” (Milgram, 1967),
which claims that all people are connected within six degrees of separation. For social
network analysis, a group is identiﬁed not by what is in common, but by the density of the
connections footnoteSee for instance the study of Pissard and Prieur (2007) on Flickr web
service groups identiﬁcation..
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In addition, while being very attentive to the relational part, network theories do not
provide an understanding of how people get to know each other, how network connections
emerge, that is before a network analysis can take place. Such an understanding could be
useful for management, as many scholars have underlined the diﬃculty of enterprises to
develop and cultivate innovation networks. More over, it does not provide an answer to my
problem, that is understanding how developer collectivities emerge and how service providers
may harness such collectivities for the sake of their exploration and exploitation needs.
Communities of . . . : the common as social fabric
The approach to communities generally stresses something that its members share. Thus,
communities are built around a common and take their meaning from it.
A well-known case of such communities is the one of communities of practice (CoP,
Wenger, 1998; Wenger et al., 2002). In management literature there is a strong tendency
to use the term “Communities of Practice” (CoP) to describe whatever cannot be included
in a general organisational schema rendering the term far too wide a category to be useful
in the distinction of informal organisational phenomena.
Wenger et al. (2002, p. 27-29) had however deﬁned three structural elements for com-
munities of practice:
• The domain, denoting the topic the community focuses on and creating a common
ground and a sense of common identity inspiring members to contribute,
• the practice, consisting in the speciﬁc knowledge the community develops, maintains
and shares and
• the community, being the “social fabric” of learning.
Hence, “cultivating” communities of practice means acting on those elements, by diﬀerent
means, as by specifying a topic, introducing a new practice or providing interaction tools. In
fact, as communities of practices have been introduced by the study of relatively stable work
environments, as Amin and Roberts (2008a) note, a long-term relationship is to be found in
their structure1.
By considering the relations stable, much of the research on CoPs has been able to focus
on the ways such relational settings guarantee knowledge on practices sharing, maintenance
and development. Regarding relationships themselves, the informal, non-biased nature of
relations is important. Hence, for Wenger and Snyder (2000) project teams are to be excluded
from the notion of CoP, as the authors have a diﬀerent view on the kind of relationships
at stake. For them, while project teams are held together by “the project’s milestones and
goals”, the linking power of CoP is “passion, commitment and identification with the group’s
expertise”. In the same work, they nuance the dimension of time, as the duration of CoPs
is proposed to be for “as long as there is an interest in maintaining the group” (Wenger
and Snyder, 2000, p. 142). Hence, when the interest of maintaining the group stops being
1Amin and Roberts characteristically quote the early work of Lave and Wenger (1991), where the notion of
the time is the only speciﬁc description of the type of relationships built, by quoting the following deﬁnition:
a system of relationships between people, activities, and the world; developing with time, and
in relation to other tangential and overlapping communities of practice (Lave and Wenger,
1991, p. 98).
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present, when the topic or the practice of the community stops being relevant, as in the case
of successful disruptions (Christensen, 1997), CoPs also stop being maintained.
Amin and Roberts (2008b) provides a list of the diﬀerent types of communities of practice
identiﬁed by the literature (craft-task-based, professional, expert or high creativity, virtual).
As observed by this list, while the diﬀerent types do not share any common type of social
ties - they vary from long-lived to short-lived - this is not the case for knowledge: every
community type shares a speciﬁc type of “knowledge practice”.
A second approach to communities comes from the sharing of resources. The case
of open source software is exemplary in the sense that its intellectual property license is
designed to guarantee the sharing (O’Mahony, 2003; von Hippel, 2010). Von Krogh et al.
(2003a) thus names “communal resources” the rewards of participating in a community,
which in the case of open source are reputation, control over technology, and learning
opportunities. Still, in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of my research, resources are not communal, as the
service provider maintains the control over his technology, though its used by developers to
create applications.
A third category of communities focusses on a speciﬁc commercial good, which structures
around it a community of its own users. This wide category of client communities varying
from fashion consumers (Di Maria and Vladi, 2008) to video gamers (Haeﬂiger et al., 2009)
highlights how a product becomes the intermediary between enterprises and users, enabling
a feedback acquisition or user-self-regulation. In some cases, such activity may lead to user’s
entrepreneurial steps, as well (Haeﬂiger et al., 2010). However, those steps enter rather
in the model of “accidental entrepreneurship” (Shah and Tripsas, 2007) than a purposive
process of both UDEs and enterprises to innovate.
In all forms, communities have a way to deﬁne their identity and their processes of
interaction. Community members can be distinguished in old and new ones and organising a
community means assuring the common life, making sure that the common will be maintained
while the newcomers will be initiated to the community values and advance their identiﬁcation
with their group, along the process of engagement and participation. As we will discuss more
in detail in Section 17.2.1, when exploring the possibility of a community-based exploration
of a service’s potential, while the community has the tendency to welcome new end-users,
the selection of developers is more slow, the community having to reassure the expertise
and the engagement of new developers before accepting them to the team. Auray proposes
that the two extremities, a very popular community and a not at all popular community
are the situations where community is less “vital”. At the same time, in-between, there are
two modes of existence of a “vital” community: on the one hand, a “supported” rhythm of
expansion, on the other hand a “patrimonial” mode of existence, where most members are
ancient ones.
14.2.3 A joint approach : collective action and conversation
A speciﬁc reading of the theoretical discussion on management research epistemology can
provide an analytical framework for the joint analysis of informal collectivities, useful for my
particular research problem of identifying how developer communities and networks emerge
and the ways in which enterprises can beneﬁt from them.
A central notion that indicates the limits between the division of networks and communi-
ties notions on the basis of their relational and cognitive content correspondingly, is the one
of the inseparability between knowledge and relations, to wit the impossibility to dissociate
knowledge and relations between individuals that acquire and develop the knowledge in the
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long term (Hatchuel, 2005c). Hence, the distinction between relation-based and cognition-
based social constructions, such as networks and communities as reviewed previously, can
only be temporal. In fact, what binds together cognition and relationships is collective ac-
tion. Hatchuel (1997, p. 185) argues that every mode of coordination is inevitably based on
a more or less coherent interaction between a relational model and a particular distribution of
knowledge. Hence, management as a discipline refers to an “epistemology of action”, where
commanding is inseparable from the relationships between subjects-objects and subjects-
subjects Hatchuel (2005b, p. 86). Epistemology of action, by addressing collective action as
a “central enigma”, takes a distance from the classical epistemology of universal scientiﬁc
laws on the on hand, and from critical approaches that “support the relativism of every knowl-
edge project (post-modernism), its dependence on social consensus (dialogue relativism) and
its contiguous historical character (constructivism)” (Hatchuel, 2005b, pp. 73-74).
As a consequence, in the particular case of informal settings, structures such as commu-
nities and social networks (the ﬁrst being based on subjects-objects relationships, the second
being on subjects-subjects, as reviewed previously), should practically meet in action. Such
an approach may spare the confusion of the reader of open source studies, for instance.
The Apache server, which is illustrated either as an exemplary case of user networks (von
Hippel, 2007) or as an exemplary case of user communities (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003)
is actually a meeting point of the two, since it is a result of a collective action. Thus, both
network elements (such as information diﬀusion) and community elements (such as exper-
tise development) are needed for such a complex project to be undertaken. Hence, in such
settings, the imperative of collective action “forces” in a way the alignment of relations and
knowledge domains to the objectives of the speciﬁc development process.
Beyond collective action, though, there also is a way of putting together networks and
communities that will be explored in the next chapter. It is simply by providing the possibility
of a conversation. In fact this has historically been the case for the emergence of the
“bourgeois public sphere” according to Habermas. While his work is usually used to illustrate
the opposition between an intimate sphere and public sphere (Cammaerts, 2008, and others),
a more careful look into Habermas’ work indicates that intimate conversation initially acted
more as an operator, a catalyst, between private and public spheres, than as an opposition
to the latter. The typical cases examined refer to the coﬀee shops, the salons and the clubs
of the period of the industrial revolution, as well as to the relation between the personal
diary and the literature of the time.
Habermas goes through the transformation of the intimacy at the court of Louis XVI
and “the social gatherings” that achieved “the character of a private party” to the salons
of the eighteenth century, characterized as the “cultural heirs of the court”. For Habermas,
the early stages of the “bourgeois public sphere” are to be found in those transformations
in what used to be the court’s intimate circle:
For inasmuch the “town” took over its cultural functions, the public sphere itself
was transformed (Habermas, 1991, p. 31).
Habermas provides the example of the Academy of Art in Paris, which in 1677 opened
its ﬁrst salon to the public, while in the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century the amateurs
éclairés formed the inner circle of the new art public (Habermas, 1992, p. 40).
Borrowing this notion of the potential for a place where intimate conversations occur to
create a public, I will use it not for the study of the “bourgeois public sphere”, but for the
possibility of emergence of a developers public, in the particular context of Web services.
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Besides, in the previous part we’ve seen how such a public emerged in the cases of the
industrial settings studies by user-developers groups, often united by an amateur press. The
advantage of such an approach is to be proven, to the extent that a topic or a place of
discussion manages to bring together people that do not belong to the same community and
are not connected beforehand.
Of course, there can be other types of synthesis, including an object within a network or
refusing the interaction of communities, that can enable an analysis only on a relational or
cognitive level. Bruno Latour (1996), for instance, by considering objects as actors is able to
deduce every activity at the network level. Michel Gensollen (2003) on the other hand, by
considering that online forum users relations are insigniﬁcant, is able to analyse informational
goods and online communities at the level of the common informational corpus constructed
by users’ activity. Still, considering action and conversation as a unifying point of networks
and communities enables me to study a case where no community or network pre-exists,
while valuing both approaches.
14.2.4 An analytical framework for communities and networks
meeting points
Figure 14.1 synthesises the above reviewed forms of informal association. For this, I use two
axes, the cognitive and the relational one. The cognitive refers to the object of interaction,
which can be a practice (Wenger, 1998) or a common resource (von Krogh et al., 2003a),
for the cases of CoPs and open source communities correspondingly. The relational axis
refers to the connections between individuals, which, as described by (von Hippel, 2007)
may use various technical substrates. There is no association that is “purely relational”
or “purely cognitive”, thus the regions close to the axis do not correspond to any kind of
collectivity. Communities, as they emphasise the object that people have in common and
which forms their identity, are more cognitive than relational. Networks, as the emphasis is
on the connections people have with each other more than their knowledge on objects are
more relational than cognitive. In addition, there is a uniting ﬁeld between communities and
networks. I identiﬁed two ways in which those two social constructions meet: a) collective
action, b) conversation.
Regarding collective action, in Chapter 16 I will explore a rather unconventional mode of
bringing together individual UDEs that is used by Web services providers, called “hackathon”.
More particularly, the study of the three days application development contest on the topic of
HTML5 sponsored by Google is in fact a way to “make emerge” communities and networks
of developers through the proposition of a speciﬁc action. The output of this process is a
wide exploration of the topic, useful for business in foggy competition.
Still, there is another type of collectivity identiﬁed, which brings together individuals
and opens up the potential of networks or communities creation, without really organising
a collective action. It is the case of the Barcamps, explored in the Chapter 15. In this
original case, there is no collective action at stake. The joining of communities and networks
as well as the deployment of the possibility for the emergence of new ones is operated
through conversation. This conversation however does not aim at the development of a
consensus (hence is not threatened by controversies) as the collectivities in question are
ad hoc, ephemeral. People who meet do not necessarily belong to the same network or
community, though a future synergy is always possible. Therefore, they constitute original
forms of interaction and sharing which are not identical to communities and networks as
reviewed previously. Thus, I use the term “conversational settings” to describe places where
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Figure 14.1: An analytical framework for communities and networks meeting points. The
uniting ﬁeld can be either collective action or conversation.
conversation may occur between people who could potentially share common things or get
connected, without such an evolution needing to be a prerequisite. Thus, such a mode refers
more to the kind of conversations strangers may have in a coﬀee shop than the discussion
between partners, community members or already connected individuals.
Finally, in Chapter 17 I will look into a nowadays more familiar form of interaction, online
forums. The online forums I will be interested in examining correspond to the needs of service
potential exploitation, and organise a conversation on the action of the developers, namely
regarding the problems they face while using a speciﬁc service’s Application Programming
Interfaces to create their own applications.
14.3 Methodology used: enrolling different strategies
of phenomenon-based research.
Von Krogh et al. (2012) in replying to a demand of the Long Range Planning editors for more
phenomenon-based research proposed a research strategy described by some methodological
guidelines for researchers, drawing from the literature corpus studying the open-source phe-
nomenon. Regarding the tradition of the phenomenon-based research in the Management
discipline, they refer to the work of Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002), the latter acknowledging
that they don’t believe “the transnational corporation really came out of any . . . literature”
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002, p. 13) - cited in von Krogh et al. (2012, p. 278). They
also refer to the suggestion of Edmondson and McManus (2007) that qualitative approaches
should be used when addressing new phenomena with little or no previous theorisation.
Besides, Mintzberg et al. (2003) when discussing strategy process concerning teaching,
share a similar spirit, which challenges the common research practice of relying on a study
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fn a literature-issued question, in the particular case of the study of new phenomena:
Asking a right question in strategy is analogous to an explorer’s finding his or
her bearing before starting the journey. There is no standard methodology for
coming up with questions: intuition and experience play far too important a role
in the process (Mintzberg et al., 2003, p. xii-xiii).
Von Krogh et al. identify ﬁve diﬀerent strategies for these kinds of studies, proposing
exemplary works for each one. These strategies are: distinguish, explore, design, theorize and
synthesize. Regarding the ﬁrst strategy, narratives, ethnographic and conceptual methodolo-
gies, followed in the case of the open source software studies to distinguish it from traditional
research ﬁelds (Raymond, 1999; Stallman, 2002; von Krogh et al., 2003a; O’Mahony, 2007,
are some exemplar studies on the ﬁeld of OSS), are the methods suggested to researchers
willing to distinguish a new phenomenon. Exploration strategies are then based in descriptive
and inductive statistics, archival data and surveys (as in Koch and Schneider (2002); West
(2003); Roberts et al. (2006)).
The third strategy, the one of research design meets an important variety of methods,
depending on the research phase of the scientiﬁc community: in the initial phase, where the
phenomenon needs ﬁrst to be singled out from other known phenomena (“embryonic phase”),
the strategy proposed is the opportunistic approach, as in Lakhani and von Hippel (2003).
In the phase where the phenomenon becomes more visible to a larger academic community
(“growth phase”), the shared infrastructure and service to researchers is suggested, as in Van
Antwerp and Madey (2008). When the phenomenon reaches a consistency when regularities
become predictable (“mature phase”), advanced modelling techniques may be used (Giuri
et al., 2008).
Finally, the last two strategies proposed by von Krogh et al. are to theorize the phe-
nomenon and to synthesize the corpus of management theories under its light. In the case
of OSS studies, scholars theorized the phenomenon using abduction or deduction (Lerner
and Tirole, 2002; Sojer and Henkel, 2010). Synthesizing was then based on reviews and
conceptual contributions (Dalle et al., 2008; Feller, 2005, for the case of OSS).
The current chapter uses the suggestions of von Krogh et al. while also making use
of the outcomes of Part II suggesting that during foggy competition, a parallel exploitation
and exploration of new technologies, markets and uses is required and that this activity
can be partly undertaken by UDEs. Thus, we expect to identify some evidence of previous
rationalisations (such as technical support) as well as open-ended methods, oriented towards
the joint provider-third party developer exploration of the platform potential - and thus the
set of possible innovation trajectories.
Table 14.1 shows an overview of the use of the three ﬁrst steps described by von Krogh
et al. (2012) in the chapters of the current part.
14.3.1 Methods
14.3.2 Observant participation
The observant participation methodological approach has already been discussed in Sec-
tion 6.3.2. It consists in taking part in ﬁeld challenges, to study the action norms of indi-
viduals in the ﬁeld. In the current part, observant participation will regard my implication
as a researcher in both conversational settings (Chapter 15) and ephemeral action settings
(Chapter 16). As already discussed in Section 6.3.2, the short temporal horizon of these
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14.3. METHODOLOGY USED: ENROLLING DIFFERENT STRATEGIES OF PHENOMENON-BASED RESEARCH.
Chapter
- Field
Question Distinction Step
“Identiﬁcation of
peculiarities and
concepts for study.
Broad cultural
terms description”
.
Exploration Step
“Data gathering
according to focal
concepts,
phenomenon
description” .
Design Step
“Experiment and
propose research
designs for the
dynamics of the
phenomenon” .
15. -
Bar-
camps
1. How can
there be
informal
knowledge &
ideas sharing
when no
networks or
communities
exist?
Neither a
community, nor a
network: a
conversational
setting.
“Regulars”
identiﬁcation.
A design for
conversational
settings.
16. -
Hackathon
2. How can
enterprises
harness UDE
activity for the
exploration of
their own
service
potential?
Elements for UDE
exploratory action
organization.
Technological,
entrepreneurial
and intimate
knowledge for
trajectories
exploration.
Proposition:
personality is an
innovation factor.
17. -
Developer
Support
Forums
2. How can
enterprises
harness UDE
activity for the
exploitation of
their own
service
potential?
Not a typical
problem-solving
setting.
A very low
problem-solving
rate.
The “curator”
expert ﬁgure and
the UDE-enteprise
“empathy”
dimension.
Table 14.1: Overview of the use of the three steps of phenomenon-based research in the
current part’s chapters, based on von Krogh et al. (2012).
settings renders this approach less inﬂuenced by cultural diﬀerences between researcher and
actors of a speciﬁc ﬁeld, as happens in the study of action within the frameworks of a speciﬁc
organization or other long-lived settings.
14.3.3 Monument study. Investigating the traces of interaction
A particularity of Web interaction, as compared to other modes of communication, such as
face-to-face or the telephone, resides in the fact that it leaves traces. This fact, already
observed in the sociology of uses (Georges, 2009) provides a research potential that I will
exploit in the current chapter. In addition, when these interactions happen in public, the
researcher can access these traces being ’invisible’ to the actors in the ﬁeld.
Inspired by Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, I face these traces as interaction mon-
uments, and use them to reconstitute the rationalities that determine the modes of online
discourse, for the case of service-UDE interaction. I use the term “monuments” to describe
the traces of human interaction that provide us the opportunity to “verbalise” and “decipher”
the context of their creation.
This methodological approach is diﬀerent from the research strategies reviewed by Yin
(2003) - see Table 4.1 on page 70. Particularly, unlike archive study, where data which has
been organized and classiﬁed by librarians or other experts, in monument analysis data is
yet to be created by the researcher, drawing from the traces interactions have left on the
technical support on which they took place.
Hence, using a “monument analysis” method, I will examine the traces of interaction
between UDEs and service providers aiming to decode and characterise the conditions of
their creation.
The kinds of monuments I will study depend on the research ﬁeld. In the chapter on
Barcamps (Chapter 15) those monuments will be the registration ﬁles, as well as meeting
photos and descriptions, all created and published by participants themselves. In the chapter
on Hackathon (Chapter 16), those monuments will be meeting organisation documents
(such as the meeting’s program), created by the meeting organisers, as well as descriptions
about projects, created by the participants themselves. Finally, in the chapter studying
developer support forums (Chapter 17), those monuments will regard the online discussions
between UDEs and service provider staﬀ, produced during the discussion and remaining
public thereafter, as well as a “Cookbook” on developer relations management created by a
Google employee to help her colleagues on their work.
14.4 Part Overview
Table 14.2 shows a short overview of the current part. Chapter 15 will address the question
of how there can be informal knowledge and ideas sharing when no networks or communities
exist. As we will discuss in Section 14.2, the Open and User innovation literature suggests
that innovations can occur beyond the boundaries of an enterprise, through user networks
or communities. Still, the question of how such networks emerge and, consequently, how
an enterprise may harness them remains open. Barcamps are conversational settings were
discussion can take place between strangers, in a self-organised mode, on new technologies,
uses or markets. To study them I used a phenomenon based approach (von Krogh et al.,
2012), drawing on material from “observant participation” and “monument” analysis. I
conclude this part with a design proposition for conversational settings analysis and creation.
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This design consists of three modules (open invitation, focus and networking), as well as a
methodological distinction between participant public and regulars.
Chapter Question Field
Methodology
(phenomenon-
based approach)
Outcome
Partici-
patory
Observa-
tion
Monu-
ments
analysis
(Alternative
research and
deployment design
proposal)
15.
1. How can there
be informal
knowledge & ideas
sharing when no
networks or
communities
exist?
Barcamps: ad hoc
conversational
settings where
UDEs meet to
discuss about new
technologies, uses
and markets and
which enterprises
“inﬁltrate”
✧ ✧
Using
conversational
settings for
networking,
environment
monitoring and
exploration.
2. How can
enterprises harness
UDE activity for
16.
i) the exploration
of their own
service potential?
Hackathon:
ephemeral action
setting, where
UDEs explore the
potential of a new
service or
technology.
✧ ✧
Ephemeral
exploratory action
settings
organization and
the importance of
participants
personality.
17.
ii) the exploitation
of their own
service potential?
Developer support
forums:
conversational
settings, where
UDEs can express
their concerns
about issues they
face during service
potential
exploitation.
✧
Beyond
problem-solving:
“curator” and
UDE-enterprise
“empathy”.
Table 14.2: Part III overview
Chapter 16 will address the question of how enterprises can harness User-Developer-
Entrepreneurs (UDEs) activity for the exploration of their own service potential. The
Hackathon I will study took place in Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, Califor-
nia, and consisted of three days of exploration of a new technology, the HTML5 protocol.
Using a phenomenon-based approach and using material produced by observant participation
and monuments study, I propose a design for exploratory settings, consisting in two basic
elements: a) knowledge sharing from the provider to the UDEs on the new technology b)
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UDE exploratory activity, based on the new knowledge and their own, previous knowledge.
Chapter 17 will address the question of how enterprises can harness UDE activity for the
exploitation of their own service potential. Two developer support forums will examined,
Facebook and Google Maps, and common patterns will be identiﬁed. Through the study of
monuments, I will propose a mode for “leading the lead users”, when they are developers.
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Chapter 15
Before networks and communities, a
conversational setting: the case of the
Barcamps in Paris
Contents
15.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
15.1.1 Chapter overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
15.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
15.3 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
15.4 Distinction step: characteristic attributes of Barcamps . . . 305
15.4.1 Registration process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
15.4.2 Self-presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
15.4.3 Program definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
15.4.4 Collective exploration and creative learning. . . . . . . . . . . 308
15.4.5 Topics and places. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
15.4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
15.5 Exploration step: participation patterns and regulars . . . 310
15.5.1 The overall public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
15.5.2 The Barcamp regulars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
15.5.3 The regulars’ groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
15.6 Design step: proposition of three modules for conversa-
tional settings deployment and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
15.6.1 On the design of a conversational setting . . . . . . . . . . . 314
15.6.2 On conversational settings as related to networks and commu-
nities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
15.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
299
15.1 Introduction
In Part I we’ve seen how Web application developers can be characterised as user-developers,
user-developer-entrepreneurs or developer-entrepreneurs depending on the value of their in-
novations, whether for their own use or commercial value, as perceived before the develop-
ment process and as perceived once an application is created. In Part II we’ve seen how
such actors emerge in industrial periods in-between market emergence and industrial ratio-
nalisation, were exploration of the potential of a new technology goes hand by hand with
exploitation of new market niches, having emerged from new uses. As there needs to be a
synergy between UDEs and enterprises providing the technologies, sharing "knowledge and
ideas" during this process, the resulting situation may point to what Chesbrough calls Open
Innovation (Chesbrough, 2004; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007).
The current chapter explores a way for providing the condition of possibility for networking
and community emergence between users, developers, entrepreneurs and enterprises. The
Barcamps conversational setting is such a solution, though it does not actually lead in
networks and communities emergence in a deterministic way. Barcamps constitute a meeting
point of users, developers, entrepreneurs and service providers. There, participants have the
opportunity to discuss and learn about new uses, markets and technologies, what I will call a
business environment, as well as their transformations, what I will call an environment shift.
Historically, Barcamps begun in 2005 in San Francisco, USA, by Web entrepreneurs that
could not participate in an oﬃcial conference, the Foocamp, because of its fees as well
as of the fact that invitations to the conference were limited. Since then, their format has
spread on an international level, and hundreds of Barcamps have assembled service providers,
developers, entrepreneurs and “curious” users, interested in innovation in the context of the
ICTs.
15.1.1 Chapter overview
Table 15.1 summarises the current chapter. Section 15.2 will review some additional theo-
retical concepts to the ones already reviewed in Section 14.2, regarding the open question
of the possibility of informal knowledge and ideas sharing when no networks or communities
exist.
Then, Section 15.3 will discuss the methodological approach that will be used in the
current chapter. Adopting a phenomenon-based research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012),
this chapter will undertake its three ﬁrst steps (distinction, exploration and design), using two
methodological approaches: observant participation (already discussed in paragraphs 6.3.2
and 14.3.2), and monuments analysis (already discussed in paragraph 14.3.3), both applied
in the speciﬁc context of Barcamps.
Section 15.4 will undertake the exploration step. The peculiarities (von Krogh et al.,
2012) of both a Barcamp as a singular setting and the series of Barcamps as a “chain”
of conversations will be investigated. The section will propose that those settings are not
communities, though we can distinguish those aiming at the exploration of the possibility of
a community emergence, of networking and those which just aim to developer-entrepreneurs
discussion as such.
Section 15.5 will further explore the focal concept (von Krogh et al., 2012) of participa-
tion. It will propose that Barcamps do not form a network, either, while it will advance the
concept of the “regulars” for the study of conversational settings.
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Question: How can there be informal knowledge & ideas sharing
when no networks or communities exist?
Section Description Methodology Outcome
15.2 (&
14.2).
Literature
Review.
Review of informal
modes of open and
user innovation
organisation.
A lack of tools and
methods for informal
settings establishment,
when no communities or
networks exist.
15.4.
Distinction
Step.
Exploration of the
peculiarities of a
Barcamp and a chain
of Barcamps.
Observant
participation,
monuments
analysis.
Field description: not a
community. Barcamps for
communities, for networks
and just for conversation.
15.5.
Exploration
step.
Further participation
analysis.
Observant
participation,
monuments
analysis.
Not a network, either.
New concepts proposal:
regulars.
15.6.
Design
step.
A synthesis for a
conversational setting
study.
Previews data
discussion.
Modules of a
conversational setting
design, topic &
participation -based
conﬁgurations.
Table 15.1: Chapter overview.
Finally, Section 15.5 will perform a second order analysis of the data previously examined,
proposing a design for conversational settings research and deployment.
15.2 Literature review
In management studies one can ﬁnd a broad spectrum of organisation modes for innovation,
beyond the level of a single enterprise. Teece and Chesbrough (2002) summarized four
typical models of business organisation for innovation: virtual organisation (Alexander, 1997;
Wiggins and Crowston, 2010), alliances (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997; Soh, 2009), joint
venture (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Peng and Shenkar, 2002), corporation with autonomous
divisions and integrated corporation (March and Simon, 1964; Henderson and Clark, 1990;
Nakhla, 2003). More recently, research in New Product Development has focussed on the
case of co-development (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Maniak and Midler, 2008) as well
as exploration (Segrestin, 2005; Gillier et al., 2010) partnerships. In research ﬁelds where
the organisational mode includes multiple ﬁrms, a central issue (for both practitioners and
academics) is the deﬁnition of the common boundaries (of the alliance, the venture or the
partnership). On the other hand, when innovation is studied at the level of a single ﬁrm,
the focus of the analysis is on the boundaries between diﬀerent departments. Moreover,
the more exploratory the nature of a project, the more diﬃcult it becomes for the actors to
evaluate and share the results of eventual innovations.
On a more informal and less structured level, networks and communities may also be a
solution for knowledge and ideas sharing. Still, as we’ve already discussed in Section 14.2
301
the question of how communities and networks are created in the ﬁrst place remains open. I
also proposed that two means can be used for "making them emerge": collective action and
conversation. Figure 14.1, copied in Figure 15.1 for ease, has synthesized a joint approach
for networks and communities, proposing that conversation and collective action
Figure 15.1: An analytical framework for communities and networks meeting points, dis-
cussed in Section 14.2. The uniting ﬁeld can be either collective action or conversation.
Barcamps have been characterised as events that function as “contact generating ma-
chines” (Aguiton and Cardon, 2007), a tool to present their ideas or projects, to get to
know new ones and meet new people, to have a weak, temporal cooperation without a pre-
viously designed strategy. Still, as we will see in the current study, within the framework of
foggy competition, these events are in a position to fulﬁl the strategical requirements both
for developers-entrepreneurs to have an overview of the shifting environment and service
providers to ’inﬁltrate’ the conversational setting and to promote their service.
From a diﬀerent perspective, scholars in management have been interested in what are
named field configuring events (Meyer et al., 2005). Maskell et al. (2006) studying the
Meetings, Conventions and Exhibitions industry, proposed the term ”temporary clusters” to
emphasize the linkage between agglomeration behaviour and knowledge eﬀects on an inter-
organisational and professional level. Hardy and Maguire (2010) have used the concept of
discursive spaces to study the UN conference that resulted in the Stockholm Convention.
Using an institutional framework of analysis, they proposed that they can lead to change in an
institutional ﬁeld and in organizations through three mechanisms: domination, interpretation,
and translation. Generally speaking, Barcamps could be added to the long list of ﬁeld
conﬁguring events. Still, unlike fairs and conferences, where the state of the art of a market
or a profession is exhibited by its oﬃcial representatives, Barcamps have a far less formal
and more exploratory nature. Oﬃcial representatives are welcome though as individuals,
descending in sense to the level of users and developers, not dominating the discourse. In
addition, unlike the UN or other institutional fora, no decision is to be taken by the gathered
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public.
However, a perspective which may be more appropriate to address the Barcamps settings
is the one of “coﬀee-like intimate places”. As the political philosopher Habermas (1991)
mentions, the notion of “intimate places” appeared during the 18th century, particularly
so during the Industrial Revolution, deﬁning the sphere in which scientists, philosophers,
engineers and entrepreneurs met in a regular but informal way. In the French case, the
“salons de thé” were key places where this sphere was developed. The intimate sphere
was in interaction with the private, the public and the commercial spheres, constituting a
“melting pot” of knowledge and ideas. Thus, as Habermas notes, parts of it were either
absorbed or limited by the private sphere (the case of the domestic “living room” becoming a
“salon”), the emergence of large industries (organising the social sphere even beyond work)
and the dominant role of media in the public sphere.
The analogy of this type of intimacy, though restricted to the level of UDEs, which is
distinguished from the family private sphere, though not entering, yet, into the public sphere,
will be useful to gasp the case of the Barcamps.
15.3 Research Methodology
My study on the Barcamp phenomenon will be developed according three steps, following
von Krogh et al. (2012): (1) distinction step, (2) exploration step, (3) research design step.
In this section we will explain these steps.
The data studied will be drawn from 16 meetings that took place within the period from
the 6th of December 2005 to the 5th of April 2008 in the city of Paris, France. My research
material will be arranged using two methods:
1. Observant participation of the Barcamps. As already described in paragraphs 6.3.2
and 14.3.2, this approach consists in observing a group’s activity while taking part in
it. To have a concrete view of Barcamp’s process, I participated in 8 of the 16 events
organized in Paris. I took part in the discussions and had numerous talks with the
participants during the events, taking notes in the process.
2. Monument analysis. As already discussed in paragraph 14.3.3, this approach is based
on the study of interaction traces, left on Web sites. The ‘monuments of interaction’
that will be studied, were produced and published by the participants themselves, and
come to complete my own observation material. Quality data (Videos, photos, de-
scriptions of the events), as well as software applications developed by the participants
will be examined.
Distinction step.
In Section 14.2 we discussed the “inadequacy of given body of theory and knowledge in the
field” (von Krogh et al., 2012), to describe and analyse informal innovation related social
settings that are neither communities nor networks, as happens in the case where individuals
do not belong in the same group and are not interconnected - and are thus strangers. I have
proposed that one of the ways in which networks or communities can emerge is through
conversation, providing the possibility for individuals to connect or to develop a common
ground.
In Section 15.4 I will examine the “bracket peculiarities” (von Krogh et al., 2012, p.
290) of the speciﬁc conversational settings of Barcamps. I will use a narrative approach,
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aiming at the provision of an explicit description of describing the phenomenon as it appears
to its stake-holders.
On the singular level, the elements that will be studied will be organisational (topics of
discussion, registration process, participation). These elements suggest that those settings
are not built around a speciﬁc cognitive domain, as in communities.
Furthermore, on a chain level, and using the model of Figure 15.1, I will distinguish the
settings in those aiming at exploring the possibility of a community, of those focussed on
networking, and those being content to converse between developer-entrepreneurs as such.
Exploration step.
Advancing my research, I will then proceed to the exploration step, developed in Section 15.5,
intensifying data gathering (von Krogh et al., 2012). Individual registration rates will be used
as a parameter to ﬁlter the list of participants, identify and further analyse the ‘regulars’
of the Barcamps. The material will be drawn from the ‘monuments’ of the Barcamps that
took place in Paris, particularly the registration ﬁles. Operating complex computer data
processing required to render these data – existing in various formats – in an exploitable
form, I will create a data base and then I will perform a quantitative study.
The information will regard the individual rate of participation in Barcamps (the number
of times each individual was registered in a Barcamp) as well as the organizational origin of
the participants.
The outcome will re-enforce the indication of them not being a community, as the vast
majority of individuals were registered less than two times over the years of the meetings
were carried out.
Design step.
Finally, Section 15.6 will be based on the previous two to propose a research design regarding
the study of the conﬁgurations of conversational settings.
For this, I will use a design approach based on the theory of Axiomatic Design (Suh,
1990; Kim et al., 1991), adapted to the level of conversational setting design. Suh’s the-
ory, originally conceived to enable an ex post design evaluation, permits the analysis of a
given technology by conﬁguring the Design Parameters (DPs) in relation to the Functional
Requirements (FRs) of its design. The DPs are understood as the answers to the question
“how?”, or the inputs to a speciﬁc system, while the FRs are understood as the answers
to the question “what?”, or the outputs of the system. For this adaptation I take into
consideration the descriptive model on group behaviour and eﬀectiveness (Hackman, 1987).
Hackman’s model studies organisational processes also by examining the inputs and the out-
puts of a work-group design. Yet, in this case the latter model cannot be accurately followed
either, as my study ﬁeld does not concern a workspace.
Regarding the DPs, I will conﬁgure the organisational “patterns” that characterize all
the settings and remain relatively stable while participants as well as the topics of the
settings change. This will be based on an analysis of the following qualitative material:
observant participation (at eight of the events), documents, photos and videos published by
the participants themselves before and after each event.
Regarding the FRs, I will propose a design of what could be considered the “output”
of these events, that is the strategical functions that can potentially be served by the DPs.
This design will draw on quantity data coming from the event registration ﬁles, available on-
line. Conclusions about the participation modalities in the overall environment, will concern
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the degree of engagement of individuals in this setting, as well as the conﬁguration of the
“regular” participants and their characteristics.
Further research can then examine similar phenomena, following the axes proposed (mod-
ules of an exploratory business environment).
15.4 Distinction step: characteristic attributes of
Barcamps
This section distinguishes the bracket peculiarities of Barcamps. Both the subjects of dis-
cussion, as described in the initial call and further speciﬁed by the participants themselves,
and the participation openness do not refer to a speciﬁc community domain or a sense of
belonging neither do they presuppose that participants are already connected. In addition,
unlike communities of practice, safeguarding and developing a common practice, Barcamps
allow to those participants interested in experimenting on new or emerging practices, po-
tentially interesting to them. The overall setting privileges an egalitarian behaviour, though
it attracts individuals of diﬀerent status, namely users, developers, entrepreneurs and service
provider executives.
Table 15.2 shows the general data on the Barcamps studied, where we observe an im-
portant variation in participation numbers, subjects and places. The following paragraphs
describe the speciﬁc characteristics of these conversational settings.
15.4.1 Registration process
An event starts with an open call for participation. Through a Web page dedicated to each
event, everyone interested can self-register, submitting his/her name, personal Web page,
organisation and e-mail, creating in this way the list of participants. There is no secretary
for the events and no authorisation is needed in order to register or to organize an event.
All these event pages are hosted in a common portal (www.barcamp.org).
The only limit to participation is posed by the capacity of the building. The list of
participants is completed publically until their number reaches the threshold of that capacity.
Open participation is also a principle widely followed in Web communities, such as Wikipedia
or on-line fora, where everyone is able to contribute without authorisation.
This organisation mode may lead to a great variety of participants. For instance, in
Barcamp 7, one could meet amongst the participants the product manager of Gmail and
Google Maps, the founder of the Netvibes Web service, the president of APRIL (a French
association for the promotion of free software), a researcher from the San Francisco France
Telecom R&D department. Even if the most important element of the participants came from
the computer science discipline, many also came from diﬀerent disciplines: management,
ﬁnance, sociology, psychology. Amongst the registered persons, one could ﬁnd ten people
coming from Google, seven coming from France Telecom R&D (Orange Labs), four from SFR
telecommunication company, as well as many entrepreneurs of Silicon Sentier association,
members of the FING (Foundation Internet New Generation), and executives of ﬁrms like
Mandriva-Linux, Hewlett Packard, SEGA and SUN Microsystems.
The DP of the registration process’ openness satisﬁes the requirement of “outsider’s”
participation. Each event is open to actors that don’t usually take part in known ecosystems
or networks. Their presence gives the opportunity to extend one’s network beyond a speciﬁc
industry, as well as to obtain new information and knowledge from other, neighbouring ﬁelds.
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15.4.2 Self-presentation
The day of the event, participants gather at the programmed place and time. The procedure
begins by their self-presentation. Each one uses three tags to describe himself, along with his
name and profession. For instance, in the Barcamp organized in the local oﬃce of Google in
Paris, a participant introduced herself using the tags “innovation”, “interdependence” and
“chocolate”.
As an organisational DP, this kind of introduction prompts the self-classiﬁcation of the
individuals according to their expertise or interests and facilitates social interaction and
networking on the basis of speciﬁc projects during the event.
15.4.3 Program definition
After the presentations, participants deﬁne the subjects of the discussion themselves. For
this purpose, a whiteboard is already prepared by the organizers, where the rooms and the
time slots of the discussions are already completed, waiting for the subjects to be ﬁlled in.
“Barcamp Paris 11” took place at Yahoo’s local oﬃces and was co-sponsored by Silicon
Sentier (a start-up association), Ziki (a Web market that puts diﬀerent enterprises in con-
tact) and Passage Piétons (an event organising agency). After the self-presentation of the
participants, they were invited to ﬁll a whiteboard with the discussion topics they desired.
On the table there were already marked the names of the available rooms (“Montorgueil”,
“Barbès”, “Rue de la Paix”, “Lepic”, “Trocadero”, “Beaubourg”, “Grande Arche”, “Mont-
martre”) in columns and the names of the available time slots (“15:30”, “16:30”, “break”,
“18:00”, “19:00”) in rows. As the centre of the common discussion topic was the concept
of virtual identity, various related discussion themes were proposed and they either were
merged into the same discussion group or constituted a diﬀerent one. Discussions on digital
identity included the following: “Digital identity by art: the project Skatcha’rt”, “Being and
appearance Twitter + RSS + Blog = Communication = identity for a lifetime, as of last
week where and how to define the Being”, “Todeka Project Digital Identity Certification”.
Yet, there were also discussion topics not included in the thematology of digital identity,
such as “Coworking Paris and Web site”, “Netvibes UWA1 and Widgets: widgets engines,
widgetisation of the web”.
This division of the participating “crowd” into many thematic discussions, serves in having
more concrete and speciﬁc discussion groups, according to their own interests. This way,
an exploration of the environment which is more focussed becomes possible, during which
useful knowledge and concepts can emerge and be shared.
From the networking perspective, discussion in small, interest-oriented groups (usually
from ﬁve to twelve individuals) reinforces the capabilities to expand one’s network, as well
as the scope of exploration. These discussions are very useful for small enterprises allowing
them to trace the important evolutions of their ﬁeld as well as to present their projects and
skills to eventual clients or partners. For platform providers, it gives a chance to spot future
innovation trajectories and use this feedback to adjust aspects of their platforms.
1Netvibes UWA:Netvibes Universal Widget API. A platform launched by Netvibes Web service as a design
tool-kit for external developers.
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15.4.4 Collective exploration and creative learning.
After the talks, an experimentation process, called “Mashpit” usually takes place using the
concepts and knowledge that emerged during the discussions. During a Mashpit participants
create prototypes of new applications and services. A Mashpit can often be a multidisci-
plinary process, as individuals coming from other disciplines other than the one of computer
programming (such as design, marketing or social sciences) can also participate.
In the case of the event organised in Google’s local oﬃces, a Mashpit took place during
the second day, where 48 individuals were registered and where ten projects were proposed
on the basis of Google Maps2. When participants met, they voted for three out of the ten
projects to be developed. After a coﬀee break, they were divided in three project groups and
started working. Finally, each team presented its project.
I will present here one of the three innovative projects. It is called “Interactive Map”.
This application had a very simple functionality: the user could mark points on a map of
Paris by a single click. Beginning from the ﬁrst marked point, a path was automatically
created to the next points marked. Finally, a course was designed by the user in some clicks.
He could execute the application as many times as he wanted to design more courses on
the map. There was no indication of speciﬁc uses of this prototype. Nevertheless, we can
imagine a way in which this application could be used for a new Web service: such as a
site where tourist guides, before exiting the hotel with their clients for a walk in Paris, can
demonstrate the course that will be followed.
Nevertheless, whether or not the prototype will end up being a commercialized service
or application is not a direct objective of the exercise (today one can ﬁnd applications and
features of Google Maps a lot more sophisticated than the “Interactive Map”). What is
important, for both developers/entrepreneurs and platform providers, is to experiment with
the innovation potential of a new platform (as well as of a combination of already existing
platforms), check the functionalities and documentation provided and, eventually, expand
the platform via the entrepreneurial activity after the event by adopting its tools.
15.4.5 Topics and places.
Table 15.3 proposes a categorisation of the conversation topics under which the Barcamps
were organised, drawing on Table 15.2. While for some meetings, usually the earlier ones,
there is often no title other than “Barcamp” (Barcamps No 2, 4, 7, 8, 11), other meetings
have a topic, although still broad (3, 9, 12, 15, 17). Six of the meetings were more speciﬁc
(1, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16), indicating a ﬁeld to discuss and not a speciﬁc technology or service.
The places are usually diﬀerent, as the discussions take place either in a cafe or a bar,
or in the premises of a services provider, sponsoring the event. The location’s capacity
also deﬁnes the maximum number of participants accepted. An event can be sponsored by
multiple organisations (corporations, start-ups or institutes) and no authorisation is needed
for its organisation.
More speciﬁcally, the Barcamps that took place in service providers’ premises have no
title. For instance, in the case of the Barcamp organized in Google’s local oﬃces in Paris,
its title was “Barcamp Paris 7”. Yet, the discussions were strongly inﬂuenced by the launch
of the new platform, Google Maps. In a similar way, the event organized in Yahoo’s local
oﬃces (“Barcamp Paris 11”), was oriented towards the general topic of “virtual identity”, an
issue that Yahoo, as well as most Web services, was discussing internally at the time when
2URL visited on 1/11/2008. http://mashpit.pbwiki.com/MashPitParis
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social networking platforms arose. An exception is the case of a later meeting sponsored by
SUN Microsystems which addressed a speciﬁc ﬁeld, the topic of “Tools 2.0” - that is tools
for Web 2.0 services3.
Topic Barcamp No Total
None 2, 4, 7, 8, 11 5
Wide 3, 9, 12, 15, 17 5
Field speciﬁed 1, 6, 10, 13, 14,16 6
Table 15.3: Barcamp topics according to expertise. Barcamp topics were mosty wide or even
not predeﬁned at all. When more precise, a general ﬁeld was speciﬁed.
When topics are speciﬁed, they remain broad. They can regard uses, be developer
oriented (Barcamps No 6, 15) or not (12, 13, 17), or they can regard broader reﬂections, such
as media and proximity (3,9). Two meetings regarded the organisation of the conversational
setting itself. The ﬁrst one was on “how to organise a Barcamp”, while the 10th was on the
development of a more permanent place were UDEs can meet and discuss.
Compared to the organisational forms met on the Web, the construction of networks
around a broad topic is a general characteristic of on-line interaction (Chakrabarti et al.,
2002; Highﬁeld et al., 2010).
Seen as an organisational Design Parameter, a wide topic satisﬁes the requirement of
attracting individuals that can be potentially interested in a speciﬁc service, when it takes
place in the provider’s chosen location, or by a speciﬁc use and the technologies that can be
utilised for it. Therefore, it provides an opportunity for participants to monitor technologies,
uses and emerging markets.
15.4.6 Discussion
The self-organising nature of the Barcamps is in opposition to the methods used by the
Meetings, Conventions and Exhibitions industry (Maskell et al., 2006), as well as by institu-
tional interlocutors Hardy and Maguire (2010). No common decisions are made, while it is
not a place where enterprises are supposed to market their products.
Being too informal and temporally ephemeral to enter into the broad spectrum of or-
ganisation modes for innovation beyond the level of a single enterprise proposed by Teece
and Chesbrough (2002), Barcamps are not networks or communities either. Beyond their
ephemeral nature, their topics are too wide, people meeting there are not necessarily con-
nected, while those who participate in those Barcamps that include a mashpit do not safe-
guard a given practice, but experiment on new or emerging practices, potentially interesting
for them.
Figure 15.2 synthesises the deployment of Barcamps’ conversational settings as a whole,
using two criteria: topic speciﬁcity (from no topic to speciﬁed ﬁeld, as summarised in Ta-
ble 15.3) and networking opportunities (on the basis of the global number of registered
individuals, as listed in Table 15.2). This synthesis makes used of the framework putting
conversation in-between informal relational models, namely communities and networks, as
discussed in Section 14.2 and modelled in Figure 14.1.
3These tools are more often developed by programmers using Java or AJAX, programming languages
animated by SUN Microsystems.
309
Figure 15.2: A synthesis of the whole set of Barcamps studied, as a conversational setting.
As the schema suggests, there have been Barcamps closer to the notion of community
building, as their topic interested a small amount of participants, others that have been
closer to networks, as no speciﬁc topic was prescribed, and a third category, more clearly
oriented towards conversation.
More speciﬁcally, the Barcamps 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, and 14 attracted a smaller number
of participants and their topic was generally less broad. They were set on the basis of
exploring the possibility of emergence of a community on a speciﬁc topic. On the other
hand, Barcamps 4, 7, 11, 12, 14 and 15 were less narrowly deﬁned, and more focussed on
networking. Barcamps 2, 8, 16 were in-between the two categories, and conversation was
largely inﬂuenced by the place itself (Silicon Sentier, Cube, La Cantine), all those places
being themselves Developer-Entrepreneur hangouts.
15.5 Exploration step: participation patterns and
regulars
In this section we are interested in further exploring these conversational setting events, by
identifying the ”regulars” in these discussions. Following a quantitative methodology, we
conﬁgure the qualitative characteristics of participation in the whole environment as well as
the speciﬁc characteristics of the “core” of this milieu, focussing on the last latterly.
15.5.1 The overall public
From the elaboration of the registration ﬁles to 16 Barcamps organized in Paris, we found that
713 individuals were registered in these events. 3% of this population had been registered
for more than six times, 10% had participated between three to six times, while 87% had
participated only once or twice (as shown in Figure 15.3).
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1-2 times: 87%
3-6 times: 10%
more than 7 times: 3%
Registration rates in Barcamps 
Figure 15.3: Registration rates in Barcamps that took place in Paris from December 6th,
2005 to April 5th, 2008.
While participants came from diﬀerent professional environments, there were two cate-
gories that actively formed this milieu: UDEs of Information and Communication Technolo-
gies start-ups or small enterprises on the one hand, and executives of platform providers,
usually in charge of technology or community aﬀairs, on the other hand.
What the participation rates suggest is that this milieu managed to be very open, at-
tracting individuals that were interested in speciﬁc “wide” topics.
15.5.2 The Barcamp regulars
As Barcamps are informal settings, many of which were organized by “ad-hoc” sponsors,
the participation rates being the criterion to determine the regulars. Hence, I am going
to analyse the group of people that belong to the 3% of the overall public, having been
registered for more than six times during the period studied. Another way to determine the
regulars of these events could just be to list the sponsors of all the events (presented in
Table 15.2). Nevertheless, since Barcamps are “ad-hoc” events, this method could lead us
to false conclusions, as their sponsors are not engaged in participation to future ones.
Once the most active individuals are identiﬁed, I conﬁgure the organizations to which
these individuals belong. This information is often available in the registration ﬁles, as
participants usually state the organization for which they work during the registration phase.
Complementary data drawn from informal discussions with some of the regulars were also
used. Finally, I conclude with a model schematically represented in Figure 15.4.
Figure 15.4 illustrates the “group” of Barcamps regulars, during the examined period,
consisting of the most regular participants. Each participant is represented by the letter A
and a number (i= 1 . . . 23). Each group is represented by an ellipse. To graphically represent
these individuals’ participation in Barcamps, I used the model discussed in Section 14.2. The
space of communities is where cognition is more important than relations, while the space of
networks is where relations are more important than cognition. Barcamps, as a conversational
setting, is placed in-between. Individuals are positioned in the schema according to the
identity they declared during the registration process, usually professional. Relations-based
professions (e.g. PR or marketing) are put on the network side. Expertise-based professions
(e.g. developers) are put on the cognitive side.
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Figure 15.4: Graphical representation of Barcamp “regulars”.
The ﬁrst remark we can make is that the core of Barcamps in Paris is quite structured.
The great majority of people frequenting the Barcamps went there along with colleagues
of theirs. Only six out of twenty three persons have frequenting Barcamps without being
accompanied by a colleague of theirs, and they have been principally marketing professionals
or bloggers. Another fact that we can easily observe, is that the Co-working network plays a
central role in the constitution of this core, as it connects like a “bridge” (Granovetter, 1973)
all the participating groups (at least one individual of each group is inside the Co-working
ellipse).
As it transpired from the discussions with the actors, collaboration amongst participants
constitutes an eventuality but not a certainty. Both for the regulars and the less regular
participants, actors are correlated but not necessarily connected.
15.5.3 The regulars’ groups
A look into the regulars’ groups reveals a developer-entrepreneur identity, belonging to or-
ganisations that are engaged in Web business. Two groups, the Barcamp Bank and the
Explorateurs du Web emerged through the process of conversations. Individuals being regu-
lars without other colleagues participating as much as them either occupied a communication
or marketing related post in a service provider, were consultants or bloggers.
Co-working is an international network, united on the basis of the construction of informal
collaboration spaces, where entrepreneurs can meet, work and exchange ideas, as well as
social niches. During the examined period this network had 734 members on an international
level (measured on September 2006). As can be seen in the Figure 15.4, six members of
the core of Barcamps participate in this network, representing (formally or informally) their
group in this network.
The start-ups association Silicon Sentier were the most regular attendants to these meet-
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ings. Financially supported by the local authorities, it emerged as a sort of local “networking
bureaucracy”, creating and exploiting value through the networking as an activity in itself
and playing a role of an intermediary amongst users, developers, entrepreneurs and enter-
prises. Seven members of Silicon Sentier (A4, A5, A10, A12, A13, A14 and A15) and two
start-ups (AF83 and Fabernovel) were involved in animating Barcamps. Silicon Sentier is
an association of a hundred new technologies start-ups, active in Paris and supported by the
City of Paris. In the last part of the period examined, the association managed to extend its
network of members and construct a permanent entrepreneurial milieu (called La Cantine),
where it organises a great variety of events (from Barcamps to seminars and other meetings).
AF83 and Fabernovel followed an important development during the period between
2006 (when they were founded) and 2009 following this strategy. Fabernovel is an innovation
management consulting company, which managed to multiply its turnover by four during this
period. AF83 is an enterprise co-founded and co-organised by Fabernovel and Beartech (a
technology start-up) for the “agile development” of web applications and services as well as
for communities organisation. During the same period, Beartech multiplied its turnover by
4.5.
France Telecom R&D also participated in the core of Barcamps in Paris, with three
individuals (A9, A3 and A6) participating in the core of Barcamps and one in the Co-working
Network. France Telecom (named Orange in between) is the largest telecommunication ﬁrm
of France. Since it employs more than 3,700 researchers, the participation in this milieu
could not be understood as a major environment monitoring and exploring strategy. Yet,
it managed to establish a relation with developers/entrepreneurs that was useful during the
launch of its platform, “Orange Partner”, in 2008. That platform allowed SMEs to build
upon the company’s network, in a way similar to the ecosystems of Web platforms.
“Les Explorateurs du Web” (“Web explorers”) is a consulting group, created in the
Barcamp process, specialized in Web services and Web applications. Five members of this
group (A1, A2, A8, A22 and A23) took part in the core of Barcamps in Paris. Beyond its
participation to this milieu, this group also organised events (“Explorcamps”) that borrowed
DPs from the Barcamp design while modifying others (for instance participation is charged
for professional events).
Barcamp Bank is another group which emerged in the Barcamp process. Having also
international links, this group organized events that aim to link ﬁnancial investment with
entrepreneurs’ projects. Two members of this group (A6 and A7) participated in the core of
the milieu in Paris.
After the examined period, diﬀerent event formats emerged modifying Barcamps’ DPs,
such as events within large organisations or with topics that weren’t related at all to ICTs.
In addition, the founding of a permanent “co-working” space by Silicon Sentier intensiﬁed
the activity of this entrepreneurial milieu beyond the organisation of Barcamps.
15.6 Design step: proposition of three modules for
conversational settings deployment and analysis
Drawing from the previous sections, I suggest a design for further research and deployment
of conversational settings. My design proposal has two levels: the one of a conversational
setting as an ad hoc meeting and the one of conversational settings in general, as compared
to networks and communities.
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DPs
Wide Open Self Topic/group Experi-
Topic Registration Presentation partitionning mentation
Monitor X X
Environment
Attract X X
“outsiders”
FRs Explore X X X X
environment
Creative X X
learning
Enable X X X X X
networking
Table 15.4: Organisational DPs – FRs matrix
15.6.1 On the design of a conversational setting
Unlike the typical setting of an organisation, I found that an active observation of a shift-
ing environment can be performed by the use of conversational settings. The format of
Barcamps, which borrows elements from the design of Web communities, can be described
by two categories of DPs: open and self-restrictive. By open DPs I refer to the broad
topic as well as the open registration parameters, while by self-restricting DPs I refer to the
self-presentation, the topic/group partitioning and the experimentation parameters. The
Functional Requirements of these events are not the same with a typical organisation either.
I could describe the FRs of this format as the need to monitor a business environment,
attract outsiders, explore the environment, enable creative learning and enable networking.
Making a synthesis of the preceding analysis, I propose the following DP - FR shown in
the Table 15.4.
According to the synthesis proposed, three modules emerge in the analysed format:
1. The open invitation module (on the upper-left side of the matrix). This module uses
the open DPs and aims to the attraction of a representative sample of a wide business
environment. The deﬁnition of a wide topic and an open registration process address
the requirement of outsiders’ attraction in order to monitor and explore shifts on a
given business environment.
2. The focus module (on the lower-right side of the matrix). This module uses the self-
restrictive DPs allowing the focus on specialized topics and working groups, enabling a
deeper exploration of practices, knowledge and concepts related to existing or emerging
business ecosystems.
3. The networking module (on the bottom of the matrix). This module which traverses
all DPs, enables social networking by providing the possibility for participants to iden-
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tify people and topics related to their own interests and extend their (personal or
organisational) social network.
This design is the most beneﬁcial for DEs, as it provides a fast and cheap way to represent
the business environment in which they act (ﬁrst module). In addition, they are in a position
to acquire more specialised knowledge in their ﬁeld from neighbour actors and test new
tools and practices while exploring innovative concepts (second module). Finally, they are
able to identify the existing actors, networks and communities at a local level and deploy a
networking strategy, including potential partners and clients (third module).
For platform suppliers, such as Google or Yahoo, this design contributes in acquiring
a speedy feedback on innovation trajectories that are deployed by entrepreneurs as well as
on the documentation and the use modalities of the tools they provide (second module).
In addition, as they are able to “meet in person” a sample of their external developer
communities and they are facilitated to extend and structure their ecosystem on a local level
(third module), taking into the account the speciﬁcities of the local market.
At the same time, these events are catalysed by the presence of occasional participants,
using speciﬁc technologies as end users or user-developers, usually making “surprising” re-
marks that may open new application ﬁelds.
15.6.2 On conversational settings as related to networks and
communities
As already discussed in Section 14.2, there are two dominant theoretical approaches to
analysing social interaction when leaving the boundaries of a speciﬁc organisation: networks,
generally reduced to weak and strong ties (Granovetter, 1973), and communities, generally
characterised by what they share. While these two notions are often used in order to analyse
similar ﬁelds, there are distinct characteristics to them: while the notion of social networks
focusses on the nature and strength of existing ties between individuals, the notion of com-
munities focusses on common practices, interests and knowledge being more ﬂexible on the
qualiﬁcation of members’ ties.
The study of the Barcamps phenomenon suggests that there can be a third way, in be-
tween networks and communities. In the Parisian case and for the period studied, Barcamps
have explored the emergence possibilities for both networks and communities, by calling
for conversation on new topics and bringing together users, developers, entrepreneurs and
enterprises that had previously been strangers. To the extent in which an entrepreneurial
“milieu” emerged throughout this whole process, from which the “regulars” had been in
position to beneﬁt more than the “occasional” participants, Barcamps constituted a conver-
sational setting providing the conditions of possibility for the creation of new networks and
communities.
Overall, beyond composing a concrete case of a conversational setting, Barcamps also
illustrate the importance of conversation itself, as distinguished from collective action, sense
of belonging or establishing long-term relationships.
15.7 Conclusion
The issue of networks and communities emergence possibility has long been puzzling Open
and User Innovation studies, since management research has no explanation for informal
settings establishment when no social connections or common ground exist.
315
The case of Barcamps revealed a potential for networks and communities emergence
through the establishment of conversational settings. The conditions for this emergence
were created thanks to a Barcamp design enabling the exploration of potential topics of
interest while providing participants the opportunity to network.
Within these settings, developers-entrepreneurs (DEs) had the chance to monitor the
appearance of new technologies, markets and uses, while enterprises had the occasion to
inﬁltrate those settings and informally promote their own services. At the same time, Bar-
camps created the conditions for both DEs and enterprises to get connected and share their
considerations through conversation.
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16.1 Introduction
In an interview taken two years after my ﬁeld research, Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of
Facebook admitted the “biggest mistake” the company had made1:
The biggest mistake that we made as company is betting too much on HTML5
as opposed to native. Because, it just wasn’t there. It’s not that HTML5 is bad,
I’m - long term - really excited about it.
In the same interview, Zuckerberg commented that the enterprise lost precious time (two
years) in focussing exclusively on HTML5 and was to change its strategy towards redesigning
their service.
This chapter explores a way for the harnessing of UDE activity to the requirements
of technological potential exploration, which is called “Hackathon”. In essence, UDEs are
invited to “hack” a speciﬁc technology and are for this reason provided with advice by
experts, during a three days meeting. While such an invitation may appear paradoxical for
other industrial contexts, it is still coherent with a strategy of platform extension through
third-party entrepreneurial activity and can provide some answers to the broader question
of “how to harness non informal communities and networks for innovation”, which remains
open in the Open and User Innovation literature, as already reviewed in Section 14.2.
The case I will study took place in Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, Silicon
Valley and lasted three days2 and concerned HTML5, a projected advancement of the Web
services technologies3.
To distinguish and explore this phenomenon, as well as to propose a research design for
its further investigation (von Krogh et al., 2012), I will use literature studying innovation
at the group level. Then, diﬀerent methodological entries (participatory observation and
monument study) will be used to draw data from the ﬁeld and analyse them, according to
what is known according to the literature.
This study will provide insights and suggestions for ephemeral group exploratory action
organisation, as well as for participants personality consideration while organising such ac-
tions.
16.1.1 Chapter Overview
Table 16.1 shows an overview of the current chapter. The question addressed will be how
to harness UDE activity for service potential exploration.
Section 16.2 will review some of the most important approaches to the use of groups
for innovative action, namely the approaches on user innovation (von Hippel, 2005), on
knowledge groups (Nonaka et al., 2000; Erden et al., 2008), on creative groups, as well as
1The interview was taken during the TechChrunch Disrupt, an event organized by a popular to
developer-entrepreneurs news site. Mark Zuckerberg: Our Biggest Mistake Was Betting Too Much
On HTML,5 Tuesday, September 11th, 2012, http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/11/mark-zuckerberg-our-
biggest-mistake-with-mobile-was-betting-too-much-on-html5/ Retrieved on October 12, 2012.
2From 13 to 15/08/2010.
3The objective of HTML5 can be resumed to the use of what in the 1970’s was conceived as hypermedia
for service development reasons. Back in the 1970’s, Ted Nelson, who is often attributed the conception
of the term “hypertext”, had considered the latter as only an attribute of “hypermedia”. Nelson’s concept
of Hypermedia was to include movies (“hyperﬁlms”), texts (“hypertexts”), audio, music and slide-shows
(Nelson, 1974, p. 85) shared in a computer network.
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Question: How to harness UDE activity for service potential exploration?
Section Synopsis Outcome
16.2. Literature
Review.
Diﬀerent approaches on
user, cognition and creativity
groups use.
A draft description of the
object to explore.
16.3. Research
Methodology.
A phenomenon-based
approach.
Research steps to follow.
16.4. Distinction Step. General characteristics of a
“Hackathon”.
A distinction of roles and
phases of a “Hackathon”.
16.5. Exploration Step. Focusing on the cognitive
aspects.
The importance of
personality for innovation.
16.6. Design Step. Taking personality into
consideration for exploratory
action organisation.
Design elements for
“personalised collective
action” deployment and
study.
Table 16.1: Chapter Overview.
synthetic approaches (Hatchuel and Weil, 2009). The section will conclude with a preliminary
description of a Hackathon, as resulting from the literature review.
For the study of the Hackathon, I will use a phenomenon-based approach (von Krogh
et al., 2012) that will be described in Section 16.3. I will use two main methodological entries:
participatory observation, as I will use my own participation to the Google Hackathon as a
ﬁrst entry, and monuments study, as I will use the traces left by the participants interactions,
principally the projects’ description, as a means to further explore the ﬁeld.
Section 16.4 will describe the general characteristics of the Hackathon, establishing it
as diﬀerent to the types of groups already identiﬁed by the literature. More speciﬁcally,
Hackathons appear to cross all levels of group tacit knowledge quality (Erden et al., 2008) in
a three day period. At the same time, its diﬀerent phases as well as the roles undertaken by
organisers and participants, generally coincide with what the literature review has suggested.
Then, in Section 16.5 I will further explore those characteristics, speciﬁcally in what
regards their cognitive aspects as observed in the ﬁeld. The seminars revealed a “foggy
competition” phase for Web apps development, as new performance criteria appear and
the potential of a disruption was a topic of discussion. Development and entrepreneurial
“tips and tricks” come to support UDEs in their activity. Surprisingly, the study of partici-
pants creations, revealing as to personal identity, goes beyond developing and entrepreneurial
knowledge, as the “intimate” knowledge, personality related knowledge, appears to have had
an important place in the development process.
Section 16.6 revisits the structure of a Hackathon, proposing a way to take into consid-
eration the personal dimension in ephemeral collective exploration activities, and suggests
some potential paths for the study and the deployment of “personalised collective action”
settings.
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16.2 Literature Review: on the use of user, cognition
and creativity groups
16.2.1 Harnessing user innovations
An important part of the literature on user innovation is constrained to the noting that
user innovation just happens. Harnessing user innovation simply means identifying those
lead users that have innovated. This task can be undertaken, for instance, by marketers
who, instead of doing research on standard categories, search for users that have modiﬁed
the characteristics and the functions of a speciﬁc product (von Hippel, 1978c). Another
approach is to identify lead users through market research and then organise a joint workshop
with product managers (Herstatt and von Hippel, 1992), also referred to as the “lead user
method”. Various limitations have been identiﬁed by scholars, such as the inability of expert
enterprise staﬀ to communicate and collaborate with users, because of a communication
gap due to technical language leading to a lack of motivation (Olson and Bakke, 2001), by
a lack of user’s ideas feasibility (Magnusson et al., 2003) or by a need to further explore
those ideas in order to be able to take them into strategical consideration (Le Masson and
Magnusson, 2003). Finally, another approach is to assign users a well-speciﬁed design space
where they can innovate (von Hippel, 1990, 1994), such as the case of Threadless, printed
T-shirts with user-designed prints (Piller, 2010).
In fact, the above approaches address diﬀerent issues: how to exploit spontaneous user
ideas for new product development, how to identify ready-made user innovations to produce
industrially, how to exploit user creativity on a given product. This diversity of approaches
is also related with the fact that users are “strange” to the enterprises rules, and their
participation is likely to be surprising (Olson and Bakke, 2001; Magnusson et al., 2003).
Adopting a broader scope, in order to include “enterprise users innovators”, we could also
mention the case of platforms as a speciﬁc one. Gawer and Cusumano (2002), analysing
Intel ’s strategic principles for platform leadership, highlight the case of the “PlugFests”,
organised by the enterprise for its partners (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, pp. 57-60). As
they note, between 100 and 200 companies usually attended these events, sending two or
three of their best engineers. There, visitors tested the prototypes of their products on the
new Intel platform, which were built on the basis of the speciﬁcations the enterprise had
published. Moreover, Intel had the chance to receive suggestions from the complementors
to improve its platform before releasing it. Still, those meetings, as described by the authors,
regarded compatibility and speciﬁcation testing issues, not the exploration of a given (Intel ’s,
in the particular case) technology’s potential.
The question of how to harness user-developer-entrepreneur activity to explore the po-
tential of a given service, includes the above mentioned questions, in the broader notion of
exploration. Still, a condition is that users do explore a potential. For this to be done, the
developers need to comply with the requirement of understanding the underpinning technical
language. More over, they have the skills to advance from an idea to a prototype, testing
the feasibility of their concepts while they explore them.
The current study will explore this possibility by the study of the Google Technologies
User Group “hackathon” to which I participated. Before passing to the examination of the
case, though, a review of the methods, described by the literature, to provide necessary
(technical) knowledge to groups will be useful for the further exploration of the case.
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Figure 16.1: Knowledge creation as a spiral process through seemingly antithetical concepts.
Quoted from Nonaka et al. (2000).
16.2.2 Knowledge in groups.
Nonaka et al. (2000) criticise the widely encountered confusion in the literature between
“knowledge management” and “information management” that addresses the organisation
as an “information processing machine”, questioning the problem-solving approach (Nonaka
et al., 2000, p. 6), as organisations also“create and define problems”. Knowledge creation is
thus considered a ‘spiral’ process “through seemingly antithetical concepts”, such as ‘tacit’
and ‘explicit’ elements of knowledge, as shown in Figure 16.1.
Reviewing contemporary issues on organizational learning, Nonaka and von Krogh (2009)
remark that “social practices may be necessary, but not sufficient, for understanding organi-
zational knowledge creation” (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009, p. 646). Being based on the
distinction between ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge, they propose that new knowledge as well
as new practices may be the outcome of “knowledge conversion’’ from one form to another
(Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009, p. 642-647). Hence, they conclude their work by proposing
the study of team formation factors and practices that may shed light on the question of the
relationship between organisational knowledge and practice:
future research on the relationship between organizational knowledge creation
and social practice should account for team formation and factors that impact
on team performance (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009, p. 648).
Sharing a similar framework of analysis and regarding the knowledge created within a
group, Erden et al. (2008) propose a hierarchy of group tacit knowledge, as quoted in
Figure 16.2.
At the earliest level of the “Group as assemblages”, “group members are as foreigners”
(Erden et al., 2008, p. 10), members are linked by weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), not
sharing common memory, understanding or norms.
The advancement at the second level, the one of “collective action”, is then performed
in three diﬀerent ways. Firstly, exposure to shared events and experiences contributes to the
sharing of the value of “collectively acting”. Secondly, through customs, a “tacit memory”
of common routines is acquired by the group. Thirdly, a “group culture” emerges, providing
a feeling of shared belonging (Erden et al., 2008, p. 11).
At the level of “phronesis”, the group obtains some quality characteristics, consolidating
its common identity and the shared interests. Erden et al. (2008) describe this level by ﬁve
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Figure 16.2: Diﬀerent levels in the quality of group tacit knowledge. Quoted from Erden
et al. (2008).
group capabilities, ultimately leading to the capability of the group to manage itself:
• convert “I” intentions to “we” intentions,
• decide on and commit to the “common goodness”,
• grasp the essence of particular situations,
• take the best action for “common goodness” and
• manage itself (Erden et al., 2008, p. 12).
Finally, “Collective improvisation” is the highest level of tacit knowledge quality a group
can achieve. (Erden et al., 2008, p. 13). At this level, “there are no predetermined rules and
roles”. Collective action is thus led by collective intuition, based on the groups’ “common
mind” (Erden et al., 2008, p. 13-14). The scholars share the view of Vera and Crossan
(2005) that “good improvisation is a tool that complements planning efforts but, because
of its creative and spontaneous nature, it is not necessarily tied to success, the same way
planning is not necessarily associated with success” (Erden et al., 2008, p. 14)
However, a paradox appears when considering the analysis of Erden et al. in my ﬁeld,
both in the case of the Barcamps (Chapter 15) and the one of the hackathon I will examine
in the current chapter: the groups that emerge in such processes seem to immediately cross
most of levels mentioned, while in the particular case of a hackathon all participants go
from the ﬁrst one of the “group as assemblages” between “foreigners” to the ﬁfth one, of
“improvisation”.
Regarding shared “rituals”, an attribute characterizing the second level proposed by Er-
den et al. (2008), in the cases of group formation we study (in Barcamps as well as in
Hackathons), the procedure to follow is imposed by the events’ format from the beginning
instead of emerging as a custom in time, as the theory suggests. In other words, it is the
procedure which becomes the basis of relationships development and knowledge sharing, and
not the opposite.
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At the same time, improvisation has to do with creativity. Following Hatchuel (2001) on
the distinction between knowledge and concept spaces, we will review the speciﬁc literature
referring to creative groups.
We will then conclude our review of knowledge-concept groups by the synthesis made
through the KCP® method.
16.2.3 Creativity in groups
It is highlighted by many management scholars that creativity within a group is a question
of rule-breaking, both in what regards the collective processes followed and the object under
design (Cunha and Gomes, 2003; Erden et al., 2008; Hatchuel et al., 2011; Le Masson et al.,
2011). In what regards business, creativity generally addresses the issue of exploration as
opposed to the one of exploitation, in the sense of “exploration of new possibilities and the
exploitation of old certainties in organizational learning” (March, 1991).
The most well known method in what concerns collective creativity, used besides early on
within the computer industry, has been brainstorming (Osborn, 1953; Clark, 1958). While
questioning the organisational order and implying intimacy among the participants, brain-
storming has been found vulnerable to the ‘ﬁxation eﬀect’, according to which ‘brainstormers’
tend to explore a limited scope of concepts, entering the same trajectory (Gillier et al., 2010;
Hatchuel et al., 2011; Le Masson et al., 2011, and others).
In Chapter 15 we’ve seen how the Barcamp conversational setting avoids this eﬀect in
practice through the ‘bottom-up’ division of exploration of a broad topic, while ensuring a
focus on particular interests and covering of a wide array of potentially interesting issues.
Still, while creativity literature focusses a lot on the production of “out of the box”,
original and diverse ideas, it does not provide a solution to a “wide box exploration”, that is
a creative exploration of a given potential, thus not leading to unrelated ideas, and demanding
much work to imagine a possible way of relation to a speciﬁc service potential.
16.2.4 KCP®: combining knowledge and creative exploration.
KCP® is an advanced method of creativity, conceived to respond to innovative design issues
met during new product development processes. The method aims to structure a collab-
orative exploration of an innovation ﬁeld. The expected outcomes are a structured set of
innovative concepts for further development and the identiﬁcation of ‘missing’ resources
and competencies needed to enrich on-going research programmes or external acquisitions
(Hatchuel and Weil, 2009; Elmquist and Segrestin, 2009)
The aims of this method, as outlined by the performance criteria deﬁned by its designers,
are the following:
• explore the whole conceptual potential of the initial concept,
• involve and support people in a rule-breaking process,
• enable relevant knowledge activation, acquisition and production,
• manage collective acceptance and legitimacy of rules (re) building.
The method is developed in three phases:
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1. K-phase, where a set of seminars with participants coming from the organisation and
its partners ‘transfers’ knowledge already obtained by the enterprise and indicates
potential innovation developments,
2. C-phase, where the participant public is divided in subgroups exploring surprising and
strongly contracting concepts and
3. P-phase, where proposals are issued as a result of the whole process, building a roadmap
of immediate solutions, research projects and prototype for the enterprise and its part-
ners.
Interestingly enough, the organisation of this method, applied in various industrial con-
texts such as the car industry and transportation services, begins by an intense process of
learning, as the potential to be explored is speciﬁc - related to the enterprise’s business.
Then, exploration is to be operated through projective concepts, based on this particular
knowledge, though projecting a design process into the unknown, obliging participants to
search for new knowledge to verify or refute these this concepts. Furthermore, beyond the
speciﬁc concepts and the ‘judgements’ on its logical or imaginary state, what is more im-
portant is the process itself, as it generates an exploration of trajectories that could not be
reviewed if already known trajectories were to be run through.
Unlike Barcamps where various platforms are explored in parallel, the emphasis on a
speciﬁc enterprise knowledge and potential to be explored at least identiﬁes three conditions
for the exploration to succeed. Those conditions, described by the three phases, can be a
reference for us in our exploratory study on the means through which platform providers
support UDE innovation.
16.2.5 Synthesis: a preliminary description of our object of study.
Speciﬁcally in what regards the question of knowledge and information transfer from the
platform provider to third parties, a question highlighted in the platform literature (Gawer
and Cusumano, 2002, and others), a ﬁrst observation under the light of organisation learning
studies, is that it is not just about information circulation, as the literature on the information
economy proposes (Porat, 1977, and others), but it is about a more complex process of
collective action’s theory and practice.
Using the terms of Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) regarding knowledge, the question
becomes one of how service provider’s ‘tacit knowledge’ on a new technology can be ‘trans-
ferred’ to the UDE community on the one hand, and how ‘sticky’ information UDE’s (von
Hippel, 1994) is, in turn, ‘transferred’ back to the provider. Furthermore, regarding creativ-
ity and improvisation, unlike the implicit hypothesis of Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) and
Erden et al. (2008) that it is undertaken on the basis of the knowledge residing within the
group, in the case of UDE innovations this knowledge basis needs to be complemented with
a platform-speciﬁc one in order for the creativity process to become possible.
Nonaka et al. (2000) and Hatchuel and Weil (2009) while using diﬀerent entries come
to some overlapping conclusions that we will use as a theoretical base to describe the object
that we expect to meet when examining the case of provider - UDE interaction in vivo.
KCP® method is based on the C-K Theory, distinguishing two major spaces: the knowl-
edge space and the concept space. This theory, initially conceived to describe a design
process, can be deductively outlined as the interaction of two spaces, based on Hatchuel and
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Figure 16.3: The object we wait to meet: a theoretical description (drawing from Nonaka
et al. (2000); Hatchuel and Weil (2009)).
Weil (2009) and Hatchuel et al. (2011): the Knowledge space, which consists of proposi-
tions that do have logical status (either true or false) and the Concept space, which consists
in propositions that may be neither true nor false (‘expansive partitions’), though demand
further exploration in order for the designers to be able to draw a logical conclusion on them.
This abstraction overlaps some of the elements proposed by Nonaka et al. (2000), as
outlined in Figure 16.1: “order”, “explicit knowledge”, “logic” and “cognition” do have a
logical status, and thus may be included in the K-space. On the other hand, the space of
the “seemingly antithetical” elements may be put in parallel to the C-space, in the sense
that one cannot conclude anything about their logical status.
Combining in this way the overlapping ﬁelds of the two theoretical approaches within our
ﬁeld of research, we can expect that the nature of the output of the interaction of platform
provider and UDE community will be (1) new knowledge, (2) new practices, (3) a roadmap
of immediate solutions, research projects and prototypes.
Furthermore, following the pattern of the KCP® method, we can expect that the process
will evolve in three steps (shown in Figure ):
1. a platform knowledge diffusion step, grounded in platform-speciﬁc knowledge, where
the provider ‘initiates’ UDEs on the platform speciﬁcations.
2. a platform potential concepts proposition step, where ideas on ‘what to do with the
platform’ are suggested by UDEs, exploring its potential and
3. a platform potential exploration step, where prototypes are proposed or built and a
roadmap for immediate solutions and research projects may emerge.
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16.3 Research methodology: a phenomenon-based
approach
To access this ﬁeld I will use both observatory participation and monument analysis method-
ological approaches, already discussed in the ﬁrst chapter of the current approach. On
the one hand, I will use information coming from my own participation in the Hackathon
organized in August 2010 at Google’s headquarters, in Mountain View, California. I will
complement this material with the traces that the participants left, mainly descriptions of
their own creations as well as the program of the meeting itself.
Distinction step.
During the ﬁrst step (Section 16.4), I will study the phenomenon of the ‘hackathon’, focussing
on its peculiarities, by using a descriptive approach (von Krogh et al., 2012). As we will
see, this type of event, while also like Barcamps, having an intimate ambiance, is a lot more
structured and intense.
Exploration step.
In Section 16.5, I will further explore the ‘hackathon’ event, expounding the content of both
seminars and applications developed. I will perform an qualitative as well as a quantita-
tive analysis upon the applications, proposing a categorisation of the trajectories of User-
Developer-Entrepreneur (UDE) innovation in the Web context. I will also use the content of
the seminars to test by induction our proposition of foggy competition in what regards the
state of the Web industry.
Design step.
Provided the results of the Sections 16.4 and 16.5, I proceed to a proposal of a Research
design regarding ephemeral action settings, according to which diﬀerent phases of the pro-
cess correspond to diﬀerent roles of the implied actors, in relation to the knowledge and
the concepts in use. I will also suggest that, beyond the programming itself, participants’
personality appears to play an important role in such settings.
16.4 Distinction step: general characteristics of a
“hackathon”
The Silicon Valley Google Technologies User Group Campout (SVGTUG-Campout) event
was divided in two parts. The ﬁrst part consisted of a series of “Technical Talks” and will
be analytically studied in section 16.4.1 and 16.5.1. Globally, it is about a form of open
seminars presenting the latest “state of the art” Web development. Some of these talks
were broadcasted on the Web during the event (live streaming) while the slides of most of
the presentations were also made available online afterwards.
The second part of the event regarded user-conceived and developed projects. This part
will be studied in sections 16.4.2 and 16.5.2. Those projects were to be developed using
the technology of reference for the event, and especially Google platforms, such as Google
Chrome navigator, the Android smart phone operating system and the OpenSocial social
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network development platform. The event registration page characteristically mentioned in
the FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions):
FAQ
Must my team develop a Google Chrome Extension?
No. You are welcome to develop an Android, OpenSocial, etc... application
over the weekend. The emphasis is on HTML5, and Google Chrome Extensions
are just one easy way to create an HTML5 application. If you can create an
application using HTML5 capabilities in other ways, knock yourself out4.
After the talks, users had 90 seconds to present their concepts to the rest of the participants
and recruit a team to work throughout the weekend. The full programme is shown in
Table 16.2. Seminar speakers were mainly from three backgrounds: researchers on Web
design, Web development “cookbooks” authors and Google engineers.
16.4.1 The seminars.
After the registration, participants gathered in the seminar room, arranged like a classroom.
The seminars started with a presentation of a Google Programs Engineer on the HTML5
protocol (“Tour of HTML5 Features”, as mentioned in the schedule)5. He highlighted
the new features supported by it (graphics, video/audio playback, notiﬁcations, real-time
communication, ability to locally store data on the client’s computer) and provided examples
of their embodiment in a Web page. He closed his presentation inviting the participants to
begin hacking (“Let’s hack!”).
The second seminar regarded an “Introduction to the Google Chrome Web Store”, pre-
sented by a member of the Google Chrome browser technical team. After going through
a short timeline of the Google Chrome project, he emphasised the distinction between end
users and developers, noting the entrepreneurial reasoning of the latter and underlining the
importance of the question “how do I make more money?” for them. Regarding the fea-
tures of Google Chrome, he emphasized the fact that “the link to the store is built in to
the browser”. Hence a user base for Chrome applications (extensions) was already there,
since the navigator had been broadly distributed. Developers could have access to this user
base submitting a Web-based application to the Google Chrome application market. It was
reported that the store addressed 7 million users, according to the latest data. The introduc-
tion included some technical advice of business importance, such as “Ask for the permission
to geolocate at the beginning of the app installation”, an information that is useful when
wanting to link a client to a speciﬁc market, for instance through advertisement. He closed
his introduction by providing the links to the documentation regarding participation in the
Chrome application market.
The third seminar was introduced by a freelance web developer who also edited hand-
books on Web development. Her presentation concerned the development of Web-based
applications oriented towards smart phone terminals7. The main axis of this talk was on the
4svgtugcampout FAQ, URL: https://sites.google.com/site/svgtugcampout/faq Retrieved on October 12,
2012.
5Paul Irish, “Tour of HTML5 Features”, presentation at GTUG event. Available at the URL:
http://html5-gtug-campout2010.appspot.com/ Page retrieved on 8 October, 2012.
7“Developing for the Mobile Web”, Estelle Weyl. Presentation available online at the following URL:
https://sites.google.com/site/svgtugcampout/schedule/mobileweb.pptx?attredirects=0 Retrieved on 8 Oc-
tober 2012.
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328CHAPTER 16. ORGANISING EPHEMERAL ACTION FOR SERVICE POTENTIAL EXPLORATION.
Gtug Campout Schedule 13-15/08/2010
Friday: August 13, 2010
12:30-1:00pm Registration
1:00-5:00pm Technical Talks (broadcast live on ustream)
1:00 - 2:00 Tour of HTML5 Features, Paul Irish (slides)
2:00 - 2:30 Intro to the Google Chrome Web Store, Erik Kay
2:30 - 3:00 Break
3:00 - 4:00 Developing for the Mobile Web, Estelle Weyl (slides)
4:00 - 5:00 Making Your Web Apps Fast, Steve Souders (slides)
6:30-7:00pm Registration
7:00-7:30pm Welcome & Kickoﬀ Talk, Alex Russell
7:30-8:30pm Pitch sessions (broadcast live on ustream)
8:30-onward Team forming and working
Saturday: August 14, 2010
8:00-10:00am Coﬀee and muﬃns
12:00-1:00pm lunch available
Implementable CSS talk by Estelle Weyl (slides | stream)
6:00-8:00pm dinner available
Sunday: August 15, 2010
8:00-10:00am coﬀee and muﬃns
12:00-1:00pm lunch available
3:30pm Registration: Demo Night Ticket Holders
4:30-6:30pm Teams demo their apps (broadcast live on ustream)
6:30-8:00pm Dinner
8:00pm Contest Winners Announced
Table 16.2: Gtug campout: the schedule of the event6.
Native Web
Cosmetics ✓ ✓
Functionality ✓ ✓*
Development ✓
Testing ✓
Distribution ✓
Payment ✓
Support ✓
Table 16.3: Seminar presentation table, marking the advantages of Web-based applications.
comparison between the “Web applications” and “native applications”8. This presentation
claimed that the Web-based applications were superior than the native ones, as they fulﬁlled a
number of additional requirements, shown in Table 16.3. The presentation table emphasized
the ability for developers to update their application, (Development and Testing), as well as
the ability to establish a commercial channel with the end users (Distribution, Payment and
Support). Still, user interface parameters are relatively underestimated by the table, as they
are described as “Cosmetics”, and constitute a ﬁeld of “native apps” superiority over “Web
apps”.
The “Technical Talks” session closed with the seminar “Making Your Web Apps Fast”9,
which discussed issues about improving the display speed of Web sites by respecting some
rules on the design of Web sites. The main argument of the presentation was that even
well-known Web sites are slow to display the content to end users. According to the speaker,
the economical impact of speed performance is crucial, as the slower the site, the lower
the engagement of visitors (a percentage will always not wait and surf to other sites). The
speaker commented that there is little emphasis on performance criteria regarding speed in
the wider computer science community.
Many of this last seminar’s arguments were based on a joint report of a Principal De-
velopment Lead Engineer from Microsoft and a Decision Support Engineering Analyst from
Google10. The conclusions of that study are shown in the Figure 16.4. As the two engineers
had explained in their report, the need for speed has been known in the community, however
the trade-oﬀ between speed and other parameters, such as revenue or user satisfaction were
under-explored. Their joint experiment on Bing and Google Search user samples provided the
correlations shown in the Figure. There, the business performance criteria examined are the
number of Queries/User (for instance Web searches), the Revenue/User, the clicks the user
8While both types of applications use the Web for the exchange of information, in our view the main
diﬀerence resides in the user-interfaces. In the ﬁrst type, the user interface is the Web browser - installed
either in the smart phone or in one’s PC. In the second type, access on Web information is made by the
speciﬁc application, without the interference of a browser. We are going to further discuss this topic on the
conversation section.
9Making Your Web Apps Fast, Steve Souders, presentation in GTUG, Mountain View, Cal. USA, August
13, 2010. Copy available in the URL: stevesouders.com/docs/gtug-20100813.pptx Retrieved on October 8,
2012.
10Eric Schurman, Jake Brutlag, Performance related changes and their user impact, Velocity Web Per-
formance and Operations Conference, 2009. Video of the presentation available at: The User and Busi-
ness Impact of Server Delays, Additional Bytes, and HTTP Chunking in Web Search, 06/23/2009. URL:
http://velocityconf.com/velocity2009/public/schedule/detail/8523 . Retrieved on October 9, 2012.
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Figure 16.4: Results of experiments on speed as a performance criterion for Web sites.
Source: (Schurman and Brutlag, 2009)12.
operates and the overall user engagement (activity as frequency of clicks and satisfaction).
Hence, the last seminar of the SVGTUG - Campout after emphasizing this performance
criterion, proposed some design tips that could improve a site’s speed (for instance “Scripts
should be at the bottom of the page”).
16.4.2 “Pitch sessions”: entrepreneurs recruiting developers to a
concept.
A “pitch session” is an event were project leaders should brieﬂy present their concepts to
attract volunteers from the public to work with, during the last two days of a “hackathon”.
Unlike the case of the ‘‘mashpits” in the “Barcamps”, we’ve examined in Section 15.4.4
on page 308, where concepts emerge after discussions, in this case project leaders should
have prepared their proposals in advance, as they only have 90 seconds to talk about them
and to convince volunteers to join them. In our case, there were thirty eight such concepts
presented to the “Campout” participants. Twenty two of them manage to recruit members
and build a team to work with, while two were merged because of their concept relevance.
The complete list of the “pitches” proposed is shown in Table B.1, page 397. Each line
of the table was completed through a speciﬁc form by those proposing concepts to develop
(“pitching”) on the ﬁrst day of the event. The ﬁelds completed are the following: Name of
person to propose the project (“Who pitched”), URL were a demo of the application would be
available (“Demo URL”), names of the participants in the project team (“Team members”),
a description of the concept , usually in terms of motivation and functionalities (“Project
Description”), the skills of the developers needed for the project (“Developers needed (#
and skills)”), additional notes (“Other special notes to developers”), the team size (“Your
team size”) and a self-presentation of the project leader (“One sentence introduction for
yourself”).
Out of thirty eight project proposals (“pitches”), twenty nine were presented during the
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last day of the Campout. Some proposals were merged (proposals 9, 18, 19, 33), while the
rest were not continued. Globally the criterion of the project advancement was participation.
Table 16.4 lists those projects that were ﬁnally presented with a short description, as
induced from the complete table.
Table 16.4: List of projects developed and presented on the last day.
Team # Project name Short description
20 Allele Interaction Image sharing within Social Networks.
34 arc.js A JS access layer for the post message protocol.
5 Copy and Paste Single feature app for selecting similar items on
a page.
14 Day Trader Tool Display historical data for ﬁnancial instruments.
24 DoUSeeMe Temporary Geo location sharing web app.
18,19 Dynamic memory Game A cross between the Memory Card Game and
Tetris
- Extend Etherpad Collaborative
Editor
An Etherpad platform extension using HTML 5.
35 Foreigner [no description available]
2 HTML 5 Store A web - based app market.
30 Html 5 Video Klippr Chrome extension - for content sharing accross
Web platforms
10 HTML 5 widgets for DreamFace Use as much HTML5 as possible in DreamFace
platform.
22 Kitlist to cloud Put a Job postings list into a “cloud” and sort
it.
7 LifeAlert An Androind app sending phone GPS coordi-
nates to a list of contacts
- LightStalking Library [no description available]
- LocalPad [no description available]
21 meal claim An Android app for ﬂight meal pay calculation.
- Merlin Finger Something magical (graphics)
26 Party Page Partners A real time event animation app.
36 Pull Prediction Social game to predict the markets
29 RashoMonty Extract Data from websites and display a com-
parative analysis.
11 real time analytics An analytics tool.
8 Rescue Me Find out the nearby hospitals around me.
12 Shout shopping browser extension A browser extension publishing ’shopping re-
lated’ product pages.
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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. . . continues from previous page . . .
Team # Project name Short description
15 Slidio An image slideshow with audio in the back-
ground.
17 Soundweaver HTML- based composition tool.
16 SweetGeo LinkedIn, Facebook, Foursquare, Meetup and
Craigslist mashup
6 Terra Traveler A “Facebook” for Travelers.
23 TetriNet Embody TetriNET game in HTML5.
3 Togethr Event invitation app.
End of table
The winners of the Campout were voted by the participant public. The prizes were:
to be featured in the Chromium blog/Twitter, App Engine credits for their app, Google
swag (advertisement item with the enterprise’s logo, usually a T-Shirt), 1 Free O’Reilly (well
known editions of hackers’ handbooks) Ebook per team member. The ﬁrst winner got in
addition an Adobe Creative Suite (since Adobe was sponsoring the event) and a lunch with
a Google engineering team.
The winner of the third place was the Dynamic Memory Game, described by the person
who coined it as follows (listed in the Table B.1 on page 402):
This is a cross between the Memory Card Game and TetrisCards drop face down
from the top of the screen and slide to the bottom, stacking edge on edge. The
user clicks on two cards temporarily revealing their faces and if identical, the
pair is removed. The user must remember the card locations and find matches
before the cards pile to the top of the screen. The game ends when one stack
of cards reaches the top.
The second winner was SoundWaver, a piano playing application on HTML5 developed
by two young participants.
The ﬁrst winner was the SweetGeo application, which was a mashup, as it made used
of APIs from diﬀerent Web services platforms, Social Networking ones in particular. The
description of the application (listed on page 402) was the following:
[SweetGeo] Takes the concept of LinkedIn, Facebook, Foursquare, Meetup,
Craigslist and mashes them together. Check in to location, post profile with
interests, needs etc. As people check in, they can view and post profiles, post
ads etc. The person you [are] looking for or [the] person who can help you might
be [the] person who just arrived.
16.4.3 Discussion: hackathon exploration roles and phases
The hackathon to which I participated managed to go through all four levels described by
Erden et al. (2008) in three days. “Groups as foreigners” were constituted, they acted collec-
tively, and developed a common, temporary identity as a concept-based group, improvising
on this concept. In addition, given the audience was constituted by developers, commu-
nication between Google staﬀ and participants was not a diﬃcult issue, as in the cases of
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non-developer lead users (Olson and Bakke, 2001), as UDEs not only were skilled developers,
but were also interested in learning about a new technology, potentially useful to them as
well. In parallel, the construction of speciﬁc application, implied by the hackathon setting,
also provided a solution to the problem of idea formulation (Magnusson et al., 2003; Le
Masson and Magnusson, 2003), as it forced UDEs not only to have a speciﬁc concept to
propose, but also that the concept be attractive to others and eventually be developed into
an application in two days - and nights - time.
The hackathon setting included requirements similar to the KCP method. There was
a phase where knowledge was transferred and a phase where subgroups explored concepts
and a roadmap with immediate solutions could be built at the end, drawing on participants
materialisations. Some diﬀerences existed regarding a more speciﬁc role division between
provider and UDEs as well as a more advanced kind of proposals through elaborated and
often very functional prototypes. Even more importantly, the design of the hackathon process
takes into account what Akrich et al. (2002) call “the art of interessement”, as attractiveness
is a requirement for both seminars and projects.
More speciﬁcally, we can describe the process of the hackathon in three phases: 1) an
“updated state of the art” transfer, 2) an “attractive concept exploration” and 3) an “overall
concept evaluation and sharing”. Figure 16.5 summarises schematically those phases, while
these phases are further described in the following paragraphs.
Figure 16.5: Attributes of a hackathon. Three phases for UDE-based exploration.
Phase 1: Updated state of the art transfer
During the ﬁrst phase, where an updated state of the art is transferred to participants through
the initial seminars, UDEs have the opportunity to learn about the latest technological
evolutions, while the service provider has the opportunity to “seduce” them, highlighting the
new opportunities these evolutions open up for developers. During the hackathon where I
participated, the new features of HTML5 were presented (graphics, video/audio playback
etc.), while new performance criteria were introduced, namely the one of Web site speed.
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In addition, many presentations talked about the business opportunities opening up for
developers (e.g. Chrome browser applications), as well as the competitive advantages this
technology may have against other (e.g. HTML5 applications versus native applications).
Moreover, participants had access to some business related “tips and tricks” (such as asking
users for permission to locate their geographical position for them to be more interesting to
advertisers).
Therefore, this phase addressed both the developer and the entrepreneurial identity of
participants, while providing them with a clear view of the “foggy competition” ﬁeld, with
the latest updates on performance criteria and features to exploit.
Phase 2: Attractive concept exploration
During the second phase, where some UDEs proposed to their peers concepts to develop,
an early evaluation of the concepts took place by the personal interest expressed by the
public to participate or not in a project. Then, during development process, participants had
the opportunity to test the new practices implied by the new technology. Service providers
watched the process and were available for developers questions. This way, developers could
learn more, while the service provider could also record the questions and the problems UDEs
face in action (for instance documentation clarity).
Hence, service provider staﬀ had not only the opportunity to receive ideas from users,
but to actually have a sample of the action of developers, usually undertaken individually or
in small groups in a dispersed manner.
Phase 3: Overall exploration evaluation and concept sharing
The ﬁnal project presentation gave the opportunity to all participants to have an overview
of the concepts explored and to vote for the best. This added a democratic dimension to
the competition process for UDEs, while it also provided an evaluation of the concepts, as
presented by the teams.
This phase also added a sense of community to the participants, having been part of a
common experience.
16.5 Exploration step: a focus on cognitive aspects
The current section advances the exploration, intensifying data gathering about initial focal
concepts. It further reﬂects on the particular knowledge taught in the seminars and fur-
ther explores the particular innovation trajectories, as resulted in participant’s creations. It
concludes with the following propositions:
• During my study period, Web applications were considered as a potential disruption,
which the hackathon aimed to explore. Thus, a consideration of the current period as
a “foggy competition” phase for Web services, where exploitation goes hand to hand
with exploration, justiﬁes the use of UDEs as explorers.
• A closer study of the resulting applications reveals that
– Hackathon exploration is not only based on the knowledge transferred by the
provider, it is also based on the previous knowledge of the UDEs.
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– The resulting trajectories explored can be categorised according to the knowledge
used by the developers, as well as by two guiding concepts. Developer’s knowledge
was either enterprise related or intimate, while the guiding concepts were either
the computer as an instrument or the Web. I compare those results to a “broad
range of literature” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 544), which enables me to propose four
types of trajectories: a) Tools, b) Tools of the self, c) Channels and d) Collective
intimacy.
In the discussion part, the trajectories explored will supported by a broader literature than
previously, particularly useful to the understanding of the stakes with the speciﬁc ﬁelds.
16.5.1 Seminars: the state of the art of HTML5.
The overall emphasis of the seminar was to support Web development as a major innovation
trajectory and promote Google platforms, getting speedy feedback from the side of the
developers.
The promise of HTML5 is to enable what Nelson had already advocated back in 1974,
i.e. to go beyond application forms and imagine other types of end user interfaces, now in the
framework of Web services. From this perspective, games applications were very illustrative of
this new potential given by the new protocols. The strategical question for platform providers
as well as the community of developers was whether the Web (as understood as the answer
to the question ‘what can end-users access using a navigator?’) can be reliable, both on the
technical and the entrepreneurial level, for developers/entrepreneurs to base their business
on. In this context, Google promoted its Web store for applications, embedded within its
Chrome browser.
This type of development was often opposed to the trajectory of ‘native applications’.
Those applications being the ones that are particular to a device, like the PC or smart phones.
However, the content of the seminars themselves revealed that Web-based applications
are not yet rationalized. The most typical example was that of the results of the study
on performance criteria on the speed parameter, which illustrated that the industry is yet
working for a rationalisation-to-come.
16.5.2 Final projects: knowledge bases and conceptual trajectories
The ﬁnal projects presented at the Campout, listed in table 16.4 (page 331), are issued from
UDE groups’ action during the three days of the event. Using the theory on user innovation,
we should assume that these creations were based on users’ “sticky” knowledge (von Hippel,
1994). Thus, the project list provides us with a capacity to look into the speciﬁcities of user
knowledge in the framework of our ﬁeld and render it less “sticky”, identifying the important
categories of use-related knowledge as well as the main conceptual trajectories explored by
the participants.
Figure 16.6 analyses the data that are found in the previous section regarding user
projects. Judging from the concepts’ analytical description (annexed in Table B.1 on
page 397) we identify two major knowledge bases used: knowledge about the enterprise
and knowledge about intimacy. Both knowledge bases are rather implicit or empirical and
not necessarily scientiﬁc. In addition, we identify two major conceptual trajectories: the
computer as an instrument and the Web.
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Figure 16.6: Data analysis: cognitive and conceptual categorization of users’ innovation in
the Google Campout hackathon.
Tools
The conceptual trajectory of enterprise and operations instruments (or tools) is one of the
oldest ones in the computer industry. It includes concepts of the Operation Research (OR)
approach13, as well as “Traditional Decision-Making Techniques” (Simon, 1965, p. 62).
Among the projects listed, “Pull Prediction”, “RashoMonty”, “real time analytics” and
the “Day Trader Tool”, all enter into the framework of Operations Research. The projects
arc.js, “Copy and Paste” and “Etherpad Collaborative Editor”, enter into the category of
Electronic data processing. The latter two applications speciﬁcally enter into what Simon
would call “Traditional Decision-Making Techniques”, including a ‘‘programmed part” (“Cler-
ical routine”) and “non-programmed” one (“Judgement, intuition and creativity”) (Simon,
1965, p. 62).
Channels
The concept of channels is related to the “information economy’s” conceptual trajectory,
emphasizing the importance of transaction (Wallis and North, 1986) and information (Porat,
1977) costs reduction as well as network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and
Klemperer, 2007) and two-sided markets (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole,
2004). Hence, I use the concept of channels to summarise those economical approaches
13OR initially consisted in the use of mathematical analysis as a tool for understanding how new weapons
could enhance U.S. security (Ceruzzi, 2008, p. 23). Yet, OR also opened the way for consulting and
organisation openness in the basis of knowledge, as it implied the participation of non-military persons to
participate in operational decisions, something that was “heretical” to the military hierarchy of the time
(Morse, 1977). OR introduced in management methods such as the queuing theory (applied for instance in
air traﬃc control, telephone centres, assembly-line manufacturing), simulation (applied in economy as the
ﬁrst step of its general diﬀusion as a method) and in logistics.
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that, despite their diversity, emerge when it comes to Web services study, since they all value
network capacities.
On the one hand, in the case of the “HTML5 Store” (later named HTML Mart), we
already analysed in the part I, enters into the category of markets, generally following the
approach of transaction costs diminution (Wallis and North, 1986). On the other hand,
“Kitlist to Cloud”, referring to the diﬀusion and elaboration of a work position announcement
list to a decentralized network of computers (“cloud”), enters the general approach of a
channel as a means of “information costs reduction” (Porat, 1977).
Intimacy-based concepts
The concept of intimacy comes to encompass a set of diﬀerent approaches to identity14.
In the speciﬁc ﬁeld of information technologies, I distinguish two forms of intimacy: a) the
one that users develop with their computer, seeing it as a “second self” (Turkle, 1984), and
I describe as “tools for the self”15 and b) the one that users develop through a computer
mediated interaction with other users, that I call “collective intimacy’ ’16.
Regarding the intimacy knowledge base, user developers exploit implicit knowledge re-
siding in the culture of “hacker communities”. Regarding the instrumental trajectory of
computers, we identify a set of projects elaborated during the event that we characterise as
“instruments of the self”. These tools are conceived for ‘solitary’ use and include the appli-
cations “Dynamic memory Game”, “mail claim”, “Rescue Me”, “Soundwaver” and “Merlin
Finger”.
The last category is the one of “collective intimacy”, which is also is the most popular
one among the projects presented. All applications refer to a collective intimacy, usually
represented in the technical speciﬁcations by the acquisition of a “list of friends” from a major
Web platform (Gmail, Facebook, Twitter and others) through their APIs. The applications
entering in this category are the following: “Allele Interaction”, “DoUSeeMe”, “Html 5 Video
Klippr”, “LifeAlert”, “Party Page Partners”, “Shout shopping browser extension”, “Slidio”,
“SweetGeo”, “Terra Traveler”, “Togethr”, “TetriNet”.
14I would like to warmly thank Philippe Lefebvre and Anne-François Schmid for our very stimulating
discussions on the concept of “collective intimacy”, of which the richness goes beyond the scope of the
current study.
15Turkle (1984) operated an ethnographic study on how computers inﬂuence how “we think about our
own”. Studying children, adolescent and professional programmers, she observed their experience with the
computer and proposed that ‘a computer program is a reﬂection of its programmer’s mind’ (Turkle, 1984,
p. 19). Hence, this type of human-computer interaction which is self-referential projects the computer as
a tool for the self.
16In a recent article, Hounkpatin et al. (2011) describe a case where a therapist chooses to intervene in
order to solve an identity based problem of Alexandra, one of their clients. The therapists managed to help
her by establishing a “collective intimacy” between her, her family and the therapists. As the authors note,
“this intimacy isn’t private at all, but clearly collective (. . . ) [and is] capable to nourish the persons in their
transformations”.
The concept of “collective intimacy” is coherent with sociological research on the use of Web services.
Particularly in what regards the ﬁeld of contemporary Web services, Réseaux (Networks) Journal. Synthe-
sising the research on the ﬁeld, Cardon (2008) argues that “Web 2.0” services can be categorised through
the “identity formats” dividing Web 2.0 services to “civil identity”, “active identity”, “virtual identity” and
“narrative identity” ones. Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel (2006a) in one of the early studies of this “school”,
explored the “production of the self” through a user interaction within the blogosphere. They analyse how,
through using the features of a blogging platform (such as posting, linking, commenting etc.), users build
their own identity while interacting with “their public”.
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16.5.3 Discussion. “Un-sticking” UDE knowledge: the importance
of personality
As analysed in paragraph 16.5.1, the early seminars on HTML5 illustrated an on-going,
though not yet complete, rationalisation process of HTML5 technology. The potential of a
disruption (Christensen, 1997) of applications business by entirely Web-based ones was the
question of exploration for the service provider. Moreover, what the study of the eventual
creations revealed is that, beyond markets and technologies, the personal dimension played
a crucial role for an important part of the projects. Commercial and instrumental projects
(as positioned in the trajectories of channels and tools) were somehow expected, as it was
a common ground between the UDEs and the service provider. Yet, the intimacy-based
projects (as positioned in the trajectories of collective intimacy and tools of the self ) have
been rather surprising. These projects, though, are not completely covered by the user
innovation literature, as one might have expected.
Figure 16.7 further synthesises the trajectories explored during the hackathon, already
discussed in the previous paragraph. The exploration was based on three main knowledge
bases: technological, entrepreneurial and intimate knowledge. While the seminars provided
knowledge on technology and entrepreneurship, intimate knowledge determined an important
part of what developers eventually wanted to develop as an application during those three
days.
Figure 16.7: Data synthesis: trajectories explored by UDEs during the hackathon and the
related knowledge bases.
The following paragraph will further discuss the personal dimension, less highlighted by
the literature.
On the personal dimension of innovation
Two of the types of innovations identiﬁed are related to the intimate sphere of their develop-
ers, the tools of the self and the collective intimacy ones. Still, the literature on knowledge
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and creativity in groups, reviewed at the beginning of this chapter (March, 1991; Nonaka
et al., 2000; Erden et al., 2008; Hatchuel, 2001; Gillier et al., 2010; Hatchuel and Weil,
2009; Le Masson et al., 2011) does not dedicate any particular attention to the personal
dimension. It is not clear whether those studies, when based on a speciﬁc ﬁeld investiga-
tion, have encountered phenomena of personality inﬂuence on innovative projects or if the
authors did not chose to evaluate such phenomena. In any case, personality is less an issue
in management research, as actor identity and its inﬂuence on innovation is studied mainly
on the basis of organisational roles.
At the same time, this dimension is not covered by the literature on user innovation,
either. The notion of “use-related sticky information” (von Hippel, 1998, 2005), while being
broad enough to describe the innovative activity of both individual and enterprise users, is
too broad to address the speciﬁc issue of individual personality.
This ﬁnding thus calls for further research on an unexplored ﬁeld of “personalised collec-
tive action”, where the attributes of the intimate sphere of each participant should be taken
into account.
16.6 Design step: taking personality into consideration
Previous sections have shown how hackathons produce an “ad hoc” collective action, creating
groups that reach to the ultimate level of collectivity, as proposed by (Erden et al., 2008) in
three days. Paragraph 16.4.3 proposed a three phase analysis of hackathons, during which
the organiser becomes observer, while the UDEs change roles according to each phase.
The three phases (updated state of the art transfer, attractive concept exploration, overall
concept evaluation and sharing) are coherent with the phases as synthesised in the literature
review part (paragraph 16.2.5), giving a more speciﬁc emphasis to seminar and concept to
explore attractiveness.
Furthermore, the previous paragraph highlighted a more subtle dimension of the process,
noting the role of developers’ personality, as expressed by those projects that make used of
intimacy-based concepts. However, the personal dimension, while found to be important to
my speciﬁc ﬁeld, does not enter into most analytical frameworks in management. Therefore,
a research design is proposed, as shown in Figure 16.8.
As suggested by the schema, the personal dimension could be taken into account during
the ﬁrst phase, by proposing “state of the self seminars”. Like the technology and market
oriented seminars, such seminars could address the personality of participants, which is found
to be a resource for innovation. That would also imply a new role for UDEs as well, the one of
the “self-exponent”, expressing himself or herself during this seminar. Regarding the second
phase, the role of “inventive exponent” would not change, since an “intimate-collective”
process is already observed as taking place in these events. However, the meaning of a
speciﬁc component in the ﬁrst phase would be to reinforce this role.
This proposal is rather counter-intuitive for management studies, as “state of the self
seminars” rather refer to spare time activities of a speciﬁc public. This attribute is proposed
as an element of research design for further study (von Krogh et al., 2012). Some of the
directions of such a study are already indicated by other scholars, though their analysis
is undertaken at a diﬀerent level. More precisely, studies exploring the eﬀects of “social
software” instruments adoption within the enterprise context highlight self-expression as
an important and challenging side eﬀect (Denyer et al., 2011, and others). While from
a work division perspective this eﬀect is rather problematic, my study proposes to face it
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Figure 16.8: A hackathon structure revisited: taking into account the personality dimension.
diﬀerently, as an attribute useful for potential exploration. Even though methods fostering
and cultivating self-expression are rather rare within the enterprise context, other contexts
of collective action, such as role playing, may provide more in-depth insights for the further
study of this element.
16.7 Conclusion
The Hackathon case revealed a possibility to harness UDE activity for a rapid service potential
exploration. Unlike user innovation literature, UDE innovative activity was “provoked” by
the meeting itself, instead of being produced and diﬀused within a user community.
The meeting format fostered a “rapid maturity” of groups’ knowledge, as all levels in
the quality of group tacit knowledge described by Erden et al. (2008) were crossed during
three days for an important number of groups. Compared to other forms of knowledge and
creativity groups management, the design of the event advantaged the evaluation of the
concepts by the participant public throughout the whole process.
The study of the content of both seminars and UDE creations has conﬁrmed a “foggy
competition” state of the Web applications domain. In addition, the process itself has
revealed an important dimension of subjectivity, namely a strong inﬂuence of developers’
intimate knowledge, in the outcome of their creations, something that has not been identiﬁed
before by the literature studying groups and innovation.
340
Chapter 17
Harnessing UDEs activity for service
potential exploitation: the cases of
developer support forums
Contents
17.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
17.1.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
17.2 Distinction Step. Developer support forums: Another case
of problem solving? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
17.2.1 Literature review: whose problem, who solves it? Different
models for problem-solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
17.2.2 Research methodology: identification of actors and roles in the
process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
17.2.3 Outcome: UDE-driven problem formulation, enterprise-based
resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
17.3 Exploration step: Testing the relevance of problem-solving
criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
17.3.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
17.3.2 Findings: a low rate of problems solved . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
17.3.3 Discussion: is problem-solving the problem? . . . . . . . . . . 356
17.4 Design step: Characterisation of developer support expertise358
17.4.1 Theoretical concepts. Beyond problem-solving: three expert
figures and one hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
17.4.2 Hypothesis. A specific expertise? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
17.4.3 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
17.4.4 Outcome: a model for the activity of a “curator” . . . . . . . 365
17.4.5 Discussion: the role of the “curator” in service potential ex-
ploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
17.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
341
17.1 Introduction
As already discussed in the beginning of the current Part, the relationship between enterprises
and developer communities remains an open question within the innovation management
literature. The current chapter explores the question of how enterprises can harness UDE
activity for their service potential exploitation, by studying online Facebook and Google Maps
developer support forums.
As these forums appear as places where developers can report “bugs”, I begin my ex-
ploration by a qualitative study of the ﬁeld as a problem-solving case and compare it to
other approaches proposed by the literature. Unlike other models, in this ﬁeld it is the user-
developer-entrepreneurs (UDEs) that set the problems, and the enterprise that undertakes
their resolution.
By further exploring this ﬁeld through the application of problem-solving performance
criteria, I ﬁnd that they are characterised by a low problem-solving rate, thus I project the
hypothesis of another function to these forums.
Then, I return to the forum conversations, aiming at characterizing the expertise of the
enterprise employees in charge of the process. I propose that an original expertise emerges,
the one of the “curator”, of which the activity is broader from problem-solving, suggesting
that UDE activity exploitation may require the management of Enterprise-UDE “empathy”.
17.1.1 Chapter Overview
Table 17.1 provides an overview of the current chapter. In order to conﬁgure the ways in
which enterprises can harness UDE activity for their service exploitation, I will explore the
ﬁeld of developers support using a phenomenon-based approach (von Krogh et al., 2012).
The advantage of this ﬁeld lies in the fact that the common element of people participating
in those forums is the development of applications on the basis of the speciﬁc service. Hence,
a UDE exploitation activity already takes place during the discussions I will study.
Distinction step
The ﬁrst step of the current investigation (Section 17.2) will have as an objective the identiﬁ-
cation of these forums’ peculiarities (von Krogh et al., 2012) as compared to other problem-
solving settings and will use a narrative methodological approach. This narration will be
based on the study of both Facebook and Google Maps developer support forums as “mon-
uments” of interaction (see Section 14.3.3) between the participants.
The comparison will take into account the phases of a problem-solving process, as well as
the actors involved in each phase for the diﬀerent models proposed by the literature, namely
community-based, enterprise-based and mixed actors problem-solving.
This section will conclude with the identiﬁcation of an uncommon process, where the
problems to be resolved are posed by UDEs, while their resolution is to be undertaken by
the enterprise. According to this mode of processing, a collaboration between enterprise
employees and UDEs only exists in the beginning, where enterprise employees and UDEs try
to formulate the issue in question.
Exploration step
During the second step of my study (Section 17.3), I will “review and evaluate research
designs used” (von Krogh et al., 2012) in the study of problem-solving processes by man-
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Section Description Problem Methodology Outcome
17.2 Distinction step:
Are developer
support forums
just another case
of
problem-solving?
Identiﬁcation and
characterisation of the
peculiarities of developer
support forums as
compared to
community-based,
enterprise-based and
mixes problem-solving
approaches.
Broad cultural terms
description, common
peculiarities recognition
for Facebook and
Google Maps developers
support forums through
the study of
conversations’
monuments.
Peculiarity:
A UDE-driven
problem
formulation, an
enteprise-based
resolution
17.3 Exploration step:
Is problem-solving
really the
problem?
Test the relevance of
problem-solving
performance criteria for
the speciﬁc ﬁeld.
Quantitative study:
calculation of problems
reported and solved
within a six months
period.
Rates of problem
solving are
particularly low for
both forums.
17.4 Design step:
Alternative design
proposal.
Characterisation
of developer
support expertise.
Compare the case of an
enteprise employee
supporting developers
with known types of
expertise.
Qualitative study:
Modelling the forum
conversation process and
the employees activity,
through the study of
both forums and
“cookbooks” for
developer supporting.
“Curator” and
“empathy”. An
alternative
proposal to study
and deploy UDE
support process.
Table 17.1: Chapter Overview.
agement scholars.
More speciﬁcally, I will use a quantitative approach to measure problem solving perfor-
mance for the two forums, based on the “bugs” reported and resolved within a period of six
months.
The ﬁndings reveal a very low rate of problems solved (14% for Facebook and 10% for
Google Maps). These ﬁndings enable me to question the relevance of this metric for the
actual use of the forum, from an enterprise perspective, and formulate the hypothesis of a
diﬀerent kind of process taking place in these forums, beyond problem-solving itself.
Design step
Finally, Section 17.4 will take an in-depth view in the conversations occurring in the forums
and will propose an alternative research design in order for the phenomenon to be better
reached (von Krogh et al., 2012), beyond problem-solving.
More speciﬁcally, I will explore the activity of enterprise employees supporting developers
as a speciﬁc kind of expertise, based on the expertise typology proposed by Hatchuel and
Weil (1992).
For this investigation, in addition to the forum conversation, I will use two early versions
of a “cookbook” written by a Google employee active in this ﬁeld and addressed to her
colleagues, as well as information from two interviews I had with her.
The section will conclude with the identiﬁcation of a new type of expertise, the “curator”,
whose action aims at “taking care” of the UDEs. This activity requires particular know-how,
while it also suggests that, before problem solving, a kind of “empathy” between UDEs and
enterprise needs to be developed.
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17.2 Distinction Step. Developer support forums:
Another case of problem solving?
17.2.1 Literature review: whose problem, who solves it? Different
models for problem-solving
Problem-solving has been one of the most inﬂuential approaches in management for the
description of innovation processes. For instance, for von Hippel “the proper organization
of innovation work” is to be undertaken and examined “with respect to the requirements of
problem-solving” (von Hippel, 1990, p. 408). Diﬀerent methodologies have been proposed,
while the partitioning of this process between diﬀerent actors may imply a permanent debate
about design modiﬁcations (Garel and Midler, 2001). Hence, the authors value the relation-
ship between actors engaged in problem-solving for the organisation of a design process and
the exchange of knowledge.
The problem-solving approach on innovation has been widely shared in the management
community. Having a broader look at the literature, we can observe that the articles in
Management correlating problem-solving and innovation have grown considerably over the
last two decades. Figure 17.1 shows the results obtained from the sciencedirect.com search
engine, using the keywords “problem-solving innovation” for the category Business, Man-
agement and Accounting for the period 1994-2012. We clearly observe an explosion of
literature correlating the two notions, passing from 284 publications in 1994 to 948 in 2012.
Although those results are not normalized by taking into account the general publication
number growth since the 1994 due to a lack of information, this graph makes clear however
that the ﬁeld studying the phenomenon can be characterized as mature (von Krogh et al.,
2012).
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Figure 17.1: Number of articles in the category Business, Management and Accounting
correlating problem-solving and innovation since 1994. Source: sciencedirect.com.
The current section will thus address the question of how enterprises can harness UDE
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activity to exploit their service potential from a problem-solving perspective. Table 17.2
shows a synthesis of the literature on problem-solving processes, discussed in the following
paragraphs, that will be used to distinguish (von Krogh et al., 2012) those processes met in
Web services.
While not all scholars attribute a similar emphasis to the diﬀerent phases of problem
solving, the following can be easily induced:
1. Problem formulation. This is the ﬁrst phase of problem solving. While once the
problem is formulated, then a decision process can generally be deployed (Simon, 1965),
this phase can be by itself tricky. While for Simon it has been described as a starting
point for the design process, “ill-deﬁned problems” - and thus the issue of problem
formulation - have been an object of debate. On the one hand, they are considered
as a user entry to innovation process (through use-related “sticky information” von
Hippel, 1990), on the other hand they are viewed as the very limits of the bounded
rationality approach (Hatchuel, 2001).
2. Resolution Process. This is the second phase of problem solving, once the problem
is deﬁned, consisting in actions that aim at the identiﬁcation of a solution. Scholars
(Thomke et al., 1998; Bernoﬀ and Li, 2008) have proposed that the performance of
the entire process can be measured by the number of solutions found.
3. Solution Implementation. Once a solution is found, this phase consists in operating
the actions required for the implementation of its solution.
Thus, according to the actors implied in each phase, I will distinguish in the following
paragraphs diﬀerent models for problem solving: community-based, enterprise-based or mixed
ones. As I will examine in Section ??, Web services processes can be described as “mixed”
activities, placed in-between community-based and enterprise-based models. In parallel, they
diﬀer from other mixed models, such as crowdsourcing or design division, since they are
characterised by a diﬀerent community-enterprise action conﬁguration. In particularl, it is
the enterprise, not the community, that solves the problems, while problem formulation is a
joint activity of both UDEs and enterprise staﬀ.
Community-based problem solving processes
Figure 17.2 summarises the model of autonomous community problem-solving management.
All three phases are undertaken by the developer community itself, through a self-governance
mode.
More speciﬁcally, as we have already seen in Section 6.2.1 (on page 98), open source
software development is considered to be a case of an autonomous and complete community
activity, where the private-collective model (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006) is fully
deployed, and where innovation “by and for user networks” (von Hippel and Katz, 2002) is
undertaken. In Section 14.2.2 we’ve discussed how communities are deﬁned by the object
they share and maintain. Maintenance in particular, is the process in which community-based
problem solving principally takes place.
Those communities’ action has been extensively studied from an individual motivation
perspective (Lakhani et al., 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006;
Roberts et al., 2006; Shah, 2006) as well as the use value one (Lüthje et al., 2005), while the
question of “how they do it?” is less explored. Some studies focus on the diﬀusion norms,
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Figure 17.2: Community-based problem-solving. Through self-governance, developer com-
munities manage all phases of problem-solving.
rather than the maintenance ones, as understood by speciﬁc intellectual property rights
(O’Mahony, 2003) or the network externalities (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003) perspectives.
While the “peer” approach is generally accepted in the above mentioned studies to de-
scribe those action norms, more detailed studies revealed both an expertise and a related
hierarchy within those communities. Auray (2004), studying Debian Linux community has
shown that a work division takes place, where only experienced developers undertake main-
tenance tasks: the community “tests” the new comers before assigning them responsibilities.
More speciﬁcally in what regards maintenance, Auray argues that, there is the question of
the quality of “bug reports”. On the one hand, there have to be many reporters, to trace
the problems of the platform. On the other hand, these reporters must have a high level
of expertise, in order to be able to correctly diagnose the problem and its importance and,
eventually, propose and implement a solution. Hence, while the community has the tendency
to welcome new end-users, the selection of developers is slower, the community having to
be reassured of the expertise and the commitment of new developers before accepting them
into the team. Therefore, open source communities are characterised by “self-governance”
processes, enabling the maintenance and further development of the common source code.
Von Krogh et al. (2003b), studying the Freenet community have also suggested similar
ﬁndings, where newcomers do not always contribute to the development, while there are
cognitive barriers to the participation of the actual development. A self-governance model
assures a role attribution and a common process establishment, too. Giuri et al. (2008)
proposed that, leadership in such communities emerges through assuring a continuity of the
whole process, from problem formulation to eventual problem resolution.
Overall, as summarised in Figure , community-based problem solving processes, such as
those in the OSS ﬁeld, are entirely undertaken by the community, in what regards problem
formulation, resolution process and solution implementation.
The term “developer community” is here used as an encompassing notion of the com-
munity members, the division of their expertise and the related self-governance model.
Enterprise-based problem solving processes
Figure 17.3 outlines the model of enterprise-based problem solving. Through its organisa-
tional structure and instruments, an enterprise here undertakes the entire problem-solving
process.
Important research has already been based on the implicit assumption that “more prob-
lem solving means more innovation”. Thomke (1998) studying simulation of experiments
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Figure 17.3: Enterprise-based problem-solving. Through its organisational structure and
instruments, an enterprise manages all phases of problem-solving.
Figure 17.4: Cognitive gaps in problem-solving processes (Jablokow and Booth, 2006).
in the car industry, used the criteria of ‘problem-solving cycles’, as well as ‘diversity’ to
measure performance in problem solving in the case of R&D. Similarly, in the context of
the pharmaceutical industry, also with experimentation, computer simulation experimenta-
tion performance was examined as a problem-solving process, of which the eﬃciency was
measured by the chemical compounds found (Thomke et al., 1998). Both industrial set-
tings involve highly skilled engineers who work in a project-based enterprise environment.
Moreover, in both cases, experimentation is guided by the pre-established scientiﬁc require-
ments of the domain (security in the former case, aﬃnity of compounds for human and
bovine isozyme for the latter), as they refer to a speciﬁc dominant design (Utterback and
Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy and Townsend, 1975).
In the particular case where the problem ‘seeker’ and the problem ‘solver’ is not the same
person or team, a problem of a “cognitive gap” appears, beyond communication issues.
Jablokow and Booth (2006), also in the setting of an integrated organisation and the ﬁeld of
pharmaceutical industry, identify the issue of a cognitive gap. This gap takes two forms (as
seen in the Figure 17.4 quoted from Jablokow and Booth (2006)): a ﬁrst form resides between
the problem and its solvers, while a second form resides between the solvers themselves.
Jablokow and Booth propose that more organisational integration contributes in bridging
cognitive gaps, though imposing diﬃculties in human resource management, because of the
human and cognitive diversities of the individuals that have to collaborate.
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From a business strategy standpoint, discussing the importance of R&D departments in
organisations, as well as the limits these structures face through the imperative of intensive
innovation, Hatchuel et al. (2001, 2002) go beyond problem-solving by proposing the intro-
duction of a new function in the enterprise, the function of innovation. Regarding the ‘design
reasoning’ of innovation processes, the scholars emphasise the value of formulating the right
questions, even before problems become visible. The resulting organisational schema (R-
I-D) consists in the management of questions to address to Research and Development
departments by this new structure that can thus lead enterprise innovation processes.
Overall, enterprise-based problem solving is entirely undertaken by an enterprise, which
coordinates the process using activating diﬀerent employees and departments according to
its internal processes.
Design division and problem-solving
Figure 17.5 summarises the model of design division between manufacturer and lead users.
Through a modular design, manufacturers can separate technological and use-related problem
solving processes. Then, the two can be undertaken autonomously.
Figure 17.5: Problem-solving through enterprise-user design partitioning. Through a modular
design, manufacturers can separate technological and use-related problem solving processes.
Then, the two can be undertaken autonomously.
In previous chapters we have already discussed the approach on design space division
between manufacturers and users. According to it, ill-deﬁned problems are due to “sticky
information”, the latter being decomposed to “technological” and “use-context” ones (von
Hippel, 2005, and others). Manufacturers can thus partition the design (von Hippel, 1990)
to diﬀerent design spaces (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Baldwin et al., 2006), one for the
manufacturer, another for user innovators. Thus, there can be two parallel problem solving
processes, each one deploying in an autonomous manner. The modularisation (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000) of the design leads to the division of innovation process into tasks, a design re-
quiring less eﬀort for the achievement of “cross-boundary communication and coordination”,
and thus augment problem-solving eﬃciency (von Hippel, 1990). In other words, the more
a project is partitioned in smaller elements, the less communication eﬀort is needed between
teams in charge for each element and problem-solving becomes more eﬃcient. Even more,
such elements can be delegated to the lead users.
Crowdsourcing as task distribution.
Figure 17.6 outlines the crowdsourcing approach, according to which an enterprise formulates
a problem and addresses it to a community of developers to ﬁnd a solution. Diﬀerent
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crowdsourcing conﬁgurations have been proposed by the literature, depending on the tools
or relational settings that mediate this process.
Figure 17.6: Problem-solving through crowdsourcing. Enterprises address their questions to
a community of developers to propose a solution.
The term was coined by Jeﬀ Howe (2006a), editor of the Wired magazine. In his article,
5 Rules of the New Labor Pool he outlined ﬁve common principles of general application1:
potential for remote task performing, need for work division in really small tasks, potential
of community-based result evaluation.
Hence, this initial, empirical deﬁnition of crowdsourcing is based on a division of labour
into small tasks, easily performed at a distance. A typical case of this dimension has been
the “Clickworkers” project launched by NASA (Benkler, 2006, p. 69)2
The emergence of this possibility of task modularisation and distributed work had been
innovative at the time. Yet, we should note that the users themselves did not innovate: they
followed some very speciﬁc instructions on elementary tasks presuming elementary knowledge
and skills as well (click on a screen using the mouse when identifying a crater in the image),
where very little creativity was needed and the results were within a limited scope of solutions
(craters spotted).
Regarding the speciﬁc operation of community-based evaluation, diﬀerent methods have
been proposed. For instance, marking comments Haeﬂiger et al. (2009) is one of the popular
ways to enable user-generated content evaluation. More sophisticated methods, such as the
Web-based Delphi (Benkeltoum, 2008), where experts are invited to evaluate innovations,
can also enter in the broad deﬁnition of crowdsourcing in the trajectory of distributed ﬁltering,
taking advantage of the Web infrastructure.
A diﬀerent view on crowdsourcing is developed by scholars focussing on problem-solving
processes. A well-known case is the one of Innocentive.
1Howe, Jeﬀ. 5 Rules of the New Labor Pool, Wired Magazine, June 2006. Retrieved: October 1, 2012.
URL:http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/labor.html
2NASA developed a Web site where Web users could mark crater they spot on the surface of Mars, by
clicking on them. As Benkler notes, the tasks performed were discrete, each easily performed in a matter of
minutes. He comments:
The clickworkers project was a particularly clear example of how a complex professional task
that requires a number of highly trained individuals on full-time salaries can be reorganized so
as to be performed by tens of thousands of volunteers in increments so minute that the tasks
could be performed on a much lower budget. The low budget would be devoted to coordinating
the volunteer eﬀort. However, the raw human capital needed would be contributed for the
fun of it. The professionalism of the original scientists was replaced by a combination of high
modularization of the task (Benkler, 2006, p. 69).
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Within the Open Innovation literature current, this case has been of major interest as
an exemplary ﬁeld of application of the approach. Characterized as an “innovation inter-
mediary”, Innocentive acts in the intersection between the “seeker”, that is the enterprise
formulating the problem, and the “solvers”, the members of the community that undertake
the problem-solving process to get the award, via the mediation of Innocentive’s staﬀ mem-
bers (Chesbrough, 2006, pp. 143-144). The resulting business model is the one of a market
between seekers and solvers.
Always regarding the same service, Lakhani et al. (2007), through an experimental investi-
gation methodology, found a 29.5% resolution rate for scientiﬁc problems that had previously
remained unsolved inside the R&D laboratories of well-known science-driven ﬁrms (Lakhani
et al., 2007, p. 4). A similar albeit older case is ideas competitions, well known to the
architect community, where creativity and originality are requested while the ‘deliverables’
can be more ill-deﬁned (Ebner et al., 2009).
Addressing the problem of idea competition organisation, Piller and Walcher (2006) have
proposed the disposal to the users of toolkits for idea competition. Lead by the principle
of users’ knowledge developed by von Hippel, Piller and Walcher propose the provision
to self-selected lead users of toolkits for prototype building. Prototype building is thus
considered another way for lead users to develop and explain their ideas, beyond verbal or
informational formulations. The aspect of “user innovation horizontal networks” (von Hippel,
2007) is translated in the requirements of these tools by Piller and Walcher (2006) as the
communication possibility among users and the enterprise organising the contest. Regarding
participants’ relations conﬁguration, it has also been proposed that collective competitions,
where participants also collaborate with each other, may advance the quality of solutions
proposed (Blohm I et al., 2011).
Overall, in crowdsourcing, as regards problem-solving, the enterprise formulates a prob-
lem, the community solves it and ﬁnally the enterprise implements the solution. There can
be diﬀerent conﬁgurations of crowdsourcing, according to the tools or the organisational
settings that mediate this process.
17.2.2 Research methodology: identification of actors and roles in
the process
In order to study the way in which enterprises harness UDE activity for their service potential
exploitation, I study two developer support forums, Google Maps and the Facebook ones. I
will study the forums of those two services as both services are among the exemplary ones
of the ﬁeld, while - in addition - both enterprises are “new”, in the sense that they both
emerged and grew within the industrial context of online services. Those elements suggest
that an identiﬁcation of common methods is very likely to be representative of the action
norms used in the speciﬁc industrial settings.
My research goal is to distinguish the peculiarities of this ﬁeld (von Krogh et al., 2012) as
compared to the approaches studied by the literature (reviewed in the previous paragraphs).
In order to do this, I study the “monuments” of interaction between the participants in the
forum conversation, as already described in Section 14.3.3.
The identiﬁcation of the Websites where forums themselves are situated is easy, as a
Web search with the name of the service and the words “developer support” is suﬃcient
to identify the addresses of the corresponding forums. In addition, both sites provide the
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option to actually download the entire discussion ﬁles3. Then, the study of the conversations
requires a speciﬁc familiarity with the very technical language utilised, which can be the study
of the speciﬁc terms employed. To this, the use of online documentation, which can be found
by a Web search of each technical term, is required during the early research period.
After the study of a number of conversations, a conversation pattern is revealed, which
is independent from the speciﬁc technologies under discussion.
Figure 17.7 shows the general schema of discussion in both forums, as induced from the
reading of forum conversations.
Figure 17.7: The actors engaged in a discussion on the developer support forum: reporter,
developer relations, community.
According to this pattern, each individual participates in the discussion with a personal
nick-name and an e-mail, from where it is possible to have ﬁrst indications on whether or
not they are service staﬀ or external developers. User proﬁles, also available in the forum
platform, provide additional information on this question.
A Reporter formulates a problem report or a new feature request. Reporters are User-
Developer-Entrepreneurs and their reports regard issues they personally face. The report
becomes an “issue”, that is a speciﬁc “thread” or conversation in the forum. The forum
being public, other UDEs may comment on the issue, usually saying whether or not they
also face the same problem or desire the same feature. In some cases, other UDEs propose
solutions to the problem, either by directly suggesting the solution or by referring to the
documentation. In addition, a provider employee follows up the discussion. In case he or she
considers that more information should be provided, she asks for it. In this case, UDEs are
likely to refer to their own web site or provide a copy of the problem eﬀects (a “screen-shot”
3This possibility was the case during the period of study, from 1/1/2010 to 31/5/2010.
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Figure 17.8: Web services problem-solving. While problem formulation is a joint process,
problem resolution and solution integration are undertaken by the enterprise solely.
in the case of a graphical problem or the output code in case of data problems).
Once the problem is well deﬁned, the provider employee lets the UDEs know that the
report or request has been acknowledged and that an internal process has been undertaken
for its resolution. Eventually, when the bug is ﬁxed or the feature integrated in the platform,
the employee informs the community.
17.2.3 Outcome: UDE-driven problem formulation,
enterprise-based resolution
The problem-solving process identiﬁed is shown in Figure 17.8. This conﬁguration is diﬀerent
from all the conﬁgurations studied by the literature.
In both UDE support services studied (the Google Maps and the Facebook developer
support forums) the agenda of the topics to be discussed is deﬁned by the developers, not
the enterprise. Hence, regarding the initial formulation of the questions to be answered, we
observe a reverse direction from crowdsourcing techniques (Howe, 2006a,b), where questions
are addressed from the enterprise to the community. The problem to be solved is one
presented by a UDE, while the one to solve it is the enterprise.
Still, problem formulation is not entirely a community issue neither. While it becomes
obvious for a non-expert that those using the forum share a common technical expertise
on programming, it is also clear that this fact does not lead to a direct transmission of
“sticky information” (von Hippel, 1994): An important role is to be undertaken by platform
developer staff, and namely the Developer Relations Department (also called DevRel), to
help users formulate their problems, in order for the correspondence of the latter to a specific
know-how to become evident. Therefore, provider employees have an important role and an
authority in this process, as they are the ones to say when a problem is well-deﬁned, and
thus can be accepted as an issue for resolution by the enterprise.
Overall, while for reporters problem resolution is the challenge to address, for provider
employees there are other preoccupations before that, while even when they do recognise a
problem, they never engage that its resolution will take place.
However, in the case where problem resolution is not the provider’s preoccupation, what
is? The next section will further explore this question.
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17.3 Exploration step: Testing the relevance of
problem-solving criteria
The current section explores the problem-solving process described previously by intensifying
data gathering inside focal concepts (von Krogh et al., 2012). More speciﬁcally, I explore
whether or not what appears as a problem-solving process serves indeed in solving problems.
I ﬁnd that the forums studied are characterised by a very low rate of problems solved, thus
I advance the proposition that their main function resides beyond problem-solving as such.
17.3.1 Methodology
It has been proposed that the rate of problem resolution can be used to qualify the perfor-
mance of a problem solving activity (Thomke et al., 1998; Bernoﬀ and Li, 2008). Using an
opportunistic design (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2012), I will measure
problem solving performance for two diﬀerent platform support forums which follow similar
processes, Google Maps and Facebook, studying the simple question of whether or not the
problems (“defections”) reported in the forums by the users are eventually solved. To this
end, I will use the following indicator:
Problem solving performance =
Problems solved
Problems reported
Regarding the data, I will exploit the fact that discussions are publicly available. My
measurement will be limited to the ﬁrst semester of 2010 (January 1st to May 31st) for both
platforms and will take into account only the issues reported and resolved within this period.
For the calculation of the number of the problems reported, I will subtract the number of
duplicated issues, that is issues that appear twice or more in the forum and thus have been
merged.
Technically, to operate these calculations, I used the CVS ﬁles of the discussion provided
by the forums and I developed a program using Perl programming language to process these
data.
The number of UDEs actually creating applications with Google Maps and Facebook
would be helpful information to further explore this data. However, I was not in position to
obtain this information. A reason for this is the openness of the process itself: UDEs do not
need to provide their personal information to develop applications with those services. An
anonymous account is suﬃcient for application development, while each user may create as
many accounts as he/she desires. In fact, Google’s Developer Relations department once
attempted to calculate the number of the developers using their platforms, although they
gave up the eﬀort4.
17.3.2 Findings: a low rate of problems solved
Figure 17.9 summarises the ﬁndings regarding the problems both reported and solved within
the examined period.
In the Facebook developer forum case, 1821 problems were reported from UDEs to
the forum for the period 1/1/2010 to 31/5/2010. This number takes into account the
duplicates, as I have already subtracted the 198 issues reported that were merged with
4Interview with Google Developer Relations manager, August 12, 2010.
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Figure 17.9: Rate of problems (“defections”) reported to Facebook and Google Maps de-
veloper forums and solved within the period from 1/1/2010 to 31/5/2010.
previous discussions. From the problems reported, 296 were resolved within the same period.
Hence, the problem solving performance, as deﬁned previously, is 14%.
In the Google Maps developer forum case, 325 problems were reported from UDEs for
the same period. This number takes into account the duplicates, I have already subtracted
the 24 issues that were merged with previous discussions. From the problems reported, 32
were resolved within the examined period. Hence, the performance in this case is 10%.
The ﬁndings on problem-solving rates for the two Web services platforms indicate a
low priority on the resolution of problems, compared to the value problem solving has for
enterprises, as proposed by management scholars.
Hence, two propositions can be induced. On the one hand, the role of forums is not
limited to problem-solving per se. On the other hand, there is a question about the value of
a problem reported in the case where no resolving action is taken by the enterprise.
17.3.3 Discussion: is problem-solving the problem?
In section 17.2 I have distinguished the problem-solving process met in Web services developer
forums from other settings met in the literature identifying a speciﬁc conﬁguration of roles
between developer community and enterprise, which is characterised by a joint problem
formulating phase and enterprise only resolution and integration phases.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings of the current section also add the suggestion that there is a
reverse process to the one met in crowdsourcing methods: here, it is actually the UDEs, not
the enterprise, that initially identify problems to be solved. Thus, the enterprise is found in
a position of “crowdﬂooding”, as developers demand it to take action, formulating a tasks
list of problems to solve.
Therefore, my research question, how to harness UDE activity for service potential explo-
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ration, has been answered only in part: UDEs should be in position to report the problems
they face during their activity. Still, while the use of the forum is clear from a developer
perspective, it is less clear from an enterprise one. As the problem-solving rate is particularly
low for both services studied, the question remains open regarding the action norms of the
enterprise itself, as actually solving the problems does not appear to be the main goal.
The following section will continue the exploration of the same process, this time from
an enterprise perspective, proposing a research design to study and deploy the management
of such processes.
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17.4 Design step: Characterisation of developer
support expertise
In the two previous sections, I investigated the developer support forum discussion as a
problem-solving process and I found that problem-solving itself is characterised by a very
low performance rate. Unlike typical problem-solving life cycles met in enterprise as well as
project management go/kill decisions, the two previous sections have revealed an open-ended
process, without a provision on a speciﬁc closure time: the life-span of an issue can take
dimensions that wouldn’t be acceptable within an enterprise context.
17.4.1 Theoretical concepts. Beyond problem-solving: three
expert figures and one hypothesis
As already evoked in the ﬁrst section of the current chapter, problem-solving is characterised
by a “tricky” phase, the one of problem formulation. This phase has been the one wherein
enterprises’ problem-solving process is challenged.
From the user perspective, von Hippel (1990, 2005) distinguished two kinds of “sticky
information”, a technological one corresponding to enterprise expertise, and a use-context
one corresponding to lead users knowledge. For von Hippel, possesion of this information
is required to innovate either in technologies or in uses. While this notion illustrates the
diﬃculty of enterprises to access lead users’ knowledge and vice versa, “sticky information”
is at the same time a barrier for further characterisation of each actor’s knowledge, due
exactly to its stickiness.
From a design perspective, Hatchuel (2001) argued that problem-solving is a special,
though limited case of a design situation. Design can also include projects where conception
expansions may occur during their undertaking, in contrast to problem-solving, where the
concepts are only set in the beginning.
Returning to the particular case I study, on using developer support forums as a means to
harness UDEs’ activity for service potential exploration, and considering only the ﬁrst phase,
the one of problem formulation, we’ve already seen that it remains an open process, as the
majority of the issues reported remain unsolved for a long period. This section will focus on
the work of the provider’s employee who is in charge of this process for the enterprise.
While this activity was encountered during the two ﬁrst sections, my focal concepts did
not allow its further exploration. Hence, I will propose an alternative research design (von
Krogh et al., 2012), appropriate for the study of this speciﬁc case.
For that, I will face this activity as a speciﬁc kind of expertise. Based on the typology of
Hatchuel and Weil (1992) on expert ﬁgures, I will project the hypothesis that, to the extent
there is indeed an expertise in the employees’ work, it is an expertise of a diﬀerent type.
The following paragraph reviews the work of Hatchuel and Weil and formulates the
hypothesis, before proceeding to the ﬁeld research.
Expert figures: the artisan, the repairer and the strategist
In their inﬂuential study, “L’expert et le système”, Hatchuel and Weil (1992) identify three
diﬀerent ﬁgures of expertise, drawing the study of four diﬀerent cases of industrial expert
systems implementation. Those ﬁgures are the artisan, the repairer and the strategist, each
representing a diﬀerent relationship between knowledge and action. Table 17.3 summarises
those actor ﬁgures with the related know-how and expertise.
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Actor figure Know-how Expertise
Artisan Doing know-how.
In the way in which certain trans-
formations are obtained by familiar
actions.
Repairer Understanding know-how.
Action and investigation to re-
establish the original state of order.
Strategist Combining know-how.
Knowledge combination, activity
planning, new concept and knowl-
edge creation.
Table 17.3: Overview: types of expertise - compiled from Hatchuel and Weil (1992, 1995).
Artisans’ know-how is described as “savoir-faire”, which is not only limited to knowledge,
but also concerns the doing. In other words, it is “the expertise which expresses, whatever
the level of detail considered, the way in which certain transformations are obtained by
familiar actions” (Hatchuel and Weil, 1995, p. 31), also referred to as “doing know-how”.
This knowledge is limited to the application of a variety of rules, ranging from abstract rules,
structuring the steps of their reasoning, to more speciﬁc ones, aiming at the resolution of
well-deﬁned problems (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992, p. 50).
Repairers’ know-how is described as “understanding know-how”, since - unlike artisan -
“the repairer’s expertise is more complex; it cannot be laid out in a straight line, and in each
new situation it intermingles action and investigation in an ever-changing pattern” (Hatchuel
and Weil, 1995, p. 36). A repairer has to establish the original state of an order that has
been disturbed, deviated from or deformed (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992, p. 52). Hence, there
is a part of the knowledge that is strictly related to the repairing experience, which cannot
be fully anticipated (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992, p. 53), though a reference state is always
known.
Finally, strategists’ know-how relies on the combination of knowledge, while his action
aims at the coordination and the planning on an enterprise level (Hatchuel and Weil, 1995,
p. 44). This type of action requires the invention of new concepts as well as the creation of
new knowledge (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992, p. 74).
To the above, Hatchuel et al. (2002) also added the role of the organisation itself, being
the encompassing setting for both collective learning and action. When faced by innovation
challenges, organisations are called to re-conﬁgure their division of labour, as well as the
corresponding professions and tasks, and create new ones.
17.4.2 Hypothesis. A specific expertise?
The process described in the two previous sections implies a series of questions, where all
three ﬁgures of experts should be implied for them to be answered in the ﬁeld, as they
address doing, understanding and planning issues. A non-exhaustive list of the questions
that can be faced in the ﬁeld is the following:
• What exactly is the problem? How can distant interlocutors share the ‘sticky informa-
tion’ von Hippel (1994) on users’ problems, as, by deﬁnition, it is “costly to acquire,
transfer, and use in a new location” (von Hippel, 1994, p. 429), while, in addition, the
source code of the platform and the third party innovations is not shared?
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• How can platform providers and user-entrepreneurs share the same vision of the “doing
know-how” and the “understanding know-how”?
• How can trust be established in this case of a problem-solving process, since providers
do not reveal their code?
• What happens if that the “tasks” operated by third party developers using the tools
are beyond the scope (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) of the enterprise, that is they do
not correspond in the planned division of design and development tasks?
• What are the strategical interplays of this process, when, for instance, new features
are added to the platform?
Hence, based on Hatchuel and Weil (1992, 1995) I propose a conﬁguration of experts as
shown in Figure 17.10.
Figure 17.10: Diﬀerent types of expertise according to the diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the
current and future states.
This reformulation uses the argument that expertise is a relationship between knowledge
and action (Hatchuel and Weil, 1992, 1995), as well as the observation that we can distinguish
two times for actions: when action begins and when its eﬀects are produced. Hence, I can
distinguish the current state (of the service technology in my case), when action begins and
the future state, when the action eﬀects occur. I also distinguish two types of states, a
familiar and a novel one.
The three types of expertise ﬁt in three of the four spaces created: doing know-how
corresponds to an action from a known state to another known state, understanding know-
how corresponds to an action from a novel state to a familiar one, while planning know-how
corresponds to a projection from a known state to a novel one.
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Hence, a gap appears, in what regards the action from a novel state to another novel
state, I advance the hypothesis that this type of expertise may correspond to the provider
employees in charge of the developer support forum.
More speciﬁcally, my hypothesis is that this situation appears when a problem is yet-to-be
formulated, a situation typical to developer support forums. To better seize this situation, let
us think of an analogous, more common situation: an agitated stranger enters the building of
a school. From the fact that he is agitated, we can understand that he is seeking something
or someone. If he asks a random person (say, a visitor exiting the building) he will have
less chance to ﬁnd what he came for. For such situations, there is a specialised service, the
reception. By posing a set of questions (“Are you looking for someone?”; “Are you looking
for a course? A seminar”) or aﬃrmations (“This is a School here, Sir!”) receptionists may
identify what the person is searching for and help him, providing the necessary information.
In a similar way, provider employees appear to have a kind of “receptionist” role, redirecting
outsiders (UDEs) and their requests to diﬀerent sorts of experts, depending on the request.
Therefore, I assume that this person should have both knowledge of the diﬀerent exper-
tises existing within the enterprises, and knowledge of their action. This “know-how” is then
to be used in the conversation with the UDEs.
In fact, research on sponsored communities has drawn similar conclusions. West and
O’Mahony (2008) compared autonomous open source communities with cases where enter-
prises deliberately started to engage in community collaboration, generating or sponsoring
open source communities. Regarding the management of this relationship, the authors iden-
tify a duality between “access” and “transparency”. The ﬁrst refers to the access that
community members have to the source code, as well as to decision making processes, com-
munity planning and - more generally - higher level platform strategy making (West and
O’Mahony, 2008, p. 8). The notion of transparency refers to “the communication of what
is happening”, according to the words of a community manager (West and O’Mahony, 2008,
p. 14). To some projects studied, while this initially meant the release of information such
as the release cycle and the goals, sponsors were progressively led to include information on
the production process (West and O’Mahony, 2008, p. 8).
Hence, the work of the expert under investigation seems to lie in-between access to
enterprise knowledge and actions and a sort of transparency of both towards UDEs, by the
provision of related information.
17.4.3 Research Methodology
The objective of my research methodology will be to propose alternative concepts for the
study of the activity of developer support through forum settings.
For that, I will use a monument study methodological approach (already discussed in
Section 14.3.3). The material I will examine are of two kinds:
1. Actual discussions on the online forum.
2. A “cookbook” edited by and addressed to provider employees who work at the post of
developer support.
3. Additional information acquired by two interviews with the author of the book.
While the forum conversations are available online, the “cookbook” was written by a
Google employee to transmit her knowledge to her colleagues, and I have been able to
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access two early versions of the documents, the one written as a draft in February 20105 and
the other as an early version of a complete Developer Community Handbook Documentation
in March 20116.
Here is how the author described the need addressed by the book7:
The area of developer support is quite new, and there isn’t much written about
how to do it - what works, what doesn’t. Given the increasing number of
APIs, and I hope, the increasing number of people attempting to support API
developers, we need to start documenting our field. This handbook is a first
attempt.
As this statement suggests, developer support is a ﬁeld under rationalisation, where the
actors themselves attempt to produce some criteria and ‘best practices’ on how to manage
third-party developer communities.
To explore this setting, I will ﬁrstly provide a description of the online conversation process
between UDEs and provider employees, as conﬁgured by the conversations. This operation
requires me to enter the actual conversation, which is of course extremely technical. Then
I will induce a model for the employee’s activity, independent from the technical language
used in the conversations.
A descriptive modelling of UDE - provider employees conversation
Figure 17.11 shows a modelling of the conversational process followed by the participants in
the forum discussion. This conversation regards speciﬁcally the problem formulation phase,
as the resolution and implementation phases are not discussed: while input on the issue is
frequently demanded by the employees, what is communicated after problem formulation is
indicative information on the internal process steps, through the use of “statuses”.
The ﬁgure distinguishes two actors: UDEs and enterprise employees. UDEs have the
option to express their problems or desires, while their discourse is weakly structured. The
initiative to open a conversation comes to the issue reporter. Then, other UDEs may join
in, expressing their interest or providing additional information and suggestions.
Issues are highly technical and regard very speciﬁc concerns the developers face during the
creation or the operation of their own application. An example of the problem formulation
is the following8:
I have found that dragend event in Google Map also triggers the click event in
IE. It is OK in Firefox and Chrome. Open IE/FF/Chrome console and see the
result of this fiddle. Any workaround will be appreciated.
The above quoted suggestion was characterised at the time by a “doing know-how” and
“understanding know-how”, used while trying to conﬁgure the current situation.
The second actor is the enterprise employee. Their role is to structure the discussion and
render the information provided by users exploitable in a form of a speciﬁed problem to solve
5Pamela Fox, Issue Tracking: Why & How, Febuary 2010. Copy provided by the author.
6Pamela Fox, Developer Community Handbook Documentation, Release 0.9, March 2011. Copy provided
by the author.
7Pamela Fox, Developer Community Handbook Documentation, p. 3.
8Google Maps Developer support forum, Issue 4072: Bug: Dragend Event also trigger Click Event in
IE. Issue URL: http://code.google.com/p/gmaps-api-issues/issues/detail?id=4072 . The full conversation
is provided in Appendix C.0.1, page 407.
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Figure 17.11: The conversational process followed in the developer support forum during an
issue resolution. Status indications are providing a level of transparency regarding internal
platform resolution process, while the debate among the community aims to clarify and
evaluate the issue under review.
or new feature to integrate to the platform. An important tool in this direction is the use of
diﬀerent statuses, informing the community on the advancement of the whole process. The
most common status is the “Needs More Info” one. Here is how the “Developer Community
Handbook” describes the context of use for this status9:
Often times, a developer posts what sounds like a valid bug, but doesn’t provide
enough information to replicate. So, we use this label to indicate that we have
reviewed the issue at least once and are awaiting further clarification from the
developer. Once they provide enough info, it moves on to one of the other labels.
Hence, a ﬁrst task for the employees is the conﬁguration of the current state, as well as
the consideration of the desired one. The case of a “bug” is relatively simple, as the term
indicates a malfunction, thus the future state is known (to “fix the bug”). Still, there is work
to do in understanding the current state. Hence, beyond a description that “sounds like a
valid bug”, the employee demands more information in order to be able to “replicate” the
problem, e.g. on her own computer, which is considered necessary for problem understanding.
To this eﬀort, employees often ask reporters to operate speciﬁc actions, potential solutions,
beyond demanding more information. For instance, the following quote comes from both a
demand for more information and a suggestion of an eventual solution from a Google Maps
employee to an UDE facing a problem with zooming the map10:
What are you executing against the map clicking a Munich hat? Are you calling
fit- Bounds() which kicks off the zoom? What if you simply increase the size of
your bounds to minimize the zoom?
Still, things are more complicated when the issue reported is not a “bug” but a request
for a new feature. The same handbook notes that in the end of problem formulation phase,
there had to be a diﬀerent status for bugs and new feature requests. While Google Maps
employees initially used the “Accepted” status for both, they changed that to “Confirmed”
and “Acknowledged” for bugs and new features requests respectively. This is how the
handbook presents the reasons for this change11:
Developers thought that “Accepted” meant that we were actually taking on the
feature request, and wondered why it was taking so long to fulfil their requests
- when in fact, we simply meant to say that it was a valid request, and that we
might fulfil it one day, given substantial resources and evidence of its utility to
other developers. So, we now use “Confirmed” for bugs, after replicating the
bug ourselves, and “Acknowledged” for feature requests, after deciding it is a
valid request for the scope of our API, and confirming it isn’t fulfilled in some
other way (like by an open source library). Anecdotally, I believe this has led to
less developers feeling teased.
In fact, this confusion is related to the diﬀerent states of a design process, as described
by Hatchuel (2001). While a bug refers to a problem-solving conﬁguration, in this particular
9Fox, Pamela, Developer Community Handbook Documentation, p. 33 & Issue Tracking: Why & How.
10Google Maps Developer support forum, Issue 2122: get-BoundsZoomLevel, URL:
http://code.google.com/p/gmaps-api-issues/issues/detail?id=2122 . The full conversation is provided in
Appendix C.0.2, page 408.
11Fox, Op.cit.
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case calling for the “repairing” of the problem, a new feature request refers rather to a, more
or less important, conceptual extension, which is a task of a “strategist”.
An example of this is the following. On September 24th 2008, a developer requested an
enhancement of the Google Maps API. He requested the addition of public transportation
itineraries information to the API, in order for developers to be able to provide services based
on them. As he commented “In many cities public transportation is more efficient than going
somewhere by car”. The next day, a Google employee posted a comment saying “shared
with the team” and marked the issue as “Accepted”. This post attracted a great deal of
interest from the community. Nevertheless, its implementation required the acquisition of
the related transport itinerary data from Google for the diﬀerent cities, which was a strategic
action, not an issue of repairing a problem.
What is not illustrated in the Figure, as it cannot be observed by the forum, is the “triage
meetings”. As described in the handbook, meetings between enterprise colleagues take place
once a week to evaluate and share the issues to be answered. Various dimensions of this
activity are described there, as the general direction that each issue should be answered within
a week, or the suggestion that employees should not monopolise the forum discussion. The
issues are distributed according to the particular engineering skills of the employees, while
other engineers, members of a speciﬁc API team may join their discussion to add their
expertise12. Eventually, all issues are gathered in a centralised information system. Then,
depending on the nature of both the issue and the relationship between the enterprise and
the developer, there is a prioritization of the issue resolution13.
Overall, enterprise employees have the responsibility to reply to the UDE’s requests by
structuring the conversation in the way that the required level of expertise to address the
issue becomes evident for them. The following paragraph will propose a modelling of their
activity.
17.4.4 Outcome: a model for the activity of a “curator”
The previous paragraph illustrated that the activity of enterprise employees in charge of
replying to UDE requests in the support forum is not exactly problem-solving. Their activity
is rather to “take-care” of the UDE concerns, in one way or another, hence, I propose to call
them “curators”, etymologically coming from the Latin verb curare meaning “take care”.
Typically enough, Fox, in the developer support “cookbook” provides her colleagues with
the following advice, in respect to the relationship with the developers in particular14:
• Care about your developers.
• Empathize with your developers.
• Keep your developers informed.
• Listen to your developers.
• Appreciate your developers.
At the same time, this “empathic” relationship is tied to a very structured, enterprise
process. Figure 17.12 suggests an alternative design to the one used in previous sections for
the analysis and the exploration of this particular actor. To model a curator’s action, I use
12Fox, Op.cit.
13Interview with Google Maps employee taken in August, 2010.
14Pamela Fox, Developer Community Handbook Documentation, March 2011, p. 4.
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the typology of Figure 17.10 (discussed on page 360), which I have compiled from Hatchuel
and Weil (1992). This compilation is based on an association of the knowledge an actor has
for the current and the future states and his ability to act from the one to the other.
Figure 17.12: A model for the activity of a “curator”.
According to this model, a curator enters a discussion trying to determine the current
state of the situation. For this a discussion with the reporter is required, which includes
aiming at the “transfer of sticky information” from the reporter to the curator. Still, there
is a possibility that the opposite is required as well, that is the provision of additional
information and instructions from the curator to the reporter, either to directly help him
resolve his problem or to enable him to deﬁne in a clear way the actual state. Then, once
the actual state becomes clear the curator has to conﬁgure the desired future state.
The ﬁrst case is when the current state is familiar, where the expertise required for a
reply is either based on doing know-how or on planning know-how. In this situation, the
determination of the future state regards the desires of the reporter.
If the reporter desires to do what the system is designed for, then a doing know-how
expertise is required for a solution. The curator should address an artisan for a reply. Such
an incident illustrates the lack of doing know-how on behalf of the reporter, i.e. his inability
to use the service for its own development process as per the service was initially designed.
Thus, the “problem” is traced in the reporter’s ignorance. Therefore, it is also an indication
that the means provided by the service to developers for the latter to acquire the necessary
skills may not be suﬃcient. In such a situation additional actions regarding knowledge
transfer from the enterprise to developers may have to be considered at an enterprise level,
such as a revision of the documentation15.
15Here is how the Developer Community Handbook evaluates documentation:
You can provide the best API in the world, but if you don’t document it, the only developers
that will use it are the ones that are paid to do it, or that enjoy pain. Most likely, your goal
is to attract every type of developer - the hobbyists, the newbies, the freelancers, the paid
employees, the student, etc. - and the goal of your documentation is to explain the API in a
way that works for all of those types of developers, and all types of learners.
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If the reporter desires to do something the system is not originally designed for, then a
planning know-how expertise is required. The curator should address a strategist for a reply.
Such an incident illustrates the potential of the service to extend to diﬀerent contexts. Such
a potential, though, requires strategical action, which generally demands more resources.
The way those requests are addressed is through their internal aggregation, evaluation and
prioritization, before strategical action takes place.
The second case is when the current state is novel, in these circumstances the curator
response also depends on the conﬁguration of the desired state.
If the desired state is familiar, then the reporter faces a problem which is due to the
system. An understanding know-how is required to solve this problem, so the curator should
contact a repairer. Such an incident indicates that other UDEs may also meet the same
problem, though its repair is a question of service robustness.
If the desired state is novel, too, then there is an impossibility to manage the situation.
More information should be requested by the curator in order for her to be in position to
address the issue. Unless the reporter - or other UDEs - are not in position to provide
more information, no action can be undertaken. Hence, while in previous circumstances the
responsibility for a resolution lay on the enterprise side, here it lies on the UDE side.
Moreover, as it is often observed, curators as well as some UDEs often have the doing,
understanding and planning know-how: they can provide advice on “how to do it”, on “why
it does not work” or “other technologies to use for the same goal”, even though it is not
their domain of expertise.
17.4.5 Discussion: the role of the “curator” in service potential
exploitation
Table 17.4 summarises the characteristics of the Curator as compared to the ones discussed
in the literature review. The curator’s know-how resides in taking care of the developer’s con-
cerns. Her action requires an expertise on novelty and expertise recognition, communication
skills, as well as conversation structuring. Some knowledge on the expertise of other ﬁgures
is required for the curator to be in position to recognise novelty and the corresponding exper-
tise, as illustrated by Figure 17.13. Besides, this knowledge can occasionally be suﬃcient to
resolve the challenges UDEs face, although it does not enter in a curator’s action speciﬁcity.
The role of this actor ﬁgure seems to be coherent with the approach of Garel and Midler
(2001) on multiple actors problem solving processes, who value the relationship between the
actors for the organisation of design modiﬁcations and the exchange of knowledge. Still, in
the case of the Web services, this relation takes less formal and more massive dimensions.
In the setting studied, the speciﬁcity of a curator’s action resided in the ability to conﬁgure
the current and the desired state of a given system, through a conversational mode, assuring
that “less developers feel teased”, to use the words of the Google employee. Hence, the
curator has to be in position to establish an intimacy with the UDE, while having the capacity
to structure the conversation for “sticky” information to be codiﬁed.
In what regards problem-solving as such, the identiﬁcation of the curator allows the
proposition of alternative performance criteria, beyond problems solved. Discussions that
remain open - that is where the curator has not closed the conversation by acknowledging
the request and addressing it to an expert - can be explored as well. As previously illustrated
by Figure 17.12, during these situations the information provided on an issue by the reporter
is not suﬃcient for the curator to determine either the current or the future states.
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Actor figure Know-how Expertise
Artisan Doing know-how.
In the way in which certain trans-
formations are obtained by familiar
actions.
Repairer Understanding know-how.
Action and investigation to re-
establish the original state of order.
Strategist Combining know-how.
Knowledge combination, activity
planning, new concept and knowl-
edge creation.
Curator Taking care know-how
Novelty & expertise recognition, in-
timacy establishment, conversation
structuring.
Table 17.4: Curator: know-how and expertise.
Figure 17.13: Diﬀerent types of experts: the place of the Curator.
Therefore, an indicator measuring the rate of problems remaining open would address
the capacity of a speciﬁc community of UDEs to formulate problems and requests in a way
that enterprise employees understand them. It can be thus an indicator of the relationship
between UDEs and enterprise, a sort of an “empathy indicator”. This proposal suggests
that the longer problems remain open, the less “empathy” there will be between UDEs and
provider and the greater will be the distance between the two.
17.5 Conclusion
This chapter explored the conditions of UDE activity use for service potential exploitation,
by studying Facebook and Google Maps developer support forums.
By examining these forums as problem-solving processes, I initially identiﬁed the pe-
culiarity that, unlike community-based, enterprise-based and other mixed problem-solving
processes, they are characterised by an uncommon element: it is the UDEs that set the
problems to solve, while the enterprise is called to provide a resolution.
Further exploring this setting, I found that problem-solving rates are particularly low.
Hence, I suggested that, while some problem-solving occurs, the function of those settings
is broader.
Therefore, based on the work of Hatchuel and Weil (1992) on expertise, I identiﬁed an
original type of expert, the “curator”, whose task is to “take care of the developers”. This
task implies another type of know-how, requiring the ability to identify expertise and novelty,
and to structure the conversation, while developing a sort of empathy between UDEs and
the enterprise.
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Chapter 18
Conclusion of Part III
18.1 The problem addressed
The current part addressed the question of how informal collectivities can emerge and the
one of the harnessing of UDE collectivities by enterprises for exploitation and exploration
reasons.
The distinction between networks and communities, the question of their emergence as
well as the one of their harnessing by enterprises have been open questions in Open and User
innovation literature (von Hippel, 2007; West et al., 2006; West and Lakhani, 2008). By
constructing a conceptual framework putting conversation and action in between networks
and communities, I was in position to explore the conditions of networks and communities
emergence, as well as their harnessing.
For this research, I used the suggestions of Part II as an input, mainly in what regards
the challenges of a parallel exploitation and exploration of a new object during the foggy
competition phase and the speciﬁc role of UDEs in such a phase of industrial development.
18.2 Methods used
For my exploration, I used two main methods: observant participation and interaction monu-
ments analysis. Both referred to ephemeral conversations and actions, where the perception
of the researchers distance to the ﬁeld is not perceived as great by the actors, as - given
the temporal framework of the setting - they are also relatively distanced from it. Both
approaches have been utilised in diﬀerent settings, in the framework of a phenomenon-based
research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012), aiming to distinguish and explore the diﬀerent
settings studied, and to advance the proposal of alternative research and deployment designs,
more appropriate for settings of this nature.
18.3 Part outcome
The current part has identiﬁed and explored three diﬀerent settings that can be used during a
foggy competition phase as such, or through the use of the attributes of the design proposed
for further research or settings deployment.
The case of the Barcamps (Chapter 15) has illustrated a way in which UDEs can explore
the possibility of new networks of communities’ emergence. Unlike the literature on com-
371
munities (Wenger, 1998; Wenger et al., 2002; O’Mahony, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003b,
and others) where a “common ground” and a “sense of belonging” exists among individ-
uals, as well as the case of social networks (Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Simard and West,
2006; von Hippel, 2007, and others), Barcamps are conversational setting where no previous
common ground or connections are pre-supposed. On the contrary, their design enables the
exploration of the possibility for networking or community building on the basis of new or
emerging topics. In addition, while they provide UDEs the opportunity to monitor emerging
technologies, markets and uses, at the same time they provide the opportunity for enterprises
to “inﬁltrate” this setting and obtain some early ties with the communities and networks
still to emerge. Diﬀerent from the “core” and the “periphery” of network analysis, as well as
the “old” and the “news” in communities, the “regulars” of such settings are not necessarily
related by personal ties or a common ground. However, they do have the opportunity to
seize emerging situations and use their lessons, as well as their relational opportunities for
their own purposes.
The case of the Hackathon (Chapter 16) has illustrated a more concrete way for enterprise
technology or service potential exploration, through the organisation of ephemeral UDE
activity. These settings have been found to be very eﬃcient in terms of “quality of group tacit
knowledge”, as all the levels proposed by Erden et al. (2008) were crossed within three days,
for a signiﬁcant number of groups. Having common elements with approaches that combine
knowledge and creativity through collective exploration, such as the KCP (Hatchuel and Weil,
2009), the Hackathon also takes advantage of the individual knowledge and preferences of
participants, both in developing concepts and evaluating them. This dimension has indicated
that personality may play an important role in the innovation processes, especially in such
ephemeral exploration settings.
Finally, the cases of developer support forums examined initially appeared as original
forms of problem-solving, enrolled in the enterprise function of harnessing UDE activity for
technology and service exploitation. Unlike problem-solving processes followed within user
communities (von Hippel, 1990; Auray, 2004), enterprises (Thomke et al., 1998; Jablokow,
2005) or mixed approaches, such as crowdsourcing (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Lakhani et al.,
2007), these forums are characterised by a reverse process: it is the “crowd” that creates
the list of uses to be solved, while the enterprise is called to do the resolution work. As
shown by the exploration of this ﬁeld, its problem-solving performance is particularly low.
Thus, advancing the hypothesis that they serve for other things, beyond problem-solving, I
investigated this function as a speciﬁc enterprise expertise. Drawing on the work of Hatchuel
and Weil (1992) on experts, I identiﬁed yet another type, which I described as a “curator”,
possessing a “taking care know-how”, and addressing cases where both the current and the
future circumstances of a system are not familiar. Advancing to a design proposition, I
suggested that the contribution of such an expert to a system might be able to get qualiﬁed
by the criterion of “UDE-enterprise empathy”.
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Conclusion de la Partie III
Problème de départ
Cette partie s’est posé la question de comment les collectivités informelles peuvent émerger,
ainsi que celle de l’exploitation des collectivités des UDEs par des entreprises dans l’intérêt
de ces dernières.
La distinction entre réseaux et communautés, la question de leur émergence ainsi que
celle de leur exploitation ont été des problèmes ouverts pour la littérature de l’innovation
ouverte et de l’innovation par l’utilisateur (West et al., 2006; von Hippel, 2007; West and
Lakhani, 2008). À l’aide d’un cadre d’analyse conceptuel mettant l’action collective et la
conversation entre les réseaux et les communautés, nous étions en position d’explorer les
conditions de leur émergence ainsi que celles de leur exploitation, en ce qui concerne les
UDEs qui développent des applications Web.
Dans cette recherche, nous avons utilisé comme point d’entrée les aboutissements de
la deuxième partie, suggérant qu’au long d’une phase de Compétition dans le brouillard
les UDEs jouent un rôle important à la fois en matière d’exploitation et d’exploration d’un
potentiel envisageable.
Méthodes utilisées
Deux méthodes ont été utilisées pour les besoins de l’exploration entreprise dans cette partie :
la participation observante et l’analyse de monuments d’interaction. Toutes les deux étaient
utilisées comme méthodes propres à l’étude des conﬁgurations éphémères, où la distance du
chercheur des enjeux du terrain, comme aperçue par les acteurs du terrain, n’est pas grande,
car, étant donné le cadre temporel court de ces conﬁgurations, les acteurs sont eux-mêmes
distanciés. Toutes les deux approches ont été utilisées dans des dispositifs diﬀérents, dans
le cadre d’une stratégie de « phenomenon-based research » (von Krogh et al., 2012), visant
à distinguer et à explorer ces dispositifs, ainsi qu’à poursuivre la recherche en proposant
des concepts de recherche et de déploiement alternatifs, plus appropriés à des dispositifs de
nature similaire.
Résultats de la partie
La présente partie a identiﬁé et exploré trois dispositifs pouvant être utilisés lors d’une phase
de la « Compétition dans le brouillard » en tant que tels, ou par le biais de l’usage des
attributs des concepts proposés pour une recherche plus approfondie ou une mise en place
plus complexe.
373
Le cas des « Barcamps » (Chapitre 15) a illustré une manière dont les UDEs peuvent ex-
plorer la possibilité d’émergence des nouveaux réseaux et des communautés. Contrairement
au cas des communautés (Wenger, 1998; Wenger et al., 2002; O’Mahony, 2003; von Krogh
et al., 2003b), où des « points communs » ainsi qu’un « sens d’appartenance » existe entre
les individus, dans les « Barcamps » il n’y a pas quelque chose de partagé en amont par les
participants. De plus, contrairement au cas des réseaux sociaux (Granovetter, 1973; 1983;
Simard et West, 2006; von Hippel, 2007), les participants ne sont pas nécessairement inter-
connectés. En revanche, leur conception permet l’exploration de la possibilité de construction
des communautés ou de « résautage » sur la base des sujets nouveaux ou émergeant. En
outre, au même titre que ces dispositifs de conversation donnent la possibilité aux UDEs
de veiller à l’apparition de nouveaux technologies, marchés et usages, ils donnent également
l’opportunité à des entreprises d’ « inﬁltrer » ces dispositifs et obtenir des premiers liens
avec les communautés et les réseaux en émergence. Autres que le « noyau » des réseaux,
ainsi que les « anciens » des communautés, les « réguliers » de ces dispositifs ne sont pas
nécessairement connectés et ne partagent pas des points en commun. Néanmoins, ils ont
tous l’opportunité de saisir des situations émergeant et d’utiliser leur expérience, ainsi que
les opportunités relationnelles, dans leur propre intérêt.
Le cas du « Hackathon » (Chapitre 16) a illustré une manière plus concrète pour
qu’une entreprise puisse explorer le potentiel de sa technologie ou son service, par le bi-
ais d’organisation d’un ensemble d’actions par de groupes des UDEs. Ces dispositifs se sont
avérés très performants en matière de « qualité de savoir tacite de groupe », étant donné que
tous les niveaux de qualité proposés par Erden et al. (2008) ont été franchis en trois jours,
pour un nombre signiﬁcatif de groupes. Ayant des éléments en commun avec des approches
qui permettent une exploration collective des nouveaux concepts et savoirs, comme la KCP
(Hatchuel et Weil, 2009), le « Hackathon » proﬁte aussi des savoirs et préférences individuels
des participants, à la fois pour le développement des concepts et pour leur évaluation. Cette
dimension a également montré que la personnalité puisse avoir un rôle important dans les
processus d’innovation, du moins quand il s’agit de tels dispositifs éphémères.
Enﬁn, les cas de forums de développeurs examinés, ont été présentés et étudiés ini-
tialement comme des dispositifs originels de résolution des problèmes, s’inscrivant dans une
fonction d’entreprise visant à bénéﬁcier de l’action des UDEs pour exploiter son service et
sa technologie. Contrairement à d’autres processus de résolution des problèmes utilisés au
sein des communautés d’utilisateurs (von Hippel, 1990; Auray, 2004), au sein des entreprises
(Thomke et al., 1998; Thomke, 1998; Jablokow, 2005) ou encore des approches combina-
toires, telle que le crowdsourcing (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Lakhani et al., 2007), ces forums
sont caractérisés par un processus inverse : c’est la « foule » qui crée la liste des problèmes
à résoudre, tandis que l’entreprise est appelée à faire le travail de résolution. Néanmoins,
comme démontré par l’exploration de ce terrain, la performance en matière de résolution de
problèmes y est particulièrement faible. Donc, en mettant en avant l’hypothèse que ces dis-
positifs servent à d’autres choses, au delà de la résolution des problèmes, nous avons étudié
cette fonction de support en tant qu’objet d’une expertise particulière au sein de l’entreprise.
Faisant appel au travail de Hatchuel et Weil (1992) sur les experts, nous en avons identiﬁé
encore un type, que nous avons décrit comme « curateur », ayant un « savoir prendre soin
», et capable de faire face à des situations où à la fois les circonstances présentes et futures
sont mal connues. En aboutissant à une proposition conceptuelle, nous avons suggéré que
la contribution d’un expert de ce type à un système pourrait parvenir à être évaluée suivant
le critère de l’« empathie » entre entreprise et UDEs.
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Chapter 19
General conclusion
19.1 Problem addressed
The problem addressed by the current study has been the one of the investigation of Web-
based applications development as a new phenomenon of modus operandi. The importance
of Web services has been explored by many disciplines on the level of use: sociological re-
search has focused on personal use (the enabling of personal expression and communication),
management research has focussed on enterprise use (the transformation of enterprise organ-
isation by the implementation of similar systems on an internal and external level), marketing
research on the new possibilities for message diﬀusion (viral marketing) and economics on
their use by buyers and sellers (network externalities, transaction and information cost re-
duction). This academic interest goes along with the increasing penetration of services such
as Google, Facebook or Twitter in social and economic life.
Still, while the use and diﬀusion of Web services in general has attracted much inter-
est from researchers, the development of these services has, so far, remained a “purely”
engineering issue.
The current the Web application ﬁeld through a business development perspective, using
a phenomenon-based research strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012). once a distinction of the
modus operandi in comparison with the models proposed by Raasch and von Hippel (2012)
and von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006) was made, the question of whether or not this
is a Web ﬁeld particularity owed to be explored, too.
An answer to this question required the exploration of Web-based application develop-
ment through two diﬀerent angles:
1. What is Web-based application development? This question addressed the need to
distinguish and explore (von Krogh et al., 2012) the modus operandi (actors, reasons,
means) of Web-based application development as compared to the known models,
namely the user and the manufacturer innovation paradigms (von Hippel and von
Krogh, 2003, 2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012). To identify this modus operandi,
the identiﬁcation of its actors, reasons and means was required. Thus, the following
questions have been also explored:
(a) Who develops Web-based applications?
(b) Why do they he do it?
(c) How is it done?
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2. Is it only a Web phenomenon? If not, when does this phenomenon appear and what
are its effects? This question addressed the need to specify the conditions of the
phenomenon manifestation, as compared to other phenomena, namely the lead-user
innovation (von Hippel, 1975) and the disruption (Christensen et al., 1998) ones.
Once these questions are answered, the question of how enterprises can exploit the
phenomenon eﬀects was answered by addressing the following questions:
1. How can the actors of the phenomenon emerge?
2. How can an enterprise exploit their action?
To address this question, a conﬁguration of Web-development modus operandi has been
presented, as compared to the known models. For this comparison, I used the distinction
between user and manufacturer innovation paradigms (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003,
2006; Raasch and von Hippel, 2012) as a reference point for analysing the phenomenon.
19.2 Methodology used
The methods used throughout this study corresponded to the speciﬁcities of the questions
posed, making use of a phenomenon-based strategy (von Krogh et al., 2012). In Part I, I
used methods akin to the distinction and the exploration of the phenomenon. In Part II, I
used a method akin to the understanding of the conditions of phenomenon appearance and
its eﬀects in business. In Part III, the methods used were akin to the proposition of ways to
exploit the phenomenon’s eﬀects.
19.2.1 Part I: phenomenon distinction and exploration
Part I addressed the question of the modus operandi peculiarities distinction and exploration,
that is the questions of who, why and how develops Web-based applications. For this, I used
a step-by-step methodological approach, each time considering one factor known (actor,
reason or means), while exploring the other two.
The ﬁrst step of my research investigated some early indications leading from a known
modus operandi to the target one. Hence, through interviews with managers of enterprises
active in the Web services sector, I have been able to reconstitute their discourse not on
their expertise (the actors, reasons and means used within their own enterprise), but on the
things they don’t master, the things judged as original. This discourse provided me with an
entry point to my ﬁeld regarding the actor and his means, namely the “developer” and the
“Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)”.
Then, considering the actor known (the developer), I joined the action of developers,
exploring its reasons and means. For that, I used an “observant participation” method,
consisting in participating in the ﬁeld challenges as an actor, while investigating the action
norms followed in the ﬁeld. The speciﬁc case studied was an “ad hoc” collective action,
consisting in the development of a Web site for the merchandise of applications, created
during a “Hackathon” event, in Silicon Valley. There, I observed that developers used both
open source devices and APIs (provided by enterprises) to create their own service, while the
reasons for this creation appeared to be both use-related and commercial, being thus placed
in-between the user and the manufacturer innovation models.
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Afterwards, I considered the speciﬁc means used as known (the APIs) and explored the
underpinning actors and the reasons of their use. For that, I studied the “Cookbooks”
describing how to use APIs for Web development. By comparing these action norms to the
ones outlined by von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006) regarding the “private-collective”
and the “private-investment” models, I identiﬁed three actor-ﬁgures: the User-Developer
(UD), the User-Developer-Entrepreneur (UDE) and the Developer-Entrepreneur (DE).
Finally, considering the speciﬁc reason known (own application commercialisation), I
investigated the actor and the means. By using a “known reason story identiﬁcation” method,
I studied the case of an application developed by an eBay user (a seller) for his own use,
and then commercialised towards other users (sellers). I concluded with the proposal for
a “personal investment” model, according to which UDEs make use of both lead user and
manufacturer’s “sticky information” (von Hippel, 2005), initially innovating for their own
use, while not “freely revealing” (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) their innovations later.
19.2.2 Part II: conditions of appearance and effects
Part II used a “problematization” methodology, consisting in examining the originality of
phenomenon, its conditions of appearance and its eﬀects. More speciﬁcally, the modus
operandi of Web-application development has been the criterion for the re-examination of the
history of three industrial settings, namely the enterprise computer, the personal computer
and the radio ones.
More speciﬁcally, I used the elements of the Web-based application phenomenon (its
actors, reasons and means) as a lens for the reading of the emergence of those industries
and I found common patterns in what regards the action of UDs, UDEs and DEs, the means
they have at their disposal and the reasons why they act.
This study was based on well-known historical works, while some use of original texts was
also required for the further exploration of topics not speciﬁcally highlighted by historians.
It has allowed the positioning of the modus operandi in industrial dynamics, as compared to
the user innovation proposal (von Hippel, 2005), the innovation diﬀusion model of Rogers
(2003) and the disruption approach (Christensen et al., 1998).
19.2.3 Part III: phenomenon exploitation
Finally, in Part III, I explored the conditions for the phenomenon exploitation. The methods
I used were “observant participation” and “interaction monument analysis”.
Initially, using an observant participation approach, I explored the conversational settings
of the UDEs themselves, useful to them for the exploration of the possibility of new networks
and communities emergence, also being “inﬁltrated” by the enterprises of the domain. In-
teraction monuments of these settings were used as complementary data to further explore
the phenomenon.
Then, I continued using the observant participation approach to join an UDE action
aiming to the exploration of the potential of a speciﬁc technology, also completing my
observation material with interaction monuments analysis. I identiﬁed thus one way for
enterprises to exploit UDE action for their own service potential exploration.
Finally, I studied one of the means that enterprises possess for developer support, forums,
based on an interaction monuments analysis. I concluded with one of the actors that should
be part of an enterprise exploiting UDE action, the “curator”.
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19.3 Contribution
The contributions of this study come from the exploration of the Web-based application
modus operandi, its positioning in relationship to the literature on industrial development,
as well as in relationship to other industrial settings and the proposition of methods privileging
the harnessing of its beneﬁts. The methods used, while often designed for the exploration
of my speciﬁc problem in a speciﬁc ﬁeld, could also be tried out in diﬀerent settings.
19.3.1 On the configuration of the Web-based application
development modus operandi
The current thesis original contribution lies in the exploration of a ﬁeld which admittedly has
a major importance for business, Web-based application development, though has not been
previously addressed as such by business scholars.
Many business-related disciplines have studied Web services, though all adopting a use
perspective. Scholars have stressed the strategical importance of having many end-users
- network externalities - (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and
Tirole, 2003, 2004; Parker and Alstyne, 2005; Eisenmann et al., 2006, and others), though
this dimension is generic to networked system and not speciﬁc to Web services. Within the
market approach, Web services have also been studied as settings allowing the reduction
of information and transaction costs for its end-users, both buyers and sellers, (Wallis and
North, 1986; Choudhury et al., 1998; Brousseau and Chaves, 2004; Christensen et al., 2005;
Baldwin, 2008, and others), though this possibility is met every time a new communication
system appears. Management scholars have pointed out the diﬃculties met by enterprises
implementing such settings for internal or external use, where the problem is traced on
the use, namely the new expression possibilities given to employees and their implications,
amongst others, in roles attribution (Fredberg, 2009; Haeﬂiger et al., 2011; Sutanto et al.,
2011; Burger-Helmchen and Cohendet, 2011, and others). Sociologists have explored the
use of such settings at an end-user level, proposing that their use value lies in the process of
personal identity expression and formation (Cardon and Delaunay-Téterel, 2006a; Cardon,
2008; Beuscart et al., 2009, and others). Still, no understanding of the development process
of the services studied is provided by those studies.
The exploration of Web-based application development has revealed a modus operandi
which is diﬀerent from both user and manufacturer innovation paradigms (Raasch and von
Hippel, 2012; von Hippel, 2005). In respect to the actor, I identiﬁed three conﬁgurations
of developers: the user-developer (UD), the user-developer-entrepreneur (UDE) and the
developer-entrepreneur (DE). Unlike the well-known case of open source software (OSS)
development (von Krogh et al., 2003a,b; Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; Auray, 2004; Benkeltoum,
2008, and others), the actors of this modus are not limited to the use of OSS: they also
have at their disposal an “innovation palette”, a set of devices (Application Programming
Interfaces) furnished by service providers, for them to innovate. Moreover, these actors
often possess both “user sticky information” and “manufacturer sticky information” (von
Hippel, 1994, 1998). Regarding the reasons for their action, they can be both use-based and
commercial.
More speciﬁcally, UDs can be characterised as “skilled lead users”, as they use their de-
velopment capabilities and the means available to them to create applications for their own
use. UDEs, have the same starting point with UDs, though they attempt the commercialisa-
tion of their creation, instead of freely revealing it, as the user innovation literature suggests
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(von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003, 2006). Finally, DEs do not innovate for the same reasons
that users do: their action directly targets commercial ends, and thus implies the distancing
of their own personal preferences and their design goals, as the latter are deﬁned by their
projection onto their potential clientele.
19.3.2 On the positioning of a specific modus operandi in
relationship to industrial dynamics
A second contribution lies in the positioning of this innovation modus operandi in industrial
dynamics. While user innovation is positioned before innovation diﬀusion and, thus, before
early adoption (von Hippel, 1975; Churchill et al., 2009; Rogers, 2003), UDEs and DEs mark
the bridge in-between innovation for own use and commercial innovation. However, this
process is not exactly like disruption (Christensen et al., 1998), where a new technology
tries to identify an appropriate market. The study of the appearance of the identiﬁed modus
operandi in the three cases of industrial development has suggested that actors, means and
reasons are mutually transformed, in parallel to the transformation of technologies, uses,
markets, while new enterprise actors are likely to emerge from this process.
The character of this transformation is found to be particular to the phases an industrial
setting undergoes during its emergence. Early materialisations cannot come from “unskilled”
lead users, as an advanced knowledge of new theories and technologies is required to explore
a new potential. In the settings studied, such knowledge came from the intimate circles of
users, developers, entrepreneurs and academics. Then, a market emerges usually through
successful eﬀorts of UDEs, likely to be materialising an old concept before a new one, that
leads to the illustration of the market possibility. Then, until an industrial rationalisation syn-
thesises the technologies, markets and uses explored in some common design rules (Baldwin
and Clark, 2000), proposing a new organisational schema, a technical substrate and a man-
agement philosophy, DEs, enterprises and early adopters co-exists in business environment
characterised by “foggy competition”. DEs are then called to prioritize potential market op-
portunities over their own preferences and to further innovate in order to reach what seems
to be a market potential. Established enterprises also join the market, though most usually
implementing older rationalisation schemas to develop and market the new object.
19.3.3 On the conditions of UDE action use
A third contribution of this study lies in the exploration of ways to exploit UDE activity.
Three settings have been identiﬁed and explored for:
• the creation of the conditions for UDE communities and networks emergence,
• the use of UDE activity by enterprises for their technologies and services potential
exploration and
• the use of UDE activity by enterprises for their technologies and services potential
exploitation.
More speciﬁcally, the study of Barcamps conversational settings has proposed a design for
the deployment and the further research of settings enabling the exploration of the possibility
for the emergence of new communities and networks. The elements of such a design are broad
conversation topics, addressing an emerging issue,open invitation, allowing the participation
381
of new or surprising actors, networking, enabled by the division of participants in small groups,
an intimate ambiance may be created amongst them and common interests may emerge.
Then, the study of the Hackathon that took place in Google’s headquarters has proposed
a design for the deployment and the further research of exploratory settings, based on the
organisation of ephemeral, focussed and distributed development of prototypes making use
of a new potential. Knowledge on the “updated state of the art” owes to be transferred
to participants in order for them to be in a position to explore its potential. Self-selection
and voting methods can be applied for the participants to evaluate themselves the concepts
explored. As suggested by the study of the speciﬁc Hackathon outcomes, participants’
creations are likely to be inﬂuenced by their own personal preferences and their intimate
environment knowledge.
Finally, the study of two developer support forums, that of Facebook and Google Maps
has suggested that, unlike usual problem-solving processes, developer support is not exclu-
sively focussed on problem resolution.
19.3.4 On methodology
To access this rather ﬂuid ﬁeld and be in position to explore my research problem, I used
methods that valued the discourse of the actors on the one hand, and my own involvement
in ephemeral actions or conversations on the other. While the volatile nature of these data
implied a diﬃculty for me to generalise, it allowed me at the same time to seize the challenges
of a very dynamic, though not yet rationalised, ﬁeld, where actors themselves are often unsure
about the “right” methods to use.
The use of diﬀerent research angles (triangulation) allowed me to distinguish and explore
(von Krogh et al., 2012) the modus operandi under study and to eventually propose research
and deployment designs for speciﬁc methods that beneﬁt its harnessing.
“Observant participation” valued my own involvement as a researcher in the ﬁeld chal-
lenges, while the exploratory and ephemeral nature of most ﬁelds themselves contributed in
narrowing the distance between observant and observed.
“Interaction monuments analysis” exploited the fact that Web interaction leaves traces.
Unlike archival study, where an archivist intervenes in a data structure, in this method I
had to design the categories myself, to turn “raw material” into “research data”. This task
was however coherent with an exploratory research perspective, where the categories are to
emerge as a research result.
A “limited problematization” was also required for exploring whether or not the modus
operandi identiﬁed was a Web business particularity. Thus, the use of this modus as a
reference problem for the study of other industrial settings has shown that similar settings
have also appeared elsewhere. This exercise has also shown that the distinction in relation
to the literature (von Krogh et al., 2012) should be completed with the comparison to other
settings, in order to conclude whether or not what appears as a new phenomenon actually
is one: there is also a chance that the object of study is just a dimension of business that
simply has not been paid much attention to by the literature.
19.4 Further research perspectives
My study has focussed on the Web, and in the second Part, it expanded to similar industrial
settings. It would thus be interesting to test the utility of the outcomes of my exploration
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in contrasted industrial settings.
Moreover, regarding the speciﬁc role of UDs, UDEs and DEs, economic research could
explore the “development cost” of their activity. Unlike well-known “entry costs”, and as
Christensen et al. (1998) also notes, often there is no market to enter. Such a cost con-
sideration, should take into account the resources required on an individual level for the
acquisition of the expertise and the means necessary for creative experimentation, as well as
for early materialisation development.
Regarding the speciﬁc means these actors use, FOSS and APIs, being based on previous
research on the open source phenomenon, I did not actually go deep into the categorisation
of these means. Both ﬁelds can be further explored to propose new categories of such means
(possibly in relationship to the diﬀerent actor ﬁgures that use them). Still, such a research
would require a profound understanding of the technical stakes, and thus would better be
undertaken using an inter-disciplinary approach, bringing together both management and
engineering knowledge.
Quantitative research could also use the outcomes of the current study to test and
evaluate the concepts proposed. Thus, surveys examining the use of services by UDs, UDEs
and DEs, according to the distinction made in the ﬁrst part, could possibly provide us with
a conﬁguration of an emerging sector, according to the phases distinguished in Part II.
Quantitative research could also explore the usefulness of the “enterprise-UDE empathy”
concept, and further explore when this empathy should be cultivated and when it should
better be avoided.
In addition, the precise measurement of the speciﬁc market performance of the enter-
prises studied in Part II, could further reﬁne - or question - the comparison of my proposal
as compared to the model of Rogers (1962). This task would also require an interdisci-
plinary approach, this time between management and history disciplines, most importantly
in what regards archival research methods for data on companies that have ceased existing
for decades.
Finally, the empirical use of the notions of collective action (Hatchuel, 2005b) and con-
versation as a meeting point between networks and communities has enabled me to study
ephemeral settings and examine their design, amidst a shifting business environment. How-
ever, the study of the relationship between collective action and conversation may imply
important epistemological questions, being able to provide a basis for further problematiza-
tion.
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Conclusion générale
Problème de départ
Le question posée par la présente étude a été celle du modus operandi du développement des
applications Web comme un phénomène nouveau. L’importance des services Web a déjà été
étudié par plusieurs disciplines au niveau de l’usage : des études en sociologie avaient exploré
l’usage personnel (en mettant l’accent sur les nouvelles possibilités d’expression personnelle
et de communication), des études en gestion avaient exploré l’usage de ces dispositifs au sein
de l’entreprise (en mettant l’accent sur les transformations organisationnelles engendrées par
leur mise en place, tant au niveau interne qu’au niveau externe), des études en marketing
avaient exploré les nouvelles possibilités ouvertes en matière de diﬀusion des messages com-
merciaux (« viral marketing ») et les économistes avaient mis en lumière leur valeur pour des
vendeurs et des acheteurs (externalités de réseaux, réduction des coûts d’information et de
transaction). Cet intérêt académique a suivi la pénétration croissante des services comme
Google, Facebook ou Twitter dans la vie sociale et économique.
Cependant, bien que la diﬀusion des services Web en général ait été mise en valeur par
toutes ces disciplines, le développement même de ces dispositifs restait jusqu’à présent une
aﬀaire « purement » d’ingénierie.
La présente étude a exploré ce champ en adoptant une perspective de développement
d’aﬀaires, utilisant une approche de « phenomenon-based research » (von Krogh et al., 2012).
Une fois la distinction du modus operandi spéciﬁque de ce terrain faite en comparaison à
des modèles synthétisés par Raasch et von Hippel (2012) et par von Hippel et von Krogh
(2003; 2006), la question de savoir si cette spéciﬁcité est particulière au champ étudié ou
non, devrait être également explorée.
Par conséquent, la proposition d’une réponse à ce problème complexe d’identiﬁcation de
l’existence ou pas d’un phénomène nouveau, exigeait une investigation à deux entrées, l’une
concernant le présent, l’autre le passé :
1. Qu’est-ce le développement des applications Web? Répondre à cette question a exigé
la distinction et l’exploration (von Krogh et al., 2012) du modus operandi (acteurs,
moyens et raisons d’action) du développement des applications Web comme comparé à
des modèles connus, à savoir les paradigmes d’innovation par l’usager et par l’industriel
(von Hippel et von Krogh, 2003; 2006, Raasch et von Hippel, 2012). Cet objectif de
recherche a, donc, imposé l’étude des questions suivantes:
(a) Qui développe des applications Web?
(b) Pourquoi il le fait?
(c) Comment il le fait?
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2. Est-ce le modus operandi un phénomène propre au développement des applications
Web? Si non, quand est-ce qu’il apparaît et quels sont ses eﬀets pour l’industrie?
Bien que la réponse à la première question exige l’étude du contexte actuel et spéciﬁque
de ce modus operandi, une réponse à la deuxième question exigeait une prise de distance
historique, la dernière étudiant les conditions de l’émergence de la possibilité de son apparition
(Lefebvre, 2005), et la comparaison avec d’autres approches proches sur le développement
industriel à travers l’innovation (Christensen, 1997; von Hippel, 1977b).
Une fois ces questions répondues, celle de l’exploitation du modus operandi en question
a été exploré, à l’aide des sous-questions suivantes:
1. Comment ses acteurs peuvent-ils émerger aujourd’hui?
2. Comment une entreprise peut-elle exploiter leur action?
Pour explorer ces dernières questions, une clariﬁcation des notions des communautés et des
réseaux, utilisées souvent dans la littérature d’innovation sans discrétion (von Krogh et al.,
2003b; von Hippel, 2007; West et Lakhani, 2008), a été nécessaire. Un cadre d’analyse
plaçant l’action collective (Hatchuel, 2005c) et la conversation entre ces deux notions, m’a
aidé à explorer des dispositifs de conversation et d’action éphémères, contribuant à la con-
ﬁguration des conditions d’exploitation de l’activité des UDEs dans le Web.
Méthodologie utilisée
Les méthodes utilisées au long de cette étude correspondaient à des spéciﬁcités des questions
posées, et faisaient usage d’une stratégie de recherche de phénomène. Dans la Partie I, nous
avons utilisé des méthodes conformes à la distinction et l’exploration du phénomène supposé.
Dans la Partie II, nous avons utilisé des méthodes conformes au besoin de compréhension
des conditions d’apparition du phénomène ainsi que de ses eﬀets dans le monde d’aﬀaires.
Dans la Partie III, les méthodes utilisées étaient conformes à l’objectif de proposition des
manières d’exploiter les eﬀets du phénomène.
Partie I : les méthodes à distinguer et à explorer un phénomène
La première partie a eu comme objectif la distinction et l’exploration des spéciﬁcités du
mode opératoire du développement des applications Web, en se posant les questions de
qui, comment et pourquoi les développe. À ce propos, nous avons utilisé une approche
méthodologique étape-par-étape, en considérant à chaque fois un des éléments (acteur,
moyens, raison) connu pendant que nous explorions les autres deux.
La première étape de notre recherche a étudié quelques indications précoces conduisant
d’un modus operandi connu à un autre, ciblé. Ainsi, par le biais des entretiens d’experts
d’entreprises actives dans le secteur du Web, nous étions en mesure de restituer leur discours,
non pas en ce qui concerne leur expertise propre (les acteurs, leurs raisons et moyens d’action
au sein de leur propre entreprise), mais sur les choses qu’ils ne savaient pas, celles qu’ils
jugeaient eux-mêmes comme originales. Ce discours nous a donné un point d’entrée à notre
champ de recherche concernant l’acteur et ses moyens à étudier, à savoir le « développeur
» et les « Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) ».
Par la suite, tout en considérant l’acteur connu (le « développeur »), nous avons pris
partie à l’action des développeurs, pour explorer leurs raisons et leurs moyens d’action. Pour
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cela, nous avons utilisé une méthode de « participation observante », consistant en notre
propre participation aux enjeux du terrain comme un des acteurs, tout en explorant les normes
d’action y rencontrées. Le cas particulier étudié était une action collective « ad hoc », visant
au développement d’un site Web pour la commercialisation d’applications Web, crée au long
d’un « Hackathon » dans la Silicon Valley. Là, nous avons observé que les développeurs
faisaient usage à la fois des dispositifs open source et des APIs (ces dernières mises à leur
disposition par des fournisseurs des services), aﬁn de créer leur propre service ou application,
tant que les raisons de leurs actions semblaient être à la fois liées à leur propre usage et à
des ﬁns commerciaux, se plaçant alors parmi les modèles d’innovation par l’usager et par
l’entreprise.
Ensuite, nous avons considéré les moyens spéciﬁques utilisés comme étant connus (les
APIs), et nous avons exploré les acteurs sous-jacents et leurs raisons d’action. À ce pro-
pos, nous avons étudié des « livres de cuisine » décrivant comment utiliser des APIs pour
développer des applications Web. En comparant ces normes d’action à celles décrites par
von Hippel et von Krogh (2003; 2006), à savoir les modèles d’investissement privé et le
collectif-privatif, nous avons identiﬁé trois ﬁgures d’acteurs : l’usager-développeur (UD),
l’usager-développeur-entrepreneur (UDE) et le développeur-entrepreneur (DE).
Enﬁn, en considérant la raison connue (la commercialisation de son propre application),
nous avons étudié l’acteur et les moyens de développement. En faisant usage d’une méthode
« d’identiﬁcation d’histoire à raison connue », nous avons étudié le cas du développement
d’une application pour les vendeurs du service eBay, initialement développée pour son propre
usage et commercialisée par la suite. Cette étude a conclu à la proposition d’un modèle
d’innovation par « l’investissement personnel », selon lequel les UDEs utilisent leur savoir
personnel, portant à la fois sur le contexte d’usage et sur la technologie, pour innover.
Partie II : conditions d’apparition et effets du modus operandi
identifié
La deuxième partie a utilisé une méthodologie de « problématisation limitée », visant à exam-
iner l’originalité du mode opératoire identiﬁé, ses conditions d’apparition et ses eﬀets. Plus
précisément, ce modus fut le critère de la relecture de l’histoire des trois cadres industriels,
à savoir celui de l’ordinateur entreprise, celui de l’ordinateur personnel et celui de la radio.
À ce propos, nous avons utilisé les éléments du développement des applications Web (ses
acteurs, leurs moyens et leurs raisons d’action) comme instrument de lecture de l’histoire
de l’émergence de ces trois industries, et nous avons trouvé des points communs en ce qui
concerne l’action des UDs, des UDEs et des DEs, ainsi que parmi les moyens d’action qu’ils
disposaient dans des cas diﬀérents.
Cette étude a été fondée sur des travaux historiques bien connus, bien qu’un recours à
des textes originaux soit parfois exigé, pour approfondir l’exploration des aspects indiqués
par notre instrument de lecture, quoique moins étudiés par les historiens. Ainsi, un position-
nement du modus operandi en question dans la dynamique du développement industriel est
convergé, ayant des caractéristiques diﬀérentes des lectures de l’innovation par l’usager (von
Hippel, 2005) et du dilemme de l’innovateur (Christensen, 1997).
Partie III : conditions d’exploitation du phénomène
Enﬁn, la troisième partie a exploré les conditions d’exploitation du phénomène. Cette étude a
fait usage des méthodes de la « participation observante » et de l’ « analyse des monuments
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d’interaction ».
Tout d’abord, en utilisant une approche de participation observante, nous avons ex-
ploré les dispositifs conversationnels utilisés par les UDEs eux-mêmes, pouvant leur servir
à l’exploration de la possibilité d’émergence de nouvelles communautés ou des nouveaux
réseaux, étant par ailleurs « inﬁltrés » par des entreprises du secteur. Les monuments
d’interaction de ces dispositifs ont été utilisés comme des données supplémentaires à nos
propres observations, pour soutenir une exploration plus approfondie.
Ensuite, nous avons continué notre recherche en utilisant l’approche de la participa-
tion observante pour faire partie d’une action des UDEs, visant à l’exploration du potentiel
d’une technologie spéciﬁque, en complétant également nos observations avec une analyse des
monuments d’interaction. Il en est résulté l’identiﬁcation d’une manière pour les entreprises
d’explorer le potentiel de leurs technologies.
Enﬁn, nous avons étudié un des moyens disposés par les entreprises pour le support des
développeurs, les forums, en faisant usage d’une analyse des monuments d’interaction. Nous
avons conclu cette recherche en proposant un type d’expert qui devrait faire part d’une
entreprise Web, le « curateur ».
Contribution
Les contributions de cette étude viennent de l’exploration du modus operandi du développe-
ment des applications Web, de son positionnement dans la dynamique industrielle, ainsi que
de la conﬁguration des méthodes facilitant son exploitation. La méthodologie utilisée, bien
que conçue pour les objectifs de notre propre recherche, pourrait également être adoptée
pour l’étude des problématiques diﬀérentes dans d’autres champs de recherche.
Sur la configuration du modus operandi du développement des
applications Web
La première contribution de la présente thèse réside dans l’exploration d’un champ d’aﬀaires,
dont l’importance a été largement reconnue par plusieurs disciplines, quoique peu exploré au
delà des aspects d’usage.
Plusieurs disciplines liées à l’étude du monde d’aﬀaires ont étudié le champ des services
Web, en adoptant une perspective d’usage. Des économistes ont souligné l’importance
stratégique pour une entreprise du secteur d’avoir un grand nombre d’usagers, plusieurs
externalités de réseau (Katz et Shapiro, 1985; Caillaud et Jullien, 2003; Rochet et Tirole,
2003; 2004; Parker et Alstyne, 2005; Eisenmann et al., 2006), quoique cette dimension soit
rencontrée dans tous les systèmes en réseau et ne soit pas spéciﬁque aux services Web.
Au sein des approches marchandes, les services Web ont été également étudiés en tant
que dispositifs permettant la réduction des coûts d’information et ceux de transaction pour
leurs usagers ﬁnaux, à la fois acheteurs et vendeurs (Wallis et North, 1986; Choudhury et
al., 1998; Brousseau et Chaves, 2004; Christensen et al., 2005; Baldwin, 2008), quoique
cette possibilité soit soulignée par toutes les études de la même discipline portant sur les
systèmes de communication. Des chercheurs en Gestion ont souligné les diﬃcultés auxquelles
les entreprises font face, lors de la mise en place de tels dispositifs pour usage interne ou
externe, où le problème est identiﬁé à l’usage, notamment sur les nouvelles possibilités
d’expression s’ouvrant pour les employés, et leurs implications dans l’attribution des rôles,
entre autres (Fredberg, 2009; Haeﬂiger et al., 2011; Sutanto et al., 2011; Burger- Helmchen
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et Cohendet, 2011). Des sociologues ont exploré l’usage de tels dispositifs d’un point de vue
d’usager ﬁnal, en aﬃrmant que leur valeur d’usage réside dans le processus de construction
et d’expression de l’identité individuelle (Cardon et Delaunay-Téterel, 2006; Cardon, 2008;
Beuscart et al., 2009). Pourtant, ces études ne suggèrent pas une approche particulière
quant au développement même de ces dispositifs.
L’exploration du développement des applications Web entreprise dans la présente étude,
a révélé un modus operandi distingué à la fois par les modèles d’innovation par l’usager et par
l’entreprise von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006); Raasch and von Hippel (2012). Concer-
nant son acteur, nous en avons conﬁguré trois ﬁgures : l’usager-développeur (UD), l’usager-
développeur-entrepreneur (UDE) et le développeur - entrepreneur (DE). Contrairement au
cas bien étudié de l’open source (von Krogh et al., 2003a,b; Lakhani et von Hippel, 2003;
Auray, 2004; Benkeltoum, 2009), les acteurs en question ne sont pas contraints à l’usage de
l’open source : ils innovent à la base d’une « palette d’innovation », qui leur est fournie à la
fois par des entreprises et par des communautés. En outre, ces acteurs disposent d’un savoir
à la fois de la « user sticky information » et de la « manufacturer sticky information » von
Hippel (1995). Quant aux raisons de leur action, elles sont à la fois liées à l’usage et à la
possibilité d’une commercialisation.
Plus précisément, les UDs peuvent être décrites comme des « lead users compétents
» , car ils utilisent leurs compétences de développement et les moyens disponibles aﬁn de
créer des applications pour leur propre usage. Les UDEs partagent la même démarche
de développement, sauf qu’ils poursuivent la commercialisation de leur application par la
suite, au lieu de la révéler librement, comme le suggérait la littérature sur l’innovation par
les usagers (von Hippel et von Krogh, 2003; 2006). Enﬁn, les DEs n’innovent pas pour
les mêmes raisons que les usagers : leur action vise directement à des ﬁns commerciaux,
fait qui implique une distanciation entre leurs préférences personnelles et leurs objectifs de
conception, car ces derniers sont déﬁnis par leurs projections sur leur clientèle potentielle.
Sur le positionnement du modus operandi identifié dans la
dynamique industrielle
Une deuxième contribution de cette thèse tient au positionnement du mode opératoire iden-
tiﬁé dans la dynamique industrielle. Bien que l’innovation par les usagers soit positionnée
avant la diﬀusion et, donc, son adoption est précoce (von Hippel, 1977b; Churchill et al.,
2009; Rogers, 2003), les UDEs et les DEs créent un pont entre l’innovation pour son propre
usage et l’innovation à des ﬁns commerciaux. Cependant, ce processus n’est pas exactement
une « disruption » (Christensen, 1997), selon laquelle un marché serait à identiﬁer. L’étude
des conditions d’apparition du modus operandi en question dans l’histoire des trois cadres
industriels, a suggéré une transformation mutuelle des acteurs, leurs moyens et leurs raisons
d’action, en parallèle de la transformation des technologies, des marchés et des usages, du-
rant laquelle d’autres acteurs sont susceptibles d’émerger, au delà d’une simple diﬀusion
d’une innovation à un nouveau marché.
Ces transformations sont caractérisées par des conditions bien spéciﬁques. Des matérial-
isations précoces ne peuvent pas être entreprises par des « lead users », à moins qu’ils aient
des compétences de développent assez pointues, tandis qu’un savoir assez avancé sur les
technologies et les théories nouvelles est exigé aﬁn d’être en mesure d’explorer un nouveau
potentiel. Dans les cadres industriels étudiés, ce savoir provenait des cercles intimes des us-
agers, développeurs, entrepreneurs et académiques. Par la suite, un marché émerge souvent
à partir des eﬀorts bien aboutis des UDEs, susceptibles de matérialiser d’abord un concept
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ancien, et révélant un nouveau potentiel de marché. Ensuite, cette activité exploratoire se
poursuivra, lorsque des DEs ainsi que des entreprises exploiteront l’objet en question dans
un marché « brumeux », où l’identité de l’objet produit et vendu restera mal connue. En-
ﬁn, la rationalisation industrielle prend en considération les technologies, les marchés et les
usages explorés auparavant, en les synthétisant dans la proposition des règles de conception
englobantes (Badwin et Clark, 2000) et en concevant un nouveau schéma organisationnel,
une philosophie de gestion et un substrat technique (Hatchuel et Weil, 1992). Une telle
rationalisation est susceptible de dominer l’ensemble du marché, sauf si une matérialisation
précoce qui n’y soit pas englobée ouvre un nouveau cycle.
Sur les conditions d’exploitation de l’action des UDEs
Une troisième contribution de cette étude réside dans l’exploration des méthodes utiles à
l’exploitation de l’action des UDEs. Trois dispositifs ont été conﬁgurés, qui permettent de:
• créer les conditions pour l’émergence des réseaux et des communautés des UDEs,
• donner la possibilité aux entreprises d’utiliser l’action des UDEs aﬁn d’explorer le po-
tentiel de leurs propres services et technologies,
• donner la possibilité aux entreprises d’utiliser l’action des UDEs aﬁn d’exploiter le
potentiel de leurs propres services et technologies.
Plus précisément, l’étude des dispositifs de conversation des Barcamps a conduit à la proposi-
tion d’un ensemble de concepts utiles au déploiement des dispositifs permettant l’exploration
de la possibilité d’émergence de relations informelles favorisant l’innovation. Ces mêmes
concepts pourraient être également utilisés comme base pour un approfondissement de la
recherche sur les dispositifs conversationnels eux-mêmes. Ainsi, des sujets de conversation
vastes, qui visent un thème émergeant, des invitations ouvertes, permettant la participation
de nouveaux acteurs ou d’acteurs surprenants, peuvent devenir des paramètres de conception
et de conduction des dispositifs de conversation, ayant comme objectif de faire du « réseau-
tage », aidé par la division des participants en de petits groupes, ainsi que de privilégier
le développement d’une ambiance intime entre les participants où des intérêts communs
puissent être identiﬁés.
Par la suite, l’étude du Hackathon qui a pris lieu dans les locaux de Google, a abouti
à la proposition d’un design pour le déploiement des dispositifs d’action exploratoire et leur
étude. Dans ce dispositif éphémère, le savoir d’un « état d’art mis à jour » était transmis
aux participants, aﬁn qu’ils puissent explorer le potentiel de la technologie en question. L’
« auto-sélection » des participants aux projets, ainsi qu’un vote pour désigner les meilleurs
projets ont fourni une évaluation des concepts lors même de leur émergence et leur premiers
aboutissements de développement. De plus, comme l’étude de ces projets l’a suggéré, ces
concepts sont susceptibles d’exprimer les préférences personnelles de leurs développeurs,
observation en prendre également en compte dans l’étude et l’organisation de tels dispositifs
exploratoires.
Enﬁn, l’étude de deux forums de support de développeurs, celui de Facebook et celui de
Google Maps, a suggéré que, contrairement aux processus divers de résolution de problèmes
déjà étudiés par la littérature, ils ne visent pas exclusivement à la solution des problèmes.
Cette étude a proposé que l’expertise exigée pour la gestion de ces forums est celui d’un
« curateur », dont l’activité peut être comprise comme agissante sur l’« empathie » entre
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l’entreprise et les UDEs. Cette empathie est mesurée par le partage des problèmes, plutôt
que par leur solution.
Sur la méthodologie
Aﬁn d’accéder à un terrain plutôt ﬂuide, et se mettre en position d’explorer mon problème
de recherche, nous avons utilisé des méthodes qui ont mis en valeur d’une part le discours
des acteurs, de l’autre mon implication propre à des dispositifs d’action et de conversation
éphémères. Bien que la nature instable des données récoltées par ces méthodes impliquait
une diﬃculté de généralisation des résultats supplémentaires, elle m’a permis en même temps
de saisir les enjeux d’un champ très dynamique, quoique pas encore rationalisé, où les acteurs
eux-mêmes doutent souvent des la pertinence des méthodes à suivre.
L’usage des angles de recherche diﬀérents (triangulation), nous a permis de distinguer
et d’explorer (von Krogh et al., 2012) le modus operandi en considération, et ﬁnir par la
proposition des designs de recherche et de déploiement de méthodes spéciﬁques privilégiant
son exploitation.
La méthode de « participation observante », proposant notre implication propre aux
enjeux du terrain, nous a permis d’avoir une observation « dans la genèse » des normes
d’action de ce modus operandi, pendant que la nature éphémère des conﬁgurations étudiées
nous a rendu « inconnu parmi des inconnus », diminuant ainsi la distance entre chercheur et
acteurs du terrain.
La méthode d’« analyse de monuments d’interaction » a exploité le fait que l’interaction
Web laisse des traces (Georges, 2009). Contrairement à l’étude d’archives, où le documen-
taliste intervient dans la structure des données, ma méthode implique que je conçois les
catégories d’information structurantes, aﬁn de transformer le « matériel brut » en des don-
nées de recherche. Néanmoins, cette tâche était compatible avec la perspective exploratoire
de ma recherche, où les catégories sont censées émerger comme résultat de recherche.
Enﬁn, une « problématisation limitée » était également exigée aﬁn d’explorer si mode
opératoire identiﬁé constitue une spéciﬁcité des aﬀaires du Web ou non. Ainsi, l’usage des
éléments de ce modus en tant que problème de référence pour l’étude de l’histoire d’autres
cadres industriels, a montré que des modes similaires ont également existé ailleurs. Cet
exercice a également montré qu’une distinction d’un phénomène étudié en rapport avec la
littérature (von Krogh et al., 2012) devrait être également complétée par une comparaison
avec d’autres cadres, aﬁn de conclure sur l’originalité du phénomène en question : il se peut
également que l’objet d’étude illustre une dimension des aﬀaires, sur laquelle la littérature,
tout simplement, n’avait pas accordé assez d’importance auparavant.
Perspectives de recherche
Notre recherche a été centrée sur le champ du Web et, dans la deuxième partie, son champ a
été élargi à des cadres industriels proches. Il serait donc intéressant de mettre à l’épreuve mes
résultats de recherche en examinant leur validité dans des cadres industriels plus éloignés.
De plus, en ce qui concerne le rôle spéciﬁque des UDs, des UDEs et des DEs, la recherche
économique pourrait explorer le coût de développement à leur échelle. Contrairement à
l’approche « coût d’entrée » qui, comme Christensen (1997) le souligne, exige un marché
(d’entrée) pour qu’elle puisse être considérée, il arrive souvent que ce marché n’existe pas.
Un calcul du coût de développement pour les UDEs devrait tenir compte des ressources
nécessaires au niveau individuel pour l’acquisition des moyens de développement et l’expertise
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correspondante, pour une exploration créative ou pour une matérialisation précoce.
En ce qui concerne les moyens spéciﬁques identiﬁés pour le cas du Web, à savoir le
logiciel open source et les APIs, en faisant usage des études précédentes sur le phénomène
de l’open source, nous n’avons pas poursuivi une catégorisation plus approfondie. Les deux
types de dispositifs peuvent faire objet d’une étude plus approfondie, dessinant leurs grandes
catégories, éventuellement en rapport avec les ﬁgures d’acteur identiﬁés. Il est important
de noter qu’une telle étude exigerait une compréhension approfondie des enjeux techniques
sous-jacents, et, donc, pourrait être menée à bien d’une manière plus rigoureuse en tant
qu’étude interdisciplinaire, en mettant ensemble à la fois du savoir en gestion et du savoir
en ingénierie.
Des études quantitatives pourraient également exploiter les résultats de la présente étude,
aﬁn de tester et d’évaluer les concepts proposés. Ainsi, des enquêtes examinant l’usage des
dispositifs de développement (comme les APIs), par des UDs, des UDEs et des DEs, selon
les grandes lignes identiﬁées dans la première partie, pourraient éventuellement proposer une
conﬁguration d’un secteur émergeant, selon les phases distinguées dans la deuxième partie.
Des études quantitatives pourraient également explorer l’utilité de la notion d’« empathie
» entre entreprise et UDEs, comme indicateur des problèmes partagés au sein d’un processus
collectif, et approfondir sur la proposition d’une règle décrivant les conditions dans lesquelles
elle doit être poursuivie, et les conditions dans lesquelles elle doit être évitée.
De plus, une mesure précise de la performance marchande des entreprises étudiées dans
la deuxième partie, aurait pu aﬃner - ou mettre en question - la comparaison du modèle
proposé par cette étude au modèle de Rogers (1962). Cette tâche exigerait également une
approche interdisciplinaire, cette fois entre des chercheurs en Gestion et des chercheurs en
Histoire, notamment en ce qui concerne l’étude d’archives d’entreprises disparues depuis
plusieurs décennies.
Enﬁn, l’usage empirique des notions de l’action collective (Hatchuel, 2005c) et de la
conversation, comme un point de rencontre entre des réseaux et des communautés, nous
a permis d’étudier des dispositifs d’action et de conversation éphémères, et d’étudier leur
design dans un contexte général d’un environnement d’aﬀaires mobile. Cependant, l’étude
du rapport entre action collective et conversation pourrait conduire à des questionnements
épistémologiques importants, générant les conditions d’une problématisation plus appro-
fondie.
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Appendix A
Auction Street application Design
Analysis
The elementary object of the eBay service is an item. It represents the item to be oﬀered
within the service, that is to be “listed”. All eBay applications serve to act on these items.
Each item listed on eBay is described by an “ID number” (automatically attributed by
the service), a “title”, one or two “categories” characterizing it, a “description”, a “photo”
of the item and by the mode in which it is oﬀered: either by auction,or by direct sale (“buy
now” option). In addition, sellers can use the following additional attributes for their item on
sale: “subtitle”, “3rd category”, “reserve” item option. These latter attributes cost sellers
extra fees. Table A.1 illustreates these Design Parameters (DPs-1) (Suh, 1990).
Auction Street application obtains these information on items by an eBay API, which is
used to extract a list of an item’s transaction history. Subsequently, the application creates
a ﬁle for every item, where additional information about the item are added by the user. The
user is called to complete the following ﬁelds for each item:
• Acquisition information.
• Customer information.
• Shipping information.
• Quantity of items in stock, not yet listed to eBay.
The Acquisition information field includes information related to the way the seller has
acquired the item in question, before using the service. By completing this such information
to a form, the seller adds the following attributes to the item:
• Name of supplier.
• Date of acquisition.
• Type of acquisition.
• Cost.
The Customer information ﬁeld includes the “name”, the “address” and the “email”
of the customer. The user is called to manually copy and paste these informations from
the conﬁrmation email he receives once his item is sold. The Shipping information ﬁeld
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Design Parameters of a listed item in eBay (DPs-1)
Item Title Sub- Categories Item Photo Quan- Price Auction Sale
ID title* 1st 2nd 3rd* Descrip- 1st 2nd* tity Starting Buy it Reserve dura- Date Price
tion Price now* Price* tion
* Extra attributes charged extra fees by eBay.
Table A.1: DPs corresponding to the attributes of an item listed on eBay.
includes the “weight” of the item and its respective “handling fee”. In addition, Auction
Street application provides the possibility to upload extra item photos for free, by using a
third-party server owned by Brown’s company.
These ﬁelds extend the object in question (the item) as well as the services that a seller
can use. These new services include the ability to add extra photos of the item without being
charged extra fees, to manage contacts (customers and suppliers) information, to calculate
proﬁt and loss for the total number of transaction for all items and to print consignment
labels for items to be sent to their buyers.
Table A.2 illustrates the extension of the ﬁnal service the seller gets while using Auction
Street software, in terms of Design Parameters as well as of Functional Requirements (Suh,
1990; Kim et al., 1991).
However, application use is not fully automated. As a consequence end users have to
use three diﬀerent applications in order to use Auction Street:
• Auction Street itself.
• Their email client application, from where they had to copy their contact informations
and paste it in the respective ﬁeld in Auction Street application.
• eBay interface for listing items (either the standard one, either the automated tool
granted by eBay, the TurboLister).
Thus, the user experience is dispersed to diﬀerent applications, as the application user
ows to master diﬀerent interfaces to eventually use it.
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Appendix B
Hackathon projects
Complete list of “pitches” at Google Campout.
Table B.1: List of projects “pitched” during the Campout at Google locals.
Time- Status Team Who Demo Team Team Team Project Deve- Other Your One
stamp # Pitched URL Email members Name Descri- lopers special team sentence
ption needed notes to size introducion
(# and develo- about
skills) pers yourself
8/13/2010
15:56:15
1 Bosco
So
reg.
gtug
@boscoso
.com
Sugar
Race
A Social Network game
that helps children main-
tain their Type I Diabetes
protocol. Racing against
their friends (and other
anonymous users around
the world) by adhering
to blood sugar monitoring
schedule, and following di-
etary & exercise regime,
this game will help incen-
tivize children to take bet-
ter care of themselves.
“1 UI De-
signer 1 Front
End coder
(HTML, CSS,
JavaScript -
particularly
JQTouch,
Sencha, etc)
1 Rails (or
GWT on
AppEngine)
back-end en-
gineer + me
(bit of front
end & bit
of backend,
but no design
skillz)“
4 SF Ruby
Meetup
organizer
8/13/2010
16:11:04
Active 2 alvin
wang
alvin
@cloud-
wizard
.com
Alvin
Wang,
Laura
Klemme,
Kenneth
Ng, An-
nie Zhao,
Paris
Chrysos,
Suyash
Joshi
HTML5
Store
“Iphone and Android store
cost 30%. They need to
pay AT&T, Verizon, etc.
We don’t. The prizes
for this campout are small.
Paypal is oﬀering $10K so
if we use adaptive pay-
ments, we can hit 2 con-
tests for 1 app. “
“Python or
Java for ap-
pengine UI
Javascript.
What pay-
ment models
will we sup-
port¿‘
4 appengine
developer
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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stamp # Pitched URL Email members Name Descri- lopers size you
ption needed
8/13/2010
16:14:05
3 Luca
Can-
dela
togethr
.us
luca.
candela
@gmail.
com
Luca
Candela
, Chris
Cinelli,
Patrik
Chopra,
Jonhnson
Nakano,
James
Williams,
Patrick
Laban,
Jon
McIntosh
Togethr “Did you ever want to do
something out of the blue,
but didn’t know anybody
to do it with? With instant
posse you can 1. create an
event 2. tag it, and de-
cide who can see it (your
friends or the world) 3. de-
ﬁne the radio of where to
look for people (in miles) 4.
deﬁne a minimum number
of participantsOnce there’s
enough people willing to
do what you have in mind,
the system shoots a mes-
sage to all willing par-
ticipants with the contact
info (user can deﬁne what
to share) or the meeting
place and provides direc-
tions based on the cur-
rent location of the partic-
ipant.Simple, easy on-the-
ﬂy event organizer.“
“1 Android
developer
1 PHP de-
veloper 1
Front end
developer“
Experience
with Lat-
itude
would be
a great
advantage
for this
project.
4 Product
Design
Extraordi-
naire
8/13/2010
16:22:13
4 Alex
Ryan
alexander
.j.ryan
@gmail
.com
Chris
Cinelli
QuoteShare “QuoteShare is an app
that I am building which
enables users to collect
and organize their favorite
quotes and share them
with their friends via
social networking apps like
facebook. The idea to
have a place that you can
go to to ﬁnd the perfect
quote when you need it
and to ﬁnd it quickly. The
collection of quotes and
the tagging and rating
is all crowd sourced. It
is implemented using
MySql, Java/Tomcat and
JQuery. I’d like to try
converting it to HTML,
maybe adding mobile,
etc.Voluntaryist Ventures
is the un-company. It is
an organization without
hierarchical power struc-
tures where developers
can self-organize their own
projects and distribute
rewards in a meritocratic
fashion. The mission of
Voluntaryist Ventures is to
relegate the bureaucracy-
laden corporation to the
dustbin of history.“
“MySql Java
Tomcat
JavaScript
JQuery
HTML5
Eclipse mo-
bile“
Open
to new
ideas for
functional
enhance-
ment.
4 Founder
of Vol-
untaryist
Ventures
8/13/2010
16:23:57
Active 5 Jason
Laster
Jason.
Laster.11
@gmail
.com
Patrik
Chopra
Copy and
Paste
Make copy and paste na-
tive to the web. Single
feature app for making se-
lecting similar items on a
page as simple as copy and
paste.
“2 Javascript
guys 1 UI
guy“
Think
refactored
selector-
gadget for
the com-
mon man.
Should be
fun
3 engineer
at Ning
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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8/13/2010
16:28:49
Active 6 Jonathan
Voelm
terratraveler
.mobi
jonvoelm
@gmail
.com
Jonhnson
Nakano
Terra
Traveler
“Design an App that is like
a stripped down mobile
App Facebook (Traveler
Book) that is for travelers.
Users make ““Traveler““
user account proﬁles with
whatever information that
they want to put out there
to the Traveler community
that uses the App. The
App couples location based
Google maps/navigation
and latitude technologies
with chat ““waves““ that
are location based and
also private messaging
when users make a hand-
shake.The App will help
users meet other Travelers
when they are out and
about. Users can share
tips, meet up for drinks,
set up ad-hock events and
group-ups.Join the team to
learn about Monetization.
“
“2 Java devs
Sr.-mid level
(android SDK
familiarity is
““++““) 1
UI dev (an-
droid) 1 Web
dev (HTM-
L/SQL/PHP
etc.)Me -
Designer/Re-
searcher
“
“Since we
will be
developing
an android
app that
pulls data
from a
web-server
develop-
ers with
knowledge
about
getting
android
apps to
pull data
from web-
server
SQL
databases
is a big
plus. Also
knowledge
about
developing
social
web fea-
tures and
wave/pri-
vate
messaging
is sought.
Experi-
ance with
GoogleMaps
App API is
a ““++““
with
Latitude
““+++““.
Experi-
ence with
Facebook
App API is
a ““+““.“
5 Cal Grad
in EECS,
Space Ap-
plication
EEE Parts
Engineer,
mobile
software
architect
8/13/2010
16:53:26
7 Anil
Pat-
tni
info.
wire-
lessapps
@gmail
.com
James
Williams
LifeAlert “This is an alert notiﬁca-
tion system which allows a
phones GPS coordinates to
be attached to a custom
alert and sent to a select
list of contacts at any given
time and it’s triggered by
a users input. Will be de-
veloped as an app for the
android platform. “
“1 JAVA/C-
SS/HTML
for android
app 1 PHP
mid level
for website
backend“
“I’m not
sure if the
coding
languages
mentioned
will be
suﬃcient
to develop
this app,
will need
to discuss
websites
function-
alities to
ﬁgure out
which
languages
and level
of ex-
pertise
would be
appropri-
ate.Twitter
@Wireless-
AppsTK“
3 Founder
& CEO
Wire-
lessApps
Non-proﬁt
smart-
phone
appli-
cation
develop-
ment
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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8/13/2010
16:32:50
Active 8 Bess
Ho
bess.ho
@gmail
.com
Patrick
Laban
Rescue Me “Find out the nearby
hospitals around me using
HTML APIs, HTML5
tags and CSS3: Web
SQL Database, Micro
format, Microdata, Geo
location, Semantic tags,
Web Forms. This will be
deployed to Web Store and
Mobile. I will continue to
build and take this hack
project to enter Health 20
Developer Challenge.“
1 serious
hacker with
experience
in HTML5
& CSS3.
Google Map
and mobile
are bonus.
I’d like
to ﬁnd
a hacker
who would
code 2
hours
without
spending
1 hour
chatting.
Someone
who would
embrace
clean
code and
good en-
gineering
practice.
Someone
is will-
ing to
write pure
HTML5
using
all web
standards.
2 hacker and
cute pie
8/13/2010
16:34:59
Merged
with
33
9 Patrick
La-
ban
laban.
patrick
@gmail
.com
Jon
McIntosh
Better
ways to
trade
items
using
HTML5
“Boiled down, its essen-
tially a new Craigslist. I
plan to create a site for the
trading of physical items
ranging from computers
and apartments to arrang-
ing a ride-share.So how
will it be diﬀerent? Fea-
tures such as auto-event
recognition based on loca-
tion or using the canvas
to manipulate a 3d render
of objects for sell will set
it apart.Hopefully you can
see what I’m aiming for.
Talk to me if you want to
know more about my idea.“
1 - 2 general
web develop-
ers, 1 UI de-
signer
3 I’m a
software
engineer 1
year out
of college
and hop-
ping on to
HTML5.
8/13/2010
16:46:07
10 Jerome
Calvo
jerome
@dream-
face .org
HTML5
widgets
for Dream-
Face
“Use as much HTML5
as possible in DreamFace
(dreamface.org) widget
based plaftorm. Build
an app tbd with team,
thinking of using BART
API (XML live feed) and
display info using as much
HTML5 new features as
possible. JavaScript/J-
Query/JSON knowledge
required as well (or not...).
Presentation optimized
for desktop and mobile
browser if time permit. “
JavaScript,
JQuery (JQ-
Touch if
time permit),
XML/JSON.
3 Frenchman,
serial en-
trepreneur,
technol-
ogist,
percus-
sionist,
Dream-
Face
evangelist
8/13/2010
16:46:14
Active 11 Carlos
Car-
dona
cgcardona
@gmail
.com
Carlos
Cardon,
Dylan
Clen-
dinin,
Mary
Zhu
Real Time
Analytics
We intend to write an an-
alytics tool using websock-
ets and node.js.
Calling all
Javascript
Ninjas!
We are
using
node.js
for the
backend
if anyone
is inter-
ested in
javascript
on the
server.
3 Front
End Web
Devel-
oper from
Santa
Cruz, CA.
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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8/13/2010
16:48:35
12 S.
Sri-
ram
ssriram
@gmail
.com
Shout
shopping
browser
extension
“Build a browser extension
that ﬁlters and logs the
’shopping related’ product
pages and searches that a
user visits. This activ-
ity can than be posted to
Facebook/twitter etc. so
friends can provide input,
vendors can oﬀer deals and
experts can oﬀer advice. “
1 emar-
ketr/busdev/-
social media
guru w/ex-
perience in
the shopping
space
The web
service has
already
been
built. I’m
looking
to build
out the
browser
extension
over this
weekend.
I could
use the
insight of
folks with
emarket-
ing/bus-
dev ex-
perience
in the
shopping
space.
2 Building
a shout
shopping
service,
Founder
565labs.com
8/13/2010
16:55:12
13 Alexander
Smirnov
alsmirnnov
@gmail
.com
Photo
Story
“Then you show your pho-
tos to friends or relatives,
there is always a small
story behind the shot (
who is this guy, how we
got there, what’s happen-
ing and what’s going on
). There are great project
to place photos in inter-
net, or write you story on
blog, but no one let’s to
combine both in convinient
way. The project intended
to create such ““Illustrated
stories““ easy, for any pur-
pose - vacation trip de-
scription, corporate event
report, or just to share
fun from your party with
friends who were missed
there.“
“1 Sr Web
designer 1-2
Java mid
to sr level.
1 content
creator “
“I’ve pre-
pared
project
template
as Mer-
curial
repository,
created
Google
Appengine
account
and de-
ployed
stub there,
so every-
thing is
ready to
start. It
uses Java
Server
faces for
UI, de-
pendency
injection
( Jboss
Weld )
and JPA
for server-
side, and
Maven
as build
system.
Although
I use Java
Server
Faces, I’m
free to
choose
any other
technol-
ogy; it
would be
even more
fun to
learn some
new tricks
during
campout.
“
3 Jboss
Richfaces
and Jboss
Portlet-
bridge
projects
architect,
JSR-314
( Java
Server
Fices ) ex-
pert group
member
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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8/13/2010
17:17:20
Active 14 Peter
Har-
ring-
ton
teamdreadtraders
.appspot
.com
teamdreamtraders
@gmail
.com
Peter
Har-
rington,
Jocelyn
Har-
rington,
Venu-
gopal
Jidigam,
Hoa
Long, P
J Gupta
Day
Trader
Tool
“This project will display
historical data for ﬁnancial
instruments. These could
be stocks, ETFs, etc. The
data will update as time
progresses. Ideally this will
be an app for sale in the
Chrome App Store. De-
pending on the number of
people interested and the
eﬀort put into this project
a number of features can
be added. Some poten-
tial features are: -Pop up
alarms to notify the trader
when a security passes a
certain value -A list of se-
curities, then clicking on
each one will display a
chart -Creative ways to dis-
play the price/volume in-
formation -Synthesized se-
curities: moving averages,
combinations of securities
-A plug-in framework that
allows users to create dif-
ferent ways to view data,
and share these. etc. “
Anyone is
welcome
2 I am a
bad-ass
engineer
8/13/2010
17:23:29
15 Harpreet hsbsitez
@gmail
.com
Slidio An image slideshow with
audio in the background.
Uses CSS3 transitions to
provide interactive experi-
ence. The images are
loaded by dragging and
dropping and the web ap-
plication randomly assigns
transition that will be used
between the switching of
an image and an animation
to run while the image is
shown.
“1
JavaScript 1
HTML5/CSS3“
3 A Web de-
veloper.
8/13/2010
17:28:33
Active 16 Jennifer
Peck
SweetGeo.comjenniferleapeck
@gmail
.com
Rojat
Mahajan,
Rohit
Surve,
Andreas,
Nik
Hodgkin-
son,
David
Phillips,
David
Phillips,
Damien
Patton,
Jennifer,
Peter,
Toby
Morning
SweetGeo “Takes the concept of
LinkedIn, Facebook,
Foursquare, Meetup,
Craigslist and mashes
them together.Check in
to location, post proﬁle
with interests, needs etc.
As people check in, they
can view and post proﬁles,
post ads etc. The person
you you looking for or
person who can help you
might be there person who
just arrived. “
“DB 1 - Ruby
or Python
1 Front end
HTML5/CSS3
“
4
8/13/2010
17:59:55
Active 17 Alex
Hwang
Aykhwang
@gmail
.com
Panini
Raman,
Alex
Hwang,
TBD
Soundweaver HTML- based staﬀ-
oriented composition
tool.
2 HTML,
JS and CSS
savvy devel-
opers
Experience
in music
helpful.
4 Student
who loves
HTML 5!
8/13/2010
18:06:44
Active 18 Siamak
Ashraﬁ
artfx.appspot.combi logica
@gmail
.com
dynamic
memory
Game
“This is a cross between
the Memory Card Game
and TetrisCards drop face
down from the top of the
screen and slide to the
bottom, stacking edge on
edge. The user clicks on
two cards temporarily re-
vealing their faces and if
identical, the pair is re-
moved. The user must
remember the card loca-
tions and ﬁnd matches be-
fore the cards pile to the
top of the screen. The
game ends when one stack
of cards reaches the top. “
“1 Javascript
Sr. 1 HTML
5 Canvas -
SVG Sr. 1
CSS3 Sr.“
I need a lot
of help.
3 computation
biologist
. . . continued in the next page . . .
402
. . . continues from previous page . . .
Time- Status Team Who Demo Team Team Team Project Deve- Notes Team About
stamp # Pitched URL Email members Name Descri- lopers size you
ption needed
8/13/2010
18:06:44
Merged
with
33
19 Siamak
Ashraﬁ
biologica
@gmail
.com
dynamic
memory
Game
“This is a cross between
the Memory Card Game
and TetrisCards drop face
down from the top of the
screen and slide to the
bottom, stacking edge on
edge. The user clicks on
two cards temporarily re-
vealing their faces and if
identical, the pair is re-
moved. The user must
remember the card loca-
tions and ﬁnd matches be-
fore the cards pile to the
top of the screen. The
game ends when one stack
of cards reaches the top. “
“1 Javascript
Sr. 1 HTML
5 Canvas -
SVG Sr. 1
CSS3 Sr.“
I need a lot
of help.
3 computation
biologist
8/13/2010
18:38:21
20 Kyle
B.
Koski
kyle2501
@gmail
.com
Kyle B.
Koski,
Joe
Saunders
Allele In-
teraction
Image File System within
a Social Network. Pack-
aged as Web App and/or a
Chrome Extension and/or
a Bookmarks Bar But-
ton. Integrating the
Google ContactsManager
API, the Tumblr API, the
Vark API, maybe other
APIs too like Wave and
Voice and Earth. Prod-
uct design goals are in User
Experience (Typography &
Colour Theory) and to out-
perform Facebook. Images
uploaded to Tumblr are
tagged to Contacts/Users
via the Google Contacts-
Manager then becomes so-
cialised with the Vark API.
“1.) APIs
2.) AJAX,
Javascript,
XML, PHP,
CSS, HTML
3.) Innova-
tive Thinkers
in Theory
of User
Interaction“
Macintosh
users are a
huge plus.
o.0
5 Independent
Interac-
tion
Designer
from Sun
Valley,
ID with
a family
history
at Apple
Computer.
8/13/2010
18:07:37
21 Henry
Chan
hpychan
@gmail
.com
meal claim “ Create an Android ap-
plication that help Air
Canada ﬂight attendent to
have an accuracy calcula-
tion for their meal pay. “
2 android
java, 1 ui
guru
The java
back-
end has
partially
imple-
mented
in Google
app en-
gine.
3 Software
archi-
tect in
Logitech
8/13/2010
18:31:44
Active 22 Adam
Glick-
man
aglick35
@gmail
.com
Adam
Glickman
Kitlist to
Cloud
“Put the LARGE
(68k viewers) Kitlist (
http://www.kitlist.org ) of
Job postings into a cloud
based list. This can sort
jobs by location, general
type of job, and by oﬀering
company. There can be
fb, twitter posts from this
list too. The list is cur-
rently on Yahoo Groups.
http://www.kitlist.org/
and
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/KITlist-
Tech/ This cloud based
list can have anonymous
mailings to other lists and
RSS posts. Currently the
list is on MySQL. “
Currently
it is on
MySQL.
2 InfoMonger
of Tech-
nology
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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8/13/2010
18:41:21
Active 23 Shahin
Saneine-
jad
ssaneine
@gmail
.com
Vincent
Malm-
rose, Earl
Malm-
rose,
Jake
Malm-
rose,
Kory
Mam-
rose,
Luong
Tam,
Larry Tu
TetriNET “Do you remember
TetriNET, competitive
Tetris from the age of
Webvan and Monica
Lewinsky? Nothing re-
mains but a decade-old
Win32 client and a server
that’s fallen and might
never get up.Let’s make
TetriNET cool again with
HTML5. We’ll draw it
with Canvas and sync
a game across clients
with XMPP. It’ll run on
my Mac, your Ubuntu,
Ballmer’s laptop, and
might even give the
iPad a proper use case
(ﬁnally!).Bonus points
for cool power-up ideas.
Block Bomb, Gravity,
and Blockquake need a
refresh.“
“1 Javascript
dev 1 Jab-
ber/XMPP or
Websockets
dev 1 CSS/UI
designer“
Should
our clients
speak
XMPP
over
BOSH or
a custom
solution
over Web-
sockets?
4 I’m a Data
Analyst
by day, a
hippie de-
veloper by
daydream.
8/13/2010
18:42:15
24 Allen
Barteld
www.
DoUSee.
me
abarteld
@gmail
.com
Allen,
Joseph
Chow,
Nick
Mahilani,
Vivek
Ganes,
Shon
Saoji
DoUSeeMe Temporary Geo location
sharing web app
Interested
in any
location
based
apps.
2 Non-
technical
serial en-
trepreneur
recently
relocated
to Palo
Alto
8/13/2010
18:50:09
25 Gopal
Gopalakr-
ishna
gopal
.gopalakr-
ishna
@gmail
.com
Adhoc so-
cial
Build a app where people
can join based on a topic
that they are interested in
and have a virtual social
meeting
“HTML 5
guru -2 J2EE
“
Developers
who has
experi-
enced in
building
social net-
working
is given
preference
4 Consultant
8/13/2010
19:23:14
26 Gabriel
J
Her-
nan-
dez
webspinner
.gabriel
@gmail
.com
Party Page
Partners
A real time event app that
will hang on top of a
client website allowing the
“host“ to present products
or new information to “in-
vited guests“ in a real time
social atmosphere. Lay-
ers of real time interac-
tion are placed on top of
the branded “party page“
for multiuser chat and host
“announcements“. Join
friends in through existing
social networks.
1 Python Sr.,
1 UI Wiz, 1
JavaScript
Mid, All
should like
html5.
The idea is
to create
an easy to
plug social
event to
a branded
website
using
mostly
web sock-
ets and
dom
manipu-
lations,
some
session
storage
will be
used also.
2 Gabriel is
a Web Ap-
plication
Developer
working
mostly in
Google
Ap-
pEngine
Python
8/13/2010
18:59:34
27 Peter
Lau-
ren-
tis
Pmjlus
@gmail
.com
Trip plan-
ner
An HTML5/android app
for mobile devices that al-
lows the user to program
an itinerary, save it, share it
by link, email, social media
networks, calculate costs,
etc
“1 designer
2 android
developers 1
chrome devel-
oper 1 other
programmers
“
Someone
experi-
enced with
geoloca-
tion
5 Entrepreneur
8/13/2010
19:04:06
28 David
Phillips
davjphillips
@gmail
.com
PeerSonar PeerSonar allows friends
to ﬁnd their friends any-
where. Through geoloca-
tion and googlemaps tech-
nology, two users can pin-
point their locations and
guide their friends to them
in real time. With Peer-
Sonar, you will never get
lost again.
DB, ruby
on rails or
python, ex-
perience with
API, front
end developer
(HTML5,
CSS3,
graphic
design)
4
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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8/13/2010
19:12:45
29 Arup
Ku-
mar
Kabi
arupkumarkabi
@gmail
.com
RashoMonty “Extract Data from Review
websites and display Con-
tent in the form of Web-
sites in tabbed presenta-
tion Use Metadata, Map
info and Tagging inputs
to give user a comparative
analysis.“
“Java(Regular
exp) [Server
side Data
mining] An-
droid UI
Ajax/Chrome
API’s
Chrome/HTML5
exp“
Read the
Movie
sum-
mary of
Rashomon,
if you
have not
seen the
movie..
3 Like to
Program
and Cam-
pout
8/13/2010
19:22:24
Active 30 Chandramouly
Rathi-
nasaba-
bathy
Chrome
Exten-
sion
chandru.
mouly
@gmail
.com
Chandramouly
Rathi-
nasaba-
bathy,
Manoj
Govidas-
samy
html5
Video
Klippr
“html5 video klippr -
chrome extension - con-
tent sharing (facebook,
youtube, twitter)“
2 javascript,
youtube apis
2
8/13/2010
19:40:36
Ryan
Deluc-
chi
bender
@onsrc
.com
ActiveDrive “Active Drive*** Be no-
tiﬁed of traﬃc backups
that lay ahead1.) Recieve
live information about al-
ternate routes2:) Users
can serve as a ““Traf-
ﬁc Enhancer““ for points
and improve traﬃc by fol-
lowing driving instructions
that will actually improve
the traﬃc.“
“1 Front-
End Web
Developer
(JavaScript)
1 Back-End
App Engine
Developer
(Java/Python
- Python
Preferred)“
“Visit the
follow-
ing link
for more
informa-
tion and
to make
more
sugges-
tions:http://www.ietherpad.com/z0ldHHUKKw“
4 Java and
Python
Developer
at Taleo
8/13/2010
19:45:45
31 Guy
Malachi
guymal
@gmail
.com
Will it
work
A system for getting feed-
back about whether an
idea will succeed. You
pitch your idea and other
users give you feedback-
/advice and rating about
your idea.
1 client side,
1 php back-
end developer
4
8/13/2010
19:57:46
Newton
Chan
the1geek
@gmail
.com
Merlin
Finger
Something
magical
Graphics Artist 2 The #1
Geek
8/13/2010
19:59:27
Chris
Lesner
chris
.lesner
@gmail
.com
Extend
Etherpad
Collab-
orative
Editor
“ == What
technologies
are in-
volved? ==
* Javascript
** server side
with Rhino
https://www.mozilla.org/rhino/
** client side
DOM/HTML
manipulation
* scala/-
java/mysql/lin-
ux/etc *
HTML/CSS
GUI person
(AJAX) *
mysql “
3 Open
Tech-
nology
Software
Developer
8/13/2010
21:28:32
Active 33 Joe
Saun-
ders
joe.a
.saun-
ders
@gmail
.com
Joe
Saun-
ders,
Alan Car-
wile, Kyle
Koski,
Jerome
Calvo
DataViz “Dynamic data visualiza-
tion application that al-
lows some level of conﬁg-
urable widgets. For the
system that is feeding the
data there are plugins that
are downloadable. Initial
implementation centeed in
the networkik equipment
space.Blue sky: command
prompt shell, target system
upgrade, etc . . . “
1or 2
javascrip-
t/css/html5
expert
4
8/13/2010
23:06:47
Active 34 Daniel
Buch-
ner
teamarcjs
@gmail
.com
Aaron
Schaar,
Brad
Boswell,
Dan
Buchner,
Jethro
Larson
arc.js “We are making a JS
access layer for the post
message protocol what en-
ables all sorts of x-domain
awesomeness. The JS
access layer’s focus is on
DOM manipulation, open
method discovery, and
solving common x-domain
use-cases.“
4 I PM
stuﬀ and
develop
thangs
. . . continued in the next page . . .
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active 35 miro
be-
ran
http://
green-
plate
.mobi
miro.
beran
@gmail
.com
miro Foreinger Foreinger
active 36 Oksana
Yarem-
chuk
oksana.
yarem-
chuk
@gmail
.com
Oksana
Yarem-
chuk
Pull Pre-
diction
Social game to predict the
markets
End of table
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Forum conversations
C.0.1 New bug: Request for more information
Conversation quotes Other Web page information
Issue name: Issue 4072: Bug: Dragend Event
also trigger Click Event in IE
Issue URL: http://code.google.com/p/gmaps-
api-issues/issues/detail?id=4072
Reported by user960...@gmail.com, Apr 11, 2012
8 people starred this issue and may be notiﬁed
of changes.
Reported by user960...@gmail.com, Apr 11, 2012
I have found that dragend event in Google Map also
trigger the click event in IE. It is OK in Firefox and
Chrome. Open IE/FF/Chrome console and see the re-
sult of this ﬁddle. Any workaround will be appreciated.
http://jsﬁddle.net/ABqMH/8/
Comment 1 by st...@stevehorn.cc, Jul 2, 2012
Duplicated and conﬁrmed this bug.
Comment 2 by project member
lu...@google.com, Jul 4, 2012
Which version(s) of IE does this aﬀect?
Status: NeedsMoreInfo
Comment 3 by ScottFer...@gmail.com, Jul 4,
2012
I see it in version 9.0.8112.16421
Comment 4 by lourol...@gmail.com, Aug 31,
2012
To make this worse : The click event is ﬁred only when
dragging a certain distance. If a marker is only dragged
for a few pixels, no additional click event is ﬁred. Hard
or impossible to ﬁnd a workaround for this. Issue ap-
pears in IE 8 and 9.
Status: NeedsMoreInfo
Owner: —-
ApiType-Javascript3
407
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Type-Defect
C.0.2 New feature: request for more information
Conversation quotes Other Web page information
URL: http://code.google.com/p/gmaps-api-
issues/issues/detail?id=2122
Issue 2122: getBoundsZoomLevel
2 people starred this issue and may be notiﬁed
of changes.
Reported by erich.sc...@gmail.com, Jan 26, 2010
Is it possible to get this functionality back or emulate it
in one way or another. I currently use map.ﬁtBounds(),
but this does often zoom too much. Therefore, I’d like
to limit the maximum zoom increase to e.g. 4 zoom
steps each click. This is easy when I can get the ’opti-
mum’ zoom myself and then use panTo(), setZoom().
It would be cool to be able to pass the destination zoom
level to panTo, and eventually have a smooth zoom in
process.
Thank you.
Comment 1 by erich.sc...@gmail.com, Jan 26,
2010
FWIW, my toy project can be found here:
http://swing.vitavonni.de/dynamic.html
It loads placemarks from a KML ﬁle, aggregates ("clus-
ters", except that it’s so primitive threshold-merging
that I wouldn’t call it clustering) them dependent on
the current zoom level.
The data is pulled from a full-text-indexed xapian
database, with temporal and geographical constraints.
The database is ﬁlled from 25+ Google Calendars pro-
vided by various swing dancing communitys around the
world.
The starting page, http://swing.vitavonni.de/ is basi-
cally the same, but with Maps APIv2, and the data
is included during page load instead of coming from
KML. It does have more features right now: the search
box is working and so is the list view. So if you type
"where:USA" into the search box, you’ll get results for
the US only (not too many yet) (If you do a full text
search for "USA" it might ﬁnd results in Germany, and
then zoom the map there instead of the US, this is
intentional that any hit in Germany takes precedence.
You can see them on the right though. No button to
auto-center the map on them though)
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In the "dynamic" version, clicking on the Munich hat
will zoom all the way in, basically taking you to a zoom
level where it’s not easy to tell where in Munich you
actually are. In the "old" version, I limit the zoom in-
crease, trying to keep the zoom in process more helpful
for the user. This is what I’d like to do with the new
API, too.
Comment 2 by daniel...@google.com, Feb 4,
2010
What are you executing against the map clicking a Mu-
nich hat? Are you calling ﬁtBounds() which kicks oﬀ
the zoom? What if you simply increase the size of your
bounds to minimize the zoom?
Status: NeedsMoreInfo
Comment 3 by erich.sc...@gmail.com, Feb 5,
2010
I have this group of markers, aggregated to a "cluster
marker" (which is the hat). WHen the user clicks the
marker, I essentially want to zoom the map to show all
the markers in this group. So I setup a new LatLng-
Bounds, and add all the marker positions to it. Then
I call ﬁtBounds() on the Map with that bounds. That
works, but it can sometimes take you from a global level
all the way to a street level, without much indication
of where you are. This is why I’d like to limit the zoom
increase.
If you want to try it yourself, you can zoom the map all
the way out. There should be a single marker, showing
some number (of clustered markers) over south-east
china. Clicking on it takes you all the way into street
level of Hong Kong, without much indication to the
user where he went.
Since the markers are clustered dynamically, I do not
have the information that the marker is in China, Hong
Kong, Hong Kong Island; so I cannot easily take the
user these semantic navigation steps down. I’m not
convinced that such a semantic clustering is useful on
every zoom level. Grouping markers into supermarkers
when their icons would overlap is so far working quite
well.
Obviously, increasing the bounds is an option, but by
how much should I increase the bounds to avoid an
overly large zoom - in particular without an option
to query the zoom that would occur with a particular
bounds.
What I essentially had in mind was along the pseudo
code: setZoom( min( getZoomForBounds(), get-
Zoom() + 4 ) )
This was possible with the v2 API.
Comment 4 by erich.sc...@gmail.com, Feb 8,
2010
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FWIW, this is the code I’m now using (via closure,
compiler, so verbose unoptimized code):
/**
* @param {google.maps.Map} map Map
* @param {google.maps.LatLngBounds}
bounds Destination
*/
var smoothZoomMap = function(map,
bounds) {
var is = map.getBounds();
var issize = is.toSpan();
var wantsize = bounds.toSpan();
var delta = Math.min( wantsize.lat()
/ issize.lat(), wantsize.lng() /
issize.lng());
var maxstep=1./4;
if (delta < maxstep) {
var c = bounds.getCenter();
var nlat = Math.max(maxstep *
issize.lat(), wantsize.lat()) /
2;
var nlng = Math.max(maxstep *
issize.lng(), wantsize.lng()) /
2;
bounds = new
google.maps.LatLngBounds(new
google.maps.LatLng(c.lat()-nlat,
c.lng()-nlng), new
google.maps.LatLng(c.lat()+nlat,
c.lng()+nlng));
}
map.fitBounds(bounds);
}
Settings maxstep=1./4 (= 4 fold zoom in = 2 levels?)
will result in animated zoom steps; however that takes
too many clicks in my situation to be useful. 1./16 is
okay to prevent the user from getting lost by too large
zoom increases, while also zooming in with reasonably
few clicks. Otherwise, the zoom steps would often be in
the range of 0.002 to 0.02. In my use cases, 16x zoom
increase seems to be useful, 32x is too much. But that
may vary, some people will prefer 4x to get the zoom
eﬀects.
Comment 5 by daniel...@google.com, May 27,
2010
How would your workaround code look if there was a
getBoundsAtZoomLevel() function?
Comment 6 by thor.mit...@gmail.com, Jun 29,
2010
410
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(No comment was entered for this change.)
Owner: thor.mitchell
Comment 7 by thor.mit...@gmail.com, Jul 1,
2010
(No comment was entered for this change.)
Owner: t...@google.com
Comment 8 by erich.sc...@gmail.com, Jan 12,
2011
@daniel: Instead of computing the bounds-that-might-
ﬁt-my-intended-zoom myself in the "if" statement and
map.ﬁtBounds(), I’d like to do:
---
var curzoom = map.getZoom();
var newzoom =
map.getZoomLevelForBounds(bounds);
map.panTo(center);
map.setZoom(min(curzoom + 4, newzoom));
---
Not sure what the parameters for a "getBoundsAt-
ZoomLevel" would be. What I’m right now doing is
to artiﬁcially increase my bounds to avoid overly big
zoom changes.
Comment 9 by alfonsfr...@gmail.com, Jan 25,
2011
I also need a getBoundsZoomLevel as i need to know
the optimal zoom to display a collection of polygons
whitout changing the actual map zoom
Comment 10 by project member
lu...@google.com, Feb 7, 2011
have you tried setting minZoom on the map?
Comment 11 by erich.sc...@gmail.com, Mar 22,
2011
minZoom as I understand *blocks* certain zoom levels.
I do not want to *prevent* the user from zooming to
this level. If he deliberate clicks on a certain level on
the zoom scale, so be it.
I just want to prevent large unexpected zoom changes
triggered by clicking map markers, since they might
confuse the user. By doing multiple iterations, he could
still zoom all the way in, but this way he’ll still actually
see where he is zooming into.
It’s really all about keeping the zoom *smooth* by pre-
venting *large* changes in the zoom level.
Thank you.
Comment 12 by pholm...@gmail.com, Mar 24,
2011
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This would be useful, another way to possibly solve this
problem is have ﬁtBounds() return the zoom level its
going to use. This way some action can be taken as a
result or not.
In my application I want take action if the zoom level
changed but not if it didn’t change.
Comment 13 by project member
c...@google.com, Mar 18, 2012
> In my application I want take action if the zoom level
changed but not if it didn’t change.
You can use addListenerOnce to do this.
Comment 14 by maft.mor...@gmail.com, Apr 18,
2012
Just seen this thread, but my suggestion was
for a separate ’zoomTo()’ function similar to
panTo(): http://code.google.com/p/gmaps-api-
issues/issues/detail?id=4084
Comment 15 by project member
t...@google.com, Jul 30, 2012
(No comment was entered for this change.)
Owner: k...@google.com
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Quand les utilisateurs créent l’industrie : le cas des applications Web
Résumé : La présente étude explore le problème, curieusement peu étudié en gestion, de l’innovation
dans le développement des applications Web. En partant de la distinction entre innovation par « l’usager »
(U) et innovation par « l’industriel/entrepreneur » (E) et en utilisant une approche de « phenomenon-based
research », elle identiﬁe un troisième acteur, le « développeur » (D), dont l’action se positionne entre les
deux autres. Trois ﬁgures d’acteur sont proposées pour le décrire : celle de l’usager-développeur (UD), de
l’usager-développeur-entrepreneur (UDE) et du développeur-entrepreneur (DE).
Cette grille de lecture (U, D, E) est testée, dans la 2ème Partie, sur le cas de trois industries dont on peut
retracer l’histoire, depuis leur genèse jusqu’à des stades de maturité avancés : l’industrie des radiocommuni-
cations, celle du PC, celle de l’ordinateur d’entreprise. L’importance du rôle joué par l’acteur D identiﬁé se
retrouve dans chacune de ces 3 industries. Les étapes de développement de chacune de ces industries peuvent
être lues comme une suite d’innovations liées à des acteurs diﬀérents - successivement : UDs, UDEs, DEs -
jusqu’à l’étape de proposition de rationalisations par des entreprises (Es) puis d’autonomisation de chacun
trois acteurs U, D, E.
Dans la phase de maturité intermédiaire que connaît le Web où sont déjà apparues des entreprises spéciali-
sées E mais où les développeurs D continuent à exister sous les formes riches de DEs ou d’UDEs, se pose la
question pour les entreprises de savoir comment mobiliser et gérer l’activité de ces développeurs à des ﬁns
d’innovation. Trois formes de gestion sont identiﬁées dans la 3ème Partie. La première méthode consiste à
favoriser l’auto-révélation de ces acteurs. La seconde consiste à mobiliser ces acteurs dans des actions éphé-
mères visant l’exploration du potentiel d’un service donné. La dernière consiste à animer une communauté de
développeurs qui utilisent déjà la technologie de l’entreprise pour les encourager à développer des applications
sur la base de cette technologie.
Mots clés : développement des applications Web, innovation par les usagers, innovation par les
industriels, entrepreneurs, développement industriel, potentiel technologique.
When users create industry: the case of Web-based applications
Abstract: The current study explores the curiously not much studied in management problem of
innovation of contemporary Web-based applications. Starting from the distinction between user (U) and
manufacturer/entrepreneur (E) innovation and using a phenomenon-based research approach, it identiﬁes
a third actor, the developer (D), whose action is found to lie in-between the two. Three actor ﬁgures
are proposed for his description: user-developer (UD), user-developer-entrepreneur (UDE) and developer-
entrepreneur (DE).
This interpretative framework (U, D, E) is tested in the second part on the cases of three industries, where it
enables a tracing of their history, from their birth to their maturity: radio industry, PC industry and enterprise
computer industry. The important role of D actor is identiﬁed in all three settings. Their development phases
can be read as a sequence of innovations related to diﬀerent actors, UDs, UDEs and DEs successively, until
the proposition of a rationalisation by enterprises (Es) and leading to the independence of the three actors,
U, D, E.
During the intermediate maturity phase of the Web, where expert enterprises Es have appeared, yet the de-
velopers Ds remain under the forms of DEs or UDEs, the question posed for enterprises is how to harness their
activity for innovation. Three management modes are identiﬁed in the third part. The ﬁrst method consists
in fostering the self-revelation of these actors. The second consists in harnessing their action using ephemeral
settings for the exploration of the potential of a given service. The last consists in animating a community
of developers already using the enterprise’s technology to encourage them in developing applications on the
basis of this technology.
Keywords: user innovation, manufacturer innovation, entrepreneurs, industrial development, tech-
nological potential.
